Exploring History

for Bilingual Classes S II

From the 20th into the 21st Century

westermann

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Germany and Bloc Confrontation 1945–1963;
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Preface

Exploring History for Bilingual Classes S II is the first history book written entirely in English for German upper-level classes. History teachers have tested the textbook in the classroom. The authors review the most relevant historical developments and provide rich source material for the study of the various themes raised in each chapter.

The book covers the age of imperialism and then concentrates on German history from World War I through the Weimar Republic and National Socialism. The division of Germany and its reunification are presented within the context of the Cold War and globalization. The last chapter deals with European integration in light of the global challenges of climate change, environmental protection, migration, terrorism and modern technology.

The textbook has a clear structure and layout, providing helpful information in separate sections. These include a compendium of historical methods, an English-German glossary, lists of terms for discussion, and an index.

Learning goals

Exploring History helps you to become competent in historical affairs. The survey of past events presents the factual background so that you understand them in historical context. Applying the central historical methods shown here lets you find and express your own assessments and back them up with well-founded historical analysis.

The original English source material presented here widens your horizons beyond national or European views and encourages you to look at problems from new perspectives.

A Note on the Language

The term "bilingual" has various meanings, which sometimes leads to confusion. This textbook avoids the code-switching which occurs when both English and German are used together. Such a "bilingual" approach limits language learning rather than enhancing it. Instead the lessons and classroom discussions here are conducted only in English. Ultimately the goal of these lessons is for you to become so competent in English that you yourself can claim to be bilingual.

The European Union calls for young people to learn at least three languages while at school: their mother-tongue and two foreign languages, one preferably that of a neighbouring country. In an increasingly globalized world, language competency and cultural awareness are essential skills.

Learning history in a foreign language is an important step in adapting to new ways of looking at the past, in overcoming language barriers, and in contributing to better understanding among different peoples and cultures – perhaps the most significant challenge in modern life today.

"The English Paw is Grabbing the World"
French cartoon, 1899

Conquest of Algeria Landing of the French fleet 1830, colour lithography, about 1890

A Group of Herero Starving to Death in the Omaheke Desert
Photograph, about 1904

German East Africa
A German colonial civil servant with his "boys" in Daressalam, photograph, about 1905

Independence Celebration
Troops of the Algerian Liberation Army marching through the streets of Algiers, photograph, 5 July 1962

The Age of Imperialism

On 13 April 2012 Prime Minister David Cameron visited Myanmar, formerly Burma. He was the first Western leader to do so after the Asian country had suffered under a military dictatorship for decades. Cameron met with both the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the reformist President Thein Sein. The visit had a special significance, as Britain had ruled Burma from the nineteenth century until it became independent in 1948. It was one of those events showing that politics as well as daily life are still affected by imperialism, an era we relate with the possession of colonies and the rule over foreign peoples.

Imperialism has been called "perhaps the single most powerful force shaping the world we inhabit" (Norrie MacQueen). This unit considers various facets of imperialism – its genesis, its characteristics and its consequences extending to today. The introductory chapter portrays the age of imperialism generally, while the following chapters deal with specific aspects of imperial rule in Britain, Germany, France and the United States of America. Special emphasis is laid on the lives of the common people – both colonized and colonizers – under colonial rule.

In addition, the age of imperialism led to an increase in competition and military rivalry among European nations. Their altered alliances contributed to the outbreak of the Great War (1914) that marked the beginning of – as some historians claim – a long-lasting "European Civil War".

The final chapter provides a more theoretical approach for a critical discussion of the underlying aspects of imperialism: "Every empire, however, tells itself and the world that it is unlike all other empires, that its mission is not to plunder and control but to educate and liberate" (Edward W. Said). Said's thesis is meant to be a starting point for a deeper analysis of imperialism.

The World in the Age of Imperialism

Going West

It takes slightly more than 48 hours for the „Empire Builder" to travel from Chicago in the American Midwest to Seattle on the Pacific Coast. Apart from attractions like the Mississippi River or the Gassman Coulee Trestle this ride also implies a historical aspect. Passing through seven US states the train travels along major portions of the Lewis and Clark Trail following the footsteps of the early pioneers and the first American cross-country expedition to the Pacific Coast and back (May 1804–September 1806). Along with its scientific goal to study the new territories this expedition was sent out by President Thomas Jefferson to expand the country to the west in order to build a powerful and strong nation between the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean, i. e. lay the foundation of an "empire".

M 1 **"The Empire Builder"**
Lithography, about 1948

Empire Building and Expansion

Building an empire – for a US citizen the term recalls the glorious days of the pioneers who set out to explore and settle new land, risking their lives to push "civilization" further westward to expand their nation. This idea of an empire was to some extent based on the example of the great ancient civilizations such as Greece or Rome. But empire-building especially from a modern European perspective also refers to the age of colonialism in the 16th and 17th century, when European nations like Spain and Portugal acquired new overseas territories in the Americas, and to the age of imperialism in the second half of the 19th century. In fact, expansion is a fundamental component of imperial policy. But as expansion includes conquering or acquiring territories with the people who live there, it also means the political and economic domination of this population.

Imperialism as a Civilizing Mission

There is still another essential element of empire-building. In 1885, the American Protestant clergyman Josiah Strong (1847–1916) published his influential work "Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis", in which he promoted domestic missionary activities in the American West. He was convinced that the "Anglo-Saxon race" (i. e.

"Manifest Destiny": Citizens of the US thought that it was their duty to conquer the territory on the western frontier.

white Protestants) had the duty to impose Christian ideals upon other races and peoples. This sense of mission is not only typical of American empire-building ("*Manifest Destiny*"), but also of European imperial expansion in the 19th century and has served as a means of motivation and justification for all imperial nations. Cecil Rhodes from Great Britain and Carl Peters from Germany used similar and even more radical arguments to imply the superiority of the white race over indigenous peoples in Africa and Asia.

Early Colonialism and the "New Imperialism"

It was not the first time that European nations sought to expand their territories and influence into faraway areas. With the discovery of the Americas in the late 15th century, Spain and Portugal began the process of expansion first. To build their empires these nations exploited the indigenous peoples by means of violent conquest and subjugated them to their economic needs and interests. Native lands were taken and given to European settlers, who used the natives as a workforce. When the Europeans realized that the natives were not suitable for the hard labour on plantations, they established the slave trade at the expense of other peoples. Finally, in the wake of the decline of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, the "new imperialism" replaced the old European

M 2 **"En Chine – Le gâteau des Rois et des Empereurs"**
French cartoon, "Petit Journal", 1898



M 3

colonization. This term is used by many historians to distinguish the new form of 19th century imperialism from the older one and marks the period between 1830 (the beginning of the French expansion in Algeria) and 1946/47 (the end of US-rule in the Philippines and the British in India). There is general agreement that the climax of "new imperialism", also called the "Age of Empire", occurred between 1870 and the end of World War I. This period also includes German imperialism (from 1884 on) and Japanese imperialism in China and Korea (from 1895 on). Indeed, the end of the "Great War" marks the beginning of the age of decolonization.

Is This Distinction Between the Old Colonialism and the New Imperialism Necessary?

First of all, the old colonies, with all their oppression, exploitation and dependence on colonizers, lacked the kind of rule and political infrastructure found later in European possessions of the 19th century, e.g. in Africa or Asia. Nevertheless, the foundation of further colonial developments was laid. Colonies were designed – as mentioned above – precisely for exploitation, providing the colonizing powers with land to settle, raw materials and agrarian products.

Secondly, the global extent and sheer speed of imperial expansion in the 19th century were phenomenal. The number of imperial powers or would-be colonizers had increased dramatically: Great Britain took first place with the most possessions; France, the USA – a colony itself only decades earlier, Germany, Japan and even Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy had acquired new land. The Europeans competed for new

territories especially in Africa ("Scramble for Africa") so that by 1900 the so-called Dark Continent was nearly completely divided up among the European powers.

Colonizers and Indigenous Peoples

As imperialism *per se* seeks to establish an order based on permanent or long-term dependence of the indigenous peoples on their colonizers against their will, the imperial powers were soon forced to defend their rule against the population in their colonies. Thus, the age of empire was not only a time of rivalries among the colonizers but also of conflicts between the natives and the imperial powers. The Herero uprising in German Southwest Africa (now Namibia) is only one example. Britain (the Mahdist Wars 1881–1899) and France (the French occupation of Algeria in 1830, the Algerian War 1955–1962) confronted the same problem.

Imperial Rule

How was it executed? The powers ruled their colonies, dominions or protectorates in different ways, depending on the colonizer, colony or the circumstances of the time. Imperial power was not necessarily linked with the possession of colonies, although most imperial nations (like Britain, France and Germany) had acquired them. The USA, for example, extended its influence to other countries (e.g. Cuba) by creating political and economic dependence and by intervening militarily. In India, Great Britain established a fully organized administration headed by a viceroy with an apparatus of soldiers and public servants who maintained formal rule in cooperation with the population and local princes.

"Exploitation Colonies" and "Colonies of Settlement"

India belonged to a type of colony that historians call exploitation colonies. A small elite of politicians, military personnel and public servants executed rule and maintained control by raising taxes but did not interfere much in the economic system of the colony. Other examples of exploitation colonies were the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), French Indochina (Vietnam) and Nigeria.

A second form, colonies of settlement, relied basically on a large number of foreign settlers who needed political or military support from their mother country. Most of these settlers were farmers interested in gaining as much fertile land as possible, often at the expense of the natives. German Southwest Africa (Namibia), British East Africa (Kenya) and Algeria belonged to this type of colony. However, no matter what type of imperial rule was imposed upon the colony, the colonizers often met with violent resistance that required the *deployment* of troops in order to put down uprisings and restore imperial order.

deployment: use

The age of imperialism was characterized by conflicts involving large numbers of victims on both sides, with long-term psychological implications. These still prevail among the formerly colonized and have a serious impact on relations between developing countries and their former colonizers. Although in the Western imagination imperialism is more an issue of the past than the present, we should be aware that it has shaped and is still shaping the world and its politics, "carving a new economic, cultural and political globalized order" (B. Bush 2006, p. 1).

Imperialism – Definitions and Statistics

M 4 Imperialism

Definition in "The Britannica Concise Encyclopedia":

State policy, practice, or *advocacy* of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other areas. Because imperialism always involves the use of power, often in the form of military force, it is widely considered morally objectionable, and the term accordingly has been used by states to denounce and discredit the foreign policies of their opponents. Imperialism in ancient times is clear in the unending succession of empires in China, western Asia, and the Mediterranean. Between the 15th century and the middle of the 18th, England, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain built empires in the Americas, India and the East Indies. Russia, Italy, Germany, the United States, and Japan became imperial powers in the period from the middle of the 19th century to World War I. The imperial designs of Japan, fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany in the 1930s culminated in the outbreak of World War II. After the war the Soviet Union consolidated its military and political control of the states of eastern Europe. [...] From the early 20th century the U.S. was accused of imperialism for intervening in the affairs of developing countries in order to protect the interests of U.S.-owned international corporations.

www.answers.com/topic/imperialism [Feb 2012].

M 5 Imperialism

A definition by the historian Hans Kohn (1953):

Imperialism, a policy aiming at the formation and maintenance of empires, has been one of the decisive factors in ancient and in modern history. Politically, it represented an attempt to unite several different nationalities or racial groups under one government which, by the extent of its territory and the wealth of its resources, would form a great power. Ideologically, it represented generally an attempt to justify imperial expansion. The origin of empires is to be sought generally in conquest, their maintenance in the exercise of overwhelming power or prestige, their justification in the real or *alleged* superiority of the conquering or imperial group over the conquered or colonial groups.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1953 ed., vol. 12, p. 122.

M 6 The New Imperialism

In his study "Colonialism" Norrie MacQueen, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Dundee, deals with the characteristics of the "New Imperialism" (2007):

What was new about the "new imperialism" of the nineteenth century? In many ways, it could be argued, not all that much. Yes, industrialization altered the economic nature of colonialism. It also changed the social setting in which it was pursued. By opening a technological gap between colonizer and colonized, both the processes and the social relations of colonialism had changed. [...] Mercantilism, after all, had given way to free-trade imperialism without bringing a basic change in how European power was exercised overseas. Colonial powers had gained and lost dominance over the previous four centuries, and the geographical focus of colonization had changed frequently without altering the general tempo of the enterprise. However, the striking feature of the new imperialism was the extent and rapidity of change across all aspects of the colonial *venture*. The sheer pace and range of expansion was breathtaking. In the thirty years before the First World War, an average of around 600,000 square kilometres of the global South was colonized annually by the global North. At the end of this period Europe controlled the major part of the earth's surface. Much of this was acquired through the so-called scramble for Africa. This added the huge landmass of the continent below the Sahara to a colonial *swag-bag* already loaded with the Asian and American possessions taken in earlier centuries. In addition, the new imperialism saw the geographical reach of the colonizers extend much further than previously into the Asia-Pacific region. By 1900 colonial rule had already been imposed on 90 per cent of Africa, more than half of Asia and almost the totality of the South Pacific. More than a quarter of the Americas remained under colonial rule despite the *disintegration* of Spanish and Portuguese power there over the previous century. The other feature of the time was the dramatic growth in the list of would-be colonizers. The narrative from the fifteenth century had been one of the relatively few European colonial powers succeeding each other at the top of an imperial hierarchy. Spain and Portugal gave way to the Netherlands, which in turn gave way to Britain,

which managed to fight off challenges from France. But by the end of the nineteenth century the stage had become very crowded. Moreover dangerously, there was no clear hierarchy among the actors. While Britain remained the largest colonial power in terms of the area of its possessions and the size of its imperial population, rivals *milled around*, challenging both British dominance and each other. The ambitions of the old colonial powers were *reinvigorated* in the second half of the nineteenth century. To varying degrees France, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal all rediscovered their imperial vocations. Portugal in particular inaugurated its Third Empire on the basis of its notionally huge (though barely occupied) African territories. But in addition wholly new players arrived on the scene as well. Germany, Belgium, Italy, Japan and the United States all acquired tropical possessions in the years around the turn of the century.

Norrie MacQueen, Colonialism (Harlow 2007), pp. 23–25.

advocacy: strong public support
alleged: claimed to be true
venture: a new business or activity
swag-bag: (informal) stolen goods
disintegration: (here) fragmentation, decline
to mill around: to move about confusedly in large numbers
to reinvigorate: to stimulate anew

M 7 Percentage of Territories Belonging to the European/US Colonial Powers (1900)

Region	Percentage Controlled
Africa	90.4%
Polynesia	98.9%
Asia	56.5%
Australia	100.0%
Americas	27.2%

Source: Alexander Supan, Die territoriale Entwicklung der Europäischen Kolonien (Gotha 1906), p. 254.

M 8 Population of European Colonies and Dominions in 1912 (in millions)

Great Britain	35.9	France	30.9	Belgium	15.0
Germany	11.2	Portugal	7.4	Italy	1.4

Source: Heinrich Hirschfelder/Wilhelm Nutzinger (ed), Das Kaiserreich 1871–1918, Bamberg 1987, p. 146.

M 9 Regional Manifestations of Globalization: Empires and Control of the "Known" World: The Largest Historical Empires

Empires and Control of the "Known" World		
British Empire	36.6 million km²	1921
Russian Empire	22.8 million km²	1895
Spanish Empire	19 million km²	1790
Qing Empire	12 million km²	1899
French Empire	11.2 million km²	1914
Portuguese Empire	10.4 million km²	1820
American Empire	10 million km²	1908
Ottoman Empire	5.6 million km²	1299–1922
Roman Empire	5.6 million km²	116
German Empire*	3.5 million km²	1914

* As a reference point, the habitable portion of the globe (i.e. excluding Antarctica) extends over roughly 52, 677,000 square miles (136,433,400 km²).

Adapted and abbreviated from: The Largest Historical Empires, in: www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/empires.htm

Tasks

1. Assess the meaning of "New Imperialism" (M6).
2. Make a list of the colonizing states and their colonies in the 19th century. Use text, M3, M7–M9.
3. Interpret the cartoon (M2), following the guidelines under "Working with Pictures and Objects" (p. 319) at the end of this volume.
4. Find traces of imperialism in our modern world (Internet).

The British Empire



M 1 **"The Four Feathers"**
Film-Poster, 2002

With the huge size of the British Empire and the complexity of imperial rule it seems advisable to focus on those aspects that can serve as case studies for more general conclusions:

- the Sudan and the Mahdist War
- India and the variety of British imperial rule
- Cecil Rhodes and the ideology of imperialism

The Mahdist War and Conflicts in the Colonies

In 2002 the Australian actor Heath Ledger starred in the film "The Four Feathers" as a young British officer in Sudan during the Mahdist War, a conflict at intervals between 1884/1885 (the Siege of Khartoum) and 1896 (the Battle of Omdurman) that, apart from the atrocities committed on both sides, cost the lives of altogether 41,000 people.

The Mahdist War is representative of many other armed conflicts that Great Britain fought against the indigenous peoples under her rule. Members of the British administration were often seen as foreign usurpers and regarded with suspicion, anger, hostility and even hatred, an attitude that was deeply rooted and nourished in the soil of imperial rule. This included real acts of terrorism against chosen representatives of the British government, among them Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India (1910–1916), who became the target of several assassination attempts, although he supported better relations between the British administration and Indian leaders, above all Mahatma Gandhi.

M 2 **British Colonial Wars**

1857–1858	The Sepoy Rebellion in India
1879	Massacre of the British mission in Kabul. British soldiers have to restore colonial order and prestige. War against the Zulu uprising in South Africa
1881	The First Anglo-Boer War: The Boers in the Transvaal declare their independence and destroy a small British force at the Battle of Majuba Hill.
1882	British invading forces defeat Colonel Arabi and his army after he has demanded "Egypt for the Egyptians". Beginning of the Mahdist War
1899–1902	South African War (second Anglo-Boer War): a war between the Boers in the South African province of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal against the British army that ends with the defeat of the Boers. The Peace of Vereeniging turns the Boer republics into parts of the British Empire.
1900	The Boxer Rising leads to the invasion of allied forces after the murder of a German official and of thousands of Chinese Christians by a secret society called "The Fists of the Righteous Harmony" who fight against foreign involvement and influence in China. Allied troops occupy and *loot* Peking in order to put down the rebellion.

to loot: to plunder and steal

In his Chrystal Palace speech Disraeli attempted to rally the working classes behind the conservative cause:
"[The working classes] are proud of belonging to a great country, and wish to maintain its greatness; they are proud of belonging to an Imperial country and are resolved to maintain [...] their empire; they believe on the whole that the greatness and the empire of England are to be attributed to the ancient institutions of the land."

New Imperial Policy

By 1900 the British Empire had become the largest empire in world history, so that nearly one quarter of global dry land was in British possession. However, before the 1870s many British politicians had favoured a "Little England", a Britain separated from its colonies to save the costs of governing them. Yet between 1874 and 1900 the British Empire grew by another 90 million people and 4 million square miles.

This policy reversal was inspired by a speech of the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli at London's Crystal Palace in 1872, when he proclaimed his vision of imperial power and greatness. Until then the centre of colonial strength had been India, "the jewel in the crown of the British Empire", the overseas base for Britain's business and

trade. The most vital link to India was the recently completed Suez Canal – a strategic point of control run by a Franco-British company. It was called "the principal highway to India, Ceylon, the Straits and the British Burma".

When the Khedive of Egypt went bankrupt in 1875, Disraeli rushed to buy Suez Canal shares, before the French government could do so. This ensured the security of British trade with India but also triggered British involvement in Egypt, the Middle East and Africa. It raised tensions with other European nations like France and later Germany: "The biggest game of Monopoly in history was about to begin" (N. Ferguson 2004, p. 233).

M 3 **Suez Canal**
Turkish Paddle Steamer in the Suez Canal, coloured drawing by Edouard Riou, about 1870

to subjugate: to force people to obey, to oppress
paramountcy: (here) supremacy

India and the Variety of British Imperial Rule

India was the most valuable part of the British Empire. After the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 the East India Company, which from the mid-18th century onwards had acquired vast Indian possessions, lost its responsibility for the continent and the government of Queen Victoria took over. This development found its climax when the Queen was crowned Empress of India in a pompous ceremony in 1877, her rule represented by a viceroy. Instead of *subjugating* more Indian princely states the British government decided to leave local rulers in office as true vassals and their states under the *paramountcy* of the British Crown. The result was a diversity of imperial rule that made British India a patchwork of different kinds of administration, the British Raj: colonies with their full dependence on London, protectorates, where local rulers had some independence, and dominions with significant freedom. At the end of the 19th century British India consisted of eight provinces administered by either a Governor or Lieutenant-Governor. British rule in India was a mixture of exploitation and support. On the one hand Britain had railway lines built and invested money for the improvement of communication and transport. On the other hand the traditional Indian economy was destroyed as the country increasingly became dependent on goods made of raw materials which came from India but were manufactured in Great Britain and then reimported to India.

The decline in Indian food production led to famines so that the British administration had to help with supplies which became easier with better railway connections. The economic and political dependence on Britain widened the social gap between a very small, wealthy Indian middle class and the extremely poor masses. Resentment of being exploited by foreign rulers led to the surge of Indian nationalism that finally resulted in India's independence in 1947.

M 4 **Empress of India**
Coronation Festivities in Delhi when Queen Victoria became Empress of India, drawing by G. Amato, 1902.

Cecil Rhodes and Imperial Ideology

The ideological basis of British imperialism was the notion of British superiority over the indigenous peoples in the colonized areas. It was promoted and spread by men like James Fitzjames Stephen (1829–1894), Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain (1839–1914), and last, but not least, the most important and notorious protagonist behind British colonization, Cecil Rhodes (1859–1902). After mining diamonds in British Cape Colony in the 1870s and gold in the Transvaal in the 1880s, Rhodes independently annexed a massive territory he called "Rhodesia". He was also committed to building a new railway from Cape

M 5 "Pied Piper of Rhodesia"
Cecil Rhodes as Pied Piper of Hamelin to whom the stupid people bring their money, from: "Punch", 10 May 1899

Town to Cairo in order to dominate African trade. His efforts became an inspiration for other imperialists and led to later claims for British territories such as Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria. His methods of acquiring new land often relied on trickery and *deception* as shown in the case of "Matabeleland" and its King Lo Bengula in 1888. Native chiefs ignorant of the legal issues signed so-called contracts that made them hand over their land to the colonizers for practically nothing. When they later realized the consequences, it was too late – the colonizers had taken over control. Lo Bengula's protest to Queen Victoria was in vain: apart from the British Secretary's advice "not to grant hastily concessions of land [...], but to consider all applications very carefully", the British government was not willing to change the situation.

British Imperialism Coming to an End

However, these deceptive procedures caused pain and humiliation on the side of the natives, who felt forced to fight against the injustice of foreign rule and occupation with all the means at hand. So in the long run Britain and the other imperial powers eventually had to give up their territories.

The First World War marked the *heyday* as well as the end of the age of imperialism. At war's end German and Ottoman territories were distributed among the British and French. At the same time the principle of national self-determination gained support in international law. The age of decolonization took a long time, gaining speed only after World War II, especially in the 1960s when British Prime Minister Macmillan talked about the "wind of change". The Empire itself was transformed into the Commonwealth of Nations in the 1920s, when the dominions were given equal status to the motherland. Further changes occurred after 1945, when most of the colonies gaining independence joined. Finally, in 1997, the last important British colony Hong Kong was given back to China, a ceremony that Prince Charles called "the end of Empire".

deception: the act of telling sth. that is not true
heyday: climax, period of greatest success

The Battle of Omdurman, 2 September 1898

M 6 A Comment

The British historian Niall Ferguson on the final stage of the Mahdist War focusing on the events at the Sudanese town of Omdurman (2004):

What happened in the Sudan on 2 September 1898 was the zenith of late Victorian imperialism, the *apogee* of the generation that regarded world domination as a racial *prerogative*. The Battle of Omdurman *pitted* an army of desert tribesmen against the full military might of the biggest empire in world history – for, unlike the earlier and privately funded wars waged in southern and western Africa, this was official. In a single battle, at least 10,000 enemies of the Empire were annihilated, despite a huge numerical advantage on their side. [...] Omdurman was the *acme* of imperial overkill. [...]

Since the early 1880s the Sudan had been the scene of a full-blown religious revolution. A charismatic holy man claiming to be the Mahdi (the "Expected Guide", last in succession of the twelve great imams) had mustered a vast army of dervishes, their heads shaven, their bodies clad in the simple jibbeh, all ready to fight for his strict [...]Islam. Drawing his support from the desert tribes, the Mahdi openly challenged the power of British-occupied Egypt. In 1883 his forces even had the *temerity* to wipe out, to the last man, a 10,000-strong Egyptian army led by Colonel William Hicks, a retired British officer. After an *indignant* press campaign [...] it was decided to send General Charles George Gordon, who had spent six years in Khartoum as the Egyptian Khedive's Governor of "Equatoria" during the 1870s. [...]

Charged with evacuating the Egyptian troops stationed in Khartoum, he set off alone, resolved to do the very opposite and hold the city. He arrived on 18 February 1884, by now determined to "smash up the Mahdi", only to be surrounded, besieged and – nearly a year after his arrival – hacked to pieces. [...] Yet it was thirteen long years before Gordon could be avenged.

The Anglo-Egyptian army that invaded the Sudan in 1898 was led by General Herbert Horatio Kitchener. [...] The thought of avenging Gordon brought out the hard man in Kitchener. [...] As he led his expeditionary force southwards into the desert wastes, he had only one thought: to repay his debt to Gordon with *compound* interest, or rather to make the killers pay it. The Mahdi himself might now be dead; but the sins of the father would be visited on his heir, the Khalifa.

It was at Omdurman on the banks of the Nile that the two civilizations clashed: on one side, a horde of desert-dwelling Islamic fundamentalists; on the other, the well-drilled Christian soldiers of Greater Britain, with their Egyptian and Sudanese auxiliaries. The dervishes, who numbered about 52,000, were spread out across the plain beneath their bright black, green and white flags, forming a line five miles long. Kitchener's men – there were just 20,000 – stood shoulder to shoulder in their family squares, backs to the Nile. Watching from the lines was the 23-year-old Winston Churchill, [...] who [...] had *wangled* his way into Kitchener's expedition as a war correspondent for the Morning Post, a position now regarded as equivalent in status to a cavalry captaincy. [...] Churchill described the inevitable outcome: "The Maxim guns exhausted all the water in their jackets, and several had to be refreshed from the water-bottles of the Cameron Highlanders before they could go on with their deadly work. [...] And all the time out on the plain on the other side bullets were shearing through flesh, smashing and splintering bone; blood spouted from terrible wounds; valiant men were struggling on through a hell of whistling metal, exploding shells, and spurting dust – suffering, despairing, dying ... The charging Dervishes sank down in tangled heaps. The masses in the rear paused, irresolute." It was all over in the space of five hours.

By one estimate, the dervish army suffered close to 95 per cent casualties; at the very least a fifth of their number were killed outright. By contrast, there were fewer than four hundred casualties on the Anglo-Egyptian side, and only forty-eight British soldiers lost their lives.

Niall Ferguson, Empire. How Britain made the modern world (London 2004), pp. 267–272.

apogee: the time when sth. is most successful or effective
prerogative: the right that sb. or a group has
to pit: to make sb. fight
acme: the highest possible standard of sth.
temerity: the confidence to do sth. especially rude or surprising
indignant: angry because of an unfair situation
compound: (here) manifold
to wangle: to get sth. by tricking sb.

Cecil Rhodes and Imperial Ideology

M 7 "Confession of Faith"

Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902) sometimes called "the most imperialist of all imperialists" made a fortune in South Africa out of diamonds and gold. He quickly supported the idea of imperial expansion and became Prime Minister of Cape Colony in 1890 after having formed the British South Africa Company in 1889 and acquired territories. Rhodes originally wrote his "Confession of Faith" on 2 June 1877 in Oxford. Later he made some additions and changes. What follows is the amended statement. The spelling and grammar errors are as in the original:

It often strikes a man to inquire what is the chief good in life; to one the thought comes that it is a happy marriage, to another great wealth, and as each seizes on his idea, for that he more or less works for the rest of his existence. To myself thinking over the same question the wish came to render myself useful to my country. I then asked myself how could I and after reviewing the various methods I have felt that at the present day we are actually limiting our children and perhaps bringing into the world half the human beings we might owing to the lack of country for them to inhabit that if we had retained America there would at this moment be millions more of English living. I contend that we are the finest race in the world and that the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race. Just fancy those parts that are at present inhabited by the most despicable specimens of human beings what an alteration there would be if they were brought under Anglo-Saxon influence, look again at the extra employment a new country added to our dominions gives. I contend that every acre added to our territory means in the future birth to some more of the English race who otherwise would not be brought into existence. Added to this the absorption of the greater portion of the world under our rule simply means the end of all wars, at this moment had we not lost America I believe we could have stopped the Russian-Turkish war by merely refusing money and supplies. Having these ideas what scheme could we think of to forward this object. I look into history and I read the story of the Jesuits I see what they were able to do in a bad cause and I might say under bad leaders. [...] Africa is still lying ready for us it is our duty to take it. It is our duty to seize every opportunity of acquiring more territory and we should keep this one idea steadily before our eyes that more territory simply means more of the Anglo-Saxon race more of the best the most human, most honourable race the world possesses.

www.uoregon.edu/~kimball/Rhodes-Confession.htm [Feb 2012].

THE RHODES COLOSSUS

STRIDING FROM CAPE TOWN TO CAIRO.

M 8 "The Rhodes Colossus"

British cartoon, 1892

George Orwell: Shooting An Elephant (1936)

M 9 "Shooting An Elephant"

The following excerpt throws light on the relationship between British colonizers and "natives" before Burma became a separate self-governing colony in 1937:

In Moulmein, in lower Burma, I was hated by large numbers of people [...].

I was sub-divisional police officer of the town, and in an aimless, petty kind of way anti-European feeling was very bitter. [...] As a police officer I was an obvious target and was *baited* whenever it seemed safe to do so. [...]

One day something happened which in a roundabout way was enlightening. [...] Early one morning the sub-inspector at a police station the other end of the town rang me up on the phone and said that an elephant was ravaging the bazaar. Would I please come and do something about it? I did not know what I could do, but I [...] started out. [...] The Burmese sub-inspector and some Indian constables were waiting for me in the quarter where the elephant had been seen. [...] I sent an orderly to a friend's house nearby to borrow an elephant rifle. [...]

As soon as I saw the elephant I knew with perfect certainty that I ought not to shoot him. It is a serious matter to shoot a working elephant – it is comparable to destroying a huge and costly piece of machinery – and obviously one ought not to do it if it can possibly be avoided. [...] But at that moment I glanced round at the crowd that had followed me. It was an immense crowd, two thousand at the least and growing every minute. [...] I looked at the sea of yellow faces above the garish clothes – faces all happy and excited over this bit of fun, all certain that the elephant was going to be shot. They were watching me as they would watch a conjurer about to perform a trick. They did not like me, but with the magical rifle in my hands I was momentarily worth watching. And suddenly I realized that I should have to shoot the elephant after all. The people expected it of me and I had got to do it; I could feel their two thousand wills pressing me forward, irresistibly. And it was at this moment, as I stood there with the rifle in my hands, that I first grasped the hollowness, the futility of the white man's dominion in the East. Here was I, the white man with his gun, standing in front of the unarmed native crowd – seemingly the leading actor of the piece; but in reality I was only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those yellow faces behind. I perceived in this moment that when the white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys. He becomes a sort of hollow, posing dummy, the conventionalized figure of a *sahib*. For it is the condition of his rule that he shall spend his life in trying to impress the "natives", and so in every crisis he has got to do what the "natives" expect of him. He wears a mask, and his face grows to fit it. I had got to shoot the elephant. I had committed myself to doing it when I sent for the rifle. A sahib has got to act like a sahib; he has got to appear resolute, to know his own mind and do definite things. To come all that way, rifle in hand, with two thousand people marching at my heels, and then to trail feebly away, having done nothing – no, that was impossible. The crowd would laugh at me. And my whole life, every white man's life in the East, was one long struggle not to be laughed at.

www.online-literature.com/orwell/887/ [Feb 2012].

to bait: (here) to provoke
sahib: owner, proprietor

Tasks

1. Characterize the war between the British and the Mahdi's troops (M6).
2. Discuss in class the religious nature of these wars (M6).
3. Analyse Rhodes's attitude towards other races and peoples (M7).
4. Write a critical review of Rhodes's justification of colonization (text, M7).
5. Write your own ending to the story (M9).
6. Analyse the "real nature of imperialism" as shown in the incident (M9).
7. Comment on Orwell's observation of the effect of imperialism on himself (M9).

The Effects of Imperialism – Comprehending Perspectives

M 10 "The Benefits of British Rule for India"

Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917) was an Indian politician who fought for a moderate way towards Indian independence. He is regarded as "the Grand Old Man of India (1871)":

In the Cause of Humanity: Abolition of *suttee* and *infanticide*. [...] Allowing remarriage of Hindu widows, and charitable aid in time of famine. [...] In the Cause of Civilization: Education, both male and female. Though yet only partial, an inestimable blessing as far as it has gone, and leading gradually to the destruction of superstition, and many moral and social evils. *Resuscitation* of India's own noble literature, modified and refined by the enlightenment of the West.

Politically: Peace and order. Freedom of speech and liberty of the press. Higher political knowledge and aspirations. Improvement of government in the native states. Security of life and property. Freedom from oppression caused by the caprice or greed of despotic rulers, and from devastation by war. Equal justice between man and man (sometimes *vitiated* by partiality to Europeans). Services of highly educated administrators, who have achieved the above-mentioned results.

Materially: Loans for railways and irrigation. Development of a few valuable products, such as indigo, tea, coffee, silk, etc. Increase of exports. Telegraphs.

Generally: A slowly growing desire of late to treat India equitably, and as a country held in trust. Good intentions. No nation on the face of the earth has ever had the opportunity of achieving such a glorious work as this.

Dadabhai Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (Bombay 1887), pp. 131–136.

M 11 "A Joke of the Century?"

The text is an article from the Indian newspaper "India Daily":

[The] Church of England has the audacity to call British colonialism in India better than American imperialism in Iraq. It is the biggest joke of the century. Colonialism is colonialism. Imperialism is imperialism. These are simply wrong. It is ridiculous to say murder is a worse crime than rape or vice versa. If you believe Americans are wrong, and then look at the mirror you will find you yourself were equally wrong. The British have no right to call the Bush Administration wrong. [...] It is true that the world with American neo cons and the Islamic extremists is not a place to practice non-violence and Lord Buddha's philosophy. But calling American atrocities worse than that of one's own is just ridiculous. What did the British do in Jaliwalanabag? They killed thousands of unarmed men, women and children after putting them in an enclosed place with no place to escape. They used mortars and machine guns to create the world's worst abuse of human rights. Was Abhu Ghraib bad? Yes, it was. But it was a prison after all. Innocent people were not all of a sudden encircled with the military commandoes and killed with no mercy.

How many Indian women were raped by the British? Go to Kolkata, the Indian capital under British Raj. Go visit Park Street and other central Kolkata regions. You will find a community that still struggles to find its root, its own identity. They are called Anglo-Indians. British *scoundrels* day in and day out mercilessly raped many Indian women. Hundreds of thousands were mercilessly murdered by the British. What [the] British did in Indian Raj was not only abuse of human rights but also complete sin. [...] They got away because Americans made the British understand that it was to UK's own benefits to allow independence of South Asia. They got away because the native Indians are naïve.

At the end what [did] the British do? They divided the country and made sure a lawless nation called Pakistan create *havoc* to India and the world. If you ever ask what was the root cause behind Islamic terrorism, you will find it is the British who created Pakistan just to punish India.

Neena Parikh, Church of England says British Raj in India was an example of caring colonialism compared to American neo-imperialism in Iraq – really – a joke of the century?, 25 Nov. 2007; from: www.indiadaily.com/editorial/18748.asp

suttee: the Hindu custom of burning a wife with the dead body of her husband
infanticide: the crime of killing a baby or a very young child
resuscitation: the act of bringing to life again
to vitiate: to make sth. less effective or legally acceptable
scoundrel: sb. behaving in an unfair or dishonest way
havoc: damage and/or destruction

M 12 "Britain's Imperial Legacy"

The historian Robert Johnson writes (2003):

Readjusting to the United Kingdom was a disorienting experience for some returning imperial and commonwealth workers. [...] Many were disillusioned because "much of what they'd served for seemed to be breaking up". Few stayed on in India after 1947 because of this disillusionment, particularly in the separatism that was "contrary to everything we thought right or possible". There was a mixture of looking forward to seeing friends and families back in Britain, but also a sense of nostalgia, which grew as the years went by. Some found England a strange place as it had changed so much from the schooldays that were their only experience of it. Former Anglo-Indians found it hard to convey what India had meant to them and what their work had been about. They found their fellow Britons uninterested. Moreover, there were insurmountable stereotypical images to contend with. The British Empire was gradually portrayed as an exploitative and immoral episode of history, which had perpetuated poverty, beggary, *squalor*, hunger and filth. [...]

The flow of post-imperial immigrants into Britain was partly the result of post-war economic growth, as in the case of many West Indian migrants; or flight from unrest, such as the Asian refugees from Uganda in the 1960s. However, migration to the British Isles predates the colonial epoch and may be only partly related to the development of a global empire. In fact, migrants from different parts of the empire had been settling in Britain, sometimes temporarily, from the eighteenth century. [...] The scale of the flow prompted the government to pass the Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1962 – limiting the influx of immigrants from former colonies –, in order to absorb and integrate the existing immigrant population.

However, the extent of that integration is debatable since British governments have sought to encourage immigrant minorities to retain their cultural identity, whilst integrating them into British society. [...] The issue degenerated into ideological arguments on racism and national identity, but whilst these disputes were part of the imperial legacy, few references to the empire were made at the time. Indeed, the contemporary far right does not invoke any imperial nostalgia, preferring to play on fears of a greater burden on taxpayers, undercutting jobs through cheap labour and "foreign" colonisation of residential areas. Hostility to foreigners in Britain also has a long and pre-colonial history. [...]

On the receiving end, many Afro-Caribbean and Asian British endure the worst of the racist provocateurs with remarkable stoicism. Inevitably, misunderstanding and suspicion occasionally erupt in a depressing cycle of violence. The early 1980s was a notable *nadir* in this respect, with rioting in London's Notting Hill, Liverpool's Toxteth and St. Paul's in Bristol. In light of the unrest, community leaders and the police made a concerted effort to improve mutual understanding and the annual Notting Hill Carnival is a success story for race relations. However, black and Asian British still feel there is indifference – if not outright hostility – from many whites, which they feel needs to be addressed. [...]

British imperialism has left both former colonisers and colonised with an important legacy. Whilst the imperial epoch is regarded as either an embarassment or a painful and humiliating episode, the lasting influence of contact between Britain and the wider world may be turned to mutual advantage in the end. A closer understanding of each other's culture and history, and a willingness to work for the same values in the Commonwealth, may ultimately prove to be the most precious and valuable outcomes of all.

Robert Johnson, British Imperialism (Basingstoke 2003), pp. 217–219.

squalor: very dirty and unpleasant living and working conditions
nadir: the worst time in so.s life or situation

Tasks

1. Find counter-arguments to Naoroji's positive evaluation of British rule in India (M10).
2. Sum up the essential statements first and then explain the author's view on the British Raj in India (M11).
3. Write a letter to Neena Parikh commenting on her opinion. Include arguments from Naoroji and Robert Johnson (M10–M12).
4. Interpret the term "separatism" (M12, l. 7) in the given context.

Germany and her Colonial Empire

Carl Peters and German East Africa

In the 1990s the citizens of Hannover's Südstadt – after heated and passionate discussions – had the Carl-Peters-Platz renamed Bertha-von-Suttner-Platz after an Austrian novelist and pacifist (1843–1914). Who was the man that caused so much outrage and whose memory was to be wiped out? In simplified terms we might say, Carl Peters was for Germany what Cecil Rhodes was for Britain: a notorious, ambitious, sadistic and enthusiastic imperialist and racist. In November 1884, Peters, the founder of the "Society for German Colonization", arrived on the island of Zanzibar which in those days, due to its trading history and Arabic influence, had a somewhat legendary reputation. Peters did not plan to stay there for long. He travelled on to the East African mainland to purchase territories from local native chiefs by means of trickery (he made them drunk and gave them contracts they did not understand and which they signed blindly); after three weeks he had acquired an area as large as South Germany. On 27 February 1885 Peters – after convincing Bismarck of his colonial plans – received an imperial charter ("Schutzbrief") from the German government. This became the basis for the "German East African Company", another step on his way to the acquisition of a territory that finally was twice as large as Germany – called "German East Africa". At that time the acquisition of land in East Africa and the foundation of colonies were based on private initiative and ambition but were not an official state business. The German government formally took over the colony on 1 January 1891, after German troops had put down a rebellion of indigenous people along East Africa's coastline who had risen up against Peters's and his helpers' brutal regime.

M 1 **German East Africa**
A German colonial civil servant with his "boys" in Daressalam, photograph, about 1905

German Southwest Africa

However, German East Africa was not the worst case among German atrocities against the natives. Carl Peters acted on private initiative and what he did was not necessarily approved of by the German government. But things were different in German Southwest Africa, where German officials committed the first genocide of the 20th century (see next page). In 1883, the Bremen merchant Adolf Lüderitz bought the Bay of Angra Pequena ("Lüderitzbucht") in a land which was soon to be called German Southwest Africa and is now Namibia. In 1884 Lüderitz sought more support from the German government against possible British trading interests. The German Chancellor Bismarck hesitated to meet Lüderitz' demands at first, but after consulting the British government and being assured there were no British claims on the land, he agreed to proclaim a German protectorate over the area.

Bismarck and Colonization

Bismarck had always had a strong aversion to colonies and refused to embark on imperial policy ("Your map of Africa is really quite nice. But my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia, and here [...] is France, and we're in the middle – that's my map of Africa."). So the decision to give state support for Lüderitz was the beginning of German imperialism. Soon German protectorates were proclaimed over Togo (5 July 1884) and Cameroon (14 July 1884). Despite popular

M 2 Building a Railway in Cameroon
Photograph, about 1910

enthusiasm for the possession of overseas territories there was no widespread urge to leave the country and settle in one of the distant and arid colonies. By 1914 only 24,000 Germans lived there, about half of them in German Southwest Africa.

As for imperial colonies, Germany, compared with European nations like Britain and France, was a latecomer. Nevertheless, when German colonialism came to a peak by the end of the 1880s, Germany had gained practically all her overseas territories in Africa and in the Pacific. This was especially remarkable as it happened before Bismarck's dismissal, although he had never been a friend of colonialism. 1899 finally saw the acquisition of the Mariana Islands, the Caroline Islands and German Samoa in the Pacific, which did not contribute much to the size of the German empire. The acquisition of territories and the practice of imperial rule were often based purely on racist feelings of superiority. The indigenous people were regarded as subhuman and savage and were treated as such. Frequent discussions within the German political elite did not really lead to improvement in the relationship between the native majority and the minority of white settlers. They tried to impose their culture, religion and traditions upon the African inhabitants and expected them to adapt to the new rules. In most cases – German imperial rule very much followed the patterns of the other colonizing nations – exploitation and oppression often enough resulted in violent conflicts with suffering and heavy casualties on both sides.

M 3



German Southwest Africa and the Herero Uprising

Such was the situation in German Southwest Africa between the Hereros and the German settlers in 1904. The settlers considered themselves members of a master race and exercised various forms of injustice. They took the Hereros' land without regard for the consequences to the natives. Finally the Hereros rose up against the settlers. It was no coincidence that the uprising occurred during the reign of Emperor William II, who had proclaimed strong imperial ambitions for Germany. On 27 July 1900 he had called upon German soldiers to have no mercy with their Chinese enemy in the so-called

"Hun Speech" that revealed his intrinsic racism and caused national and international indignation. When in 1904 the Hereros, led by Samuel Maharero, started to rebel against German settlers and representatives and killed unarmed civilians, Germany sent troops under the command of General von Trotha. He devised a plan to annihilate all Hereros. After the battle of Waterberg the Hereros – armed, unarmed, men, women and children – were driven into the desert of Omaheke where tens of thousands died of thirst.

The End of Germany's Colonial Empire

Only ten years later the First World War led to the decline of Germany's colonial empire. The Versailles Treaty made Germany give up all her colonies and ended the dreams of a German superpower. Even today the impact of the Herero massacre is perceptible when compensation claims against Germany are made.

M 4

Timeline of German Imperialism

May 1883	Instructed by Lüderitz, Heinrich Vogelsang acquires the Bay of Angra Pequena, later renamed "Lüderitzbucht".
1884	Foundation of the "Society for German Colonization" by Carl Peters
April 1884	German Southwest Africa: the land acquired by the merchant Adolf Lüderitz is granted protection by the German government under Chancellor Bismarck.
July 1884	Togo becomes a German protectorate.
July 1884	Cameroon becomes a German colony.
November 1884	The German flag is hoisted for the first time in German New Guinea.
November 1884–February 1885	German claims on the land of German Southwest Africa are confirmed by the Conference of Berlin.
November 1884	Carl Peters makes contracts for the acquisition of land in East Africa.
January 1885	The German flag is hoisted in Samoa.
February 1885	Carl Peters's acquisitions are granted protection by the German Empire.
September 1885	Foundation of the "German East African Company"
1 July 1890	Germany and Great Britain conclude the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty, returning Heligoland to Germany and setting the borders of German East Africa.
1 January 1891	Germany assumes sovereignty over German East Africa.
11 September 1894	The "Hottentot Uprising" is ended by German troops. Hendrik Witbooi, the leader of the rebellion, surrenders to German imperial rule.
17 February 1900	Samoa becomes an official protectorate of Germany.
June 1900–September 1901	The Boxer Rebellion in China, Emperor William's "Hun Speech" in Bremerhaven on 27 July 1900
January 1904	Beginning of the Herero uprising
August–October 1904	After their defeat at the Battle of Waterberg the Hereros are driven into the Omaheke desert where most them die of thirst. This event is regarded as the first genocide of the 20th century.
July 1905–August 1907	The Maji Maji Rebellion in German East Africa
August 1914	World War I begins.
1919	In the Versailles Treaty Germany loses all her colonies.

M 5 A Comment

The British historian Michael Balfour on the importance of German overseas possessions (1964):

In the interlude, however, Germany had acquired colonial territories some four times as large as herself. Parts of them, and notably S.W. Africa, were capable of white settlement. But they were arid und undeveloped areas; had they not been, someone else would have acquired them earlier. All in all, they proved a sad disappointment, absorbing relatively few men, providing relatively few imports and requiring relatively heavy expenditure. By 1914 there were less than 25,000 Germans in all the colonies taken together, including the armed forces. *Hemp* and phosphates were the only commodities of which they met anything like Germany's full requirements [...] and there is no reason why these could not have been obtained equally cheaply and with considerably less effort from areas not in German possession. Admittedly the colonies were until 1906 mismanaged, but this was not the root of the trouble. In colonial matters the Germans were the victims of much *fallacious* thinking, but the fallacies did not originate with them. We are now becoming able to see how relatively transient Europe's colonial episode was in the nature of things bound to be. But it would be idle to deny that Britain, thanks to her luck and enterprise in leading the way and to the effort and expenditure which she put in, found in her colonies useful markets and sources of cheap supplies to an extent which Germany never did. On the other hand the Germans as persistently underestimated the importance of investment for gaining overseas trade as they overestimated the importance of possessing territory. Had they invested overseas the same proportion of their national income as Britain, they would soon have come to enjoy much the same advantages, although the consequential reduction in home investment might have reduced their competitive power.

When the German colonies did not come up to German expectations, the disillusionment created a suspicion that once again Germany had started too late. And when Germans went on to ask why the process of parcelling out the world should be halted at a moment more favourable to others than to them, it would have required more insight than men then possessed to answer that of course the process would never halt, since history abhors a full-stop as much as nature a vacuum. Certainly only a visionary could have seen in those days that, although the course on which events were moving was destined to weaken Britain, it was not to any State in Europe that the benefit would *accrue*.

Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and his Times (Harmondsworth 1964), pp. 52–55.

hemp: a plant used for making rope
fallacious: based on false information
to accrue to: to be given to



M 6 "The World's Plunderers"
US cartoon by Thomas Nast, 1885

Heroro Uprising in Southwest Africa

M 7 Samuel Maharero

The following letter was written by Samuel Mahahero on 6 March 1904 in reply to a letter from the German Governor Leutwein asking him why he had started the war:

The beginning of the war is not just in this year begun by me, but by the whites, for you know how many Hereros have been killed by white people, especially [by] traders with rifles and [by guards] in prison. And always when I brought the matter to Windhoek, the blood of my people was always valued at no more than a few head of [cattle] [...] The traders increased the trouble in the way that they of their own accord gave my people credit [i. e. loans]. After they had done this they robbed them, going so far as to take away by force, to repay themselves, two or three head of cattle for a debt of one pound sterling. These are the things which have caused the war in this land. And now in these days the white people said to us that you who were at peace with us and had love for us were not here, and they began to say to us: the Governor who loved you has gone to a hard war, he is dead and because he is dead you [Hereros] must also die. They went so far as to kill two Hereros of Chief Tjetjo, even Lieutenant N. began to kill my people in the *gaol*. Ten died and it was said that they died of sickness, but they died by the hands of the labor overseer and by the lash. Eventually Lieutenant N. began to treat me badly and to look for a reason for killing me, so he said: the people of Kambasembi and Uanja are making war. Then he called me to question me. I answered him truthfully "No", but he did not believe me. At last he hid soldiers in boxes in the fort. And he sent for me so that when I came he could shoot me. I did not go; I saw his intentions and so I fled. Thereupon Lieutenant N. sent men with rifles to shoot me. Because of these things I became angry and said: "Now I must kill the white people even if I die. That I should surely die I heard from a white man named X. [...] I am the Chief, Samuel Herero."

www.namibweb.com/germans.htm [Feb 2012].

M 8 Samuel Maharero
Chief of the Herero

M 9 "In The German South African Army"

Gustave Freensen, a soldier in the German army, tells of his experiences in the campaign against the natives in 1904:

We were to surround the enemy in an arc to the north and corner them, just as one runs in a circle and corners a *colt* so that it runs back where the boy is waiting with a halter in his hand. We were to make forced marches with fewer and lighter wagons, which meant smaller and lighter rations, and with less and lighter clothing. We were about three hundred men – marines, sailors, and the home guards, who were leading us.

The troop of old Africans again went on ahead, officers and common soldiers, all mounted. Then came the old major with one officer; then we foot-soldiers in a long, thin line veiled in dust. Here and there in our line were the thirty great Cape wagons loaded with the light field-pieces and each drawn by from ten to twenty-four long-horned oxen, which were driven, with much shouting, by Negroes. On both sides of the way was more or less dense, grayish green thorn-bush, the wood of which is as hard as bone, and which grows to the height of a man, and sometimes twice that height, and has curved thorns as long as one's finger. In such wise and through such country we now traveled day after day and week after week. And day by day and week by week our progress became more painful. For soon came the time when we began to suffer from hunger and want, when the oxen began to fall from exhaustion, and when some of the clumsily rumbling wagons were full of the distress of the wounded or very sick.

When the sun mounted high over us, almost to the zenith, and the sand was scorching, and eyes and throats were burning, the van would halt at a clearing where there ought to have been water, but the water was not always there. Then suffering terribly from thirst, we had to dig holes to see if we could find a little water slowly filtering through. Often it was salt or milky from lime, or smelled vile; and oftener we didn't find even this

miserable, loathsome water, and we had to go on again thirsty, far into the night. If we did find water, we would make a barricade of thorn-bush around us. Then each mess division would get its meager supply of food; a little meat from a freshly killed ox which had fallen exhausted, a little flour, and a little rice. The meat or flour we stirred up in a kettle with the bad water, and set it over the fire, calling it meat soup, or bouillon with rice, or pancakes, which they called "Plinsen." The cooking utensils were cleaned with sand. After that we lay for an hour in the shade of the wagons or of a canvas that had been set up, and then started on again.

Weary and indifferent, we marched on till evening and often into the night, and I don't know that in those weeks we ever sang. The moonlight lay wonderfully pale, like bright spider webs, over the broad, bushy land and the unfamiliar stars gleamed strangely confused and restless. The gun-straps pressed on our shoulders, our feet stumbled in the uneven track, and our thoughts were slow and dull. When we had reached water in the night and had had dealt out to us one or two, or, if it was more plenty, even three cook-pan covers full of the miserable stuff, we were too tired to cook properly. We stirred up together a little of whatever we got and ate it half cooked. We had orders to bring the water to the boiling-point before we took it; but I have seen the officers, and for that matter even the physicians themselves, drink it just as it was. We were too tired and apathetic.

Eva March Tappan, ed., The World's Story, A History of the World in Story, Song and Art (Boston 1914), Vol. III: Egypt, Africa, and Arabia, pp. 465–484.

gaol: a British spelling of jail
colt: a young male horse



M 10 A Group of Herero Starving to Death in the Omaheke Desert
Photograph, about 1904

Tasks

1. Compare and contrast the author's views on German colonialism with British imperial rule (M5).
2. Interpret the cartoon "The World's Plunderer" (M6).
3. Explain why the Herero uprising occurred and discuss whether it was justified (text, M7, M10).
4. Describe the impact of warfare in the colonies on the common soldier (M9).
5. Start an Internet search on the situation of Zimbabwe today and discuss the policy of Zimbabwe's government with regard to her colonial past.
6. Germany has apologized for the Herero massacre but refuses to pay compensation. Discuss this attitude from a political, moral and historical point of view by collecting as much information about Namibia and her inhabitants as possible (Internet).

France and her "Civilizing Mission"

"I looked closely at the cell they had put me into. I should never have imagined or believed that a country like mine, a country like France, the mother of freedom throughout the world, a country that had brought forth the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, could possibly possess an establishment of such barbarous repression as the Saint-Joseph solitary-confinement prison – not even in French Guiana, not even in a pocket-handkerchief-sized island lost in the Atlantic."

The above excerpt taken from Henri Charriere's semi-autobiographical novel "Papillon" deals with a French *convict* who is falsely charged with murder and sent to the penal colony of French Guiana on the east coast of South America. The narrator, partly in solitary *confinement* on islands that are surrounded by *shark infested* waters with strong currents, undergoes the torment of French law enforcement in the 1930s until he finally manages to escape.

The novel not only denounces the inhuman conditions of the French penal system, but also makes the reader aware of the second French colonial empire that began with the invasion of Algeria in 1830. After Algeria France continued to gain more overseas territories. The establishment of control over Mexico from 1861 to 1867 failed, but France was more successful in Cochinchina in 1867 and 1874 and in Cambodia in 1863.

M 1 **Conquest of Algeria**
Landing of the French fleet 1830, colour lithography, about 1890

Timeline: Algeria as a French Colony

M 2

1830	A French invasion army of 37,000 soldiers conquers Algiers and other Algerian coastal towns. France intends to expand her military stations, control coral fishing and stop piracy.
1847	Western and southern expansion of the colony, including parts of the Sahara. Increasing numbers of French settlers establish a modern economy. Indigenous people do not benefit from this economic growth and become increasingly poorer.
1848–1852 and since 1884	The three Algerian coastal departments become part of the French mother country. They no longer have mere colonial status but instead send representatives to the French National Assembly. On the other hand there are no equal rights for the Algerian people.
1914	Indigenous Algerians participate in World War I. Demands for political and legal equality are still not met by the French government.
1954	Algerian War of Independence by the National Front of Liberation (FLN) The French respond to terrorist attacks with massive violence.
1962	Algeria gains independence.

Assimilation and Association

To understand French colonial rule more precisely it is necessary to take a closer look at two concepts: assimilation and association. Assimilation required the adoption of French culture, traditions and beliefs etc. by natives. Association promoted the coexistence of preexisting political structures with the superstructure of empire, joining native chiefs with the French administration in order to reinforce colonial authority. Both types were components of the French idea of the *mission civilatrice*, which meant giving so-called inferior races the blessings of French culture and "providing the inhabitants with some education and regular justice, teaching them the division of labour and the uses of capital when they are ignorant of these things"; in short, assimilating them into the new culture. Jules Ferry, Prime Minister of France twice between 1880 and 1885, justified this policy in saying "the superior races have a right [...] to civilize the inferior races". From the French viewpoint this duty also implied the right of intervention as the indigenous peoples were often regarded as barbarian or savage who longed for aid from civilized nations, even if it had to be achieved by military or other repressive measures. Thus the conquest of Algeria was executed in a war that brought about utter destruction, the killing and mutilating of people, the plundering of cities and the *desecration* of Muslim religious sites. It was the pattern that other colonizing nations, i. e. Great Britain, also relied on to justify their actions with their intellectual and cultural superiority.

convict: prisoner
confinement: restriction of movement, imprisonment
shark infested: full of sharks
desecration: the act of deliberately spoiling sth. holy

French Rule and Settlers in Africa

After colonization had begun, the relationship between the settlers and the colonized people remained strained. Taking part in a civilizing mission gave French settlers ("colons") extraordinary and exclusive rights that put them into a much better position than the Muslim natives, at the same time increasing anger and resentment on the Algerian side. By 1915 only about 50,000 Muslims had the right to



M 3 **Algerian War**
French soldiers search an Algerian, photograph, 20 March 1962.

vote in the civil communes that were dominated by the French settlers who had taken land from the local population by new legislation in the 1870s. This injustice became worse when France passed the *Code de l'indigénat* ("Indigenousness Code") in 1875, which widened the legal gap between Algerians and "colons" by putting further restrictions first on Algerians and later on the native population of other colonies.

The End of the French Empire

However, neither assimilation nor association helped the colonies to survive as French territories in the long run, and after World War II the process of decolonization began. In Indochina and Algeria long and disastrous wars caused casualties and losses that ran to nearly 1.5 million soldiers and civilians. The Algerian War between 1954 and 1962 was waged with massive cruelty on both sides – according to historians 960,000 people were killed. Finally in 1962 Algeria achieved its independence. Today only a few scattered territories in the Pacific and Atlantic have remained and are now parts of the French state.

Yet, the heritage of France's imperial past is still visible today, sometimes in situations that we do not necessarily relate to history. In July 2006 close to the finish of the FIFA World Cup Final, the French player Zinedine Zidane, at that time the world's best player, was insulted by the Italian player Marco Materazzi. Thereupon Zidane attacked Materazzi with a headbutt and was sent off. In all the discussions, analyses, interviews and comments on this incident there was one aspect of Zidane's biography that was never left unmentioned: the fact that he was indeed a French citizen, but that his parents were from Algeria.

M 4 **Independence Celebration**
Troops of the Algerian Liberation Army marching through the streets of Algiers, photograph, 5 July 1962.

M 5 French Imperialism in the 19th Century

The historian James J. Cooke on the basic features of French colonialism (1973):

Imperialism consequently emerged from 1848 as a *tarnished* institution, and under the reign of Napoleon III the situation deteriorated as Napoleon's policy led to a further series of setbacks for France overseas. The French intervention in Indochina in 1859 raised a storm of protest in Paris over the cost, and this prompted Napoleon III to consider a complete withdrawal from the area. [...] Despite the rising protests France would stay in Indochina. [...]

When the empire fell in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, imperialism was clearly in disrepute, as many regarded colonial adventures as the partial cause of the collapse. The troops kept in Algeria, Senegal, and Indochina, they argued, could have helped turn the tide in France in 1870. As doubtful as this seems, it was still true that during the 1870s there were few vocal imperial adherents in France, but by 1880 the picture had changed a great deal. By 1881 a number of activist deputies had been elected to the Chamber, especially from the colonies. [...] They were dedicated to making imperialism popular in their respective districts and in France as a whole, and in the long run they enjoyed a position of respect within the colonial ranks. [...]

The attitude of the French politician Etienne, dedicated to the expansion of the French empire, toward the colonies could be summarised in one sentence: "Every colonial enterprise is a business which must be prudently and practically conducted", and he voiced the colonialists' utilitarian approach to colonialism by saying, "We are not philosophers; we are men of action. [...] We want our colonies to strengthen, extend, and enrich France; we must act and act practically." The drive to make the empire show some tangible value for France was necessary because there always remained in the Chamber forces antagonistic to colonialism. [...] By the turn of the century the Socialists, [...] questioned both the cost and the morality of imperialism.

But many expansionists were not concerned with the lofty concepts of morality. [...] Aspiring to a colonialism that would be productive for France, they had little time for the ideal of assimilation, which was "[...] a spontaneous collaboration and cordiality [between France and the natives]". The native, the anti-assimilationists believed, was the least important element in the French colonial system. The colon, a European settler in a hostile, non-white land, was like the western pioneer in the United States; he became the keystone of French control in the colony. If the French tricolour was to wave continually over a colony, it would have to be supported by the colons and a strong, nearly independent colonial army. Indifferent to the needs and aspirations of the subject peoples, the annexationists considered the white settlers as the producers of raw materials necessary for French industry, and as buyers of French manufactured finished products; the base of neo-mercantilism, as the colonialists saw it, had to be the European colonist. For example, the 200,000 Frenchmen in Algeria [...] became for Eugene Etienne a special cause celebre in the Chamber, and he never tired of telling the Chamber that the colons of Algeria, facing great dangers, were the solid foundation of France's Maghribi empire. [...]

In the 1880s, however, the arguments surrounding the position of the colonial settler as a participant in the industrial expansion of France played a more important role. This certainly appealed to Jules Ferry, who was more inclined to accentuate the position of the colony and the settler vis-a-vis industrialism than the pioneers' possible role in extending the population of Frenchmen in the overseas possessions. Jules Ferry was the leader of the 'Opportunist' block within the Chamber, and, in the colonial sphere, Ferry's policy was simple: temporarily forget the revanche for the defeat in 1870/71 and concentrate on the expansion of empire. [...] Psychologically, colonies would help France forget about the humiliation of 1870. They would provide industrial France with necessary raw materials and eager markets. [...] Ferry's concepts of imperialism and his opposition to a strict policy of revenge before France had reforged a strong nation became the imperialists' philosophy.

James J. Cooke, New French Imperialism 1880–1910 (Newton Abbot 1973), pp. 14–17.

tarnished: (here) ruined, rather bad

French Imperialism Reflected by Historiography

M 6 The Concept of Assimilation

The historian Norrie MacQueen on the background of the French policy of assimilation (2007):

Where the British approach to colonial administration was shaped by variations in the colonial setting, the French one was strongly centralized. Where Britain regarded its empire as fundamentally "apart" from the metropolis (however strong the bonds of culture and sentiment), France took a much more "integrative" view. Its colonies were *France outre-mer* ("overseas France"). Although its tropical territories might not be physically *contiguous* with the metropolis, they were politically, even spiritually, extensions of European France. [...]

The very idea of France would be implanted permanently in its colonies and the prospect of their having a long-term future that was not "French" was rarely considered.

The sources of this mindset lie in great part in French enlightenment thinking, along with a marked and long-standing preference in French political culture for administrative centralism. [...] The French revolutionaries were convinced that their humanist vision was universally applicable – and therefore exportable – to all parts of the world. [...] For France, therefore, the *mission civilatrice* was more specific than the civilizing missions pursued by Britain and the United States. It had to do with the exportation of uniquely French attitudes rather than vaguely defined "progressive" ones. The expression used for this was *rayonnement* – an illumination of the way. [...] It may be, too, that France's geographical position encouraged an integrative philosophy of colonialism. France is an Atlantic power and saw itself as a part of the "advanced" – that is to say northern – European community of nations in the nineteenth century. But it is also a Mediterranean country whose southern waters look directly across to North Africa. The jewels of its colonial crown, most particularly Algeria, may not have been territorially contiguous with metropolitan France, but they had a much closer physical proximity than, say, that between India and Britain. [...]

France's imperial project [...] has to be seen as an extension of European insecurities. Defeat in 1815 led to colonial adventure in Algeria in the 1830s. Humiliation at the hands of Prussia in 1873 was a preliminary to France's headlong plunge into the scramble for West and Equatorial Africa. Colonial expansion provided the stamp of great power status for France [...]. The millions of subject people acquired as a result, provided a blank sheet of humanity on which the superiority of French intellectual and political culture could be inscribed.

The colonial policy that grew from this psychological *loam* was that of assimilation. The political roots of assimilation were to be found in the *crucible* of the French Revolution. Quite admirably taking the principles of human liberty, equality and fraternity to their logical conclusion, the revolutionaries of the 1790s extended full political rights to the peoples of the French colonial possessions of the time. Local representation in the French national legislature and manhood *franchise* were granted to at least the settled populations of the tropical possessions. [...] The *flaw* in this apparently commendable and progressive approach to colonial rule, however, was that it assumed the colonized people were French and that their indigenous cultures were inferior to that of the European metropolis. Although inherently non-racist in its basic suppositions about human potential, it was profoundly racist at the cultural level. [...]

In practice, assimilation was a philosophy often more honoured in the *breach* than in the observance. In periods of conservative rule in France (that is, for much of the nineteenth and twentieth century), the citizenship rights of the colonized were usually ignored. Achieving the status of assimilated citizen in the first place became subject to all sorts of economic and educational barriers that were set unrealistically high. The rigid centralization that was an essential part of the assimilation policy did not vary, however, and French rule usually *loomed* heavily and brutally over the colonies.

Norrie MacQueen, Colonialism (Harlow 2007), pp. 80–84.

contiguous: next to each other
loam: soil especially good for plants to grow in
crucible: melting pot
franchise: (here) the right to vote
flaw: a fault in sth. that makes it useless
breach: failure to follow a law or rule
to loom: to appear as a danger to come

M 7 Imperialism: A French Viewpoint

Pierre Paul Leroy-Beaulieu was a French economist, born in 1843 and educated in Paris at the Lycée Bonaparte and the École de Droit. He afterwards studied in Bonn and Berlin, and on his return to Paris began to write for Le Temps, Revue nationale and Revue contemporaine:

The great value of colonies [...] is not only that they serve to catch the overflow population of the mother country, nor even that they open a particularly reliable area of investment for excess capital, it is also that they give a sharp stimulus to the commerce of the country, that they strengthen and support its industry and *furnish* to its inhabitants – industrialists, workers, consumers – a growth of profits, of wages, or of interest. But [...] these advantages resulting from the prosperity of the colonies, are not limited just to the mother countries; they extend to all the countries of the old world [i. e. Europe] and in fact there is not a nation which does not derive a real benefit from this increase in the productivity of humanity. [...] Imperialism has caused the opening of new sources of production. [...]

It is thus that unknown products have been brought to the consumers of Europe to increase their comfort. [...] That is the first and incontestable result of imperialism. And this is the second: It is to open the new markets for the sale of products manufactured in Europe, markets more profitable and more expandable than those we have been limited to previously, because the new societies have an ability to grow and to create and accumulate riches infinitely greater than the old societies. Thus trade is stimulated and extended, the division of labour is augmented; industry having before it wider openings can and must produce more and such production on a greater scale calls for new improvements and new advances.

S. Pollard et al., Documents of European Economic History (London 1972), Vol. 2, pp. 165–167.

to furnish: to provide

Le Petit Journal

ADMINISTRATION 5 CENT. SUPPLEMENT ILLUSTRÉ 5 CENT. ABONNEMENTS

DIMANCHE 19 NOVEMBRE 1911

LA FRANCE VA POUVOIR PORTER LIBREMENT AU MAROC LA CIVILISATION LA RICHESSE ET LA PAIX

M 8 **"Le Petit Journal"** Frontpage of 1911

Tasks

1. Describe the basic features of French imperialism in the 1880s (text, M5).
2. Give your personal opinion on the French theory of "assimilation" regarding the consequences for the colonized people (M6).
3. Analyse the front page of the French journal, referring to its caption (M8).
4. Compare French imperialism with British and German models (M7, M8). Make a list of keywords.

The United States – Empire Through Influence

The US, Cuba and the Philippines

In October 1962 the world was holding its breath. Never before had mankind come closer to nuclear destruction and annihilation. The Soviet Union had secretly deposited nuclear weapons on Cuba that could reach the US within minutes. The US government under President Kennedy had demanded their immediate withdrawal. The crisis had accelerated into a scenario where both superpowers were on full alert with their nuclear potential aimed at each other and prepared to use it. Fortunately, after common sense prevailed, the conflict was settled and the world could heave a deep breath of relief.

It might have been the last US military conflict on Cuba, but it was not the first: On 17 April 1961 the invasion of the Bay of Pigs by an expeditionary force of Cuban exiles with US support failed. In 1898, during the zenith of imperialism, the United States helped Cuba in a revolt against Spain during the Spanish-American War. In the Treaty of Paris (1898) Spain had to give up Cuba and also the Philippines, but this did not mean that both the Cuban and the Philippine peoples were freed from foreign rule. In the aftermath of the war the US took over temporary control in Cuba, although a new republican constitution was created. But the US government kept the right to intervene and thus limited Cuba's sovereignty and autonomy considerably by the Platt Amendment. Cuba also had to lease Guantanamo Bay to the US as a naval base, well-known to the world after 9/11 as a prison for those who were arrested in the war against terrorism. What happened in Cuba continued in the Philippines: The US attempted to install imperial power and control, leading to a Filipino declaration of war on 2 June 1899. In spite of its official ending in 1902 the Philippine-American War continued until 1913. It was not until 1946 that the US fully recognized the Philippines as an independent and sovereign state.

M 1 **"The Duty of the Hour"**
US caricature by Louis Dalrymple on the Spanish colonial regime, 1898

M 2

Timeline: Cuba in the Age of Imperialism

since 1868	Cuba's struggle for independence from Spain
1886	Abolishment of slavery, but no equal rights for black people. Sugar cane and tobacco plantations are in the hands of large landowners who – due to a steep fall in prices – are forced to sell their possessions to US investors.
1898	Spanish-American War; US-intervention in the "Guerra de Independencia", Peace of Paris between Spain and the US, occupation of Cuba by the US (until 1902)
1901	Cuba's first constitution grants special rights to the USA (Platt Amendment), Guantanamo Bay is leased to the United States as a naval station, giving access to Cuba for intervention.
since 1902	Cuba receives formal independence, but US dominance on the political and economic sector prevails; several military interventions by the US
1959	Victory of the Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro, Cuba becomes a Socialist Republic.



M 3

From the Atlantic to the Pacific

Although the zenith of US imperialism – in accordance with European colonialism – was at the turn of the century, its foundation was laid much earlier. "The principle of our institution is expansion," said US Secretary of State Edward Everett in the middle of the 19th century. He meant not only the conquest of the North American continent, pushing the frontier further and further west to the Pacific, but also the prospect of acquiring more distant territories. Even in 1789 Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), the third President of the US (1801–1809), regarded America as the centre for further expansion into the north and the south.

The claim for expansion, apart from economic motives, was basically characterized by the idea of a civilizing mission that regarded American Anglo-Saxon values as beneficial for others. In 1823 James Monroe (1758–1831), the fifth President of the United States, developed his idea of an American hemisphere, a zone of influence that had to be protected against European influence. The American historian William A. Williams interprets the Monroe Doctrine as the "manifestation of the American Empire".

Indeed, the number of US overseas acquisitions both in Asia and the Caribbean is large but not as impressive as the European empires of Britain or France. Apart from Cuba and the Philippines the United States gained Puerto Rico, Guam and Wake via the Treaty of Paris in 1898, and American Samoa in the Treaty of Berlin in 1899. Hawaii officially became a part of the United States in 1900, Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867. The Mariana Islands (1859) and the US Virgin Islands (1917) can be added to the list. Although many Americans supported overseas expansion as contributing to the economic and political development of the nation, it was also met with scepticism and criticism, e.g. by Andrew Carnegie (1835–1919), an extraordinarily successful American industrialist, and by the famous writer Mark Twain.

M 4 **"Prosperity Plum Pudding"**
US cartoon, "Judge", Vol. 50,
3 February 1906



THERE'S PLENTY OF ROOM AT THE TABLE. WHY NOT ASK THE HUNGRY LITTLE FELLOW TO SIT DOWN?

US Imperial Rule

Although US principles of justification were very similar to those of European imperial nations, her rule was distinctly different. Great Britain and France had clearly-defined empires, based on a mother country with a periphery of colonies that were often directly ruled by a governor who had to answer to London or Paris. The US also controlled territories beyond her continental borders, but these patches of land were not colonies. Instead, the USA used her economic power to establish spheres of influence and thus operated with imperial economic policies profiting from all the benefits that colonies could provide ("Open Door Policy"). There is no doubt that the USA, like some European nations, was an imperialist state, but she had no formal empire beyond her acknowledged borders. In the formal empires of the European countries, the end of the age of empire signaled a clear end to their imperial policies. In the USA it was not necessary to end "imperialist" policy, but rather to maintain American influence in wider parts of the globe. Recent discussions on US involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East show that – in the eyes of many – the United States has not yet managed to wipe off this stain on her reputation.

M 5 The Platt Amendment

The United States occupied Cuba for five years after 1898. In 1901, Secretary of War Elihu Root (1845–1937) drafted a set of articles (later known as the Platt Amendment) as guidelines for future United States-Cuban relations. Despite considerable Cuban resistance, they became a part of the 1902 Cuban Constitution. In the following years the United States used the amendment several times to send troops, to maintain or place friendly governments in power, and to protect investments. The amendment was abrogated in 1934:

Whereas the Congress of the United States of America, by an Act approved 2 March 1901, *provided* as follows:

Provided further, that in fulfillment of the declaration contained in the joint resolution approved April twentieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, entitled "For the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain *relinquish* its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect", the President is hereby authorized to "leave the government and control of the island of Cuba to its people" so soon as a government shall have been established in said island under a constitution which, either as a part thereof or in an ordinance appended thereto, shall define the future relations of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows:

I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will *impair* or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgement in or control over any portion of said island. [...]

III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.

IV. That all Acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein. [...]

VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

VIII. That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.

"The Platt Amendment", in: C. I. Bevans, ed., Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949, Vol. 8 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 1116–17, from: www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1901platt.html

to abrogate: to officially get rid of a law
provided that: only if a particular thing happens
to relinquish: to give up
to impair: to make sth. less good or effective

Tasks

1. Interpret one of the cartoons (M1 or M4).
2. Analyse the effects of the Platt Amendment (M5).
3. Discuss in class whether Cuba can be regarded as a US colony (text, M5).

US-Imperial Rule – Theodore Roosevelt and the "Open Door Policy"

M 6 "International Police Power"

Excerpt from President Theodore Roosevelt's Annual Message to Congress 6 December 1904:

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. [...]
Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them only *in the last resort*, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence can not be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it. In asserting the Monroe Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama, and in endeavoring to circumscribe the theater of war in the Far East, and to secure the open door in China, we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large. There are, however, cases in which, while our own interests are not greatly involved, strong appeal is made to our sympathies. [...] But in extreme cases action may be justifiable and proper. What form the action shall take must depend upon the circumstances of the case; that is, upon the degree of the atrocity and upon our power to remedy it. The cases in which we could interfere by force of arms as we interfered to put a stop to intolerable conditions in Cuba are necessarily very few.

http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/trspeeches.html [Feb 2012].

M 7 "The New Diplomacy"

President Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1905) as policeman, US cartoon, 1906

M 8 A Comment

In the following excerpts British historian Barbara Bush deals with the meaning of US expansion in historiography (2006):

Most studies of imperial and postcolonial culture omit discussions of the USA as an imperial power. The USA [...] is either absorbed into a general notion of the West or it stands for a monolithic West. US continental expansion is treated as an entirely separate phenomenon from nineteenth-century European colonialism rather than related to it. In conventional historiography, the assumption endures that the American struggle for independence from British colonialism resulted in an anti-imperialist culture in the USA. [...] The concept of American "exceptionalism" has defined the USA as a unique nation. Proponents of this view argued that, after the brief imperialist era before the First World War [...] external interventions were not sanctioned by anti-imperialist administrations from Woodrow Wilson [1912–21] onwards, or by the US public [...]. After the First World War the "anti-imperialist" USA championed the "self-determination of nations" and this myth of US anti-imperialism strengthened during the Second World War. [...]

Keylor (1992) challenges myths of isolationism and argues that the American state was expansionist from the time of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) which claimed hegemony over Latin America. US informal empire in Central and Latin America was extended in what Keylor terms the "era of direct domination", 1914–32, with military interventions in Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. During the depression years, the USA became more insular and protectionist, but "indirect hegemony" persisted. [...] US cultural influence was also extended through US philanthropic foundations such as the Carnegie Trust and Rockefeller Foundation [...]. Developments in the Second World War also challenged myths of anti-imperialism. Humanitarian rhetoric of human rights and self-determination concealed a *bid* for global hegemony. In 1945 the USA controlled 50 per cent of the global GNP [Gross National Product] and dominated new international organizations such as the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the World Bank and the UN [...]. After the war the USA *reneged* on commitment to self-determination as applied to colonies that were strategic to the new Cold War order; energies were now directed to counteracting anti-colonialist communist movements in Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, Latin America, Africa and the Caribbean. [...]

Barbara Bush, Imperialism and Postcolonialism (Harlow 2006), pp. 199–201.

in the last resort: when everything else has been considered
bid: offer
to renege: to decide not to do sth. already promised

Tasks

1. Sum up Roosevelt's message to the Congress (M6).
2. Interpret the cartoon "The New Diplomacy" (M7).
3. Discuss whether expanding the frontier and spheres of influence can be regarded as imperialism (M8).
4. Compare and contrast the American, British and French models of imperialism.

M 1

Imperial Rivalries: Foreshadowing the Great War

The Fashoda Incident

Kodok is a small South Sudanese town on the banks of the upper Nile, nowadays without any economic relevance. But in 1898, then called Fashoda, it became the sight of one of the most crucial incidents in the "Scramble for Africa", marking the climax of British-French colonial rivalries and bringing both countries into direct confrontation. It persuaded French and British politicians to work out a stable and peaceful settlement over their colonial interests and to find a "mutually satisfactory solution to the African question" (J. J. Cooke 1973, p. 86).

In the 1890s Britain was determined to link her possessions in South Africa with her northern territories (East Africa, Egypt), as Cecil Rhodes had suggested, by constructing the Cape-Cairo railway. France, on the other hand – which concerned Britain – tried to unite her West African possessions with the colony of Obock (a small port town in Djibouti) on the Red Sea, linking the Niger River and the Nile to control trade in the area effectively. It was evident that a military station on the upper Nile was necessary; Fashoda seemed the best site for it. So, in May 1897 a French force of about 200 men under the command of Captain Jean Baptiste Marchand set out from Brazzaville to arrive at Fashoda in July 1898. When the British realized the seriousness of the mission, they sent out a flotilla of gunboats under the command of Herbert Kitchener that reached Fashoda in September 1898. The French soon recognized that their military station could not be maintained, while the British public was not ready for a war with France. Diplomatic negotiations arranged an agreement with both powers defining the sources of the Nile and the Congo as the frontiers of their spheres of influence.

M 2 **William II**
Portrait in the uniform of a „Gardekürassier", painting of 1895

From Anglo-French to Anglo-German Rivalries

The new and more confident relationship between the two powers resulted in the "Entente cordiale" on 8 April 1904. It not only settled colonial issues between Britain and France, but also ended French isolation in Europe stemming from the policy of Otto von Bismarck. After Fashoda, the focus of imperial rivalries shifted from Anglo-French relations to Anglo-German issues and brought attention to a new main player – the German Emperor William II.

Although historians like Hans-Ulrich Wehler minimize William's importance for German policy, his character is certainly worth a closer look. William was an eccentric and bizarre person, suffering from a handicap he had acquired during his birth – a badly-withered left hand with a paralyzed arm – and a severely disturbed relationship with his mother, Queen Victoria's eldest daughter. Historians assume that this relationship influenced his attitude towards Britain, which he admired but also regarded as a rival to outdo in naval strength. Therefore, William supported Germany's extensive battleship programme.

A basically weak person, William was influenced by his entourage of courtiers and advisors who urged him to pursue "Weltpolitik" to make Germany win a "place in the sun". In the naval race, Germany could never really compete with Britain, but the Emperor's efforts gradually deteriorated German-British relations and led to tension and distrust on both sides. Two incidents showed William's over-

M 3 **"Enfant Terrible"**
"Don't be so restless! You will finally cause the boat to capsize!" In the boat the European powers England, France, Austria and Russia, British cartoon, "Punch", 10 May 1890

estimation of Germany's abilities, lack of a sense of proportion and erratic behaviour, which led to misunderstanding and anger in Europe and even in Germany. The political consequences for the country were isolation in Europe and a widespread assumption that the Kaiser might endanger peace in Europe:

The First Moroccan Crisis (1905–1906)

When France tried to establish a protectorate over Morocco, Germany opposed these attempts. The Emperor paid a dramatic visit to Tangier in March 1906, giving a speech in which he proclaimed Morocco's independence. The conflict was finally solved at the Algeciras Conference in Spain, where French claims in Morocco were backed by the vast majority of European countries, especially by Britain. The *Entente cordiale* showed its strength in this crisis.

The Second Moroccan Crisis (July 1911)

When France tried to put down unrest in Morocco the Kaiser sent the gunboat "Panther" to Agadir ("Panthersprung"), a measure that irritated Britain deeply as she had agreed with King George in May 1911 "that the French occupation of Morocco was a *fait accompli* about which little could be done" (M. Balfour 1964, p. 312). It was obvious that the German justification for the action was nothing but a pretext. Britain suspected the Kaiser wanted to have access to Morocco and supported France again. In the French-German Treaty of Fez (4 November 1911) France's role in Morocco was accepted, whereas Germany received territory in what is now the Republic of Congo.

On the Road to World War I

It was certainly not only William's clumsiness on the field of foreign politics and his inability to see the world as it was that created the breeding-ground for the Great War. Undoubtedly circles in France were still looking for revenge and in Britain Lloyd George, then *Chancellor of the Exchequer*, added fuel to the fire in his famous Mansion House

Chancellor of the Exchequer: minister of finance

speech (21 July 1911). He said that Britain might go to war if "she were treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations [...] that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."
By 1914, the European nations tangled up in imperial rivalries and split into two alliances – Germany and Austria on the one hand, and Britain, France and Russia on the other. The powder-keg was filled, so that it simply took the incident in Sarajevo to blow up the whole thing: World War I began.

M 4



M 5

Timeline: On the Road to World War I

1882	Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy
1890s	Continuing imperial expansion
1891	Dual Entente between France and Russia
1898	Fashoda Crisis: France and Britain nearly go to war over the Upper Nile. German Naval Law authorizes a battle fleet to rival Britain's.
1899–1902	Boer War: British policy condemned by the whole of Europe
1902	Anglo-Japanese Alliance
1904	Anglo-French Entente
1905	1st Moroccan Crisis
1907	Anglo-Russian Entente
1908–1912	Naval race accelerates
1911	2nd Moroccan Crisis
1912	1st Balkan War
1913	2nd Balkan War
1914	Assassination at Sarajevo: Outbreak of the First World War

M 6 The Fashoda Incident

The following is an excerpt from Winston Churchill's (1874–1965) two-volume documentary on the reconquest of Sudan where he worked as a war correspondent in 1898. Winston Churchill was British Prime Minister twice from 1940–45 and 1951–1955:

First of all, Great Britain was determined to have Fashoda or fight; and as soon as this was made clear, the French were willing to give way. Fashoda was a miserable *swamp*, of no particular value to them. Marchand, Lord Salisbury's "explorer in difficulties upon the Upper Nile," was admitted by the French Minister to be merely an "*emissary* of civilisation." It was not worth their while to embark on the hazards and convulsions of a mighty war for either swamp or emissary. [...]

After some weeks of tension, the French Government consented to withdraw their expedition from the region of the Upper Nile. [...]

Then it became known that the French Government had ordered the evacuation of Fashoda. Some weeks were spent in making preparations for the journey, but at length the day of departure arrived. At 8.20 on the morning of the 11th of December the French lowered their flag with salute and flourish of bugle. [...]

Marchand shook hands all round, and the British officers bade their gallant opponents a final farewell. [...]

The disputes between France and England about the valley of the Upper Nile were terminated, as far as material cause was concerned, by an Agreement, signed in London on the 21st of March, 1899, by Lord Salisbury and M. Cambon. [...] Its practical effect is to reserve the whole drainage system of the Nile to England and Egypt, and to engage that France shall have a free hand, so far as those Powers are concerned, in the rest of Northern Africa west of the Nile Valley not yet occupied by Europeans. This stupendous partition of half a continent by two European Powers could scarcely be expected to excite the enthusiasm of the rest. Germany was, however, soothed by the promise of the observance of the "Open Door" policy upon the Upper Nile. Italy, protesting meekly, followed Germany. Russia had no interests in this quarter. France and England were agreed. The rest were not consulted: and the Declaration may thus be said to have been recognised by the world in general.

It is perhaps early to attempt to pronounce with which of the contracting Powers the advantage lies. France has acquired at a single stroke, without any serious military operations, the recognition of rights which may enable her ultimately to annex a vast African territory. At present what she has gained may be described as a recognised "sphere of *aspiration*". The future may convert this into a sphere of influence, and the distant future may witness the entire subjugation of the whole region.

Sir Winston Churchill, The River War (London 1899), from: www.gutenberg.org/etext/4943, pp. 171–178.

swamp: land covered by water
emissary: sb. working for a government
aspiration: ambition

Timeline: The Fashoda Crisis

M 7

February 1896	Captain Marchand leads a French military expedition into the Congo River Valley.
10 July 1898	Marchand's expedition establishes a French military camp in the Upper Nile Valley at Fashoda.
2 September 1898	The British Lord Kitchener leads an army into the Sudan and wins the Battle of Omdurman against the Mahdist forces.
19 September 1898	When he learns of the French force at Fashoda, Kitchener proceeds immediately upriver and a fight ensues between Marchand's and Kitchener's forces.
3 November 1898	French government orders Marchand to withdraw from the Nile. The French force leaves via Abyssinia because Marchand refuses to accept British protection and the soldiers refuse to return via the Congo.
21 March 1899	The Anglo-French agreement recognizes the Upper Nile as a British sphere of influence.

The State of German-British Relations on the Eve of the Great War

M 8 A Comment

The British historian Eric Hobsbawm on the contribution of Germany and Great Britain to the outbreak of the First World War:

But what made the world an even more dangerous place was the tacit equation of unlimited economic growth and political power, which came to be unconsciously accepted. Thus the German emperor in the 1890s demanded "a place in the sun" for his state. [...] It simply formulated a principle of proportionality: the more powerful a country's economy, the larger its population, the greater the international position of its nation-state. There were no theoretical limits to the position it might thus feel to be its due. [...]

In practical terms, the danger was not that Germany concretely proposed to take Britain's place as a global power, though the rhetoric of German nationalist agitation readily struck the anti-British note. It was rather that a global power required a global navy, and Germany therefore set out (1897) to construct a great battle-fleet, which had the incidental advantage of representing not the old German states but exclusively the new united Germany, with an officer-corps which represented not Prussian junkers or other aristocratic warrior traditions, but the new middle classes, that is to say the new nation. [...] Besides, could a country of Germany's importance not be expected to have a navy corresponding to her importance?

But from the British point of view, the construction of a German fleet was more even than yet another *strain* on the already globally over-committed British navy, already much outnumbered by the united fleets of rival powers. [...]

Unlike all other navies, the German fleet's bases were entirely in the North Sea, opposite Britain. Its objective could not be anything except conflict with the British navy. [...] What was for Germany a symbol of her international status, and of undefined global ambitions, was a matter of life or death for the British Empire. [...] Germany's navy, even as a regional navy, which it did not intend to remain, was a threat both to the British Isles and to the global position of the British Empire. [...] Under the circumstance, and given the economic rivalry between the two countries' industries, it was not surprising that Great Britain found herself considering Germany as the most probable and dangerous of potential adversaries. It was logical that she should find herself drawing closer to France and, once the Russian danger had been minimized by Japan, to Russia, all the more so since the Russian defeat had, for the first time in living memory, destroyed that equilibrium of the powers on the European continent which British foreign secretaries had so long taken for granted. It revealed Germany as by far the dominant military force in Europe, as she was already industrially by far the most *formidable*. This was the background for the surprising Anglo-Franco-Russian Triple Entente.

The division of Europe into two hostile blocs took almost a quarter of a century, from the formation of the Triple Alliance (1882) to the completion of the Triple Entente (1907). [...]

They merely demonstrate that international friction in the period of imperialism was global and *endemic*, that nobody – least of all the British – knew quite in what direction the cross currents of their and other powers' interests, fears and ambitions were taking them, and, though it was widely felt that they took Europe towards a major war, none of the governments knew quite what to do about it. Time and again attempts failed to break up the bloc system, or at least to offset it by rapprochements across the blocs: between Britain and Germany, Germany and Russia, Germany and France, Russia and Austria. The blocs, reinforced by inflexible plans for strategy and mobilization, grew more rigid, the continent drifted uncontrollably towards battle, through a series of international crises, after 1905, were increasingly settled by "brinkmanship" – i.e. by the threat of war. [...]

What made the situation even more explosive was that, precisely in this period, domestic politics in the major powers pushed their foreign policies into the danger zone. As we have seen [...], after 1905 the political mechanisms for the stable management of regimes began to creak audibly. It became increasingly difficult to control, still more to absorb and integrate, the mobilizations and counter-mobilizations of subjects in the process of turning into democratic citizens. [...] What turned the Agadir Crisis from an occasion for potential horse-trading into a zero-sum confrontation was a public speech by Lloyd George, which seemed to leave Germany with no option except war or retreat. Non-democratic

politics were even worse. Could one not argue: "that the principal cause of the tragic Europe breakdown in July 1914 was the inability of the democratic forces in central and eastern Europe to establish control over the militarist elements in their society and the abdication of the autocrats not to their loyal democratic subjects but to their irresponsible military advisers"? And worst of all, would not countries faced with insoluble domestic problems be tempted to take the gamble of solving them by foreign triumph, especially when their military advisers told them that, since war was certain, the best time for it was now?

Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire (London 1995), pp. 318–322.

strain: pressure
formidable: very impressive
endemic: very common

M 9 The First Word of the Emperor in the New Century
"Such as my grandfather did for his army, so I am willing to fulfill the work of re-organization for my navy, unwavering and in the same way", German postcard, 1900

M 10 The Expansion of the German Navy 1897–1914
Based on annual expenditure in pounds (British source)

A British table of 1914 showing the growth of the German navy since 1897	
1897: 5,725,000	1899: 6,500,000
1900: 7,500,000	1901: 9,500,000
1903: 10,000,000	1905: 11,500,000
1906: 12,000,000	1907: 14,225,000
1908: 16,490,000	1909: 20,090,000
1911: 21,720,000	1912: 22,215,000
1913: 23,030,000	1914: 25,894,000

Source: Alison Kitson, Germany 1858–1990, Hope, Terror and Revival (Oxford 2001), p. 58.

Tasks

1. Give a brief account of the events at Fashoda (text, M6, M7).
2. Analyse the result of the Fashoda incident for the British-French relationship (text, M6, M7).
3. Summarize the aspects of British-German relations that contributed to the outbreak of World War I (M8).
4. Discuss how the Great War could have been avoided and how Germany could have contributed to peace.

M 1 **"Something Geographic"**
"In good weather we can repaint the facade of our globe, as the old paint is peeling off in some places."
From the satirical magazine "Kladderadatsch", 1884



Wenn das gute Wetter ſich hält, ſoll nächſtens die Façade unſeres Erdballs friſch geſtrichen werden, da an manchen Stellen die alte Farbe ſchlecht gehalten hat.

Approaches to Understanding Imperialism

Various explanations of imperialism are plausible. Each of these studies is reliable and questionable at the same time, so the *unbiased* observer should consider all given facts as valuable for his judgement. The following aspects should be mentioned.

unbiased: not influenced by an own opinion
underconsumption: consumers buy less than is produced, which leads to economic difficulties

Colonies as the Result of Socio-Economic Conditions

A very early critique of imperialism was published by the English economist J. A. Hobson in 1902 under the impression of the Boer War, which he deeply condemned. In 1887 Hobson moved to London in the middle of an economic crisis. He had contact with several scientists seeking ways out of the depression. These encounters contributed to Hobson's theory of *underconsumption* and became an important element in making the mechanism of imperialism understandable. In Hobson's view imperialism was the result of a concentration of wealth causing low wages and underconsumption among the poor masses. This situation – so he suggested – needed an outlet for the overproduction of goods in Europe that was found with new markets in the colonies. Although Hobson was a liberal, his study largely influenced Lenin's notion of imperialism as "the highest stage of capitalism" (1916). He suggested that it was not possible to reduce underconsumption through liberal strategies and regarded imperialism as a prelude to World War I. Both Hobson and Lenin based their studies on a strictly economic perspective and laid the foundation of the "theory of capitalist imperialism", in which colonies are seen as "the product of the socio-economic conditions of the imperialist states and an inevitable outcome of their historical evolution" (D. K. Fieldhouse 1974, p. 191).

M 2 **Joseph A. Schumpeter** (1883–1950)

Joseph A. Schumpeter's Socio-Psychological Approach

A completely different explanation of imperialism was put forward by the Austrian-American economist Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1950)

atavistic: relating to feelings or ideas of people in the distant past

in "The Sociology of Imperialism" (1918). He rejected Lenin's view by suggesting that imperialism was nothing but objectless expansion, an *atavistic* pattern established deep in human history and nature. In his opinion the links between economics and imperialism were not as relevant and decisive as Hobson and Lenin suggested. Thus, he replaced them with human behaviour and psychology.

The Negation of "New Imperialism"

More modern studies have modified Hobson's one-sided economic approach. In their article "The Imperialism of Free Trade" (1953) the British John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson maintained that too much emphasis was laid on the distinction between formal and informal empire. Hence, they objected to the notion of "New Imperialism", saying that already in the mid-Victorian era by "informal means, if possible, or by formal annexations when necessary, British paramountcy was steadily upheld" (J. Gallagher and R. Robinson 1953, p. 2).



M 3 Hans-Ulrich Wehler (*1931)

Hans-Ulrich Wehler and "Social Imperialism"

Another controversial theory of imperialism under Bismarck and the Kaiser was developed by the German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler. He sees a strong interdependence between domestic issues and overseas expansion of imperial Germany. Although some of his theses are criticized by historians as too one-sided, his contribution to a deeper understanding of imperialism is undeniable.

Further Approaches to Imperialism

Though modern historians still regard the economic side of imperialism as an important factor they often focus more on historical and political aspects. In his study "The Age of Empire" (1987) the British historian Eric Hobsbawm does not neglect the socio-economic perspectives but emphasizes their character as status symbols for the imperialist nations.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that there were a number of people – both politicians and businessmen – who definitely profited from the expansion of British trade by colonization and annexation (Niall Ferguson). However, it would be short-sighted if we limited our study of imperialism to purely economic aspects. There is a much larger array of explanations, so understanding imperialism is a process which requires various and sometimes even divergent perspectives. None of the theories offered by historical or economic science can claim to be the only acceptable hypothesis. Every single case of colonialism must be studied individually with an examination of "general forces operating within Europe and in other parts of the world" (D. K. Fieldhouse 1974, p. 193).

Although the zenith of imperialism was nearly a century ago, it has distinctly left its footprints in the modern world. Nearly everyone nowadays, no matter whether he lives in former colonies or in the old imperialist nations, is somehow affected by its legacy: The "extraordinary global reach of classical nineteenth and early twentieth century European imperialism still casts a considerable shadow over our own times" (E. Said 1993, p. 4).

Approaches to Understanding Imperialism – Working with Scientific Texts

M 4 J.A. Hobson on Imperialism

The following text is an excerpt from John Atkinson Hobson's (1858–1940) book "Imperialism, a Study" (1902):

No mere array of facts and figures adduced to illustrate the economic nature of the new Imperialism will suffice to dispel the popular delusion that the use of national force to secure new markets by annexing fresh tracts of territory is a sound and a necessary policy for an advanced industrial country like Great Britain [...].

But these arguments are not conclusive. It is open to Imperialists to argue thus: We must have markets for our growing manufactures, we must have new outlets for the investment of our surplus capital and for the energies of the adventurous surplus of our population: such expansion is a necessity of life to a nation with our great and growing powers of production. An ever larger share of our population is devoted to the manufactures and commerce of towns, and is thus dependent for life and work upon food and raw materials from foreign lands. In order to buy and pay for these things we must sell our goods abroad. During the first threequarters of the nineteenth century we could do so without difficulty by a natural expansion of commerce with continental nations and our colonies, all of which were far behind us in the main arts of manufacture and the carrying trades. So long as England held a virtual monopoly of the world markets for certain important classes of manufactured goods, Imperialism was unnecessary. After 1870 this manufacturing and trading supremacy was greatly impaired: other nations, especially Germany, the United States, and Belgium, advanced with great rapidity, and while they have not crushed or even *stayed* the increase of our external trade, their competition made it more and more difficult to dispose of the full surplus of our manufactures at a profit. The *encroachments* made by these nations upon our old markets, even in our own possessions, made it most urgent that we should take energetic means to secure new markets. These new markets had to lie in hitherto undeveloped countries, chiefly in the tropics, where vast populations lived capable of growing economic needs which our manufacturers and merchants could supply. Our rivals were seizing and annexing territories for similar purposes, and when they had annexed them closed them to our trade. The diplomacy and the arms of Great Britain had to be used in order to compel the owners of the new markets to deal with us: and experience showed that the safest means of securing and developing such markets is by establishing "protectorates" or by annexation. [...]. It was this sudden demand for foreign markets for manufactures and for investments which was avowedly responsible for the adoption of Imperialism as a political policy. [...] They needed Imperialism because they desired to use the public resources of their country to find profitable employment for their capital which otherwise would be superfluous. [...]

Every improvement of methods of production, every concentration of ownership and control, seems to accentuate the tendency. As one nation after another enters the machine economy and adopts advanced industrial methods, it becomes more difficult for its manufacturers, merchants, and financiers to dispose profitably of their economic resources, and they are tempted more and more to use their Governments in order to secure for their particular use some distant undeveloped country by annexation and protection.

www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1902hobson.html

M 5 The Sociology of Imperialism

Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1850) was an Austrian-American economist who, in total disagreement with Lenin, regarded imperialism not as the most advanced state of capitalism but as a characteristic of the upper classes' irrational chauvinism based on the interests of home policy (1918):

For it is always a question, when one speaks of imperialism, of the assertion of an aggressiveness whose real basis does not lie in the aims followed at the moment but an aggressiveness in itself. And actually history shows us people and classes who desire expansion for the sake of expanding, war for the sake of fighting, domination for the sake of dominating. It values conquest not so much because of the advantages it brings, which are often more than doubtful, as because it is conquest, success, activity. Although expansion as self-purpose always needs concrete objects to activate it and support it, its meaning is not included therein. [...] Thus we define: Imperialism

is the object-less disposition of a state to expansion by force without assigned limits.

Our analysis of historical material show: First, the undoubted fact that object-less tendencies toward forceful expansion without definite limits of purpose, nonrational and irrational, purely instinctive inclinations to war and conquest, play a very great role in the history of humanity. As paradoxical as it sounds, innumerable wars, perhaps the majority of all wars, have been waged without sufficient reason. Secondly, the explanation of the martial, functional need, this will to war, lies in the necessities of a situation, in which peoples and classes must become fighters or go under, and in the fact that the physical dispositions and social structure acquired in the past, once existent and consolidated, maintain themselves and continue to work after they have lost their meaning and their function of preserving life. Thirdly, the existence of supporting elements which ease the continued life of these dispositions and structures can be divided into groups. Martial dispositions are especially furthered by the groups ruling the internal relationships of interests. And with martial dispositions are allied the influences of all those who individually stand to gain, either economically or socially, by martial policy. Both groups of motives are in general overgrown by another kind of *foliage* which is not merely political propaganda but also individual psychological motivation. Imperialism is an atavism. It falls in the great group of those things that live on from earlier epochs, things which play so great a role in every concrete situation and which are to be explained not from the conditions of the present but from the conditions of the past. It is an atavism of social structure and an atavism of individual emotional habits. Since the necessities which created it have gone forever, it must – though ever martial development tends to revitalize it – disappear in time. Modern Imperialism is one of the *heirlooms* of the absolute monarchical state. The "inner logic" of capitalism would have never evolved it. Its sources come from the policy of the princes and the customs of a pre-capitalist milieu. But even export monopoly is not imperialism and it would never have developed to imperialism in the hands of the pacific bourgeoisie. This happened only because the war machine, its social atmosphere, and the martial will were inherited and because a martially-oriented class (i. e. the nobility) maintained itself in a ruling position with which of all the varied interests of the bourgeoisie the martial ones could ally themselves. This alliance keeps alive fighting instincts and ideas of domination. It led to social relations which perhaps ultimately are to be explained by relations of production but not by the productive relations of capitalism alone.

www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1918schumpeter1.html

to stay: (here) to endure or bear
to encroach: to gradually take sth. from sb.
foliage: leaves of a tree or plant
heirloom: valuable possession of a family for many years
jerry-builder: sb. building very quickly and with the least of money

M 6 Imperialism, Business and Politics in Britain

In the following text the British historian Niall Ferguson (born in 1964) deals with the interrelation between business and politics in British imperialism at the end of the 19th century (2004):

Not only was imperialism immoral, argued the critics. According to the Radicals, it was also a rip-off: paid for by British taxpayers, fought for by British soldiers, but benefiting only a tiny elite of fat-cat millionaires, the likes of Rhodes and Rothschild. That was the thrust of J. A. Hobson's profoundly influential "Imperialism: A Study", published in 1902. "Every great political act", argued Hobson, "must receive the sanction and the practical aid of this little group of financial kings": [...]

Henry Noel Brailsford [British left-wing journalist, 1873–1958] took Hobson's argument further in his "The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace". [...] "To defend the interests of Lord Rothschild and his fellow bondholders, Egypt was first occupied, and then practically annexed by Great Britain. [...] The extremest case of all is, perhaps, our own South African War." Was it not obvious that the Boer War had been fought to ensure that the gold mines of the Transvaal remained securely in the hands of their capitalist owners? Was not Rhodes merely, in the words of the Radical MP Henry Labouchere, an "Empire *jerry-builder* who has always been a mere vulgar promoter masquerading as a patriot, and the figure-head of a gang of astute Hebrew financiers with whom he divides the profits"?

Approaches to Understanding Imperialism – Working with Scientific Texts

Like those modern conspiracy theories which explain every war in terms of the control of oil reserves, the Radical critique of imperialism was an over-simplification. [...] And like those other modern theories that attribute sinister power to certain financial institutions, some anti-imperialism conveyed more than a hint of anti-semitism. Nevertheless, when Brailsford called it "a perversion of the objects for which the State exists, that the power and prestige, for which all of us pay, should be used to win profits for private adventures", he was not entirely wide of the mark. "We are engaged in Imperial trading," he wrote, "with the flag as its indispensable asset, but the profits go exclusively into private pockets." That was substantially true.

Most of the huge flows of money from Britain's vast stock of overseas investments flowed to a tiny elite of, at most, a few hundred thousand people. At the *apex* of this elite was indeed the Rothschild Bank, whose combined capital in London, Paris and Vienna amounted to a staggering £ 41 million, making it by far the biggest financial institution in the world. [...] Nor is there any question that the extension of British power into those economies generated a wealth of new business for Rothschilds. [...] What is even more conspicuous is the closeness of the relationships enjoyed by the Rothschilds with the leading politicians of the day. Disraeli, Randolph Churchill and the Earl of Roseberry were all in various ways connected to them both socially and financially. The case of Roseberry – who served as Foreign Secretary under Gladstone and succeeded him as Prime Minister in 1894 – is particularly striking, since in 1878 he actually married Lord Rothschild's cousin Hannah. [...] Nor was Roseberry the only politician who failed to achieve the complete separation of his private and public interests. One of the principal beneficiaries of the occupation of Egypt was none other than Gladstone [William Ewart Gladstone : British Prime Minister, 1809–1898] himself. In late 1875 – possibly just before his rival Disraeli's purchase of the Suez Canal shares – he had invested £ 45,000 in the Ottoman Egyptian Tribute loan of 1871 at a price of just 38. He had added a further £ 5,000 by 1878, and a year later invested a further £ 15,000 in the 1854 Ottoman loan, which was also secured on the Egyptian Tribute. [...] Even before the military occupation of Egypt, these proved a good investment: the price of the 1871 bonds rose from 38 to 57 in the summer of 1882. The British takeover brought the Prime Minister still greater profits: by December 1882 the price of 1871 bonds had risen to 82.

Niall Ferguson, Empire. How Britain Made the Modern World (London 2004), pp. 283–287.

M 7 Social Imperialism

In the following excerpt the German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler discusses the mechanisms of "Social Imperialism" in Germany (1970):

Early German imperialism can also be viewed as the initial phase of an apparently contemporary phenomenon. Jürgen Habermas [German sociologist and philosopher, born 1929] has demonstrated recently how, under the present system of state-regulated capitalism, political power is legitimized chiefly by a deliberate policy of state intervention which tries to correct the disfunctions of the economy – in particular disturbances of economic growth – in order to ensure the stability of the economic system. The demand for "legitimation" to which these societies are subject, leads to a situation in which a "substitute programme" replaces the discredited ideology of the liberal-capitalist market economy. Ruling elites are thereby obliged to do two things if they wish to preserve the system and their own vested interests. First, they must ensure that favourable "conditions for stability be maintained for the entire social system and that risks for economic growth be avoided". Second, they must "pursue a policy of avoiding conflict by granting compensations in order to ensure the loyalty of the wage-earning masses". [...] These problems do not have an exclusively modern significance. Their historical genesis can be traced back to the last third of the nineteenth century. In Germany, as has already been stated, their origins can be clearly traced back to the Bismarckian era. It may be illuminating to view German imperialism during these years – like many other actions of the developing interventionist state – as an attempt on the part of the ruling elites to create improved conditions favourable to the stability of the social and economic system as it stood. They had realized that the traditional and charismatic authority of the government was losing its effectiveness.

In creating better conditions for social and economic stability, they thus hoped to take the

heat out of internal disputes about the distribution of the national income and of political power, and at the same time provide new foundations for the rule of an authoritarian leadership and of privileged social groups. Bismarck's [...] regime together with the social forces which supported it, and later on particularly the exponents of Weltpolitik, expected that economic and social imperialism would legitimate their authority. Critical observers at the time also recognize this fact clearly.

From a consideration of these two theoretical questions – first, the problems of uneven economic growth, and second, the need for an authoritarian system to legitimate itself – there emerges one fundamental point for the following discussion: German imperialism is to be seen primarily as the result of endogenous socio-economic and political forces, and not as a reaction to exogenous pressure, nor as a means of defending traditional foreign interests. This interpretation is specifically directed against the notions recently put forward by Professor Gallagher, Professor Robinson, Dr. Fieldhouse and others.

Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck's Imperialism 1862–1890, in: Past&Present, No.48 (Aug. 1970), pp. 123–125.

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

M 8 Caricature Criticizing Colonialism

Germania nurses a black baby, German cartoon, 1904.

Tasks

1. Summarize Hobson's theory of imperialism (M4).
2. Compare and contrast Schumpeter's theory of imperialism with Hobson's (M4, M5).
3. Speculate on how the interests of politicians and financiers could have contributed to British imperialism (M6).
4. Explain the meaning of Wehler's theory of "Social Imperialism" (M7).
5. Discuss the pros and cons of the above-mentioned theories in groups and draw your own conclusions.
6. Interpret the cartoon (M8).

Conclusion

This unit deals with the Age of Imperialism, ranging from the French conquest of Algeria in the 1830s to the beginning of the Great War, as well as various theoretical explanations of imperialism. Although it covers as many important and interesting aspects as possible, one has been left out on purpose – the period of decolonization. The demands of subjugated peoples for self-determination grew increasingly stronger since the 1920s. Though this right was famously expressed in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points as early as 1918 and finally fixed in the United Nations Charter in 1945, the process of dismantling the old empires only gained pace during the 1950s and 60s.

Decolonization was not always a peaceful process. The Algerian War is only one example among others equally as bloody and violent, if not more so. Even if independence itself was achieved by peaceful means, this did not mean that the new order was one of stability and prosperity. Often enough corrupt governments took over or civil wars broke out: The former Belgian Congo provides one of the most harrowing examples of such troubles. Yet there have been countries in which decolonization proved to be a success: Ghana, for instance, has enjoyed peace and slow, but continuous, growth ever since.

However, the end of the empires did not mean the end of "imperialism". The term itself has become a key word to attack expanding influence, and not just in the political field. Regularly "First World" states are accused of imperialistic means by those of the "Second" and "Third". Efforts to promote the English language are labeled "linguistic imperialism" (The Guardian, 13 March 2012); in 2003 the American author Paul Driessen coined the expression "eco-imperialism" as a criticism of Western efforts to limit increasing pollution in developing countries. The Age of Imperialism may have ended decades ago, but "imperialism" is still omnipresent in our world today.

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1875	Benjamin Disraeli acquires the majority shares of the Suez Canal for the British Empire.
	French protectorate over Tunisia
1880/81	1st Boer War: the Boer Republics defend their independence against the British Empire.
1881 – 1899	The Mahdi Wars in Sudan
1882	British control over Egypt
1882	Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy
1884	Foundation of the "Society for German Colonization" by Carl Peters
April 1884	German Southwest Africa is granted protection by the German government.
July 1884	Togo becomes a German protectorate, Cameroon a German colony.
November 1884	The German flag is hoisted for the first time in German New Guinea.
November 1884 – February 1885	Conference of Berlin: formalization of the "Scramble for Africa", "effective occupation" becomes the criterion for the possession of a colony.
1885	Foundation of the Indian National Congress
1887	Formation of French Indochina
1888	Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company occupies and annexes Rhodesia.
July 1890	Germany and Great Britain conclude the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty, with Germany obtaining Heligoland and giving up claims in Africa. Also shared borders of African colonies are fixed.
1893/94	The "Hottentot Uprising" in German Southwest Africa
1898 – 1900	French expeditions to unify all French colonies in Western Africa
1898	Fashoda Crisis: France and Britain nearly go to war over the Upper Nile as a result of their rival ambitions to establish a continuous west-east axis respectively a north-south axis in Africa.
1898	Spanish-American War, occupation of Cuba by the USA (until 1902), annexation of the Philippines
1898	The US annexes the Republic of Hawaii.
1899 – 1902	Philippine-American War
1899 – 1902	2nd Boer War: Britain conquers the South African Boer Republics using concentration camps to fight Boer guerrilla tactics. The British policy is condemned by the whole of Europe.
June 1900 – September 1901	The Boxer Rebellion in China against the influence of foreign imperialistic nations, suppressed by the intervention of British, French, German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Italian, Japanese and American troops.
January 1904 – October 1904	Herero uprising in German Southwest Africa, Herero and Namaqua genocide
1904	Anglo-French Entente against Germany
July 1905 – August 1907	The Maji Maji Rebellion in German East Africa
1907	Anglo-Russian Entente against Germany
1911	Agadir Crisis: Germany threatens with war after Morocco is occupied by the French.
1914 – 1918	World War I
1918/19	Paris Peace Conference: Germany loses its colonies to Britain, France and Japan; former Ottoman territories become British and French protectorates.

"Soldier's Farewell"
Photo, 1914

Trenches at Ypres, 1917

Women Producing Grenades,
Berlin 1916

„I Want You For U.S.Army",
US recruitment poster, 1917

William II Goes into Exile,
10 November 1918

Тов. Ленин ОЧИЩАЕТ землю от нечисти.

"Comrade Lenin cleans the Earth from scum"
Soviet poster, 1920

The First World War, 1914–18

When Franz Ferdinand, the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, was shot in Sarajevo in June 1914, the assassination set off a series of events which led to the outbreak of the First World War. What could have been a limited Serbian-Austrian dispute instead meant that Europe divided into antagonistic camps according to the system of alliances then in existence. When mobilization began, war became inevitable. However, most observers assured themselves that the war would only be a short, decisive affair.

The German advance on France (through neutral Belgium) seemed successful at first, but when the campaign was stopped before Paris, trenches were built and the conflict turned into a war of attrition. On the Eastern front, the German campaign was more successful; Russia was forced to surrender to the Central Powers much later. In addition, successful Axis campaigns in Italy and Turkey put pressure on the Allies. But failure to achieve clear victory persuaded military leaders on both sides to turn to deadlier weapons, such as poison gas and unlimited submarine warfare.

Soldiers suffered particularly from the difficult situation on the front during the long war. In addition, with men increasingly called to military service, women were expected to replace them in various jobs on the home front. Civilians made many sacrifices in supplies and food to help the war effort. After the conflict ended, women pointed to their wartime roles as an argument for getting the vote.

In 1917 Axis hopes of victory were raised by the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, which eventually led to the Russian withdrawal from the war. At the same time these hopes of victory were dashed by the American entry into the war on the side of the Allies. By November 1918 the abdication of the German Emperor was announced, and the negotiated armistice with the Allies was signed a few days later.

The conflict ended in bitter catastrophe for all the participants, even for the "victorious" Allies. Historians have studied the war and its origins ever since, attempting to find those responsible for the calamity, or, if that was not possible, to at least find ways to avoid such a conflict in future. An overview of various historical perspectives on the war is included in this chapter.

In addition to the military conflict itself, the First World War also provided the context for the most sweeping political and social change of the twentieth century – the October Revolution in Russia. A brief summary of the revolutionary situation in Russia and several different interpretations of it are included in this chapter as well.

M 1 **"The Arrest of the Assassin"**
Photograph, 1914

The Outbreak of the War

The July Crisis of 1914

28 June 1914 was a fine day in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, was paying a visit to the southern province of the Empire. When his convoy was crossing the town, two shots were fired. The bullets hit Franz Ferdinand and his wife sitting next to him, both fatally.

The assassin was a young Bosnian Serb fighting for the independence of the Slav nations from Habsburg rule. He was in touch with a secret Serbian terrorist organization, which had provided him with weapons and training. Although small in size, Serbia had long been a troublesome neighbour to Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. The assassination at Sarajevo offered a favourable opportunity of dealing a harsh, punitive blow at Serbia. However, that small country had a powerful protector – Russia. Before taking any steps, the Austro-Hungarian government sounded out the attitude of Germany, its partner in the Dual Alliance. How would Germany react?

The government in Berlin took a gloomy view of international affairs. From its point of view, the hostile powers of the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France and Russia) were growing stronger by the year, whereas the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, Germany's only reliable ally, was weakened by internal strains. Austria-Hungary seemed to be in desperate need of a boost to her prestige in the Balkans, which,

M 2

Timeline 1914

Juni 28	Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria is assassinated in Sarajevo.
July 6	Germany gives Austria 'carte blanche'.
July 20–23	French President Poincaré visits St. Petersburg and declares that France will be on Russia's side whatever happens.
July 23	Austria sends an ultimatum to Belgrade (Serbia): (1) ... that Serbia is to ban all societies organizing anti-Austrian propaganda (2) that Serbia is to dismiss all officials to whom Austria objects (3) that Austrian police and officials are to enter Serbia to make sure that these two demands are carried out.
July 25	Russia promises to help Serbia. Serbia accepts (1) and (2) of the Austrian ultimatum, but refuses to accept (3) for reasons of her sovereignty. Austria mobilizes part of her troops.
July 28	Austria declares war on Serbia.
July 29	Russia mobilizes part of her troops (against Austria-Hungary). In an ultimatum to Belgium, Germany demands the right for her troops to march through Belgian territory in case of war against France.
July 30	Russia mobilizes all her forces (directly against Germany).
July 31	In two ultimata Germany demands that a) Russia demobilize and b) France declare her neutrality in case of war between Germany and Russia.
August 1	a) Russia does not answer the German ultimatum and b) France mobilizes her forces and rejects the ultimatum. Germany mobilizes her forces. Germany declares war on Russia.
August 2	Great Britain mobilizes her fleet.
August 3	Germany declares war on France and invades Belgium.
August 4	Great Britain declares war on Germany because she has violated Belgian neutrality.

M 3 **Russia Protects Serbia**
Russian cartoon, July 1914

eventually, might even tear the Triple Entente apart. So Germany gave her ally the thumbs up for any measures she considered appropriate – even at the risk of a conflict much greater than expected.

However, instead of acting quickly now and creating a fait accompli, Austria-Hungary wasted precious time. Only on 23 July did she issue a harsh ultimatum against Serbia, followed by a declaration of war. Now it was Russia's turn to fan the flames. She mobilized her troops on behalf of her small ally, which, in those days, was the first step of taking military action. Thus, the machinery of alliances clanked into operation. One week later, the five great powers of Europe were at war with each other. "The lamps are going out all over Europe", British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey remarked dejectedly. "We shall not see them lit again in our time".

Fighting Starts

Germany's grand strategy for the war that followed was as daring as it was reckless. Its mastermind was the former Chief of the General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen. Faced with an unfavourable war on two fronts, its idea was to split it up. As Russia was expected to be slow at getting her troops ready, the bulk of the German army should attack France first and bring her down within just six weeks' time. This being accomplished, Russia would be dealt with. France's borders to Germany were strongly fortified, though. For this reason, the German attack was to be launched via Belgium. The fact that the violation of that country's neutrality was likely to draw Great Britain into the war against Germany was not paid much attention to by the predominantly military thinking in Berlin.

At first, things went according to plan. But at the River Marne, both the French army and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) were able to stop the German advance. That meant that the Schlieffen Plan had failed, and the war took on a totally different, unexpected character.

M 4 **The War Begins**
German troops leave Berlin for the front. Photograph, August 1914



M 5 **In the Trenches**
Soldiers in the trenches on the western front, ca. 1916

The War in the West – Trench Warfare

After the German advance had been stopped on the River Marne, the armies tried to outflank each other to the north in a "race to the sea". Then, in early November 1914, warfare quite abruptly turned from mobile into static. With heavy artillery and, increasingly, machine guns dominating the theatre of war, the soldiers had to disappear from the open ground or they stood no chance of survival. So they literally "dug in": a gigantic system of trenches was set up, often several metres deep, stretching from the North Sea coast down to Switzerland. The opposing trenches often lay just a few hundred metres apart from each other, with "no man's land" in between. Under these circumstances, trying to conquer any ground from the enemy was bound to result in heavy losses on both sides. Two major battles, both of them in 1916, became emblematic of the war on the western front: those of Verdun and of the Somme.

The Germans struck first. In February 1916, they began a formidable offensive against the fortress of Verdun, which was of utmost military and symbolic importance to France. The idea was to pin the best part of the French army to that place and to wear it down in a struggle of attrition. Both French and German losses were devastating. When the battle calmed down in July, the casualties amounted to more than 600,000 men. Verdun had not fallen.

With the French busy at Verdun, the great offensive planned by the Allies for that year fell largely to the British. Their intention was to break through the German lines on the River Somme and drive them eastward. An enormous bombardment of 1.5 million shells preceded the attack. However, when the British stormed the German trenches on 1 July they met with tough resistance. Out of 100,000 soldiers who attacked that day, 20,000 were killed and 40,000 wounded. When the battle ended in November, the German front line in the Somme area had been slightly set back along a few kilometres, but there had not been any real break-through. Casualties were almost double in number to those at Verdun. As an eminent historian put it, "to the British, it was and would remain their greatest military tragedy of the twentieth century, indeed, of their national military history".

M 6 **Destruction in Belgium**
The area around Ypres has been pounded into a muddy morass. Concrete bunkers destroyed by artillery fire are surrounded by thousands of shell holes filled with water in the middle of what was once a forest.
Aerial photograph, 1917

M 7 **"Just be patient, you'll all get your turns!"**
German military postcard, 1914

The War at Sea

At the outbreak of the war the British fleet had imposed a blockade on Germany, which hit the country's war effort hard. The most significant naval encounter took place at Jutland off the Danish coast in May 1916. More British than German ships were sunk in that battle. Faced with the superior strength of the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet, the Germans returned to port, though, with many of their vessels severely damaged.

The War in the East – Facing Russia

The Russian advance came sooner than expected; the tsar's troops entered East Prussia in August 1914. Though far inferior in numbers, the German eastern army managed to defeat the invaders by a brilliant display of tactical skill. This victory earned their commanders, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, lasting fame. The Russians were more successful against Austro-Hungary at first. Yet in May 1915, the Central Powers, in a combined effort, broke through their front line in Galicia and drove the tsar's army back. Vast territories including today's Poland and parts of the Baltic could be conquered, which was a considerable success for the Central Powers.

War in the Mountains and in the Straits

Italy was a partner of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austro-Hungary. Having been promised territorial gains at the expense of Austria, she entered the war on the Allies' side in May 1915. The front line ran right through the Alps, while fighting concentrated on the River Isonzo north of the Adriatic. There, the Central Powers managed to break through in October 1917. The Italian army virtually broke apart; only with the help of Allied troops could the advance be stopped north of Venice.

Unlike Italy, the Ottoman Empire sided with the Central Powers. In an attempt to establish a direct link with their Russian ally, the British and French mounted a landing operation at Gallipoli in the Dardanelles in February 1915. Their troops managed to get ashore, but due to Turkish resistance, any attempt to move inland failed. In early 1916, the campaign had to be called off.

The First World War – A Propaganda Campaign

M 8 **British Postcard, 1914**
The four soldiers wear uniforms of Australia, India, Canada, and Great Britain. In the corners are the national emblems of each country.

M 9 **"For the greatest effort"**
National Loan. Société Générale.
French poster for war bonds, 1918

M 10 **"Germany, Germany above all",** German postcard, 1914



M 11

Tasks

1. Determine the propaganda value of the different cartoons, postcards, and posters (M3, M7–M10). Decide which one you consider the most effective and explain why.
2. Find the poem "In Flanders Fields" written by John McCrae on the Internet. Compare and contrast the message of the poem with the photograph of Ypres in 1917 (M6, p. 62 M1).
3. Use the legend to assess the thematic contents found on the map (M11).
4. Analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the Central Powers and the Entente during the First World War according to the map (M11).
5. Explain the origins of the First World War. Differentiate between political, economic, military and ideological origins (text).

M 1 **Battle Remains**
A tank stuck in the mud on a battlefield near Ypres.
Photograph, March 1918

M 2 **A Coalwoman**
Photograph, during the First World War

Life on the Front and on the Home Front

Life in the Field

For the soldiers, life on the front was hard and exhausting. Trenches offered adequate protection against rifle and machine gun fire, but they provided little shelter from shells and grenades. Men were literally ripped apart or suffered from "shell-shock" under constant bombardment, or they were buried alive in their makeshift dug-outs. The trenches were usually muddy, wet and infested by rats and lice. Food was drab and, with the Central Powers, increasingly scarce. In April 1915, poison gas was introduced to the battlefields, which choked and blinded the soldiers exposed to it.

Life at Home

Under the impact of the war, daily life changed considerably. Due to the British naval blockade, vital supplies of resources from abroad fell by 90 % and were soon running low in Germany. Foodstuffs had to be rationed, and the longer the war lasted, the longer the queues for food became. Bread rations fell to 60 % of peacetime consumption in late 1915, and in the following winter, turnips replaced potatoes (which had run out) as the German people's basic diet. More than 700,000 civilians are supposed to have died from various consequences of malnutrition. Scientists worked out ingenious ways to substitute missing raw materials, for instance nitrate.

Governments imposed strict regulations on both the economy and private life. Within the very first week of the war, the British parliament passed the "Defence of the Realm Act", which conferred wide-ranging emergency powers to the executive. In Germany, the "Hindenburg Program" of 1916 co-ordinated and boosted the nation's arms production, and it called on all men under the age of 60 to actively support the war effort. The military also assumed governmental control in a "silent dictatorship". In the same year, Britain introduced conscription for the first time in her national history.

The Changing Role of Women

The cost of living rose everywhere, so it was difficult for the women to muddle through, with their men off fighting. Since male labour was in short supply, many women could take up jobs they had hitherto been barred from and became e.g. train conductors or postwomen.

The most conspicuous new field of female labour was the munitions industry, though. In Britain, the newly-founded Ministry of Munitions launched a public campaign and put pressure on factories to take on more female workers. As the job carried considerable patriotic prestige and was paid extraordinarily well, the number of so-called "munitionettes" increased dramatically to 950,000 by 1918. However, work in the munitions industry was exhausting and dangerous, particularly for women with little training. Moreover, the incessant exposure to toxic chemicals was thoroughly unhealthy. Women whose skin took on a yellowish hue due to sulphur were sarcastically dubbed "canary girls". Although it was generally accepted that women were doing very well at their new jobs, they were expected to give way to the men again once the war was over. At least women were granted the long-contested right to vote as a result of the war.

M 3 Siegfried Sassoon: Attack

Sassoon (1886–1967) volunteered for military service at the very outset of the war. He was one of the most prominent British war poets:

At dawn the ridge emerges massed and dun
In the wild purple of the glow'ring sun,
Smouldering through spouts of drifting smoke that shroud
The menacing scarred slope; and, one by one,
Tanks creep and topple forward to the wire.
The barrage roars and lifts. Then, clumsily bowed
With bombs and guns and shovels and battle-gear,
Men jostle and climb to, meet the bristling fire.
Lines of grey, muttering faces, masked with fear,
They leave their trenches, going over the top,
While time ticks blank and busy on their wrists,
And hope, with furtive eyes and grappling fists,
Flounders in mud. O Jesus, make it stop!

http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/sassoon-attack.asp

M 4 Erich M. Remarque: Description of Combat

In his novel "All Quiet on the Western Front" (1928), Remarque (1898–1970), who served on the front himself, describes the brutal reality of trench warfare. His narrator is a young German soldier, experiencing an attack by the enemy:

Suddenly the nearer explosions cease. The shelling continues, but it has lifted and falls behind us, our trench is free. [...] The bombardment has stopped and a heavy barrage now falls behind us. The attack has come. No one would believe that in this howling waste there could still be men; but steel helmets now appear on all sides out of the trench, and fifty yards from us a machine gun is already in position and barking. [...] We recognize the smooth distorted faces, the helmets: they are French. They have already suffered heavily when they reach the remnants of the barbed wire entanglements. A whole line has gone down before our machine-guns [...]. I see one of them, his fact upturned, fall into a wire cradle. His body collapses, his hands remain suspended as though he were praying. Then his body drops clean away and only his hands with the stumps of his arms, shot off, now hang in the wire. [...]
We make for the rear, pull wire cradles into the trench and leave bombs behind us with the strings pulled, which ensures us a fiery retreat. The machine guns are already firing from the next positions. We have become wild beasts. We do not fight, we defend ourselves against annihilation. [...] The forward trenches have been abandoned. Are they still trenches? They are blown to pieces, annihilated – there are only broken bits of trenches, holes linked by cracks, nests of craters, that is all.

Sources of the Western Tradition. Volume 2. Ed. by Marvin Perry e.a., Boston / New York 1999, p.306.

M 5 German Soldiers with Gasmasks in a Trench
Photograph, 1916

Tasks

1. Compare and contrast the two authors' descriptions of the fighting (M3, M4).
2. After the war ended, many former soldiers found it difficult or even impossible to adjust to civilian life. Explain why, using either Sassoon (M3) or Remarque (M4) to prove your arguments.

The First World War – The Changing Role of Women

M 6 Women in the Factories

Like so many others, young, upper-middle-class Naomi Loughnan from London opted to become a "munitionette", a woman replacing men off fighting in the munitions factories. She writes about her experiences:

Though we munitions workers sacrifice our ease we gain a life worth living. Our long days are filled with interest, and with the zest of doing work for our country in the grand cause of Freedom. As we handle the weapons of war we are learning great lessons of life. In the busy, noisy workshops we come face to face with every kind of class, and each one of these classes has something to learn from the others. Our muscles may be aching, and the brightness fading a little from our eyes, but our minds are expanding. [...]

The day is long, the atmosphere is breathed and re-breathed, and the oil smells. Our hands are black with warm, thick *oozing* from the machines, which coat the work and, incidentally, the workers. We regard our horrible, begrimed limbs with disgust and secret pride. [...] The work is hard. It may be, perhaps, from sheer lifting and carrying and weighing, or merely because of those long dragging hours that keep us sitting on little stools in front of whirring, clattering machines. [...]

Shoulder to shoulder with the children of the slums, the upper classes are having their eyes prised open at last to the awful conditions among which their sisters have dwelt. Foul language, immorality, and many other evils are but the natural outcome of overcrowding and bitter poverty. [...] Attempts at friendliness from the more understanding are treated with the utmost suspicion, though once that suspicion is overcome and friendship is established, it is unshakable. [...]

Sometimes disgust will overcome us, but we are learning with painful clarity that the fault is not theirs whose actions disgust us, but must be placed to the discredit of those other classes who have allowed the continued existence of conditions which generate the things from which we shrink appalled.

Sources of the Western Tradition. Volume 2. Ed. by Marvin Perry e.a., Boston / New York 1999, pp.309–311.



M 7 Women Producing Grenades, Berlin 1916

M 8 Opposition to Female Employment

With the men at war, women took up well-paid factory jobs in Germany, too. However, many of them resigned again shortly afterwards. The women's rights activist Magda Trott (1880–1945) explains why:

Even on the first day it was noticeable that not everything would proceed as had been supposed. Male colleagues looked askance at the "intruder" who dared to usurp the position and bread of a colleague now fighting for the Fatherland, and who would, it was fervently hoped, return in good health. Moreover, the lady who came as a substitute received exactly half of the salary of the gentleman colleague who had previously occupied the same position. A dangerous implication, since if the lady made good, the boss might continue to draw on female personnel; the saving on salaries would clearly be substantial. It became essential to use all means to show the boss that female help was no substitute for men's work, and a united male front was organized.

It was hardly surprising that all the lady's questions were answered quite vaguely. If she asked again or even a third time, irritated remarks were passed concerning her inadequacy in comprehension, and very soon the male teacher lost patience. Naturally, most of his colleagues supported him and the lady found it difficult, if not impossible, to receive any instruction and was finally forced to resign.

This is what happened in most known cases. We must, however, also admit that occasionally the fault does lie with the lady, who simply did not have sufficient preparation to fill a difficult position. There may be male colleagues who would gladly share information with women; however, these women are unable to understand, because they have too little business experience.

Sources of the Western Tradition. Volume 2. Ed. by Marvin Perry e.a., Boston / New York 1999, p. 312.

M 9 Tribute to Women's Commitment

The widely-read British satirical magazine "Punch" praised the nation's women in its June 1916 edition:

It is quite impossible to keep pace with all the new incarnations of women in war-time – bus-conductress, ticket-collector, lift-girl, club waitress, post-woman, bank clerk, motor-driver, farm-labourer, guide, munition maker. There is nothing new in the function of ministering angel: the myriad nurses in hospital here or abroad are only carrying out, though in greater numbers than ever before, what has always been woman's mission. But whenever he sees one of these new citizens, or hears fresh stories of their address and ability, Mr Punch is proud and delighted. Perhaps in the past, even in the present, he may have been, or even still is, a little given *to chaff* Englishwomen for some of their foibles, and even their aspirations. But he never doubted how splendid they were at heart; he never for a moment supposed they would be anything but ready and keen when the hour of need struck.

The Great War. Sources and Evidence. Second edition. Ed. by David Stewart e.a., Melbourne/Australia 1995, p. 231.

oozing: sth. that flows slowly
to chaff: to ridicule or tease

Tasks

1. Assess the long-term effects on British society of women working in munitions factories (M6).
2. Compare and contrast the male attitudes in both texts (M8, M9).

M 1 **„I Want You For U.S.Army",**
US recruitment poster, 1917

The War Draws to a Close

The Americans Enter the War

Many expected World War I to be a short conflict, over by Christmas of 1914. When stalemate occurred and a war of attrition resulted, German military strategists had to deal with a longer war in which they were outmatched. Not only did Germany and Austria lack essential raw materials for a lengthy war, the Axis powers were clearly outnumbered in terms of available manpower. Thus, the German leadership attempted to overcome the poor strategic outlook by turning to desperate measures. In May 1915 a German submarine torpedoed the British passenger ship Lusitania, killing about 1,200 aboard – among them 128 US citizens. Although the German government had warned Americans not to sail on the ship and declared the area in which the ship was sunk as a zone of war beforehand, the sinking of the Lusitania set off a storm of protest in the US. At the time, Germany managed to avert an American declaration of war by abandoning unlimited submarine warfare. However, the German decision to renew the submarine policy in 1917, as well as a German offer of alliance to Mexico in case of war with the US (revealed by the "Zimmermann Telegram"), led the US to declare war. US troops were slow to mobilize, but by mid-1918 the additional American manpower and materiel proved instrumental in winning the war for the Allies.

Long-standing principles of American foreign policy (formulated as early as Presidents George Washington and James Monroe) had called for the US to avoid involvement in European affairs. However, US President Woodrow Wilson claimed that participation in the war was necessary to "make the world safe for democracy". 1917 marks a change in American diplomacy from professed isolation to active involvement, with the US emerging from World War I as a major financial, political and military power.

M 2 **US Troops Disembark in France**
Photograph, ca. 1917

Revolution and Collapse in Russia

Three years of war had pushed Russia to her limits. In February 1917, there were food riots and anti-war demonstrations in the capital. When the soldiers sent to put down the unrest joined the protesters, the old regime was lost. Tsar Nicholas II abdicated on 15 March, and Russia became a republic. However, the new "provisional government" failed to bring about overdue reforms, and it also kept up the war effort. A radical group from the political left, the Bolsheviks with their leader Lenin, issued the slogan "bread and peace". Though small in number, they managed to overthrow the provisional government in a second revolution in early November. Lenin's main objective was to consolidate the Bolsheviks' grip on Russia. Wishing to put an end to the war quickly, he accepted the harsh peace terms set by the enemy. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918, Russia gave up vast stretches of land to Germany. The war in the east was over at last.

More on the revolution can be found in the following chapter, "Revolution in Russia".

Calendar Discrepancy

In 1917 the Julian calendar was still in use in Russia, while the western world had adopted the Gregorian calendar. The Julian dates (13 days earlier than the western dates) are given here in the discussion of Russian events.

Decision in the West

When peace was made in the east, 318,000 US soldiers had already arrived in France. By August 1918, there would be 1.3 million. So the German General Staff decided to mount all its might in a last, all-or-nothing offensive in the west. With considerable reinforcements from the east, the Germans managed to break through the Allies' front lines in several places from March to early summer 1918. However, their army, run down in four years of relentless war-fare, had all but lost its capacity for mobility. When the offensive failed in July, the Allies counter-attacked; this time, for good.

In early October, the German military command had to admit defeat and urgently asked the government to negotiate a ceasefire before the army fell apart. The Allies offered terms so severe that the armistice was equivalent to Germany's surrender. It was signed on 11 November 1918. Two days before, Emperor William II had abdicated. Finally, after a tremendous effort, the Allies had won the Great War.



M 3 William II Goes into Exile, 10 November 1918

William II says good-bye to his entourage at Eysden on the border between Belgium and the Netherlands before crossing into exile. Photograph, Eysden (Belgium), 10 November 1918

The Americans Enter the War – Dealing with opposing points of view

M 4 President Woodrow Wilson's War Message to the US Congress, 2 April 1917

After US merchant ships had been sunk by German submarines in early 1917, President Wilson (1856–1924) addressed Congress:

The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of; but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. [...] Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up among the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. [...]

The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Source: 65 Congress, I Session, Senate Document No. 5. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ww18.htm [18 Feb 2014].

rebuttal: reply countering arguments made in a debate

M 5 Opposing President Wilson

Robert La Follette, Republican Senator from Wisconsin, speaks to the US Congress in a rebuttal to US President Wilson, 4 April 1917:

If we are to enter upon this war in the manner the President demands, let us throw pretense to the winds, let us be honest, let us admit that this is a ruthless war against not only Germany's Army and her Navy but against her civilian population as well [...]

Countless millions are suffering from want and privation; countless other millions are dead and rotting on foreign battlefields; countless other millions are crippled and maimed, blinded, and dismembered; upon all and upon their children's children for generations to come has been laid a burden of debt which must be worked out in poverty and suffering, but the "whole force" of no one of the warring nations has yet been expended; but our "whole force" shall be expended, so says the President. We are pledged by the President, so far as he can pledge us, to make this fair, free, and happy land of ours the same shambles and bottomless pit of horror that we see in Europe today.

Just a word of comment more upon one of the points in the President's address. He says that this is a war "for the things which we have always carried nearest to our hearts – for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government." [...]

But the President proposes alliance with Great Britain, which, however liberty-loving its people, is a hereditary monarchy, with a hereditary ruler, with a hereditary House of Lords, with a hereditary landed system, with a limited and restricted suffrage for one class and a multiplied suffrage power for another, and with grinding industrial conditions for all the wageworkers.

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAlafollette.htm#source [24 Oct 2013]

Tasks

1. Contrast the arguments for and against the US entry into the war.
2. Evaluate the respective arguments in the context of the historical situation.

A Century of Controversy

World War I has been a rich source of controversy. Former British Prime Minister Lloyd George's claim in 1933 that all the European nations had simply *"slithered"* into the war was already a common opinion in Germany. But in 1961 a German study of the war's origins triggered a debate on the role of history in politics and society which continues to this day.

M 1 An Introduction

British historian Annika Mombauer on the importance of historical context in studies of World War I (2002):

What conclusions can be drawn at the end of this investigation into the debate on the origins of the First World War, and after nearly ninety ears of controversy? First, this book has demonstrated the intimate connection between the political concerns of a society and its interpretation of history. Historical controversies need to be studied against the background of contemporary political *preoccupations*. If we are to understand fully the motivations of the victorious Allies and defeated Germans, the revisionists and anti-revisionists, those who *espoused* the comfortable compromise point of view of the 1930s and those who strove to revisit the question of the origins of the First World War during the 1960s and beyond, it is vital to consider the historical context in which their views were formulated. Likewise, the political agendas of those who shaped the controversy need to be considered. Generally speaking, if a topic is deemed worthy of *sustained* debate, this is in no small measure due to the fact that it has a contemporary relevance and a popular resonance which elevate it above the status of "mere" history. As such, the question of the origins of the First World War has been of immense importance for the history of Germany following both world wars, and for the history of Europe as a whole.

Secondly, studying and understanding historical controversies in their historical context cannot be overemphasized. This controversy proves, if proof were needed, that history is only ever the interpretation of events, formulated against the background of political agendas. History is not an objective, factual account of events as they occurred, and historical accounts have to be read with a clear understanding of their provenance. History is subject to bias, falsification and deliberate misinterpretation on the part of individuals, even professional historians, as well as to censorship by government bodies, if the finds of history are too uncomfortable or reflect too badly on the present. For students of history, this is perhaps the most important conclusion of this book.

Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (Harlow, Essex, 2002), p. 222.

M 2 Lenin, 1916

Lenin's Interpretation of the First World War (1916):

It is proved in the pamphlet that the war of 1914-18 was imperialistic (that is, an annexationist, *predatory*, plunderous war) on the part of both sides; it was a war for the division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies, "spheres of influence" of finance capital, etc.

Proof of what was the true social, or rather, the true class character of the war is naturally to be found, not in the diplomatic history of the war, but in an analysis of the objective position of the ruling classes in all the belligerent countries. [...]

Private property based on the labor of the small proprietor, free competition, democracy, all the catchwords with which the capitalists and their press deceive the workers and the peasants--are things of the distant past. Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries. And this *"booty"* is shared between two or three powerful world *marauders* armed to the teeth (America, Great Britain, Japan), who involve the whole world in their war over the sharing of their booty.

Vladimir Illyich Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1916; also at:

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1916lenin-imperialism.html#bm3 [17 Oct 2013].

to slither: to crawl or slide
preoccupation: fixation
to espouse: to support
to sustain: to continue
predatory: greedy
booty: stolen goods
marauder: outlaw, thief

M 3 Treaty of Versailles, 1919

Article 231 (1919):

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partviii.asp [28 March 2013].

M 4 Fay, 1928

US historian Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (1928):

The greatest single underlying cause of the War was the system of secret alliances which developed after the Franco-Prussian War. It gradually divided Europe into two hostile groups of Powers who were increasingly suspicious of one another and who steadily built up greater and greater armies and navies. Though this system of alliances in one sense tended to preserve peace, inasmuch as the members within one group often *held* their friends or allies *in restraint* for fear of becoming involved in war themselves, the system also made it inevitable that if war did come, it would involve all the Great Powers of Europe. The members of each group felt bound to support each other, even in matters where they had no direct interest, because failure to give support would have weakened the solidarity of the group. Thus, Germany often felt bound to back up Austria-Hungary in her Balkan policies, because otherwise Germany feared to lose her only thoroughly dependable ally. Similarly, France had no direct political (only financial) interests in the Balkans, but felt bound to back up Russia, because otherwise the existence of the Dual Alliance would have been threatened, the balance of power destroyed, and the best guarantee of French safety from a German attack would have been lost. Likewise, the officials of the British Foreign Office became increasingly convinced that England must support France and Russia in order to preserve the solidarity of the Triple Entente as a check to the Triple Alliance. In the crisis of July, 1914, it was not, merely a question of Austria, Serbia and the Balkans; it was a question, of the solidarity and prestige of the two groups of Powers into which Europe had become divided. As one reads the new British Documents, one is struck by the emphasis on this necessity of preserving the solidarity of the Triple Entente. [...] It was stated more *bluntly* by Herr Zimmermann to the British Ambassador in Berlin on August 1, when he saw with excited regret that Germany, France, and perhaps England, would be drawn into a war which none of them wanted: "It all came from this d–d system of alliances, which was the curse of modern times."

http://www.johndclare.net/causes_WWI2_Fay.htm [8 Oct 2013].

M 5 Joll, 1966

British historian James Joll considers the "Fischer controversy" and German historians (1966):

Professor [Fritz] Fischer's book [...] is a large, detailed work, some 900 pages long and is based on a vast collection of German government archives hitherto not available for study. [...] Why, then, has a scholarly monograph with no great obvious appeal to the general public and little stylistic attraction caused such an outcry? It so scandalized some German historians that one of the most respected of them wrote, "I could not put the book down without feeling deep melancholy: melancholy, and anxiety with regard to the coming generation [...]"

To answer this, it is necessary to look at Professor Fischer's main thesis and then to examine some of the criticisms, both general and detailed, which have been made against him. But even before doing this, it is important for English readers to remind themselves just how dominant a role the "War Guilt Question" played in the study of contemporary history in Germany between the wars and how sensitive a point it still is. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles laid down that Germany accepted responsibility for the war imposed "by the aggression of Germany and her allies". This, quite apart from its political effects, was to impose on German historians – and later on some foreign historians too – the duty of assembling the evidence to refute the view that Germany was responsible for the war. [...]

to hold in restraint: to keep under control
bluntly: (speaking) directly

It might have been thought that, after World War II, the issue would have died, since even the Germans agreed that it was Hitler and the Nazi leaders who were responsible for the war [...]. For the Germans this was extremely important: if the blame was put squarely on to Hitler, then the rest of his countrymen were absolved. Hitler and the Nazis, instead of being regarded, as they are by some historians, as a product of German society and German ideologies, could be treated as a unique phenomenon, a sort of inexplicable *scourge* inflicted on the German people from outside, and alone responsible for the disasters and horrors of the Third Reich. It is for this reason that many Germans resent any suggestion [...] that what Hitler was doing [...] was no different from what other German statesmen had wanted to do. [...]

It is this suggestion – and it is no more than that – which has particularly aroused many Germans to criticize Fischer, and started a controversy in which even the German government apparently intervened by trying to stop Professor Fischer from undertaking a lecture tour in the United States, while the President of the Bundestag accused him and his students of being intellectual *flagellants*, and the editor of a respected newspaper denounced him for "national *masochism*" and suggested that he should resign from his University Chair. Fischer's main thesis – perhaps over-emphasized by the title "Grasping at World Power" – is that Germany was ready to resort to war in order to establish herself as a "Weltmacht," a Great Power, that is, which could take its place along with the other world powers, who had established their position in the world before Germany had achieved national unity. [...] Professor Fischer demonstrates, by a detailed examination of the documents, first that the German government, if they did not actually want war in 1914, were at any rate prepared to face the risk of it in pursuit of their general aims, and that they systematically encouraged their Austrian allies to provoke war with Serbia even when they saw that it could not be localized; and, secondly, that, as soon as the war had started, they developed plans, which they had already previously discussed, for large-scale territorial annexations and for the establishment of a German-controlled new order in Europe.

James Joll, "The 1914 Debate Continues. Fritz Fischer and His Critics", Past & Present, No. 34 (July 1966), pp. 100–113; also at http://www.jstor.org/stable/650057 [15 Oct. 2013].

M 6 Herwig, 1987

German-American-Canadian historian Holger Herwig on official German efforts to falsify documentation on the origins of World War I (1987):

This article will trace the genesis and course of the official campaign in the Weimar Republic (and beyond) to counter Allied charges of German war guilt (Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles), and offer some suggestions concerning its impact upon subsequent German affairs. The inquiry will show that the German government as early as 1914, and especially during the period from November 1918 to June 1919, sought to "organize" materials in order to answer questions concerning the origins of the war. Further, it will show that from June 1919 through the Third Reich, key elements of the German bureaucracy mounted a massive and successful campaign of disinformation that *purveyed* false propaganda through a wide range of channels. [...]. Writers were also engaged either directly or indirectly by the Foreign Ministry to propagate its views, to organize translations of foreign studies sympathetic to the German cause, and to channel the Wilhelmstrasse's official line to German schools and diplomatic missions via newspapers and radio. Finally, some comments will be directed toward several important memoirs which were either "ordered" by patriotic editors or watered down in their final published versions in an attempt to preserve a national-conservative version of history.

By selectively editing documentary collections, suppressing honest scholarship, *subsidizing* pseudo-scholarship, underwriting mass propaganda, and overseeing the export of this propaganda especially to Britain, France, and the United States, the patriotic self-censors in Berlin exerted a powerful influence on public and elite opinion in Germany and, to a lesser extent outside Germany. Their efforts polluted historical understanding both at home and abroad well into the post-1945 period. [...]

scourge: terror, punishment
flagellant – sb. who beats himself
masochism: getting pleasure from pain
to purvey: to provide
to subsidize: to finance

The significance of the campaign of official and semi-official *obfuscation* and perversion of fact extends well beyond the history of Germany or the origins of the Great War. It raises basic questions concerning the role of the historian in society, scholarly integrity, decency, and public morality. It further illustrates the universal problem of establishing the critical record of events that are sufficiently vital to the national interest to become the objects of partisan propaganda. What is the present generation, for example, to make of the collective and concerted efforts of eminent German scholars purposefully to distort their countrymen's study of history and sociology of knowledge? Does a perverse law operate whereby those events that are most important are hardest to understand because they attract the greatest attention from mythmakers and charlatans? And is a nation well-served when its intellectual establishment *conspires* to obstruct honest investigation into national catastrophes, upon which past, present, and future vital national interests can be reassessed? [...]

Last but not least, my investigation bears directly upon the nature and meaning of the "1914 analogy," which continues to influence political science thought on the possible causes of a third world war. I suggest that the history upon which that analogy was based has been distorted. It serves no purpose to continue to believe that Europe "slid" into war unknowingly in 1914, that no nation harbored aggressive tendencies during the July crisis, and that fate or providence alone designed this cruel course of events. Indeed, the "1914 analogy" ought to be rethought and reworked in light of the actual mindset of German political, diplomatic, and military leaders in 1914.

Holger H. Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patrotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War", International Security, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall, 1987), pp. 6-8; also at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538811 [7 October 2013].

M 7 Clark, 2013

Australian historian Christopher Clark on the current interest in World War I (2013):

There is virtually no viewpoint on [the war's] origins that cannot be supported from a selection of the available sources. And this helps in turn to explain why the "WWI origins" literature has assumed such vast dimensions that no single historian (not even a fantasy figure with an easy command of all the necessary languages) could hope to read it in one lifetime – twenty years ago, an overview of the current literature counted 25,000 books and articles. Some accounts have focused on the *culpability* of one bad-apple state (Germany has been most popular, but not one of the great powers has escaped the *ascription* of chief responsibility); others have shared the blame around or have looked for faults in the 'system'. There was always enough complexity to keep the argument going. [...] Though the debate on this subject is now nearly a century old, there is no reason to believe that it has run its course.

But if the debate is old, the subject is still fresh – in fact it is fresher and more relevant now than it was twenty or thirty years ago. The changes in our own world have altered our perspective on the events of 1914. In the 1960–80s, a kind of period charm accumulated in popular awareness around the events of 1914. It was easy to imagine the disaster of Europe's "last summer" as an Edwardian costume drama. The *effete* rituals and *gaudy* uniforms, the "ornamentalism" of a world still largely organized around hereditary monarchy had a distancing effect on present-day recollection. They seemed to signal that the protagonists were people from another, vanished world. The presumption stealthily asserted itself that if the actors' hats had gaudy green ostrich feathers on them, then their thoughts and motivations probably did too.

And yet what must strike any twenty-first-century reader who follows the course of the summer crisis of 1914 is its raw modernity. It began with a *squad* of suicide bombers and a cavalcade of automobiles. Behind the outrage at Sarajevo was an *avowedly* terrorist organization with a cult of sacrifice, death and revenge; but this organization was extra-territorial, without a clear geographical or political location; it was scattered in cells across political borders, it was unaccountable, its links to any sovereign government were *oblique*, hidden and certainly very difficult to discern from outside the organization. Indeed, one could even say that July 1914 is less remote from us – less illegible – now than it was in the 1980s. Since the end of the Cold War, a system of global bipolar stability has made way for a more complex and unpredictable array of forces, including declining empires and rising powers – a state of affairs that invites comparison with the Europe of 1914. These shifts in perspective prompt us to rethink the story of how war came to Europe. Accepting this challenge

does not mean embracing a vulgar presentism that remakes the past to meet the needs of the present, but rather acknowledging those features of the past of which our changed vantage point can afford us a clearer view.

Among these is the Balkan context of the war's *inception*. Serbia is one of the blind spots in the historiography of the July Crisis. The assassination at Sarajevo is treated in many accounts as a mere pretext, an event with little bearing on the real forces whose interaction brought about the conflict. [...] The marginalization of the Serbian and thereby of the larger Balkan dimension of the story began during the July Crisis itself, which opened as a response to the murders at Sarajevo, but later changed gear, entering a geopolitical phase in which Serbia and its actions occupied a subordinate place.

Our moral compass has shifted, too. The fact that Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia emerged as one of the victor states of the war seemed implicitly *to vindicate* the act of the man who pulled the trigger on 28 June – certainly that was the view of the Yugoslav authorities, who marked the spot where he did so with bronze footprints and a plaque celebrating the assassin's "first steps into Yugoslav freedom". In an era when the national idea was still full of promise, there was an intuitive sympathy with South Slav nationalism and little affection for the ponderous multinational commonwealth of the Habsburg Empire. The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s have reminded us of the lethality of Balkan nationalism. Since Srebrenica and the siege of Sarajevo, it has become harder to think of Serbia as a mere object or victim of great power politics and easier to conceive of Serbian nationalism as an historical force in its own right. From the perspective of today's European Union we are inclined to look more sympathetically – or at least less contemptuously – than we used to on the vanished imperial patchwork of Habsburg Austria-Hungary.

Lastly, it is perhaps less obvious now that we should dismiss the two killings at Sarajevo as a mere mishap incapable of carrying real causal weight. The attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001 exemplified the way in which a single, symbolic event – however deeply it may *be enmeshed* in larger historical processes – can change politics irrevocably, rendering old options obsolete and endowing new ones with an unforeseen urgency.

Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London, 2013), pp. xxiv-xxvii.

obfuscation: confusion
to conspire: to plot, scheme with sb.
culpability: blame
ascription: attribution
effete: soft, womanish
gaudy: bright and vulgar
squad: a small group
avowedly: sworn
oblique: unclear
inception: beginning
to vindicate: to prove sb.'s innocence
to be enmeshed: to be involved

Tasks

1. Summarize Mombauer's central statements (M1).
2. Divide into small groups and chose one of the texts on World War I (M2, M4–M7) to interpret. Report back to your class, considering the following:
   a. Find the main arguments.
   b. Point out the proof the author uses to back up his arguments.
   c. Assess the historical context of the text.
   d. Analyse what the author considers most important and explain why he does so.
3. Evaluate Mombauer's arguments (M1), using the text your group interpreted as proof of your opinion.

1917 – An Epochal Year

During the First World War, unexpected developments affected the course of the war and led to fundamental changes in twentieth century politics and society. These profound changes are considered markers between one historical era and another. Two such changes were the US entry into the war and revolution in Russia. Both developments in 1917 signalled the end of the "long" nineteenth century and the emergence of the United States and the new Soviet Union as superpowers. The US entry into the war has already been presented in the foregoing chapter.

M 1 **Tsar Nicholas II with Wife and Son**
Photograph, ca. 1907

legacy: tradition
to unsettle: to make sb. nervous, upset

M 2 **Russian Peasants**
Photograph, ca. 1910

Revolution in Russia

Autocratic rule was the governing principle in Russia. The tsar claimed his power according to divine right and was supported by the church, the military, and a feared secret police force. There was no *legacy* of individual civil rights or popular sovereignty based on western ideas formed during the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In addition, Russia at the end of the nineteenth century remained largely an agrarian country. Some modern industry had begun in Moscow and St. Petersburg, in the central Urals (with ore deposits), around Baku (oil) and in the Donets Basin (coal mines). This initial industrialization was accompanied by a beginning workers' movement. In exile sometimes within and outside of Russia, leaders of the labour movement organized for the day when the autocratic political system weakened. However, the groups were diverse in their goals and various political factions found it difficult to cooperate. One such group was the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, founded in 1898 to unite the opposition Marxist groups across the entire country. At its Second Party Congress in 1903, the party split into two hostile factions, called the Mensheviks ("minority" in Russian) and Bolsheviks ("majority"). Lenin led the Bolsheviks.

The transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy *unsettled* Russian society. By 1900 a rapidly growing peasant population could not harvest enough food to feed itself; too little land was cultivated and the cultivated land was not productive enough. The government tried to increase the pace of industrialization after 1891, but did so by raising taxes on the peasantry. This forced peasants to seek jobs in industrial centres, which spread dissatisfaction from the cities into the countryside. In factories, eleven-hour workdays at low wages with inhumane and unfair labour practices generated discontent, despite laws restricting child labour and limiting fines on workers for arriving late to work, for example. Trade unions and strikes were outlawed. The authorities carried out various campaigns of Russification, in which non-Russian groups were encouraged (and sometimes forced) to give up their culture and language. The assimilation of various national minorities, for example in the Baltic States and Ukraine, in addition to the Christianization of religious minorities, like Muslims and Jews, was the goal of Russification. These campaigns often raised resentment among the ethnic and religious communities which were targeted. Finally, students increasingly expressed their opposition to the government by demonstrating, rioting, distributing propaganda, and even committing acts of terrorism. Taken separately, these sources of discontent (the agrarian problem, the labour problem, the nationality

M 3 **"Bloody Sunday" in St. Petersburg**
Demonstrators led by G. Gapon demanded social reforms in front of the Winter Palace on 9 January 1905 and were fired upon by the Russian military.
Contemporary painting

problem, and the educational elite problem) might not have been sufficient to spark civil unrest. Taken together, they made up a broad political opposition waiting for an opportunity to voice its demands.

The Revolution of 1905

The opportunity came during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. Military setbacks coupled with food shortages led to increasing unrest. When troops fired on a peaceful demonstration at the Winter Palace in the capital St. Petersburg on 9 January 1905, the incident set off a revolution. Nation-wide strikes occurred, the universities were closed for the rest of the year, army units revolted and naval units mutinied. Russia lost the war against Japan – a humiliation for an international power with one of the world's largest armies facing a nation which had ended its long isolation only in the 1850s. The tsar countered the political agitation by instituting a parliamentary assembly, the State Duma. However, the Duma was limited to advisory functions, and the autocratic position of the tsar remained intact. But the creation of the Duma, together with a constitution in 1906 and the proclamation of civil liberties such as press freedom, satisfied moderate demands. Despite initial military unrest, the army and navy remained loyal to the tsar and were used to put down strikes and riots which continued throughout 1905. Radical political forces remained opposed to the regime, but the changes made were enough to stop the revolutionary movement in 1905.

After the Revolution of 1905 the social and political situation seemed calm. The tsar essentially maintained his autocratic position, but pressure for change continued. As military defeat drew near in 1917, the country was shaken by two revolutions – a moderate one in February, a radical one in October. Other surprising developments accompanied the main events. A coup d'état was hindered, radical agitators were arrested, then released, others went into exile, then returned. Various political groups tried to cooperate with each other,

Calendar Discrepancy

In 1917 the Julian calendar was still in use in Russia, while the western world had adopted the Gregorian calendar. The Julian dates (13 days earlier than the western dates) are given here in the discussion of Russian events.

but were unable to overcome their rivalries. A brief outline of the most important events follows.

The February Revolution of 1917

The First World War put a great strain on the Russian Empire, which did not have the developed resources to support an extended military conflict. As the war continued, food and supplies became scarce, leading to starvation and malnutrition; war casualties (soldiers who died, were wounded, taken prisoner or missing) in Russia were the highest in all the participating countries. In addition, Russian campaigns during the war were unsuccessful. Defeats on the front increased war weariness. By the end of February 1917 troops refused the order to fire on groups of workers demonstrating in Petrograd (the renamed St. Petersburg). Unlike the situation in 1905 the regime abruptly collapsed; Tsar Nicholas II abdicated a few days later.

The System of Dual Power

A Russian Provisional Government formed by deputies from the Duma took over the administration of the country, unopposed by the army. The Provisional Government, led until July by Georgy Lvov, was to remain in office until a constituent assembly could be elected. At the same time, more radical "soviets" ("councils" in Russian) of workers competed with the Provisional Government. This period is known as the era of dual power, with the Provisional Government controlling the state apparatus and the soviets basing their claims to power on a national network of councils supported by the working classes and the political left. The Provisional Government insisted on continuing Russian participation until the war was won – an unpopular political decision.

In April 1917 the German leadership agreed to send the exiled Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin from Switzerland through Germany and Sweden to Russia via closed railway car. The Germans believed that Lenin's presence in Russia would destabilize the Provisional Government and bring about a Russian withdrawal from the war. After arriving in Petrograd Lenin published the April Theses, his programme for the Bolshevik assumption of power during the revolutionary situation. The Bolshevik slogan of "peace, land, and bread!" increased pressure on the Provisional Government to end the war, to distribute land to the peasants, and to end the food shortages. In addition, Lenin propagated "all power to the soviets", which presented a direct challenge

M 4 The System of Dual Power
The Provisional Government (left) and the Petrograd "Soviet of Workers and Soldiers" (right) in the Tauride Palace, an 18th-century noble palace in Petrograd. Photographs, 1917

to the Provisional Government. As the circumstances changed, it was unclear which of the dual powers – the Provisional Government or the soviets – would prevail.

In July 1917 an uprising began in Petrograd; Alexander Kerensky replaced Lvov as prime minister in the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks were accused of being in the pay of the Germans and the party was forbidden. Lenin fled to Finland to avoid arrest. However, the Provisional Government continued to lose support. The government's attempts to reverse the military losses were unsuccessful, desertion among the armed forces was widespread, and popular opinion demanded an end to the war. When a military coup against the Provisional Government began in August, Kerensky appealed to the Petrograd Soviet for help in combating the counterrevolution. In September he proclaimed Russia a republic, without waiting for a constituent assembly to decide the matter. All these measures discredited the Provisional Government, while the Bolsheviks won majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets.

M 5 **Lenin on Arrival in Petrograd from Exile**
Photograph, 3 April 1917

to cede: to surrender, transfer

The October Revolution of 1917

Lenin, who had returned from Finland, took charge of the planned armed uprising at the Bolshevik headquarters in the Petrograd Smoly Institute and oversaw the removal of the Provisional Government from the Winter Palace with surprisingly little violence. On 26 October the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets enacted measures popular with many Russians. A Decree on Peace was designed to prepare the Russian exit from the war, while a Decree on Land transferred the property of landowning estates, the crown, and the monasteries to the Peasants' Soviets. Lenin was elected Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, thus becoming the leader of the first Soviet government. The Bolsheviks then turned to consolidating their political power. Counterrevolutionary tendencies were combated by a new secret police, the Cheka. Elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in December, with results unfavourable to the Bolsheviks, who won only 23.5 % of the vote.



M 6 **Joseph Stalin (1879–1953)**
Stalin is shown here at the18th Party Congress.
Painting by Alexander Gerasimov, 1953

Developments After 1917

The revolutionary upheaval continued for years. The Bolsheviks dissolved the Constituent Assembly in January 1918 after it had met for only one day. After the signing of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk with the Axis Powers, Russian participation in World War I ended. But the peace agreement extracted a high price from Russia: Reparations were set at six billion German gold marks, the Baltic states were *ceded* to Germany, Russian territory in the south Caucasus went to the Ottoman Empire, and Ukraine was declared independent.

The country was plagued by a civil war between "Whites" and "Reds". After November 1918, Western powers interfered in the civil war by supporting the counterrevolutionary "White" forces. The Bolsheviks ruthlessly put down uprisings and revolts, such as the Kronstadt rebellion in 1921, and an era of "Red Terror" decimated the country. Lenin, injured in an assassination attempt in 1918 and then afflicted by three strokes, was an invalid at the time of his death in 1924. He was replaced by Joseph Stalin, whose powers far exceeded Lenin's and who ruled as a dictator until his death in 1953.

Various Historians' Views on the October Revolution

M 7 An Assessment

American journalist John Reed at the Winter Palace on 25 October 1917 (1919):

We went toward the Winter Palace by way of the Admiralteisky. All the entrances to the Palace Square were closed by *sentries*, and a cordon of troops stretched clear across the western end, *besieged* by an uneasy *throng* of citizens. Except for far-away soldiers who seemed to be carrying wood out of the Palace courtyard and piling it in front of the main gateway, everything was quiet. We couldn't make out whether the sentries were pro-Government or pro-Soviet. Our papers from Smolny had no effect, however, so we approached another part of the line with an important air and showed our American passports, saying "Official business!" and shouldered through. At the door of the Palace the same old shveitzari, in their brass-buttoned blue uniforms with the red-and-gold collars, politely took our coats and hats, and we went up-stairs. In the dark, gloomy corridor, stripped of its tapestries, a few old attendants were lounging about, and in front of Kerensky's door a young officer paced up and down, gnawing his moustache. We asked if we could interview the Minister-president. He bowed and clicked his heels.

"No, I am sorry," he replied in French. "Alexander Feodorvitch is extremely occupied just now...." He looked at us for a moment. "In fact, he is not here...." [...]

"Are the Ministers here?"

"They are meeting in some room – I don't know where."

"Are the Bolsheviki coming?"

"Of course. Certainly, they are coming. I expect a telephone call every minute to say that they are coming. But we are ready. We have yunkers in the front of the Palace. Through that door there."

"Can we go in there?"

"No. Certainly not. It is not permitted." Abruptly he shook hands all around and walked away. We turned to the forbidden door, set in a temporary partition dividing the hall and locked on the outside. On the other side were voices, and somebody laughing. Except for that the vast spaces of the old Palace were silent as the grave. An old shveitzar ran up. "No, barin, you must not go in there."

"Why is the door locked?"

"To keep the soldiers in," he answered. After a few minutes he said something about having a glass of tea and went back up the hall. We unlocked the door.

Just inside a couple of soldiers stood on guard, but they said nothing. [...]

The place was all a huge barrack, and evidently had been for weeks, from the look of the floor and walls. Machine guns were mounted on window-sills, rifles stacked between the mattresses.

As we were looking at the pictures an alcoholic breath assailed me from the region of my left ear, and a voice said in thick but fluent French, "I see, by the way you admire the paintings, that you are foreigners." He was a short, puffy man with a baldish head as he removed his cap.

"Americans? Enchanted. I am Stabs-Capitan Vladimir Artzibashev, absolutely at your service."

It did not seem to occur to him that there was anything unusual in four strangers, one a woman, wandering through the defences of an army awaiting attack. [...]

"We had a review this morning early," he went on, as he guided us through the rooms and explained everything. "The Women's Battalion decided to remain loyal to the Government."

"Are the women soldiers in the Palace?"

"Yes, they are in the back rooms, where they won't be hurt if any trouble comes." He sighed. "It is a great responsibility," said he.

For a while we stood at the window, looking down on the Square before the Palace, where three companies of long-coated yunkers were drawn up under arms, being *harangued* by a tall, energetic-looking officer [...]. After a few minutes two of the companies shouldered arms with a clash, barked three sharp shouts, and went swinging off across the Square, disappearing through the Red Arch into the quiet city.

"They are going to capture the Telephone Exchange," said some one. [...]

We walked back up to the Red Arch, where a knot of soldiers was gathered staring at the brightly-lighted Winter Palace and talking in loud tones.

"No, comrades," one was saying. "How can we

sentry: guard
to besiege: to surround
throng: crowd
to harangue: to shout

shoot at them? The Women's Battalion is in there – they will say we have fired on Russian women." [...] Up the Nevsky the whole city seemed to be out promenading. On every corner immense crowds were massed around a core of hot discussion. Pickets of a dozen soldiers with fixed bayonets lounged at the street-crossings, red-faced old men in rich fur coats shook their fists at them, smartly-dressed women screamed epithets; the soldiers argued feebly, with embarrassed grins [...] A man appeared with an armful of newspapers, and was immediately stormed by frantic people, offering a rouble, five roubles, ten roubles, tearing at each other like animals. It was Rabotchi i Soldat, announcing the victory of the Proletarian Revolution, the liberation of the Bolsheviki still in prison, calling upon the Army front and rear for support— a feverish little sheet of four pages, running to enormous type, containing no news....

John Reed, Ten Days That Shook the World (1919), at http://www.marxists.org/archive/reed/1919/10days/10days/ch4.htm [22 Feb 2014].

M 8 The Storming of the Winter Palace

Soviet official version of the storming of the Winter Palace in October 1917 (1939):

The Petrograd workers in those days showed what a splendid schooling they had received under the guidance of the Bolshevik Party. The revolutionary units of the army, prepared for the uprising by the work of the Bolsheviks, carried out fighting orders with precision and fought side by side with the Red Guard. The navy did not lag behind the army. Kronstadt was a stronghold of the Bolshevik Party, and had long since refused to recognize the authority of the Provisional Government.

The cruiser Aurora trained its guns on the Winter Palace, and on October 25 their thunder ushered in a new era, the era of the Great Socialist Revolution.

On October 25 (November 7) the Bolsheviks issued a manifesto "To the Citizens of Russia" announcing that the bourgeois Provisional Government had been deposed and that state power had passed into the hands of the Soviets.

The Provisional Government had taken refuge in the Winter Palace under the protection of cadets and shock battalions. On the night of October 25 the revolutionary workers, soldiers and sailors took the Winter Palace by storm and arrested the Provisional Government.

The armed uprising in Petrograd had won.

History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Short Course (1939), p. 208.

M 9 Why Study the Revolution Today?

US historian Alexander Rabinowitch in 2011:

[T]he October 1917 revolution in Russia was certainly one of, if not the single most important, events in the 20th century.

The revolution occurred in what was then the third largest country in the world, with a population of more than 165 million, occupying an area three times as large as the United States and bigger than China and India combined. It brought Lenin and the Bolsheviks to power, derailing the possibility that Russia would become a liberal democracy on the Western model. It should be kept in mind that the revolution began as an experiment in egalitarian socialism. Into 1918 and on into the 1920s, it stimulated revolutionary unrest throughout Europe and not only Europe.

Under Stalin, the political system spawned by "Red October" was transformed into an all-powerful, ultra-repressive, authoritarian dictatorship. Yet in Europe the threat of a revival of "Red October" remained. In 1933 this contributed to the rise to power of Hitler, who had promised to destroy the Soviet Union and Bolshevism once and for all. Thus the path that led to World War II was set. After the victory of the allies, Stalin's Soviet System expanded into Central and Eastern Europe.

Fear of the spread of Communism helped give rise to the Cold War between East and West which lasted until the implosion of the Soviet system in 1991. Surely, the centrality of the October Revolution in shaping modern European history and indeed world history demonstrates the importance of knowledge about it on the part of thinking people everywhere – and not just academic specialists like me.

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/06/rabi-j01.html?view=print [19 Feb 2014].

Tasks

1. Compare and contrast the descriptions of events in the Winter Palace (M7, M8).
2. Agree or disagree with Rabinowitch (M9), giving reasons for your opinion.

Conclusion

At the end of the First World War Europe was exhausted. The conflict had been far more damaging and destructive than leaders had thought it would be as it began. In the first years after it ended, the war was called the Great War and was regarded as the deadliest conflict in modern history. The failures of diplomacy and politics which followed – these are dealt with in the next chapters in this series – led to the even more catastrophic Second World War.

The First World War marks the end of the "long" nineteenth century and the beginning of the short, "modern" twentieth century. What was "modern" about the war? In military terms some aspects seemed particularly modern: Reliance on increasingly destructive weaponry (poison gas, submarine warfare) regardless of who was killed, and the call for total popular involvement in the war effort. Socially, the war brought an increase in the civil rights and independence of women, as well as extensions to those men who had previously been excluded. Politically, the war led to the fall of four empires (German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman), with the introduction of popular sovereignty in each. All four had difficulties in adjusting to the new political reality. Even in Britain and France – the "winners" of the war – the colonial empires showed serious weakness by the time the conflict ended. Economically, European nations had to deal with the unexpectedly high cost of the war's destruction. Not only did vast stretches of territory (especially along the lines of the front) have to be recultivated, but also pensions and support for war veterans and their families had to be paid.

Generations of historians have studied the origins of the First World War and contributed to an unusually large collection of works dealing with them. Historical controversy also surrounds the revolution in Russia, with different historical "schools" examining the sources and offering interpretations often contradictory to one another. Both of these historical controversies demonstrate how historians are affected by their own social and political contexts.

Two new powers emerged from the war: The United States and the Soviet Union. Their rivalry affected the course of the twentieth century dramatically.

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1914	
28 June	Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria is assassinated in Sarajevo.
5 July	Germany assures Austria-Hungary support in case of war ("blank check").
23 July	Austria-Hungary sends Serbia an ultimatum; Serbian reply is unsatisfactory.
28 July	Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia. Russia mobilizes its forces.
31 July	Germany sends ultimatum to Russia to stop mobilization. Russia insists mobilization is only directed against Austria-Hungary. Germany also sends ultimatum to France.
1 August	France mobilizes and rejects the ultimatum. Germany mobilizes. Germany declares war on Russia. Italy declares her neutrality.
2 August	Germany invades Luxemburg.
3 August	Germany declares war on France and invades Belgium.
4 August	Great Britain declares war on Germany for violating Belgian neutrality.
12 September	The German offensive in the west fails. The war becomes a war of attrition.
1915	
23 May	Italy enters the war on the side of the Allies.
1916	
February – September	The Battle of Verdun
29 August	new German high command (OHL) led by Hindenburg and Ludendorff
1917	
from 1 February	unrestricted submarine warfare
15 March (O.S. 2 March)	The Russian tsar abdicates following the February Revolution.
6 April	US declares war on Germany.
7 November (O.S. 25 October)	Bolsheviks assume power in Russia in the "October Revolution".
5 December	German-Russian armistice
1918	
3 March	Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
from July	Allies open a new western offensive.
28 September	Ludendorrf seeks an armistice.
11 November	armistice signed at Compiègne

November Revolution in Germany
Soldiers at the Brandenburg Gate on 9 November 1918

First President of the Republic: Friedrich Ebert (1919–25)

Women's Right to Vote
Women at a polling station in Berlin, 6 June 1920

"Eliminating the Reichstag"
Collage by John Heartfield, 1932

Last President of the Republic: Paul von Hindenburg (1925–34)

A Soup Kitchen in Germany
A free meal at the Salvation Army, Berlin, 1930



"Our Last Hope – Hitler"
National Socialist election poster, 1932

The Weimar Republic

The Weimar Republic was a brief, but critical episode. The republic was the first democracy in Germany, a goal many had longed for ever since the revolution of 1848. Nevertheless, the republic failed. This chapter considers various reasons why.

The republic was proclaimed in the last days of World War I. War fatigue and the hopelessness of the military situation made continued fighting pointless. However, the sudden collapse of civil and military order overwhelmed the authorities. Allied insistence on democratic governance forced the removal of the German emperor before the war could be ended. Faced with rapid and far-reaching change, political, industrial and military leaders compromised where necessary, but tried to preserve their essential interests as much as possible. Opponents and supporters fought over the future form of the republic during the November Revolution, while the military denied its responsibility for the lost war.

Many Germans found the consequences of the lost war burdensome. Territorial losses, financial burdens created by war debt and reparations, restrictions on the German military all resulted from the Versailles peace treaty. The political elite refused to acknowledge the justification for these measures and stonewalled their implementation. For many years Versailles was seen as the root of all financial evils which befell the country, although political attempts to avoid paying reparations – not the treaty itself – led to hyperinflation.

The Weimar constitution was the most liberal ever seen in Germany. However, when German parliamentarians met after World War II to construct the Basic Law, they had the failure of the Weimar system in mind. The changes they made were intended to prevent an extremist assumption of power like that experienced during the Weimar Republic.

Germany became a motor of cultural creativity during the days of the republic. Berlin especially acted as a magnet for creative people pulled in by the city's tolerance. But modernism was not appreciated by everyone – traditionalists objected not only to the new ideas but also to the hedonism clearly enjoyed in some circles. Indeed, the cultural creativity which some saw as a blessing was proof to others that modern life had become truly degenerate.

Nevertheless, by the mid-1920s the republic seemed to have gained its footing. Gustav Stresemann successfully restored German diplomatic standing in international affairs, inflation was overcome, reparations were reduced, and economic growth resumed. This positive development ended abruptly with the Great Depression. Economic problems led directly to political difficulties, as radicals gathered votes while moderate parties were accused of incompetence and blamed for the economic crisis.

As the parties could no longer maintain a majority coalition, President Hindenburg turned to appointing "presidential governments" which depended on his support alone. Finally, Hindenburg accepted the right-wing extremist Adolf Hitler as chancellor. This ended even the pretence of democratic government in Weimar Germany.

Civil Unrest and a New Start 1918–1919

Startling Changes in 1917

German military strategists prior to World War I had planned a surprise attack which would prevent a long-lasting conflict. When these plans failed, the country lacked natural resources and was unprepared for the hardships caused by a *war of attrition* lasting for over four years.

Various peace initiatives failed, such as US President Wilson's call in 1916 for the warring parties to state their conditions, the Reichstag's peace resolution of 1917, and the Austrian offer of a separate peace in 1917, among others. The outbreak of the Russian Revolution in February led to the signing of a Russian-German armistice in December of 1917 and raised German hopes that the war might still be won. However, the American entry into the war in April 1917 encouraged the Allied Powers to hold on and fed German despair. Active soldiers grew war weary, as did civilians struggling with acute shortages on the home front.

The Generals Recognize the Coming Defeat

In August 1918 the Supreme Command revealed that German military prospects were hopeless and pushed the government to seek an armistice at once on 29 September. The prospect of defeat led to demands for political reform which the Supreme Command quickly took up. The pressing goal was to include the political parties which formed the majority in the Reichstag, but which had played no role in the German government until then. On 3 October 1918 Emperor William II changed his mind and appointed Max von Baden Imperial Chancellor. He in turn insisted that his government be supported by a majority in the Reichstag, took representatives of the Majority Social Democrats, Progressives and the Centrists into his government, and promptly sent a peace note to US President Wilson. The German public was informed of the approaching military defeat on 5 October, to its complete surprise.

Negotiations with the Americans slowed when President Wilson refused to deal with a Germany still led by William II. With the Emperor refusing to abdicate, the military command pushed for a return to full-scale military operations, despite its earlier insistence that the war was lost. This change of course threatened to destroy the armistice negotiations in progress. Baden demanded General Ludendorff's dismissal; he resigned and was replaced by General Groener. On 28 October the Reichstag amended the constitution: The chancellor and ministers were made responsible to the parliament and decisions on war and peace passed to the government. Germany became a parliamentary monarchy, with the role of the Emperor greatly reduced. Meanwhile, soldiers continued to die needlessly on the front and civilians faced the unnerving prospect of a fifth winter of war. While the political leaders looked for an exit strategy, a *tipping point* was reached.

war of attrition: war in which the enemy is worn down through loss of personnel and material
tipping point: when a significant change is made
to mutiny: to revolt against authority
to resort to: to turn to sth. as a final option

Leftists Divided

Revolution had already occurred in Russia and was feared in Germany, where Marxists had envisioned it for some time. However, the German left had divided during the war years, undermining any revolutionary

M 1 **Sailors on the Ship "Prince Regent Luitpold"**
Kiel, November 1918. On the blackboard: "Soldiers' council of the warship Prince Regent Luitpold. Long live the socialist republic!"

M 2 **Friedrich Ebert**
Special issue of the German post office, 1971

cohesion it might have had. The Social Democratic Party had split into the Majority Social Democrats (MSPD) and Independent Social Democrats (USPD); the Spartacists were influenced by Bolshevik ideas from Russia. German leftists were as surprised as the German government when sailors *mutinied* in November 1918.

From Mutiny to Revolution

Sailors in the German navy mutinied against a suicidal order to attack the British fleet in the English Channel from 24 October 1918. Starting on ships near Wilhelmshaven, the mutiny was put down at first, but it quickly moved to the base of naval operations in Kiel. On 3 November naval troops fired on civilians and sailors demonstrating for more food and an end to the war, but the violence merely fired up more public support for demonstrations the following day. Baden sent the SPD deputy Gustav Noske to Kiel to bring the revolt under control. Noske restored order there on 4 November, but could not prevent the revolt from spreading. Indeed, the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils across all of Germany made radical revolution a real possibility – an idea as frightening to established conservative circles as to reform-minded Social Democrats.

By 6 November Wilhelmshaven was also in the hands of the mutineers. The revolt quickly included all the larger German coastal cities as well as Hanover, Frankfurt on the Main, Brunswick, Stuttgart, and Munich. On 8 November Kurt Eisner, a journalist and Independent Social Democrat, declared Bavaria the first "soviet republic" ("Räterepublik", the term approximated the Russian usage) in Germany. The territorial princes either abdicated or were deposed.

On 9 November Baden, still unable to obtain William's consent, *resorted to* a fait accompli and published a statement announcing the abdication. Baden also passed his own office on to Friedrich Ebert, leader of the MSPD and the largest faction in the parliament. When Philipp Scheidemann (MSPD) heard that the Spartacist Karl Liebknecht was about to proclaim a socialist republic, he walked to a balcony of the Reichstag and proclaimed the German republic. Ebert was horrified – he had expected to save the monarchy. That was no longer possible. Liebknecht, standing on a car in a park in front of the royal palace, proclaimed the "free socialist republic" at about the same time; he repeated his proclamation about two hours later from the palace balcony.

Ebert Forms a Provisional Government

Ebert's provisional government called itself into being as the Council of People's Deputies ("Rat der Volksbeauftragten") on 10 November. It consisted of six Social Democrats equally represented from the majority and independent factions and was supported by the workers' and soldiers' councils. In addition, an elected twenty-eight member Executive Council of the Socialist German Republic ("Vollzugsrat") acted in the name of the various workers' and soldiers' councils in Berlin. The two councils appeared to compete with each other in political matters briefly. National elections for a constituent assembly were scheduled for 19 January 1919.

The Ebert-Groener Pact

During the evening of 9-10 November General Wilhelm Groener called Ebert from military headquarters in Spa offering to provide the new government with support in return for Ebert's assurance that the army could remain independent of civilian control. Thus Ebert made certain that leftist agitation from the independent socialists, the Spartacists, and the workers' and soldiers' councils could be resisted by military means. In addition, the military commanders would plan for the orderly retreat and return of German soldiers after the signing of the armistice. Groener secured a lack of democratic control over the German military into the republican era.

Armistice Signed

In the meantime, Max von Baden had sent a group of delegates led by Matthias Erzberger (Centre Party, "Zentrum", Z) to sign the armistice with the Allies. This went into effect at 11 a.m. on 11 November and the military catastrophe of an Allied invasion of Germany was avoided.

Employers and Labour Come to an Agreement

Under pressure from the growing strength of the councils, German industrialists and labour movement leaders negotiated an agreement to prevent an eventual nationalization of industry and with it the end of trade unions. Labour representatives led by Carl Legien signed an agreement with industrialists led by Hugo Stinnes and Carl Friedrich von Siemens on 15 November 1918. This Stinnes-Legien Agreement recognized trade unions as the sole legitimate representatives of the workers, instituted the eight hour working day, and set up workers' committees ("Betriebsräte") in factories to oversee workers' rights and to deal with factory owners on a cooperative basis. In return for the employers' acceptance of these long-term union demands, the workers agreed to maintain orderly production in the factories, to refrain from wild strikes, and to rely on workers' committees rather than councils in the work place.

M 3 **"Spartacist Revolt"**
Street battles in the publishing district of Berlin, 5 January 1919

Civil Unrest Continues

In December 1918 the Spartacists founded the new Communist Party of Germany ("Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands", KPD). Although it could not rely on much popular support, its charismatic leaders Liebknecht and Luxemburg were well-known. Nevertheless, fears of a Bolshevik revolution in Germany united Ebert and the MSPD together with the army to put down leftist disturbances. Here the Free Corps ("Freikorps") also came into play. These units of demobilized soldiers commanded by former officers were joined by unemployed adventurers and disappointed nationalists to fight in the streets against those they considered left-wing.

The Executive Council called for a "First General Convention of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils" ("Erster Allgemeiner Kongress der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte") in Berlin on 16 December. Although a military unit killed several Spartacists and USPD members in an attempt to keep the convention from meeting, on 19 December the convention rejected a soviet model of government for Germany and supported the government's decision to hold elections to a constituent assembly. On Christmas Eve Ebert ordered a division of sailors removed from the

M 4 Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919)

royal stables near the palace, but the operation was unsuccessful. The debacle proved that Ebert lacked the power to enforce his orders and reinforced his reliance on Groener's military to provide security for the government. The USPD reacted to the violence and the use of the military against the rebels by withdrawing its representatives from the Council of the People's Deputies.

In early January 1919 workers occupied the editorial offices of newspapers critical of the workers' and soldiers' councils. Some leaders of the USPD and the KPD supported the workers, calling for a general strike on 7 January which drew 500,000 participants. The strike was followed by some of the workers arming themselves and attempting to establish a soviet republic by violence. This "Spartacist Revolt" was crushed by troops summoned by Gustav Noske, minister of national defence, and led by General von Lüttwitz, commander of the army in Berlin. The revolt ended on 13 January. Nevertheless, Free Corps in Berlin continued to seek rebels in the city and deal with them harshly. They caught Liebknecht and Luxemburg on 15 January 1919 and murdered both. This led to demonstrations and protests in other German cities. Noske and his troops put these down together with council republics in the other major German cities. The Munich soviet republic was the last to be eliminated in May 1919.

Changing Assessments of the Revolution

The lack of cooperation among the leftist political parties, as well as Ebert's distrust of the workers' and soldiers' councils plagued the political atmosphere of the republic throughout its existence. The fact that the MSPD relied on the conservative forces of the army during the revolutionary situation meant that the essential structures of Imperial Germany could not be reformed but continued into the republic. For many years the revolution was belittled as no "real revolution" and the republic as a "republic without republicans".

to malign: to tell harmful lies about sth.

During the era of the Weimar Republic, the November revolution was *maligned by* conservative circles as having been the "stab in the back" to the German army during World War I. To members of the MSPD, the workers' and soldiers' councils appeared to raise the red flag of Bolshevism. Ebert's reliance on military elites has been criticized for preserving the old order into the republic. However, Ebert sought stability in an acutely troubled situation. Some members of the USPD and, of course, Spartacists and Communists regarded the revolution as merely "bourgeois" and not far-reaching enough to achieve truly socialist goals. During the Nazi era, the "stab in the back" criticism of the revolution became the official interpretation to the exclusion of all others.

After 1945 the Weimar Republic was regarded as a tragic forerunner to Nazism. In this view the failure of the republic at its end was the most important aspect of historical study, displacing the early difficulties of the November revolution almost entirely. East German historians largely dealt with the revolution in terms of the MSPD's betrayal of the working class and the USPD's incompetent leaders. Since the West German student demonstrations of 1968 and the massive popular demonstrations of 1989 leading to the fall of East Germany, historical interest in popular unrest during the November revolution has been revived.

Material on the "Stab in the Back" Myth

M 5 Call for an Armistice

The German Supreme Command (led by General Paul von Hindenburg) calls for an armistice (3 October 1918):

The Supreme Command continues to hold to its demand expressed on Sept. 29 of this year that a request for an armistice should be sent to our enemies immediately. As a result of the collapse on the Macedonian front, the consequent weakening of the reserves on the western front, and the impossibility of making good the very severe losses which we have suffered in the last few days, there is, as far as it is humanly possible to judge, no future chance of forcing a peace on the enemy. [...] The situation becomes daily more critical, and the Supreme Command may be forced to take very grave decisions. The circumstances call for a cessation of hostilities in order to spare the German nation and its allies needless sacrifices. Each day that is lost costs the lives of thousands of brave soldiers.

Letter signed by General Paul von Hindenburg to Chancellor Max von Baden, 3 October 1918, cited in: Arthur Rosenberg, A History of the Weimar Republic (London: 1936), p. 245.

M 6 Creating the Myth

General Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg's testimony before the parliamentary investigative committee, 18 November 1919:

General Field Marshall v. Hindenburg: History will render the final judgment on that about which I may give no further details here. At the time we still hoped that the will to victory would dominate everything else. When we assumed our post we made a series of proposals to the Reich leadership which aimed at combining all forces at the nation's disposal for a quick and favorable conclusion to the war; at the same time, they demonstrated to the government its enormous tasks. What finally became of our proposals, once again partially because of the influence of the parties, is known. I wanted forceful and cheerful cooperation and instead encountered failure and weakness.

Chairman: That, too, is a value judgment, against which I must enter a definite protest.

von Hindenburg: The concern as to whether the homeland would remain resolute until the war was won, from this moment on, never left us. We often raised a warning voice to the Reich government. At this time, the secret intentional mutilation of the fleet and the army began as a continuation of similar occurrences in peace time. The effects of these endeavors were not concealed from the Supreme Army Command during the last year of the war. The obedient troops who remained immune to revolutionary attrition suffered greatly from the behavior, in violation of duty, of their revolutionary comrades; they had to carry the battle the whole time.

(Chairman's bell. Commotion and shouting.)

Chairman: Please continue, General Field Marshall.

von Hindenburg: The intentions of the command could no longer be executed. Our repeated proposals for strict discipline and strict legislation were not adopted. Thus did our operations necessarily miscarry; the collapse was inevitable; the revolution only provided the keystone.

(Commotion and shouting.)

An English general[1] said with justice: "The German army was stabbed in the back." No guilt applies to the good core of the army. Its achievements are just as admirable as those of the officer corps. Where the guilt lies has clearly been demonstrated. If it needed more proof, then it would be found in the quoted statement of the English general and in the boundless astonishment of our enemies at their victory.

That is the general trajectory of the tragic development of the war for Germany, after a series of brilliant, unsurpassed successes on many fronts, following an accomplishment by the army and the people for which no praise is high enough. This trajectory had to be established so that the military measures for which we are responsible could be correctly evaluated.

1 The general referred to was British General Frederick Maurice, who led the British Armistice Commission, but he has denied having said it.

Source of English translation: Paul von Hindenburg, "The Stab in the Back" (November 18, 1919), in: The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg. Published by the University of California Press, pp. 15–16.

Source of original German text: Stenographischer Bericht über die öffentlichen Verhandlungen des 15. Untersuchungsausschusses der verfassungsgebenden Nationalversammlung, vol. 2. Berlin, 1920, pp. 700–01.

M 7 An Assessment

British historian Richard Evans on the stab in the back myth (2004):

[The] provisions [of the armistice] were almost universally felt in Germany as an unjustified

national humiliation. Resentment was hugely increased by the actions taken, above all by the French, to enforce them. The harshness of the Armistice terms was thrown into sharp relief by the fact that many Germans refused to believe that their armed forces had actually been defeated. Very quickly, aided and abetted by senior army officers themselves, a fateful myth gained currency among large sections of public opinion in the centre and on the right of the political spectrum. Picking up their cue from Richard Wagner's music-drama The Twilight of the Gods, many people began to believe that the army had only been defeated because, like Wagner's fearless hero Siegfried, it had been stabbed in the back by its enemies at home. Germany's military leaders Hindenburg and Ludendorff claimed shortly after the war that the army had been the victim of a "secret, planned, demagogic campaign" which had doomed all its heroic efforts to failure in the end. [...] Kaiser Wilhelm II repeated the phrase in his memoirs, written in the 1920s: "For thirty years the army was my pride. For it I lived, upon it I laboured, and now, after four and a half brilliant years of war with unprecedented victories, it was forced to collapse by the stab-in-the-back from the dagger of the revolutionist, at the very moment when peace was within reach." Even the Social Democrats contributed to this comforting legend. As the returning troops streamed into Berlin on 10 December 1918, the party leader Friedrich Ebert told them: "No enemy has overcome you!"

Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (London: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 60–61.

M 8 **"The Betrayal of Judas"**
Antisemitic drawing by Willy Knabe, 1942

Tasks

1. Interpret the photograph of the November Revolution on page 4, considering the reactions of the bystanders.
2. Choose two incidents between November 1918 and January 1919. Explain the effect both had in Germany (text).
3. Portray the origins of the "stab in the back" myth. Indicate who was made responsible for the lost war as time passed (M5–M8).

Material on the November Revolution

M 11 Three Assessments

a) German historian Reinhard Rürup (1968):

To this day, the literature about the 1918–19 revolution reflects certain characteristic doubts as to whether it was a "real" or a sham revolution – a collapse incorrectly described as revolution. The contemporaries of the revolution had, at least to begin with, no doubts on that score. [...] Yet opinions began to change even before the revolution had run its full course, and people tended increasingly to assess the revolution in terms of its accomplishments. [...] With the passage of time, such reinterpretations became even more pronounced, and the revolution was increasingly seen and described as no more than a collapse or a "transition period" between two systems through which the country had to pass.

In actual fact, there was a revolution in Germany in 1918–19. Recent research confirms this beyond a shadow of doubt. True, it was a movement born of misery and exhaustion, and the overthrow of the monarchy was in itself not a creative act. But that was not all that happened. The revolutionary mass movement which developed early in November pursued aims which went beyond a revolt against the symptoms of mismanagement. The revolution had a programme; even though the spontaneous character of the movement prevented its precise formulation, its outlines were nevertheless quite plain. The revolutionary movement strove for the abolition of the authoritarian state and for a truly democratic transformation of political, social and economic conditions. It sought to liberate the people from political and social dependency and to lay the foundations for a constitution of freedom. This programme was not carried out. The history of the revolution is the history of its step-by-step regression. The revolution failed even though the new governments which it brought to power managed for a time to remain in office. The revolution ended in its own negation – not as the result of a successful counter-revolution – but through the establishment of a political order which might well have been achieved without a revolution, but which, in any case, made no use of any of the political options presented by the revolution.

Reinhard Rürup, "Problems of the German Revolution 1918–19", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1918–19: From War to Peace (Oct. 1968), pp. 133–35.

b) American historian Gerald Feldman (1993):

[...T]he fact that historians speak quite comfortably about revolutions in 1830 and 1848 which produced minor changes or were unsuccessful makes one wonder why the German Revolution of 1918–1919 cannot be treated with the respect it deserves. The revolutions of 1989 provide even more compelling evidence that 1789 and 1917 are not the only models of true revolution. Certainly the spreading of the councils movement from Kiel clear across Germany in a matter of days is about as spontaneous a development as one could wish, even if it lacks the *cinematic* possibilities provided by the Bastille and the Winter Palace. The real difficulty, of course, is that the November Revolution did not lead to a social and economic revolution and that the Republic it established came to such a sorry end in 1933, allegedly in large measure because of the "incomplete" Revolution of 1918–1919. [...]

Two analytical points may be made at the outset. First, it is misleading to think of continuity and revolution as mutually exclusive. The idea that an important function of revolution can be to maintain and legitimize changes that have already taken place is an old one, but it deserves *reiteration* in this context. Second, there is reason to doubt whether a full-scale revolution in the sense of the "great" revolutions is possible in as advanced an industrial society as the Germany of 1918. One of the reasons for this is the dependence of the population upon the services of highly organized and articulated state agencies that makes running the risk of a total breakdown of the state structure unacceptable to most of civil society. Another, however, is that civil society itself is highly organized and has available efficiently led, self-interested economic and social groups and parties which have the mass bases, skills, and power to assume responsibility and "manage" the revolutionary crisis.

Gerald D. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 87.

cinematic: relating to film, filmic
reiteration: repetition

c) British historians David Evans and Jane Jenkins on the November Revolution (1999):

Bearing in mind the condition of Germany towards the end of 1918 when set against the general European background, it is easy to understand why some thought the country "ripe for revolution". The nation's morale had been shattered by defeat in war, shortages remained acute, demobilisation was slow and disorganised, and the country was awash with arms. With the Hohenzollerns out of the way, there was a feeling that it was time to make a break with Germany's imperial past and create a more just society. On the face of it, events in Germany seemed about to follow a close parallel with those in Russia a year earlier. The nation was in a state of turmoil, the monarchy had been overthrown and a provisional government set up, a network of workers' and soldiers' councils was widespread across the country, and left-wing extremists were actively planning a coup in Berlin similar to that engineered by the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg in October 1917. However, there were also major differences in the comparative situations. Germany was an advanced industrial nation with a powerful capitalist class backed by a substantial and influential middle class. The condition of the German working classes, who since the 1880s had benefited from a range of welfare measures, was in no way similar to that of their Russian counterparts who for generations had suffered tsarist indignity and oppression. Unlike the Russian army, which, humiliated time and again, had been driven to mutiny, the German army could still reflect on the glorious achievements of Prussian militarism in bringing about the nation's unification. Hindenburg, in common with other Germans of his age, had fought at the Battle of Sadowa in 1866 and taken part in the victorious campaign against France in 1870 – both still within living memory. Even with the Kaiser gone, there were still powerful conservative forces in position in the civil service, the judiciary and the professions and the old class structure remained intact. Hindenburg and Ludendorff may have passed from the scene temporarily but High Command influence was still in place in the form of General Groener and others.

The political left, whose whole-hearted commitment to revolution was essential, was divided in both policy aims and strategy. The majority SPD was far from revolutionary and more dedicated to the introduction of social reform and the promotion of democratic government. Whilst Hugo Haase's Independent Socialists of the USPD were more radical, they certainly did not envisage a revolutionary solution to the nation's problems. The Spartacists and other minority extremist groups did preach revolution but the threat they presented to the stability of Ebert's government proved to be exaggerated. In 1918, there was widespread discontent which resulted in demonstrations and strikes but these were aimed more at the Kaiser and his discredited military clique than the capitalists and upper classes. With the socialists disunited and lacking in revolutionary intent, anarchy on a grand scale never really occurred. Ebert's pact with Groener was also born of the fear that left-wing militancy might threaten German stability, possibly lead to civil war and jeopardise the peace talks about to start in Paris. The fact that the revolutionaries stood no chance against the military and Freikorps was not clear to Ebert at the time and consequently he was judged to have over-reacted. It was certainly true that the willingness shown by the SPD leadership to collaborate with the military was not a good omen for the future.

David Evans and Jane Jenkins, Years of Weimar and the Third Reich (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999), pp. 12–13.

Tasks

1. State the main arguments of Rürup, Feldman, and Evans/Jenkins regarding the November Revolution (M11, a–c).
2. Evaluate the historians' assessments.
3. Compare and contrast the lasting effects of the Russian Revolution in 1917 with the German November Revolution.

Treaty of Versailles and the Weimar Constitution

Military Defeat Leads to the Collapse of Four Empires

Four imperial powers collapsed as a direct result of losses suffered in World War I: the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman Empires. The first was swept aside by the two Russian revolutions in 1917. In a separate peace signed between the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) and the Soviet Union at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, the Soviet government renounced vast expanses of territory in then western Russia and agreed to pay six billion marks as compensation to Germany.

Although the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk became ineffective within the year it was signed, the Soviet revolutionaries seemed to threaten Germany directly when the German monarchy was deposed in November of 1918. One of the major concerns of the new German republic was how to deal with leftists demanding a Soviet type of government. Military defeat in Austria-Hungary in 1918 led to the dissolution of the dual monarchy and multinational empire. Finally, the Ottoman Empire, long considered the sick man of Europe, was partitioned when hostilities ended in 1918 and was replaced by the new Republic of Turkey in 1923.

When considering the political and economic burden that the peace treaty of Versailles placed on the new German republic, the effects suffered by the other Central Powers in their own separate peace treaties following World War I should be kept in mind. Although Germany was indeed punished, Austria (in the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye) and Hungary (in the Treaty of Trianon) lost relatively more territory while the state of Austria-Hungary was dissolved entirely. Bulgaria (in the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine) and the Ottoman Empire (in the Treaty of Sèvres) also suffered substantial losses. However, the settlement with the Ottoman Empire was set aside when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established Turkish national independence and a new peace treaty was negotiated.

M 1 **"Down with the Dictated Peace!"**
Demonstration against Versailles in the Berlin Lustgarten, May 1919

The Treaty of Versailles

German and American leaders in 1918 believed that Wilson's Fourteen Points would serve as the basis of negotiations for the peace treaty. However, when the Peace Conference convened in Paris on 18 January 1919, other negotiators, especially Lloyd George of Britain and Clemenceau of France, pushed for harsher terms. On 7 May the German delegation, which had arrived in Paris only a week earlier, was given the terms of the treaty. Not only did the members of the delegation refuse to sign, but Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann in Berlin called the treaty dishonourable and resigned from office, bringing down the government. Under extreme pressure to sign or see the war resume, a new German delegation finally signed the treaty on 28 June 1919.

The German public, which was completely unprepared for its punitive terms, found the treaty outrageous. Germany lost ten percent of its population and thirteen percent of its land area on the continent; the German colonies were placed under Allied mandates. The largest territorial losses were in Alsace-Lorraine (which was returned to France) and parts of provincial Posen and West Prussia (which were added to the revived state of Poland). Danzig became a free city under



M 2

the administration of the League of Nations; the left bank of the Rhine and a fifty-kilometre wide demilitarized zone on the right bank fell under Allied occupation for fifteen years. France took over possession of the Saar coalfields; a plebiscite to decide their national status was to be held in 1935. The German army was reduced to a force of 100,000 men and military conscription was abolished; the navy consisted of only 15,000 men, a small number of ships and no submarines. No air force was permitted. Two aspects of the treaty responsible for German popular resentment were the Allied demands for the Kaiser to be turned over for trial as a war criminal and the insistence on German reparations for war damages. The total sum of reparations was not set at Versailles, but by a Reparations Commission which set the sum at 132 billion marks (then $31.4 billion or £6.6 billion) in 1921. Although historians have often presented this sum as accurate, it was never intended to actually be paid.

One provision from Wilson's Fourteen Points which was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles was the founding of the League of Nations. This international organization (and forerunner of the United Nations) to promote peace was established with headquarters in Geneva. However, the League did not admit the Soviet Union or Germany – both pariah states at the time. The United States did not join the League or sign the Treaty of Versailles, as Wilson could not get the US Senate to approve either foreign treaty. Germany eventually joined the League in 1926.

M 3 **"Constitution of the German Reich"**
Title page of the edition for schools, 1919

The Weimar Constitution

Elections for the National Assembly were held on 19 January 1919. Women had the right to vote for the first time. Because Berlin was considered too dangerous, the assembly met in Weimar from 6 February until 11 August, when the constitution was signed by President Friedrich Ebert. The solid democratic majority which was elected to the assembly and worked out the constitution continued to lose strength in later elections; government coalitions in the following years were short-lived. From February 1919 until January 1930, twenty different government coalitions were formed.

Constitutional Principles

The Weimar Constitution established the German "Reich" (a term which continued from the Imperial era) as a republic. A system of federal states ("Länder"), the separation of powers, elections based on proportional representation, and a catalogue of human and civil rights were formulated within a relatively short time. The National Assembly voted to approve the constitution by a vote of 262 to 75 on 31 July 1919.

Problematical features of the constitution were recognized later in the powers of the president, the role of the chancellor and cabinet ministers, and plebiscites.

The President

The president had executive powers to appoint and dismiss governments, to appoint judges, to dissolve the national parliament (Reichstag), to act as commander-in-chief of the military and as head of state in international affairs. He was also given special powers in emergency situations (Article 48) and could call for referenda on laws passed by the Reichstag. He was elected directly by popular vote for a seven-year term of office. For the most part, the president's constitutional role was similar to the German emperor's functions in the pre-Weimar era.

The Chancellor and Cabinet

The chancellor and cabinet ministers were appointed and dismissed by the president. However, the constitution required that the chancellor and his ministers have the confidence of the Reichstag; if not, they could be removed from office by a parliamentary vote of no confidence. The direction of policy was to be determined by the chancellor. It remained unclear how the government could act if the Reichstag and the president did not agree.

The Parliament

The Reichstag was elected proportionally by men and women voters over the age of twenty. If the president found a measure passed by the Reichstag questionable, he could call for the voters to approve or disapprove of it. Such a vote was also possible if five per cent of the electorate petitioned for it (referendum). Ten per cent of the electorate could also petition for a plebiscite on a law proposed by the voters themselves (initiative). Thus, both the president and the voters could directly affect decisions made by the chancellor and his government in the Reichstag.

Material on Versailles

M 4 Treaty of Versailles

Excerpts from the Treaty (1919):

ARTICLE 227

The Allied and Associated Powers publicly *arraign* William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.

A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.

In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, with a view *to vindicating* the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed.

The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial. [...]

ARTICLE 231

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

ARTICLE 232

The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.

The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the *belligerency* of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partviii.asp [28 March 2013]

M 5 "War Guilt"?

American historian Sally Marks on "war guilt" and the Treaty of Versailles (1978):

The myths about German reparations begin with the Versailles Treaty. The much-criticized "war guilt clause," Article 231, which was designed to lay a legal basis for reparations, in fact makes no mention of war guilt. It does specify "the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." That Germany committed an act of aggression against Belgium is beyond dispute. Further, upon the theory of collective responsibility, the victors incorporated the same clause, mutatis mutandis, in the treaties with Austria and Hungary, neither of whom interpreted it as a declaration of war guilt. In later years, however, German politicians and propagandists *fulminated* endlessly about "unilateral war guilt," convincing many who had not read the treaties of their injustice on this point.

While Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty established an unlimited theoretical liability, Article 232 in fact narrowed German responsibility to civilian damages as defined in an annex.

Sally Marks, "The Myths of Reparations", Central European History, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sept. 1978), pp. 231–32.

M 6 Two Historians' Views on the Treaty of Versailles

a) Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan on the Treaty of Versailles (2001):

With different leadership in the Western democracies, with stronger democracy in Weimar Germany, without the damage done by the Depression, the story might have turned out differently. And without Hitler to mobilize the resentments of ordinary Germans and to play on the guilty consciences of so many in the democracies, Europe might not have had another

to arraign: to blame, to charge with a crime
to vindicate: to justify
belligerency: warfare
to fulminate: to criticize harshly

Material on Versailles

war so soon after the first. The Treaty of Versailles is not to blame. It was never consistently enforced, or only enough to irritate German nationalism without limiting German power to disrupt the peace of Europe. With the triumph of Hitler and the Nazis in 1933 Germany had a government that was bent on destroying the Treaty of Versailles. In 1939 Von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, told the victorious Germans in Danzig: "The Führer has done nothing but remedy the most serious consequences which this most unreasonable of all dictates in history imposed upon a nation and, in fact, upon the whole of Europe, in other words repair the worst mistakes committed by none other than the statesmen of the western democracies."

Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World (London: John Murray, 2001), p. 493.

b) British historian Richard J. Evans on the Treaty of Versailles (2003):

[The Treaty of Versailles] was greeted with incredulous horror by the majority of Germans. The sense of outrage and disbelief that swept through the German upper and middle classes like a shock wave was almost universal, and had a massive impact on many working-class supporters of the moderate Social Democrats as well. Germany's international strength and prestige had been on an upward course since unification in 1871, so most Germans felt, and now, suddenly, Germany had been brutally expelled from the ranks of the Great Powers and covered in what they considered to be undeserved shame. Versailles was condemned as a dictated peace, unilaterally imposed without the possibility of negotiation. The enthusiasm which so many middle-class Germans had demonstrated for war in 1914 flipped over into burning resentment at the terms of peace four years later.

In fact, the peace settlement created new opportunities for German foreign policy in East-Central Europe, where the once-mighty Habsburg and Romanov empires had been replaced by a *squabbling congeries* of small and unstable states such as Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. The Treaty's territorial provisions were mild compared with what Germany would have imposed on the rest of Europe in the event of victory, as the programme drawn up by the German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in September 1914 had clearly indicated in principle, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concluded with the defeated Russians in the spring of 1918, had graphically demonstrated in practice. A German victory would have led to a huge reparations bill being served on the defeated Allies, too, no doubt many times larger than that which Bismarck had sent to the French after the war of 1870-71. The reparations bills that Germany actually did have to pay from 1919 onwards were not beyond the country's resources to meet and not unreasonable given the *wanton* destruction visited upon Belgium and France by the occupying German armies. In many ways, the peace settlement of 1918-19 was a brave attempt at marrying principle and pragmatism in a dramatically altered world. In other circumstances it might have stood a chance of success. But not in the circumstances of 1919, when almost any peace terms would have been condemned by German nationalists who felt they had been unjustly cheated of victory.

Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 66–67.

squabbling: arguing
congeries: accumulation
wanton: careless, reckless

Tasks

1. Outline the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles for Germany (text, M2).
2. Interpret German outrage about the Treaty of Versailles (text, M1–2, M4–5). Give your opinion of the treaty today.
3. Comment on the two historians' views on the Treaty of Versailles (M6, a–b).

Material on the Weimar Constitution



M 7

M 8 Historical Assessments of the Weimar Constitution

a) American journalist William L. Shirer (1960):

The constitution which emerged from the Assembly after six months of debate [...] was, on paper, the most liberal and democratic document of its kind the twentieth century had seen, mechanically well-nigh perfect, full of ingenious and admirable devices which seemed to guarantee the working of an almost flawless democracy. The idea of cabinet government was borrowed from England and France, of a strong popular President from the United States, of the referendum from Switzerland. An elaborate and complicated system of proportional representation and voting by lists was established in order to prevent the wasting of votes and give small minorities a right to be represented in Parliament.

William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (London: Mandarin, 1960), p. 56.

b) British historian Richard J. Evans (2003):

All in all, Weimar Germany's constitution was no worse than the constitutions of most other countries in the 1920s, and a good deal more democratic than many. Its more problematical provisions might not have mattered so much had circumstances been different. But the fatal lack of legitimacy from which the Republic suffered magnified the constitution's faults many time over.

Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 88.

Tasks

1. Point out problematical aspects of the Weimar Constitution (text, M7).
2. Compare and contrast your assessment of the constitution with those of both historians (M8, a–b).

M 1 **Matthias Erzberger**
Murdered by nationalist radicals in 1921



M 2 **Memorial Stone for Matthias Erzberger in the Black Forest**

For Internet research

Statistician Emil Julius Gumbel's excellent work, Vier Jahre politischer Mord (Berlin, 1922), which deals with political murders in Germany from 1919 to 1922, is available in German at http://www.archive.org/stream/vierjahrepolitis00gumb#page/n0/mode/2up

Years of Instability 1919–1923

The early years of the republic were characterized by dramatic political and economic troubles.

Murder as a Political Weapon

Ebert and other Social Democrats worried about the leftist threat to Germany early on, but right-wing political activists proved a far greater danger to the republic. Conservative and nationalist groups sided with military circles and the forces of the "Free Corps" to destabilize the republic and restore the monarchy. The "stab-in-the-back" myth propagated to block criticism of the military served as an excuse to rid Germany of its democratic leadership.

The speed of the change to a republican government in 1918 had left some social elements behind. For example, many civil servants remained loyal to the monarchy. Policemen who arrested right-wing extremists, as well as the state *prosecutors* and judges who tried them, often sympathized with the political goals of the accused. Indeed, the mild sentences given to right-wing assassins seemed to encourage those who took the law into their own hands. The deaths of moderate and left-wing activists intimidated and silenced many who did not agree with the right-wing *perpetrators*. One of the greatest weaknesses of the republic was its inability to protect its supporters.

Political Murders, 1919–1922

political murders committed	by leftists	by rightists
total political murders	22	354
unpunished murders	4	326
sentences passed	38	24
confessed perpetrators freed	–	23
length of prison sentence per murder	15 years	4 months
executions	10	–

Following the Kapp Putsch (1920) 705 crimes were officially reported. Of those, 412 were amnestied, 176 cases were not taken to trial, one (1) sentence was put into effect.

from H. Pross, Die Zerstörung der deutschen Politik, Frankfurt 1959, p. 139 f.

Attempted Overthrows of the Government

The republic was threatened from all sides: In early 1919 the Spartacist revolt was put down, but in March 1920 an attempted coup d'état of active and former military servicemen led by Wolfgang Kapp began in Berlin. General Seeckt, the acting commander of the army, insisted that the army would not fire on its own soldiers. Despite Seeckt's lack of support for the government, the coup failed within only five days. Its planners had organized and coordinated their goals poorly; also a general strike called in Berlin mobilized the working class and effectively shut down the city.

President Ebert was unable to dismiss the generals who had let down the government, as the attempted coup set off left-wing unrest in

the Ruhr area. Ebert was forced to turn to Seeckt to restore order there. Consequences of the Kapp Putsch extended to Bavaria, where the right-wing separatist Gustav von Kahr removed the elected government and installed himself as the head of an anti-republican government until his resignation in September 1921.

A Year of Crises – 1923

Several crises in 1923 threatened the existence of the republic, as they raised questions about the ability of government to maintain democracy in the country.

Reparations

Although the German delegation had been forced to accept the payment of reparations by the Treaty of Versailles, her leaders hoped to achieve a reduction in the sum demanded through later negotiations. In a series of international conferences in the early 1920s this strategy paid off, as the sum was continually reduced. However, because the Allied propaganda throughout the war had insisted that the Germans would eventually pay for the war debts, it was politically suicidal for Allied statesmen to reduce the German debt in public. Thus, a payment schedule was adopted in 1921 which hid the actual reduction from all except the most financially skilled. Nevertheless, the German government continued to insist that the reparations were the source of the increasing German inflation, which was too simple an explanation of the problem.

M 3 **Inflation in Germany**
After the introduction of the Rentenmark a woman burns the worthless old currency in her kitchen stove, Berlin, 1923

Inflation in Germany

The First World War was financed in Germany by loans rather than raised taxes. Upon losing the war, Germany had to repay her national debt as well as the reparations which were demanded by the Allies. Pensions for war invalids, widows and orphans put an additional burden on public finances. Inflation had begun during the war years, but after 1918 it increased, partly because moderate inflation is a subtler financial instrument for politicians to use than increased taxation. The Allies insisted that German taxes be increased (German tax levels were lower than those in the Entente countries after 1918) and Matthias Erzberger, the minister of finance, carried out an extensive reform of the tax structure. However, as inflation levels grew, the Erzberger finance reform failed because income taxes were set before they were collected. In the time gap between assessment and collection the value of the mark decreased before the taxes were finally paid. Even financial reform became a victim of hyperinflation.

The Occupation of the Ruhr and Hyperinflation

In May 1921 the London Ultimatum set up a schedule of reparation payments which led to the resignation of the German government (Fehrenbach). The following government was forced to accept the schedule, but Chancellor Wirth and Foreign Minister Rathenau adopted a new policy – that of "fulfillment". By attempting to fulfill the demands of the Allies, so the thinking went, the government would persuade them that the demands were impossible to meet. This demonstrated impossibility would then lead to renewed negotiations and reduced demands.

prosecutor: a person who brings a legal case against someone in court
perpetrator: sb. who does sth. illegal, a criminal



M 4 **"No! You Can't Make Me"**
Poster supporting passive resistance in the Ruhr, 13 January 1923

unsettling: disturbing

KPD	=	Communist Party of Germany
USPD	=	Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany SPD
SPD	=	Social Democratic Party of Germany
BVP	=	Bavarian People's Party
Z	=	Centre Party
DDP	=	German Democratic Party
DVP	=	German People's Party
DNVP	=	German National People's Party
NSDAP	=	National Socialist German Workers' Party

M 5 **"Beer Hall Putsch" 1923**
Nazi attempted coup d'état on 8–9 November 1923. Photograph of the rebels.

When Germany defaulted on her reparations payments in December 1922, the Allies had had enough of the continuing cycle of excuses, defaults, and new negotiations. Instead, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr in January 1923. Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno called for passive resistance, essentially a general strike of all German workers in the Ruhr coal mines. The French brought in their own workers to replace the resistant Germans, punished and intimidated German strikers. A wave of national revulsion in Germany led to acts of sabotage and violence in the occupied areas; the occupiers responded harshly. The German government paid two million strikers wages and supported their families. The money to do so was simply printed up and distributed – an enormous loss of German finances. The Ruhr occupation removed 85% of coal supplies from German hands, and unemployment spread throughout other parts of the country. The value of the mark sank to lows never before experienced in an industrialized economy. An American dollar, exchanged for 4.2 marks before the war, was worth 4.2 trillion marks on 20 November 1923. Personal accounts contributed to a deeply *unsettling* memory of the extreme phase of hyperinflation, when earnings and savings disappeared in the blink of an eye. The long-term effect on the Republic was devastating, as many associated democratic government with instability and unreliability.

Currency Reform Ends the Crisis

On 13 August 1923 the new Chancellor (and Foreign Minister) Gustav Stresemann (DVP) changed the governmental course in a "Grand Coalition" (SPD, Z, DDP and the DVP). The government ended passive resistance in the Ruhr, began negotiations which led to the 1924 Dawes Plan and the resumption of reparations payments. The occupation of the Ruhr came to a close in mid-1925. Stresemann introduced a new currency, the Rentenmark, which stopped the vicious circle of hyperinflation. Although the government was brought down in November 1923 by a vote of no confidence (the government was criticized for treating left-wing rebels in Saxony more harshly than it treated right-wing rebels in Bavaria), Stresemann remained as Foreign Minister and served in that position until his death in 1929. The policy of fulfillment which he pursued while in office became known for avoiding conflict with the Allies. In later years, conservatives and Nazis twisted the term "fulfillment" to denounce efforts to achieve international cooperation.

Further Political Destabilization

Several political disturbances continued to destabilize the republic throughout 1923 against the background of the Ruhr occupation. Separatists in the Rhineland and in the Palatinate, encouraged by the French and Belgians, tried to secede from Germany. The police and the military suppressed planned communist coups in Saxony and Thuringia before they began. In Hamburg a communist coup attempt was quickly crushed. In Munich, Adolf Hitler, an unknown right-wing extremist, led a coup against the Bavarian government in a "Beer Hall Putsch", which was swiftly put down. Although these disturbances were all mastered in a timely manner, the republic had to deal with difficulties that appeared to threaten its very existence.

Material on Inflation

M 6 Inflation and its Effects

Morgan Philips Price, reporter for the "Daily Herald" and later Labour MP in Britain (18 October 1923):

The condition of Germany now literally *beggars description*. That is no exaggeration but naked truth. I have lived through some very critical times during the Russian Revolution in 1917–18, but I do not remember a time quite as bad as this which has now befallen Germany. Even in the worst times in Russia one always had a feeling that the suffering was for some ideal which would make it all worthwhile. Today in Germany the economic catastrophe is worse than in Russia then, and in addition to that there is scarcely a ray of light on the horizon [...]. In Germany today there is a complete breakdown of the capitalist mechanism of distribution and exchange, and there is no sign yet that any of the would-be dictators are in a position to set up any state machinery which can do what the Communist Party did for Russia in 1917–18 – namely, hold the nation together by making everyone bear the same burden to achieve a common end. The government of the Reich is bankrupt. The mark has ceased to be currency and is merely a vast mass of paper packets representing so many dollars or pounds. The number of packets to the dollar varies every day [...]. Those who are lucky enough to have foreign currency can get along, but even then with difficulty. If anyone were to be asked how much it costs to live in Germany today he could only reply: "It cost me at ten o'clock this morning so much, and at five o'clock this afternoon so much" [...] The new currency, if it is going to be stable and backed by some material asset, will, under the present relation of classes in Germany, be dependent for its stability on the trusts. A percentage of their property will become the gold guarantee, and they have put their conditions for this "sacrifice": the abolition of the eight-hour day. The Bavarian government, as the advanced guard of the trusts, is pressing for this. The government of the Reich and of Prussia still has Social Democrats in it who are pledged to resist the conditions of the trusts, and the trade unions will keep a watch on them. But the Franco-German industrial combine is on the march and its slogan is: "Down with the eight-hour day, no more unemployment benefits and '*open shop*'." [...] The volcano is smoldering; there are eruptions here and there, and it may continue for a long time yet in this state of suppressed activity.

Morgan Philips Price, Dispatches from the Weimar Republic, Versailles and German Fascism. London, Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 1999, pp. 169–70.

M 7 Inflation

The Austrian writer Stefan Zweig, who fled from the Nazis in 1934, wrote in his autobiography on the inflation (1943),

Nothing ever embittered the German people so much – it is important to remember this – nothing made them so furious with hate and so ripe for Hitler as the inflation. For the war, murderous as it was, had yet yielded hours of jubilation, with ringing of bells and fanfares of victory. And, being an incurably militaristic nation, Germany felt lifted in her pride by her temporary victories; while the inflation served only to make it feel soiled, cheated, and humiliated; a whole generation never forgot or forgave the German Republic for those years and preferred to reinstate its butchers.

Stefan Zweig, The World of Yesterday (New York, 1943), p. 313.

to beggar description: cannot be described
open shop: a business or factory hiring workers without regard to their trade union membership

Tasks

1. Explain the origins of political instability in Germany, 1919–23 (text).
2. Interpret the photograph (M3).
3. Assess the effects of inflation in and after 1923 (text, M6–7).

Material on Reparations

Table on Reparations Payments	
International Agreement	**Reparations Assessed**
Treaty of Versailles	preliminary sum of 20 billion marks payable by 1 May 1921
Allied Conference in Paris (29 January 1921)	269 billion gold marks, payable over 42 years
Reparations Commission (27 April 1921)	German *liability* assessed at 132 billion gold marks
London Ultimatum (5 May 1921)	132 billion gold marks The debt was divided into a schedule of bonds: A 12 billion payable by 1 July 1921 B 38 billion payable by 1 November 1921 C 82 billion payable by 1963 (financial experts saw the C fund as merely an attempt to pacify public opinion in the Allied countries) In reality, only 50 billion gold marks were to be paid.
1924 Dawes Plan	reduced the reparations payments temporarily: 1 billion gold marks to be paid in 1924; by 1928 annual payments increase to 2.5 billion gold marks
1929 Young Plan	replaced the Dawes Plan: total reparations reduced to 112 billion gold marks, payable until 1988
1931 Hoover Moratorium	one-year moratorium on reparations payments announced due to the Great Depression
Lausanne Conference 1932	sum reduced to a last payment of 3 billion gold marks, but no payment was made because the agreement was not ratified

M 8

M 9 Three Opinions on the Reparations

a) American historian Sally Marks on the "myths" of reparations (1978):

Much has also been made of the fact that the treaty did not specify the total German reparations liability. While some financial uncertainty was thus engendered in both Germany and the victor states, and Germany was able to propagandize effectively about the iniquity of having to sign a "blank check," delay was actually in Germany's interest. Because of inflated popular expectations in the victor countries, the reparations totals discussed at the peace conference were astronomic, ranging to sixteen times the amount finally set. The British experts, Lords Sumner and Cunliffe, were so unrealistic that they were nicknamed "the heavenly twins." As time passed, the proposed figures were progressively reduced and by 1921 a substantial degree of realism had set in. Finally, the Versailles Treaty specified that Germany make an interim payment of 20 billion gold marks before May 1, 1921, by which time the Reparation Commission was to set the total *liability*. In fact, 20 billion marks is approximately what Germany paid during the entire history of reparations. During the interim period, she paid less than 8 billion marks, mostly as credit for transferred state properties. Technically, none of this was considered reparations, as it was fully consumed by prior charges, notably occupation costs and the expense of provisioning Germany. In time, however, there developed a certain tacit recognition of the 8 billion as reparations. [...] By the summer of 1922, it was clearly impossible to restore the London Schedule, which was in virtual *abeyance*, but there was no agreement on what to do. By this time, Germany's currency depreciation had become acute. This depreciation had begun during World War I and had continued at an erratic pace. A conjunction had developed between reparations deadlines and dramatic inflationary lurches of the mark. Germans argued that reparations were destroying their currency while British and French experts agreed that Germany was deliberately ruining the mark, partly to avoid budgetary and currency reform, but primarily to escape reparations. In this, the Entente experts were correct. Those historians who have accepted the German claim that reparations were the cause of the inflation have overlooked the fact that the inflation long predated reparations. They have similarly overlooked the fact that the inflation mushroomed in the period from the summer of 1921 to the end of 1922 when Germany was actually paying very little in reparations. They have also failed to explain why the period of least inflation coincided with the period of largest reparations payments in the late 1920s or why Germans claimed after 1930 that reparations were causing deflation. There is no doubt that British and French suspicions late in 1922 were sound.

The Reich Chancellery archives indicate that in 1922 and 1923 German leaders chose to post-pone tax reform and currency stabilization measures in hopes of obtaining substantial reductions in reparations. [...]

Sally Marks, "The Myths of Reparations", Central European History, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sept. 1978), pp. 232–233, 238–39.

b) American historian Gerald D. Feldman on the historiography of reparations (1993):

The Germans blamed the Allied reparations demands and the efforts to fulfil them for causing the galloping inflation and hyperinflation, while the French blamed the Germans for ruining their currency deliberately in order to evade reparations, a view widely held outside France as well. Historians have found it difficult to transcend the partisan struggle, and the battle [...] is frequently refought with new evidence, recycled old evidence, and theoretical speculation. The older historiography tended to take the side of the Germans by blaming the French for indulging in a shortsighted *intransigence* that frustrated British attempts to find a rational, businesslike solution to the reparations question and permit the peaceful reconstruction of the European economy. In the 1970s, a new historiography, making use of freshly opened French archives, economic theory, and the cheerful post-1945 solutions to the Franco-German rivalry, has sought to demonstrate that the British were often more unreasonable than the French, that the French were much more sensible than previously supposed, and that it was the Germans, aided and abetted by the *duplicitous* British, who undermined and aborted French efforts to secure a peaceful and satisfactory solution. It would be unfortunate, however, if the welcome discoveries concerning the complexities of French reparations policy were to be used to create the illusion that the German story was a simple tale of treaty evasion and bad faith.

Gerald D. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924 (New York, Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1993), p. 309.

c) American historian Gerald L. Weinberg on the cost of both world wars (2005):

The Federal Republic of Germany, created out of the three western zones of occupation in 1949, though much smaller and more seriously damaged by the war than the Germany of 1919, paid far more in reparations than in the inter-war years, the key difference being that of a government with the political will to follow a new policy, a will embodied in its leader Konrad Adenauer. The result was that instead of impoverishing herself, first by run-away inflation, later by horrendous deflation, in order to prove that Germany could not pay, this time she became wealthier than ever as she returned constructively to the world economy.

This dramatic change in Germany was, perhaps, due not only to her new leadership but also to another major difference between the impact of the two great wars on the country. World War I had been fought almost entirely outside Germany; though hard on that country as well, it had damaged the enemies of Germany far more than herself. This time the war had come home: first in the bombing which her own foolish defiance of the earlier peace treaty had provoked and then in the form of invading armies, which Germany had also brought on herself. The experience of World War II was not only terrible for others; this time the conflict had indeed left its mark inside the country. There is more than symbolic significance in the decision of several German cities to keep at least one large ruined building as a conspicuous reminder of the devastation of war.

Gerald L.Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, (Cambridge U. P., 2005), p. 900.

liability: legal responsibility to pay for sth.
in abeyance: put aside temporarily
intransigence: stubborn refusal to compromise
duplicitous: behaving dishonestly in order to trick sb.

Tasks

1. Comment on the connection between reparations and inflation in Germany (M8–9).
2. Explain the persistence of reparation myths, considering who profited and who lost by them.

Stabilization in the Years 1924–1929

The "Stresemann Era"

From August until November 1923 Gustav Stresemann (DVP) held the posts of chancellor and foreign minister. After his government fell, he remained in every cabinet as foreign minister until 1929, which contributed to the stabilization of the republic. This phase is often called the "Stresemann Era".

Stresemann is an ambiguous figure. As a member of the National Liberal Party before the First World War, he was known for his strong monarchist views. During the war he supported German territorial conquest, Ludendorff's military policies, and unlimited submarine warfare. At the war's close, Stresemann rejected armistice negotiations and argued that a fight to the bitter end was inevitable. These views raised questions about his integrity during the Weimar Republic.

Domestically, Chancellor Stresemann ended passive resistance in the Ruhr and hyperinflation in the crisis year of 1923. In foreign policy he sought a rapprochement with France. Stresemann insisted that he had simply become a supporter of the republic as a reasonable course under the given circumstances ("Vernunftrepublikaner").

M 1 **Treaty of Locarno**
Foreign Ministers Stresemann and Briand, 1925

Revising Versailles in Foreign Policy

In 1922 Rathenau had astonished many in signing a treaty with Soviet Russia at Rapallo. At the time the Soviet Union was as diplomatically isolated as Germany; both states revoked their claims against each other (especially those made at Brest-Litovsk), restored full diplomatic relations, and began new trade arrangements. A secret agreement allowed the German military to train troops and to build and test arms inside the Soviet Union – beyond the reach of Versailles Treaty military inspectors. In return, the Red Army gained access to German military technology and planning. Even without clear knowledge of the secret military arrangements, Rapallo disturbed many European diplomats.

In attempting to revise the Versailles Treaty, Stresemann took a different approach. He proposed German guarantees for the security of her western borders in return for international agreement that the eastern German borders could be revised. In seven treaties signed at Locarno in 1925, consensus was reached. In the "Rhineland Pact" Germany, France, and Belgium promised not to attack each other; the United Kingdom and Italy signed as guarantors of the pact. In case of aggression by any of the first three powers, all the remaining powers were to come to the aid of the attacked country. Germany signed *arbitration* agreements with France, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; disputes were to be decided by an arbitration tribunal or by the Permanent Court of International Justice. In addition, France signed treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and all signatories promised assistance if conflict with Germany arose. The treaties were registered with the League of Nations. In 1926 the League admitted Germany with a permanent seat in its Executive Council; the Allied forces occupying the western Rhineland began to withdraw – a removal completed in 1930.

arbitration: settling international disputes by asking an uninvolved third party to decide

In 1926 Stresemann reaffirmed the Rapallo Treaty with the Soviet Union in the Treaty of Berlin; both countries promised to maintain friendly relations and to remain neutral if either were attacked by a

third power. Stresemann considered the Berlin treaty an attempt to associate the Soviet Union with the Locarno treaties.

Stresemann's diplomatic success created the impression of a statesman who could be trusted. Indeed, he and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize together in 1926. Nevertheless, Stresemann's international reputation was not always respected by his countrymen. Nationalists and political extremists condemned his efforts to reconcile Germany with her earlier enemies.

M 2 **"Down with the Dawes Plan!"**
Election poster opposing the Dawes Plan, 1924



M 3 **"You'll have to pay for the next three generations!"**
Poster for the initiative against the Young Plan, 1929

From Dawes to Young and the End of Reparations

In 1924 the American banker and financial expert to the Allied Reparations Commission, Charles G. Dawes, suggested reducing German reparations temporarily. The plan gave the German economy time to recover from the crises of 1923 and stabilized the currency, making foreign loans to Germany attractive once again. Stresemann quickly grasped the opportunity and agreed to the plan.

In 1928 the largest payment scheduled in the Dawes Plan fell due. It threatened to destabilize the German economy. Therefore, the Inter-Allied Reparations Commission, together with the American industrialist Owen Young, worked out a new payment plan. The Young Plan of 1929 set up annual payments – one-third to be paid by Germany and the remaining two-thirds to be financed by American banks (with Germany paying interest on these loans).

German nationalists and Nazis criticized the Young Plan and initiated a "Liberty Law against the Enslavement of the German People". The bill was a broadside against the Treaty of Versailles; it renounced all reparations claims, the "war guilt" clause, and threatened government officials who paid reparations with criminal prosecution for treason. The agitation generated the largest propaganda campaign seen in the Weimar Republic. When the bill failed to pass the Reichstag and then failed in the popular referendum, the stability of the republic seemed assured.

However, security was brief. Stresemann died on 3 October 1929, leaving Germany without her leading statesman. At the same time the Wall Street crash plunged the global economy into depression. When the Reichstag ratified the Young Plan on 12 March 1930, American loans to Germany were already being recalled and Germany could not fulfil the plan's payment schedule.

US President Herbert Hoover declared a one-year moratorium on reparation payments in 1931. Without reparations from Germany, the French and British governments refused to make payments on the war debts they still owed American investors. At the Conference of Lausanne in 1932, a last payment schedule was set up, but by then reparations were clearly a lost cause. Although reparations were no longer a serious concern by the time he became chancellor, Adolf Hitler declared that Germany would refuse to pay further in 1933.

Historians have disagreed in their assessments of the struggle over the Young Plan. Earlier historians claimed that the Nazis used the campaign to win more political support. More recently, historians have pointed out that the party was already growing, so that the agitation over the Young Plan was less important in the rise of the Nazis.

Material on Stresemann

M 4 "The New Germany"

Translation of Stresemann's Nobel Lecture, "The New Germany" (29 June 1927):

[...] A people that has experienced all that the Germans have been through, naturally offers fertile soil for the extremists. The ballast in the center of the German ship which saved it from heavy rolling in the past, that valuable and steady middle class group, no longer exists. *The uprooted* saw their hope in a complete reversal of affairs. It was at this time that the great tide of Bolshevism broke over Germany, appearing on the left as Communism and on the right as National Socialism. That a nation, whose currency had collapsed, whose social and economic reorganization had been as *ruthless* as ours – that this nation, which had to learn to live in an entirely new situation, has been able to master Bolshevism of the Right and of the Left, shows the healthiness of its spirit, the zeal of its industriousness, and the victory of realpolitik over the imaginary and illusory. [...]

It was a turning point in European history when the Germans initiated the policy which led by way of Locarno to Geneva. Just read what Mr. Briand said about the significance of this German decision. Along this road, Germany has experienced numerous and profound disappointments. This is not the place to discuss them in detail. I do not think of Locarno only in terms of its consequences for Germany. Locarno means much more to me. It is the achievement of lasting peace on the Rhine, guaranteed by the formal renunciation of force by the two great neighboring nations and also by the commitment of other states to come to the aid of the victim of an act of aggression in violation of this treaty. Treuga Dei, the peace of God, shall reign where for centuries bloody wars have raged. It can and it ought to be the basis for a general cooperative effort among these nations to spread peace wherever their material power and moral influence reach. The overwhelming majority of the German people support these aims. The youth of Germany can be won over to the same cause. Youth sees its ideal of individual physical and spiritual achievement in the peaceful competition of the Olympic Games and, I hope, in technical and intellectual development as well.

Those who strive for these ideals, however, cannot succeed in the long run when, years after the war, foreign bayonets remain unsheathed in a nation which, although defeated, rejects revenge and asks only for peace. The policy of Locarno is incompatible with policies of distrust, violence, and oppression. Locarno is the policy of understanding and free will. It is the policy of faith in a new future and, in contrast to the policies of the past, it must become the policy of the future. Germany faces this future with a stable nation which has been based upon hard work, upon an economy which will give increasing millions income and security in our cramped territory, and upon a vital spirit which strives for peace in accordance with the philosophies of Kant and Fichte. [...]

www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1926/stresemann-lecture.html [10 Apr 2013].

M 5 Stresemann's Contemporaries Assess his Character

a) British historian John Wheeler-Bennett (1930):

With the possible exception of M. Aristide Briand, no figure since the war has so dominated European affairs as did Herr Stresemann; and no statesman has shown so unwavering a devotion to what he conceived to be the right course for his country. By a fortunate coincidence it was also the right course for the world. Herr Stresemann may be said to have been the first of the Europeans.

b) British journalist Claud Cockburn (1957):

Personally I found that Stresemann was entertaining provided that you did not believe in him. He was one of those Germans who had, at a fairly early date, discovered that the way to get away with being a good German was to pretend to be a good European. He had a wonderful act in which he pretended to be not only fat, which he was, but good-hearted and a little muzzy with beer into the bargain. In reality he was as quick and sharp as a buzz-saw, and if being a sharp, fast-moving buzz-saw was not enough, he would hit you from behind with a hammer.

c) The Times of London on Stresemann's death (4 October 1929):

He [Stresemann] remained intensely nationalist; but the necessities of Europe and the interdependence of its states led him to the wider nationalism that sees in co-operation the only escape from chaos [...]. It is intelligent and practical

patriots – not vague idealists who cannot first serve their own countries – who make the 'good Europeans' of today. Stresemann did inestimable service to the German Republic; his work for Europe as a whole was almost as great.

Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann: Weimar's Greatest Statesman (Oxford: U.P., 2002), pp. 1–4.

M 6 Interpreting Stresemann

British historian Jonathan Wright on Stresemann (2002):

Stresemann's early biographers believed in his good faith, and set out to explain his evolution from German nationalist to European statesman. After the war there was a reaction as the vast collection of his unpublished papers became available to historians. Annelise Thimme drew a *perceptive* portrait of him as a man torn between romantic nationalism and a realism imposed by circumstance. This was an important corrective to the temptation to promote Stresemann in the early years of the Federal Republic as a pioneer of European unity rather than simply a peaceful Europe of nation states [...].More recently, there has appeared the first comprehensive biography by Christian Baechler. This traces Stresemann's career in great detail and reaches the conclusion that there was a genuine development in his outlook from Wilhelminian imperialist to believer in collective security through the League. This conclusion is all the more striking coming from a French historian.

Parallel to the debate about Stresemann's intentions ran a debate about the history of German foreign policy and the forces that sustained it. Were there fundamental continuities from the Wilhelminian empire to the Third Reich in the prevailing view of Germany's place in the world, the elites which made policy, and the social and political forces they represented? Or was there rather, as Peter Krüger argues, a discontinuity during the Weimar Republic as the constraints of conducting a purely peaceful foreign policy took hold in the Auswärtiges Amt, establishing a style which had more in common with that of the Federal Republic than the Third Reich? In this debate too the interpretation of Stresemann plays a *pivotal* role.

While it is natural that attention should have concentrated on Stresemann's foreign policy, it is easy to forget that he also played a central role in the domestic politics of the Weimar Republic. Indeed at his death in 1929 he was widely seen by admirers and critics alike as the master of the parliamentary game and as the person who maintained the precarious balance of the political system. This was an extraordinary achievement for someone whose political career had been written off after the First World War, because he had supported victory and the High Command to the end. *Spurned* by the republican parties in 1919, he became their unanimous choice as chancellor in August 1923 at the height of the crisis caused by the French occupation of the Ruhr. When his government fell in November 1923 he remained as foreign minister and continued to hold that office in the seven administrations which followed until his death in October 1929. This required skill and courage as well as luck. His development from the discredited monarchist of 1919 to the greatest of the pragmatic republicans (Vernunftrepublikaner) was first described by Henry Turner in a concise and authoritative study in the 1960s. There remain, however, interesting questions. What light does Stresemann's career throw on the structure of Weimar politics? On what did his power rest, other than his own ability? Could one speak of a 'Stresemann system'?

Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann: Weimar's Greatest Statesman (Oxford: U.P., 2002), pp. 1–7.

the uprooted: people without roots
ruthless: pitiless
perceptive: understanding, wise
pivotal: extremely important
to spurn: to reject

Tasks

1. Outline Stresemann's policies to stabilize the republic (text).
2. Interpret Stresemann's Nobel lecture (M4).
3. Portray the difficulties Stresemann presents to historians (M5–6).
4. Speculate on how the Weimar Republic might have developed if Stresemann had not died in 1929.

Cultural Kaleidoscope of the Weimar Republic



M 1 **Untitled**
Painting by George Grosz, 1920

M 2 **"Variety Cabaret Metropol"**
Advertisement poster, 1920

Task

Choose a person mentioned here and make a presentation on him or her in class.

Although modernization of the arts began during the Imperial era, its reception was restrained. Expressionism, the artistic groups *Der blaue Reiter* and *Die Brücke*, and Richard Strauss's *Salome* and *Rosenkavalier* faced hostile receptions before World War I; plays like Wedekind's *Frühlings Erwachen* and Hauptmann's *Die Weber (The Weavers)* had led to scandals. Several significant works by the Mann brothers, atonal music by Schönberg, and buildings designed by Gropius were created before 1914. These beginnings led to a remarkable cultural outburst in painting, music, theatre, literature, film, architecture, technology, and science.

The "Roaring Twenties" – A Breakthrough to Modernity

In America and Europe, young people who had seen the mortality of World War I determined to enjoy their lives in the short time they had. Whether the twenties were termed "roaring" (as in the US), "golden" (Germany), or "crazy" (France), these years saw a phenomenal release of youthful energy and sweeping social changes.

When the right to vote was extended to women after 1918, they insisted on independence in economic, social, and sexual matters as well. In cities women increasingly worked for pay and bought household appliances to free themselves from housework. The "flapper" – a woman with short hair, in a loose-fitting dress, high heels, make-up, and dancing the Charleston – became the female image of the day.

Berlin had a reputation as a centre of prostitution and sexual freedom. A large selection of nightclubs, variety clubs, and bars drew adventurers from within and outside of the city. Prostitution, homosexuality, transvestite shows, and pornography were clearly in evidence, though still illegal at the time.

Popular Mass Media

New media, such as radio and cinema, were cheap forms of entertainment with mass appeal. Cabarets were especially popular. German films experimented with expressionism to portray horror or science fiction themes. Josef von Sternberg criticized the German educational system and middle-class morality in his film *Der blaue Engel (The Blue Angel*, 1930). Fritz Lang condemned capital punishment in the case of a child murderer who escaped the police in his thriller *M* (1931). Erich Maria Remarque's anti-war novel, *Im Westen nichts Neues (All Quiet on the Western Front*, 1929), criticized military service and the war, which led to political controversy in 1930 over the US film based on the novel.

Silencing the "Roaring Twenties"

Conservatives and Nazis condemned the modernity of the Weimar era as "degenerate" ("entartet"). New directions in art and music were rejected as un-German. With the arrival of the Great Depression in 1930, the cultural vibrancy of the Weimar era came to a swift close. Economic austerity policies affected the lives of artists and consumers alike. Foreigners, Jews, and homosexuals who had enjoyed the cosmopolitan atmosphere of Berlin could not survive in a Nazi regime. Many emigrated for political, intellectual or religious reasons. Those who could not emigrate were forced to adapt to the new political system or even to face imprisonment or execution.

A Selected List of Cultural Figures in the Weimar Republic		
Name	**Work**	**Situation after 1933**
Art		
Käthe Kollwitz (1867–1945)	illustrator and sculptor	censored for anti-war art; but mother-and-child pieces used for propaganda
Ernst Barlach (1870–1938)	sculptor, printmaker and writer	considered "degenerate", forbidden to work as an artist
Max Liebermann (1847–1935)	painter and printmaker	resigned from Prussian Academy of Arts in 1933
Paul Klee (1879–1940)	painter	emigrated to Switzerland in 1933
Music		
Arnold Schoenberg (1874–1951)	composer (twelve-tone technique) and poet	emigrated to US in 1933
Kurt Weill (1900–1950)	composer, esp. for Brecht *(Threepenny Opera)*	emigrated in 1933, first to Paris, then to US
Film		
Marlene Dietrich (1901–1992)	actress, singer *(The Blue Angel)*	emigrated to US in 1930, performed in tours for Allied troops in WWII
Fritz Lang (1890–1976)	director, producer, writer *(Metropolis, M, The Testament of Dr. Mabuse)*	emigrated to France in 1934, then to the US
Billy Wilder (1906–2002)	director, writer, producer, artist, journalist *(Emil and the Detectives, Ninotchka, Sunset Boulevard, Some Like It Hot)*	emigrated to France in 1933, then to the US
Theatre		
Bertolt Brecht (1898–1956)	poet, writer, director *(Threepenny Opera, Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny, Mother Courage and Her Children)*	emigrated to Denmark in 1933, then to Sweden, Finland, and in 1941 to the US; left the US in 1947
Carl Zuckmayer (1896–1977)	playwright *(The Blue Angel, Der Hauptmann von Köpenick, Des Teufels General)*	plays banned in 1933; emigrated to Austria, then to the US in 1939, left for Switzerland in 1958
Vicki Baum (1888–1960)	journalist, writer *(Grand Hotel)*	emigrated to the US in 1931
Literature		
Kurt Tucholsky (1890–1935)	journalist, satirist, writer (pseudonyms: Kaspar Hauser, Peter Panter, Theobald Tiger, Ignaz Wrobel, esp. *Die Weltbühne)*	lived in Paris in 1924, emigrated to Sweden in 1930; Nazis closed Weltbühne, burned books and expatriated T. in 1933
Carl von Ossietzky (1889–1938)	journalist (esp. *Weltbühne),* winner of 1935 Nobel Peace Prize	tried for treason and espionage in 1931, released in 1932; arrested 1933, held in KZ Esterwegen
Alfred Döblin (1878–1957)	writer, physician *(Berlin Alexanderplatz)*	emigrated to France in 1933, to US in 1940; returned to Germany in 1945, then to France in 1953
Thomas Mann (1875–1955)	writer *(Die Buddenbrooks, The Magic Mountain),* winner of Nobel Prize in Literature in 1929	emigrated to Switzerland in 1933, to US in 1939, returned to Switzerland in 1952
Heinrich Mann (1871–1950)	writer *(Professor Unrat, Der Untertan)*	books burned in 1933; expatriated, emigrated to France in 1933, then to US
Erich Kästner (1899–1974)	writer, journalist, poet, satirist	books burned in 1933, worked under a pseudonym during the Nazi era
Architecture		
Walter Gropius (1883–1969)	architect, founder of the Bauhaus	emigrated to Britain in 1934, then to the US in 1937
Mies van der Rohe (1886–1969)	architect, last director of the Bauhaus	emigrated to US in 1937
Science		
Max Planck (1858–1947)	theoretical physicist (quantum theory); 1918 Nobel Prize in Physics	criticized by Nazis for support of Jewish scientists
Albert Einstein (1879–1955)	theoretical physicist (general theory of relativity); 1921 Nobel Prize in Physics	emigrated to US in 1933; Nazis burned his books, included him in a list of those targeted for assassination
Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976)	theoretical physicist, a creator of quantum mechanics ; 1932 Nobel Prize in Physics	criticized by Nazis after 1933 as a "white Jew"; worked on developing German nuclear energy during WWII
Lise Meitner (1878–1968)	physicist	emigrated to Sweden in 1938

The Republic in Crisis

The Great Depression and Its Effects on the Republic

Following the financial crisis produced by the Wall Street crash of October 1929, American loans to Germany were recalled, leaving German banks with too little capital for credit or investment at home.

M 1



The Great Depression led to reductions in industrial production, business closings, increases in personal and corporate bankruptcy, sinking incomes and rising unemployment. After the hyperinflation of 1923, German governments could not use inflationary policies to combat the economic downturn. Instead, Chancellor Heinrich Brüning turned to a course of strict austerity measures. Salaries of civil servants were cut by 25% and social spending was lowered by 14%, thereby reducing government expenses. Taxes and social security contributions were raised in order to increase government income. These austerity measures led to extreme economic downturn: Unemployment rose, production decreased, the cost of social services increased; the crisis grew worse with each day. By July 1931 the German banks failed. Unemployment increased from 2.6 million in February 1930 to 5.6 million in 1932. Despite harsh criticism, Brüning saw no alternative to his selected course of action. Thus the economic dilemma led to a

M 2 **A Soup Kitchen in Germany**
A free meal at the Salvation Army, Berlin, 1930

political crisis. As a result voters lost confidence in democratic and parliamentary solutions.

M 3 Paul von Hindenburg
Last President of the Republic (1925–1934)

The Fall of the Grand Coalition, 1930

The last government of the Weimar Republic which had the support of parliament was the Grand Coalition of Chancellor Hermann Müller (SPD, Z, DVP, DDP, BVP). Unemployment compensation paid by the German government had been established in mid-1927; the Müller government was not prepared for the rapidly rising unemployment of the Great Depression. The coalition stood down when the parties could not agree on whether to raise the contributions for unemployment insurance to 3.5 per cent or to 4.0 per cent. Considering the political changes which followed, the government's demission on 27 March 1930 seems tragically short-sighted.

The Problem with Hindenburg

In 1925 Friedrich Ebert died suddenly in office. His successor had to be elected by popular vote for the first time in the history of the republic. In the first ballot none of the candidates received an absolute majority. By the second ballot, Hindenburg was persuaded to stand for election. His largely right-wing supporters regarded his presidency as an attempt to roll back Weimar democracy, some hoped that Hindenburg would reinstate the monarchy. However, these supporters were disappointed when Hindenburg presided with integrity, at least in his first years in office. Historians dispute his role in the end of the republic – some argue that Hindenburg's election was disastrous and led directly to Hitler's assumption of power, while others claim that Hindenburg provided stability for the middle years of the Weimar Republic. As the political situation disintegrated from 1930 on, Hindenburg turned to near dictatorial measures to overcome parliamentary opposition. In an ironic twist of political fate, he was forced to rely on support from democratic political parties which he did not approve of to win re-election. The presidential election in 1932 reversed the voting coalition of 1925 – an indication of the speed with which the Nazi opposition had grown and the desperation of the democratic parties to keep Hitler from being elected.

Government by Emergency Decree

Hindenburg appointed Heinrich Brüning (Z) as chancellor in a minority cabinet independent of coalition considerations. Although the Reichstag could have brought the government down by a vote of no confidence (Art. 54), the SPD decided to tolerate it in office. Brüning's austerity course quickly led to a loss of popular support. But the country was no longer run by a parliamentary majority. Instead, Hindenburg and Brüning had worked out an arrangement in which the president appointed the chancellor (Art. 53) and supported his policies. Measures which could not be passed in parliament were instituted by emergency decree (Art. 48). Although parliament could *rescind* an emergency decree (also Art. 48), if it did so, the president disbanded the assembly and called for new elections (Art. 25). Governments which operated according to this new procedure were called "presidential governments". These were the last cabinets of the Weimar Republic, led by chancellors Brüning, Papen, and Schleicher.

to rescind: to annul

Material on the Great Depression

M 4 **"Looking for Work..."**
Photograph, 1930

M 5 **Sleeping "on the Ropes"**
Homeless people in Berlin rest "on the ropes" for a small fee.

M 6 **Unemployed Waiting for Newspapers,** Photograph, 1932

Material on Presidential Elections 1925 and 1932



M 7



M 8

M 9 An Assessment

German historian Jürgen W. Falter on presidential elections in 1925 and 1932 (1990):

[...] Hindenburg's presidential record was far better until 1930, or even March 1932, than many liberal and socialist commentators had expected. In 1932, the Weimar coalition parties even regarded the Field Marshal as the only chance to keep Hitler and the NSDAP from power. Thus, at the age of 85, much against his own intention (he would have preferred either to head a right-wing ticket or to be the "nonpolitical" candidate of the whole people), Hindenburg changed political camps in regard to the political parties supporting him. It is interesting to explore the voters' reactions to this change of coalitions and to investigate the parallels and differences between the Hindenburg electorates of 1925 and 1932. [...] Hindenburg's electoral success in 1932 was highest in those counties where he was least successful in 1925. Hitler, on the other hand, was able to draw much more electoral support in the old Hindenburg strongholds than Hindenburg himself [...]. Hitler was able to get the support on the first ballot of about 50 percent of the 1925 Hindenburg voters (and about 60 percent on the second ballot, when many of the conservative first-ballot Duesterberg voters switched to the Nazi leader). From the perspective of voter fluctuations, Hindenburg seems to have lost his old constituency. He was reinstated in office by his former opponents, the followers of the Catholic Center Party, the Social Democrats, and the few remaining left-liberals of the DDP/DStP. The social correlates of the vote of the two main contenders of 1925 and 1932 [...] reveal the radical rearrangement undergone by the Hindenburg voting coalition. In 1925, the Hindenburg vote was lower in predominantly Catholic, in urban, industrialized districts, and in regions where unemployment was above average. By contrast, the Hindenburg vote of 1932 increased with the number of Catholics and self-employed in the district. And Hitler's constituency of 1932, like Hindenburg's of 1925, was located in predominantly Protestant counties, in rural areas, and in districts with lower than average unemployment rates.

Jürgen W. Falter, "The Two Hindenburg Elections of 1925 and 1932: A Total Reversal of Voter Coalitions", Central European History, Vol. 23, No. 2/3 (Jun. – Sep., 1990), pp. 234–36.

Tasks

1. Describe the international financial cycle, 1924–32 (M1).
2. Portray the economic problems which led to political crisis after 1929 (text, M4–6).
3. Compare and contrast the presidential election results of 1925 and 1932 (M7–9).

The End of the Republic

M 1 **Heinrich Brüning (Centre)** Chancellor from 30 March 1930 to 30 May 1932 (789 days)

Brüning's Ill-Fated Government

In July 1930 Brüning's proposed budget called for extensive cuts in spending and increases in taxes. The budget was defeated in the Reichstag, but Hindenburg signed it into law as an emergency measure under Article 48 of the constitution. The Reichstag *repealed* the law, so Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag (Art. 25) and reinstated the budget once more as an emergency measure; new elections for the Reichstag were set for September 1930. In these elections the Nazis jumped from a splinter party (2.6 % in the 1928 elections) to the second largest party in the Reichstag with 18.3 % of the popular vote (and 107 seats).

Brüning stayed in office and continued to govern by means of presidential emergency measures. His government was tolerated by the Social Democrats, rather than risking new elections which might bring even more votes for the Nazis and the KPD. Brüning tried to prevent renewed outbreaks of domestic violence through a presidential decree on 13 April 1932 which forbade the Nazi SA and SS organizations. Parliamentary resistance to Brüning's minister of defense led to Groener's resignation on 12 May 1932. In the end, Brüning was brought down when he lost Hindenburg's support for his government because of a proposed cut in subsidies for large eastern landowners in the "Osthilfe" programme. Hindenburg himself had benefited from "Osthilfe" funds. Under pressure Brüning resigned on 31 May 1932.

to repeal: to overturn, to cancel

The Fiasco of Papen's Chancellorship

During a conversation among General von Schleicher, Hindenburg, Hitler and Hermann Göring, a deal was reached: The Nazis would support a new government if Hindenburg allowed the SA and SS to operate in public and set new elections in the near future. The new chancellor, on 1 June 1932, was Franz von Papen. He had served as an officer in the Imperial army, had advanced to the General Staff, and had excellent contacts with General Kurt von Schleicher, who suggested him to Hindenburg.

M 2 **Franz von Papen (formerly Centre),** Chancellor from 1 June to 17 November 1932 (170 days)

Papen's chancellorship was characterized by turmoil. On 4 June Hindenburg disbanded the Reichstag and set new elections for 31 July. On 16 June he rescinded the emergency decree which had forbidden the SA and SS. The electoral campaign was the bloodiest in the Weimar Republic. In one month alone, street violence led to 99 deaths and 1125 people injured. After the notorious "Altona Sunday" (17 July), Papen claimed the Prussian government responsible for not having stopped the bloodbath. On 20 July he published an emergency decree (signed by Hindenburg already on 14 July but not dated) which dismissed the Prussian government and named Papen the Reich Commissioner for Prussia in its place as a guarantee for "public security and order" in Prussia.

The new elections were a disaster for the republic. The Nazis won 37.4% of the popular vote (230 seats in the Reichstag). As the Communist Party also made advances, the antidemocratic factions in the Reichstag (Nazis and KPD) held more than one-half of the seats. Papen remained chancellor, but the Nazis demanded that Hitler be appointed chancellor and Nazis be given key ministerial posts.



M 3

KPD	=	Communist Party of Germany
USPD	=	Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany SPD
SPD	=	Social Democratic Party of Germany
BVP	=	Bavarian People's Party
Z	=	Centre Party
DDP	=	German Democratic Party
DVP	=	German People's Party
DNVP	=	German National People's Party
NSDAP	=	National Socialist German Workers' Party



M 4 **Kurt von Schleicher (no party affiliation),** Chancellor from 3 December 1932 to 28 January 1933 (55 days)

Hindenburg refused to do so. Papen's minority government could no longer rely on Nazi toleration; a no confidence vote was possible at any time.

New elections to the Reichstag were set for 6 November 1932. The results were a warning for the Nazi leadership, as their support dropped to 33.1% (196 seats). Many believed that the Nazi zenith of electoral power had been reached, among them Nazi leaders themselves. They began to seek opportunities to join the government despite their earlier reluctance to do so.

Schleicher Fails as Chancellor

The November 1932 elections made it clear that Papen could not continue as chancellor. He resigned on 17 November. Hindenburg was not convinced, however, and entertained the idea of giving Papen another chance in office. General Kurt von Schleicher, despite the fact that Papen was his own protégé, opposed the idea and persuaded the president to appoint him instead. On 3 December Hindenburg did so.

Schleicher proved unable to consolidate his political position. Papen, acting in compliance with Hindenburg, began talks with Hitler and Goebbels to find an acceptable basis for a new coalition government. Hitler insisted on becoming chancellor, but Papen was welcome to the vice-chancellorship. The government envisioned was essentially a coalition of the Nazis and nationalists, with some non-political members. The cabinet was to have only two Nazi ministers (Wilhelm Frick as interior minister, which included the administration of the police forces, and Hermann Göring without portfolio). Schleicher resigned as chancellor following a conversation with Hindenburg on 28 January. Papen worked out the details for the new cabinet and on 30 January 1933 the president appointed Hitler chancellor.

For the most part, historians consider Papen and Schleicher "grave-diggers of the republic". They could not keep each other under control, much less the Nazis.

Further Destabilization: The Rise of the National Socialists

Founded in January 1919 as the German Worker's Party in Munich, the small political group was renamed the National Socialist German Workers' Party ("Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei", NSDAP) on 24 February 1920 under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. Although Austrian, he had served in the German army during World War I; after the war he set out to make a life for himself as a political figure. Hitler first came to public attention when he was arrested after his coup d'état (the Munich "Beer Hall Putsch" on 9 November 1923) failed and he was sentenced to a five-year prison term. However, he was released in December 1924. While in prison he dictated his political programme "Mein Kampf" to his personal secretary.

The Nazi party had fallen into various rivalling groups during his short prison stay. Hitler reorganized the party into a hierarchical structure with himself as its personal cult leader ("Führerpartei"); it was refounded in February 1925. In the following years, the party's stated goal was to assume the political power of the state by legal means. Antisemitic, antidemocratic, anti-capitalistic, and anti-liberal, the party gained publicity through its agitation against the Young Plan in 1929.

With the coming of the Great Depression, the National Socialists reached an astounding 18.3% of the popular vote in the 1930 Reichstag elections. The disastrous experience with "presidential governments" also helped the Nazis in the July 1932 elections. Thereafter, however, the party began to lose voters. Fear of a return to political insignificance boosted the Nazi insistence that they be included in the government.

After the failures of the three preceding governments, Hindenburg was persuaded to appoint Hitler as chancellor along with two of his party members as cabinet members in yet another presidential government. Papen, vice-chancellor in this coalition of Nazis and German Nationalists, claimed he was certain that he could "tame" the Nazis.

M 5



M 6



Material on Hindenburg's Presidency

M 7 An Assessment

British historian Richard J. Evans assesses Hindenburg's presidency (2003):

The elections to the post of President that followed [Ebert's death] were a disaster for the democratic prospects of the Weimar Republic. The *baleful* influence of Weimar's political fragmentation and lack of legitimacy made itself felt here, since in the first round, none of the candidates looked like winning, so the right *drafted in* the reluctant figure of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as a rallying-point for their divided supporters. In the subsequent run-off, if either the Communists or the autonomous Bavarian wing of the Centre Party had voted for Hindenburg's best-supported opponent, the Catholic politician Wilhelm Marx, the Field Marshal might have been defeated. But, thanks to the egotism above all of the Bavarians, he was elected by a clear majority. A symbol par excellence of the old military and Imperial order, Hindenburg was a bulky, physically imposing man whose statuesque appearance, military uniform, war service medals and legendary reputation – mostly undeserved – for winning the great Battle of Tannenberg and for guiding Germany's military destiny thereafter, made him into a much-revered figurehead, above all for the right. Hindenburg's election was greeted by the forces of the right as a symbol of restoration. [...] For many, Hindenburg's election was a big step away from Weimar democracy in the direction of a restoration of the old monarchical order. A rumour duly did the rounds that Hindenburg had felt it necessary to ask the ex-Kaiser Wilhelm, now in exile in Holland, for permission before he took up the post of President. It was untrue, but it said a great deal for Hindenburg's reputation that it gained currency.

Once in office, and influenced by his strong sense of duty, Hindenburg, to the surprise of many, stuck to the letter of the constitution; but, as his seven-year term of office wore on, and he moved into his eighties, he became ever more impatient with the complexities of political events and ever more susceptible to the influence of his inner circle of advisers, all of whom shared his instinctive belief that the monarchy was the only legitimate sovereign power in the German Reich. Persuaded of the correctness of the use of Presidential emergency powers by the example of his predecessor, Hindenburg began to feel that a conservative dictatorship exercised in his name was the only way out of the crisis into which the Republic fell at the beginning of the 1930s. Whatever influence Hindenburg's election might therefore have had in reconciling opponents of the Republic to its existence in the short run, in the long run it was an *unmitigated* disaster for Weimar democracy. By 1930 at the latest, it had become clear that the Presidential power was in the hands of a man who had no faith in democratic institutions and no intention of defending them from their enemies.

Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (London: Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 81–83.

baleful: harmful
to draft in: to call on sb. to serve in a team or group
unmitigated: absolute, unbroken

M 8 "German Magic Works, Inc."

Cartoon by Karl Arnold in "Simplicissimus", February 1933: "There's nothing to worry about as long as chancellors are pulled out continuously!"

Material on Schleicher's "Querfront" Strategy

M 9 From Wikipedia

Wikipedia on Schleicher's strategy (2013):

Schleicher hoped to attain a majority in the Reichstag by gaining the support of the Nazis for his government. To gain Nazi support while keeping himself Chancellor, Schleicher often talked of forming a so-called Querfront ("cross-front"), whereby he would unify Germany's *fractious* special interests around a non-parliamentary, authoritarian but participatory regime as a way of forcing the Nazis to support his government. It was hoped that faced with the threat of the Querfront, Hitler would back down in his demand for the Chancellorship and support Schleicher's government instead. Schleicher was never serious about creating a Querfront, which intended to be a bluff to compel the NSDAP to support the new government. As part of his attempt *to blackmail* Hitler into supporting his government, Schleicher went through the motions of attempting to found the Querfront by reaching out to the Social Democratic labour unions, the Christian labor unions and the left-wing branch of the Nazi Party, led by Gregor Strasser.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt_von_Schleicher [12 April 2013]

M 10 US Historian Henry A. Turner on Schleicher's *Alleged* "Querfront" Strategy

Turner considers the "Querfront" strategy (i.e., dividing left-wing Nazis from the main party and joining them into a political coalition with trade-unionists) a historians' myth (2008).

Faced with a certain vote of no confidence when the Reichstag reconvened and unwilling to risk an election in which no major party would stand behind his cabinet, Schleicher finally abandoned hope of co-opting the Nazis. *Blundering* into the trap being laid for him by his embittered *erstwhile* protégé Franz von Papen, he asked President von Hindenburg to dissolve the Reichstag and violate the constitution by not scheduling a new election within the constitutionally mandated sixty days. Forced to resign the chancellorship when the president rejected his request, he clung to the vain hope of retaining control of the army as defense minister and recommended that the president appoint Hitler as his successor if the Nazi leader could *muster* a Reichstag majority.

This assessment of Schleicher's role in the developments that brought Hitler to power differs sharply from those found in the many versions based on the non-existent Querfront project. That myth has accorded him the status of a failed but well-intentioned chancellor who strove in vain to keep power beyond Hitler's grasp – as virtually an anticipatory *Widerstandskämpfer*. Stripped of that myth, he emerges as a political incompetent who sought in vain to tame the NSDAP by offering it a subordinate role in an authoritarian regime he himself intended to head, an arrangement that would unavoidably have *entailed* extensive policy concessions to Nazi ideology. In his vain pursuit of that goal, Schleicher maneuvered himself into a political Sackgasse that resulted in his fall and cleared the way for the success of Papen's intrigues on behalf of Hitler's appointment as his successor. Taken together with his earlier part in the transfer of power from the parliament to the presidency and his complicity in the destruction of the Prussian anchor of Weimar democracy, Schleicher's pursuit as chancellor of a partnership with the Nazis entitles him to a place high on the list of Totengräber of the republic.

By casting Schleicher in a *benign*, if ineffectual, anti-Hitler role, Querfront theories distort the historical record in numerous ways. Most damagingly for an understanding of the demise of the Weimar Republic, they divert attention from the sources of Schleicher's political prominence. His rise to the top of the German government was made possible only by the failure, after the revolution of 1918, to replace the old Prussian-German army with a republican defense force and the election, seven years later, of former Field Marshall von Hindenburg as president. The resulting resurgence of military influence at the top levels of politics – exercised in large measure behind the scenes by Schleicher himself – played a major role in undermining Germany's first attempt at democracy and reached its disastrous *denouement* during his ill-fated chancellorship.

As for the Querfront myth itself, its persistence, despite abundant contrary evidence, bears testimony to the authoritativeness bestowed by one of the most potent determinants of how the past is perceived, even by professional historians: sustained repetition.

Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., "The Myth of Chancellor Von Schleicher's Querfront Strategy", Central European History, Vol. 41, No. 4, (Dec., 2008), pp. 673–681.

M 11 Weimar's Staying Power

British historian Colin Storer on the achievements of Weimar (2013):

It is true that Germany's democratic traditions and institutions were not as mature and deep-rooted as those of Britain or the United States, but then each of these had been a nation state for at least a century longer than Germany. And although it did ultimately succumb to dictatorship, the Weimar Republic held out against the forces ranged against it for longer and left a more lasting legacy than many of its near neighbours. Of the 'new democracies' that emerged from the First World War, Germany preserved its parliamentary democracy longer than any other save Austria and Czechoslovakia. Germany's experience of revolution and counter-revolution, political violence and economic dislocation in the first half of the 1920s was far from unique and is mirrored by developments throughout Central and Eastern Europe and even in the British Isles.

The Weimar Republic also had one of the most open and progressive societies in Europe. It extended the *franchise* to women on an equal basis to men before any of the more established democracies of Western Europe or the United States, and by the mid-1920s had more female parliamentarians (at both federal and state level) than the United Kingdom. Weimar Germany was widely regarded as a haven of sexual tolerance and progressive social ideas, and it was one of the first states in Europe to enact progressive legislation on prostitution and to consider the decriminalization of homosexuality. Finally, the shift to the Right at the end of the 1920s, and the ultimate abandonment of democracy when parliamentary politics seemed unable to adequately cope with renewed economic crisis at the onset of the Great Depression, was a Europe-wide phenomenon in which Germany was not the first, nor the last, state to abandon democracy in favour of a more authoritarian or fascist alternative.

Considering what came after it, the fact that Weimar democracy ultimately failed to survive was a tragedy not just for Germany, but also for Europe and the wider world. Yet this should not detract from the myriad achievements of the republic's 15 years of existence. In trying to understand how and why the Weimar Republic collapsed we should not lose sight of the positive features of its history. The story of the republic is one of creation as well as destruction, whether that be the formation of democratic institutions, the building of a modern urban consumer society or the manufacture of great works of art, and it deserves to be remembered as such. It was a remarkable period in German history that demonstrates both the best and worst features of democratic politics and what can happen to modern industrial societies when they face extreme conditions. Indeed, given the pressures placed upon it and the consistent opposition it faced from large sections of German society, that Weimar democracy endured as long as it did is a remarkable achievement in itself.

Colin Storer, A Short History of the Weimar Republic (London, 2013), pp. 204–05.

fractious: difficult to control
to blackmail: to threaten sb. in order to make him do what you want
alleged: claimed to be true
to blunder: to move carelessly
erstwhile: former
to muster: to bring together, to unite
to entail: to involve
benign: gracious, harmless
denouement: end
franchise: the right to vote

Tasks

1. Write a definition of "presidential government" and assess its effects on the republic (text, Heartfield collage on page 4, M1–4).
2. Outline the rise of the Nazi Party (text, M5–6).
3. Decide how appropriate Hindenburg's name is for streets and public places in Germany today. Give reasons for your opinion (text, M7–8).
4. Evaluate Schleicher's "Querfront" strategy (M9–10).
5. Refer to Storer's evaluation of Weimar (M11). Consider which aspects of life in the Weimar Republic you find significant today.

Conclusion

The Weimar Republic was born in difficult circumstances: A lost war, harsh peace treaty, and a divided society on the edge of civil war placed great burdens on the country. In its early years, the republic was destabilized by political murders, attempted coups d'état, and separatist revolts. Inflation increased at first gradually, then rapidly, until the German currency was essentially worthless. In 1923 – the year of general crisis – the republic seemed to have reached its lowest point.

The turnaround from the depths was remarkable. Inflation was stopped by introduction of a new currency, Germany regained her diplomatic status internationally and became a member of the League of Nations, reparations payments were reduced to moderate amounts. The encouraging progress made from 1924 to 1929 ended abruptly with the Great Depression. Political deadlock followed. The introduction of "presidential governments" from 1930 to 1933 undermined the first German democracy. The utterly irresponsible decision to appoint Hitler chancellor set off a tragedy which began in Germany, but ended in a catastrophe for the whole world.

Despite the fall of the Weimar Republic, its legacy has proved long-lasting. The transformation of Germany into a modern welfare state, a process which began in Weimar, has continued to the present day. The Stinnes-Legien agreement between employers and trade unions from November 1918 is still a basis for labour relations in Germany today, as is the unemployment compensation passed into law in 1927. Bitter lessons learned from the Weimar experience were applied to the Basic Law in 1948–49, providing a more stable constitutional framework for the country today. Perhaps most impressively, insistence on democratic principles is a persistent feature of German civil society today.

Even the modernity of the "Roaring Twenties" has been revived since 1945. Although the burst of Weimar creativity ended in 1933, German innovation, creativity and expression have continued to build on their earlier roots. The vibrant culture of Germany today is a result of this Weimar legacy as well.

Literature

Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, London: Penguin, 2003.

Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider, New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

Christopher Isherwood, The Berlin Novels (Mr Norris Changes Trains and Goodbye to Berlin), London: Vintage, 1999 (first published 1935).

Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World, London: John Murray, 2001.

Anton Kaes, et.al., eds., The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1994.

Suggested Films
(available on YouTube.com):
The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920)
Nosferatu (1922)
Metropolis (1927)
The Blue Angel (1930)
All Quiet on the Western Front (1930)
M – Eine Stadt sucht einen Mörder (1931)

Timeline

1918	
9 November	Proclamation of the Republic
11 November	Armistice signed in Compiègne, France
15 November	Stinnes-Legien agreement between employers and labour
1919	
19 January	Elections to the National Assembly in Weimar
28 June	Treaty of Versailles signed
11 August	Weimar Constitution goes into effect
1923	
Autumn	Inflation reaches its climax
8–9 November	"Beer Hall Putsch" in Munich fails
15 November	Currency stabilized by the introduction of the Rentenmark (1 Rentenmark = 1 billion old marks)
1925	
28 February	President Friedrich Ebert dies
26 April	Paul von Hindenburg elected president
1927	
17 July	Unemployment compensation established in Germany
1928 – 1930/32	
28 June 1928 – 27 March 1930	Chancellor Hermann Müller (SPD) leads a Grand Coalition of SPD, DDP, Z, BVP and DVP
22 December 1928	"Liberty Law" referendum opposing the Young Plan fails
24 October 1929	Wall Street Crash
30 March 1930 – 30 May 1932	Heinrich Brüning (Z) chancellor of a "presidential government"
19 September 1930	Parliamentary elections; Nazis win 18.3 % of the popular vote
1932	
February	6.13 million workers unemployed
1 June – 17 November	Franz von Papen chancellor of a "presidential government"
20 July	Papen dismisses the Prussian government and makes himself Reich Commissioner for Prussia
31 July	Parliamentary elections; Nazis win 37.4 % of the popular vote
6 November	Parliamentary elections; Nazis win 33.1 % of the popular vote
3 December	Kurt von Schleicher appointed chancellor of a "presidential government"
1933	
28 January	Schleicher resigns as chancellor
30 January	Adolf Hitler appointed chancellor of a "presidential government"

Public Humiliation, Cuxhaven, 1935

Nuremberg Rally, 1938



Burning Inventory of the Synagogue in Mosbach, November 1938

Hans (1918–1943) and Sophie Scholl (1921–1943), 1942

Jewish Women and Children in Auschwitz, 1944

Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (also known as the Holocaust Memorial) in Berlin, 2007

The Third Reich 1933–1945

When Hitler was appointed chancellor on 30 January 1933, few realized how dramatically Germany was about to be changed. At first the Nazis had only a minority in the cabinet and safeguards to democratic governance were in place. Yet unexpected events combined with aggressive posturing made it possible for the Nazis to establish a dictatorship by 24 March 1933 with the Enabling Act. They then maintained power by reshaping German society according to Nazi ideology.

This ideology propagated a hierarchy of ethnicities and races – clearly rejecting democratic principles. Some groups were considered more valuable than others; those less valued were eventually singled out for virtual slavery and death. Abstruse political ideas and anti-Semitic resentment became official government policy. At the same time, ideas of "community" took precedence over individual rights. The Nazi insistence on racial superiority became most virulent when taken to its logical extreme – that "Aryan" Germans were entitled to world domination. Peoples living in Eastern Europe were especially endangered by Nazi efforts to establish racial superiority.

The regime conducted foreign policy accordingly. In a Europe still dealing with the consequences of the First World War, the other powers set a high priority on avoiding renewed military hostilities. In addition, the Nazi goal of unifying with Germans living outside the German borders seemed reasonable. Hitler and his diplomatic corps were able to take advantage of this situation. However, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 forced both France and Britain to change course and to rearm. The German invasion of Poland proved to be the last straw for the Allies, who finally declared war. Unmoved, the Third Reich set out on two massive campaigns – the military conquest of Europe and the Holocaust.

German resistance to Nazism faced many obstacles. The slightest criticism or expression of frustration could be punished severely. Nevertheless, a number of Germans actively opposed the regime. Catholic objections to the euthanasia programme met with limited success. The "White Rose" published leaflets opposing the regime, the Kreisau Circle discussed plans for a better Germany. Members of both these groups were executed when discovered. In 1944 the military also plotted against Hitler, for which thousands were executed.

At the outbreak of the war, German military forces were remarkably successful. However, German strategists made critical mistakes, such as the decision to invade the Soviet Union before Britain was forced to surrender. Despite early victories in the USSR, German troops were unable to overcome Soviet forces. The German defeat at Stalingrad in January 1943 marked the turning point of the war. Still, the fighting continued and reached shocking levels of destruction. By war's end much of Europe lay in ruins, its peoples utterly exhausted.

M 1 **Hitler Salutes the Crowds Celebrating his Appointment as Chancellor of Germany**
30 January 1933

Hitler and the Nazi Party: Establishing and Consolidating Power (1933–1934)

Hitler Becomes Chancellor: Moving Toward Dictatorship

When President Hindenburg appointed Hitler Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933, a process which eventually ended the Weimar Republic began. But Hitler's appointment did not result in dictatorship straight away. To reach that goal the Nazis had to take further steps. At first Hitler still had to share his power with a number of conservative ministers in his government, whereas only two other Nazis, Hermann Göring (without portfolio) and Wilhelm Frick (Minister of the Interior), were members of his cabinet. Many people in Germany believed that the real power still lay in the hands of non-Nazis. Some, like von Papen, the former Chancellor who had arranged for a coalition with Hitler, believed that the Nazi leader could be "*tamed*" ("We have hired him"), and completely misjudged the ruthlessness of Hitler and his party. In the following weeks the Nazis continued to consolidate their position as Hitler was both Chancellor and leader of the largest party in Germany. With Hindenburg's support Hitler could rule nationally through the emergency decrees which Article 48 of the Constitution made possible. In the largest and most populous of the German states, Hermann Göring, Prussian Minister of the Interior, expanded the strength and influence of the Nazi paramilitary organizations – the SA ("Sturmabteilung") and SS ("Schutzstaffel").

The next important step towards dictatorship was taken with the Reichstag Fire Decree on 28 February 1933. A young Dutchman, Marinus van der Lubbe, had set fire to the Reichstag building, destroying it completely only the day before. Hitler immediately exploited the event to his advantage, claiming that van der Lubbe had not acted alone but was part of a Communist and socialist conspiracy that had to be fought on the spot. However, no evidence was found to substantiate the Nazi claim. An emergency decree under Article 48 of the Constitution suspended freedom of the press, of speech and of association. Many basic civil rights were set aside and the police, SA and SS could arrest political opponents without trial, search private homes, and censor the mail and telephone calls.

The Reichstag Fire Decree went into effect just before a national election was to be held. As one of his first decisions in office, Hitler had persuaded Hindenburg to call for a new election on 5 March 1933. Despite widespread terror, intimidation and atrocities committed by Nazi *thugs*, the party did not win a majority of the votes cast (just 43.91 % of the votes, or 288 seats out of 647). Nevertheless, Hitler and his followers claimed an overwhelming victory, although the Nazi coalition government with the German National People's Party (DNVP) could not *muster* the two-thirds majority in the Reichstag required to amend the constitution.

On 21 March, Hitler and the Nazis turned the formal opening of the Reichstag into a spectacular propaganda show and a bow to Prussian conservatism. "The Day of Potsdam" celebrated President Hindenburg's role in an attempt to distract the public from the Nazi violence during the election and to mislead observers about Hitler's real intentions.

to tame: to bring under control
thug: a violent man, a criminal
to muster: to bring together, to gather

M 2 The Day of Potsdam: Hitler and President Hindenburg
21 March 1933

In view of the circumstances of the March elections and the passage of the Enabling Act, discussions about the "legality" of the Nazi consolidation of power are pointless. As shown above, it was neither peaceful nor legitimate. On 23 March 1933, when the Enabling Act was passed by 444 votes to 94, i.e. when the Reichstag voted to revoke its functions, similar conditions prevailed. The Kroll Opera House, where parliament met after the Reichstag fire, was surrounded by members of the SA and SS, intimidating, threatening and shouting at deputies. Those expected to vote against the bill were even refused admission into the Reichstag. Many others had either been arrested, were in hiding, or had fled the country. The Centre Party had been promised that the Catholic Church would be respected and its members left alone. Finally, only the deputies of the SPD voted against the law. Otto Wels held a courageous speech opposing the law and the uniformed Nazi members reacted in frenzy. The law gave Hitler the power to rule without presidential decree or authorization by the Reichstag. The separation of powers no longer existed, so there was no control of the government by the Reichstag or other institutions.

However, the Weimar Constitution was never actually replaced. Instead of trying to establish constitutional legitimacy for their rule, the Nazis based their power on a permanent state of emergency. This emergency was limited to four years when it began, but was extended repeatedly and remained in force until 1945. Germany had become a dictatorship.

Consolidation of Power: Coordination ("Gleichschaltung")

Having established their political power the Nazis' next aim was to bring society and state under control. Until then Germany had been a pluralistic country with many different interest groups. Moreover,

it had been a federal state, giving its provinces ("Länder") a certain amount of independence and participation in the process of making political decisions ("Reichsrat"). The next phase brought the subordination of the German provinces to the central government. Nazi police commissars removed the previous authorities and replaced them with Reich governors; in January 1934 the provincial parliaments ("Landtage") were abolished altogether.

to purge: to remove undesirable people

Furthermore, the civil service was *purged* of political opponents and of Jews: 12.5% of the civil servants in Prussia were dismissed on racial or political grounds. Their offices were taken over by Nazi party members, among them many SA and SS leaders, who were given important positions in the police and security sectors. This enabled them to oppress and persecute opponents and stabilize Nazi rule in the long run. Political parties were dissolved, joining those that had already been banned (such as the Communist Party, KPD), so that the NSDAP remained the only party in Germany.

M 3 **May Day Propaganda**
The Nazis coopted 1 May, which trade unionists had long claimed as an international workers' day.

1 May 1933 was declared a holiday, the first German Labour Day. It was a milestone for workers who had demanded such a holiday for decades. However, the very next day on 2 May, members of the SA and SS occupied trade union offices, arrested officials and confiscated trade union property. All trade unions were effectively abolished. A new organization, the German Labour Front ("Deutsche Arbeitsfront") under the leadership of Robert Ley, was set up. Membership was compulsory. It claimed to reconcile the conflict of interests among workers and employers, who lost the right to negotiate over wages and working conditions. Workers also lost the right to strike to pursue their goals. Wages were set by state representatives. This kept labour under control and prevented a rise in real income.

By the end of July 1933, most of the major interest groups apart from the church and the army had been brought into line. Hitler succeeded in neutralizing the role of the Catholic Church by signing a concordat with the Pope on 8 July promising the Church that it would be left alone as long as it did not interfere with political matters. German Protestants, who were less centralized than Catholics, were divided between "German Christians" who supported Nazi goals and more traditional groups which opposed Nazi ideals. In the early phase of the Nazi regime, Protestants enjoyed a degree of organizational independence.

The German army also escaped "coordination" for the time being. Hitler depended on its support and did not want to provoke any kind of challenge to his rule. He also had to rely on well-trained and strong armed forces in order to realize his foreign policy goals. Thus, he sought to get along with army leaders.

"The Night of the Long Knives"

Ernst Röhm, the leader of the SA, was a long-time friend of Hitler's and a fervent supporter of what he regarded as a National Socialist revolution. Röhm criticized the revolution for not having been completed; he was determined to maintain the SA as an important institution in the Nazi state. He wanted to merge the SA with the army and to lead the new military organization himself. Hitler was familiar with Röhm's views and had to decide whether to back the SA or the army. Hitler knew that the army was much more important for his goals and that he could not tolerate any rivalry between the two

M 4 **Adolf Hitler and Ernst Röhm at the Nuremberg Rally** 1933

M 5 **„Heil Hitler"** Photo collage of the events of 30 June 1934 by John Heartfield

organizations. Hitler chose the army: On the night of 30 June 1934 Röhm and other leaders of the SA were shot by members of the SS on the grounds that they had allegedly planned a plot against Hitler ("Röhm Putsch"). Political figures, such as the former Chancellor and General Schleicher, who might have formed an opposition to the Nazis, were also killed at the same time. Both General von Blomberg and President Hindenburg thanked Hitler publicly for his actions. The SA no longer played an important role in the Nazi state. The process of coordination had been successfully completed.

Nazi Terminology

The Nazis invented words and terminology to portray their actions in a positive sense. One of the difficulties historians face is to interpret and translate these terms without accepting the Nazi point of view implied by them.

"Machtergreifung"
One of the earliest Nazi myths concerned what they called their "seizure of power" ("Machtergreifung"). Other terms used by German historians to portray the event have been the "assumption of power" ("Machtübernahme"), the turning over of power ("Machtübergabe" or "Machtüberreichung"). The "seizure of power" myth completely ignored the fact that Hitler was appointed Chancellor by President Hindenburg according to normal constitutional procedures. Nevertheless, the Nazis insisted that they had subverted and overcome established channels entirely and had simply usurped power to take over control of the government.

"Gleichschaltung"
The Nazi term suggests that processes are "synchronized" or "coordinated" as with a direct current of electricity, so that all the components use the same strength of current. This chapter calls the process in which the Nazis attempted to centralize their control over governmental hierarchies and social groups "coordination".

An analysis of Nazi language creation and usage (in English translation) is available in the work of Victor Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI - Lingua Tertii Imperii (2000).

Sources on "The Reichstag Fire Decree"

M 6 Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State, 28 February 1933

By the authority of Section 48 (2) of the German Constitution the following is decreed as a defensive measure against Communist acts of violence endangering the State:

1. Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further notice. Thus restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on the right of assembly and association, and violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications, and warrants for house-searches, orders for confiscations as well as restrictions on property rights are permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.

2. If in any German state the measures necessary for the restoration of public security and order are not taken, the Reich Government may temporarily take over the powers of the supreme authority in such a state in order to restore security.

3. States and local authorities have to comply to the limits of their responsibilities with the orders issued by the Government of the Reich under the powers conferred on it by Paragraph 2 ... .

Translation from J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., Nazism, A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, 1919-1945, Vol. 1 (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), p. 142.

M 7 Reichstag Fire Decree – An Assessment

British historian Ian Kershaw comments on the circumstances of the Reichstag Fire Decree (2009):

By the time of the cabinet meeting, Hitler's near-hysterical mood of the previous evening had given way to colder ruthlessness. The "psychologically correct moment for the showdown" with the KPD had arrived. It was pointless to wait longer, he told the cabinet. The struggle against the Communists should not be dependent on "juristical considerations". There was no likelihood that this would be the case. The *rounding up* of Communist deputies and functionaries had already been set in train by Göring during the night in raids carried out with massive brutality. Communists were the main targets. But Social Democrats, trade unionists, and left-wing intellectuals such as Carl Ossietzky were also among those dragged into improvised prisons, often in the cellars of SA or SS local headquarters, and savagely beaten, tortured, and in some cases murdered. By April, the number taken into "protective custody" in Prussia alone numbered some 25,000.

Ian Kershaw, Hitler (London, 2009), pp. 275–276.

M 8 Nazi Violence After the Reichstag Fire Decree

British historian Richard Grunberger writes (1970):

The seizure of power was accompanied by the rounding up, maltreatment and torture (often ending in death) of thousands of anti-Nazis. Arrested by the Gestapo, or police "auxiliaries", these prisoners, for whom the existing police jails proved inadequate, were lodged in concentration camps. In 1933 neither the Gestapo nor the concentration camps were the streamlined institutions they subsequently became and their control was disputed between Nazi administrators, the SA and the SS. Local [party] Gauleiters and SA leaders set up so-called "wild" concentration camps, and on occasion – as at Papenburg camp near Osnabruck – rival agencies of the Nazi regime fought virtual *pitched* battles in disputes over the running of camps.

In March 1933 Himmler became Police President of Munich, with Heydrich as his assistant; June saw the creation of Dachau concentration camp – model for all subsequent hells on earth.

Camp routine, enforced by SS and SA men, whose only alma mater had been the drill-hall, was a sadistic perversion of military training. KZ inmates had to answer roll-calls, salute stand to attention, report themselves present, and proceed *at the double* – and to endure the vilest forms of barrack-square abuse in the process. For breach of regulations they were liable, according to the official disciplinary code, to undergo any of the following: punitive labour, punitive drill, extended roll-calls, confiscation of mail, reductions of rations, solitary confinement, confinement in the dark, incarceration in a stand-up cell, twenty –five strokes on the posterior (covered or bare), suspension from a pole by the wrists, transfer to a punishment battalion, death by shooting or hanging. [...]

The guards in Dachau – enrolled in the so-called Death's Head units – were largely drawn from the lowest stratum of Bavarian society: *moronic* and brutalized peasant types who in a period of

reviving employment looked to SS service as a socially acceptable (not to say prestigious) means of avoiding honest labour. *Irascibly* primitive, these Dachau guards nursed a particular animus against intellectuals and Jews (two partly overlapping categories), and prisoners with academic titles or an offensively scholarly mien – such as wearers of spectacles – elicited even more vicious reactions from them than others. The camp personnel's native coarseness – thus the camp clerk's enquiry about the name of an inmate's mother might be phrased as "Which Jew-whore shitted you out?" – was intensified by conditioning: during training, members of the Death's Head units would alternate three weeks of gruelling military drill with one week's concentration-camp guard duty, in the course of which they had to watch whippings and hangings alongside the prisoners.

As far as the outside world went, the SS arranged things so that the German public's knowledge about concentration camps was simultaneously – and paradoxically – both widespread and patchy. Though all Germans were vaguely aware of their existence, concentration camps remained taboo topics surrounded by secrecy and dread. But since total secrecy would have detracted from the value of camps as deterrents, a minimal supply of information about what went on behind those electrified barbed-wire entanglements, searchlights and machine-gun towers was allowed to reach the outside world. Thus the stereotyped formula "shot while trying to escape", behind which official announcements (on the inside pages of newspapers ads in communications to next-of-kin) camouflaged the premeditated murder of camp inmates, soon passed into common usage as a universally understood cynical euphemism.

As time went on the unofficial *grapevine* which supplemented the official media as an essential source of information also spread knowledge of the SS practice whereby the next-of-kin of murdered prisoners would be informed of their bereavement by the postal delivery of an urn containing the deceased's ashes.

Even so many citizens of the Third Reich remained fully persuaded that concentration camps subserved the professed Nazi aim – enshrined in the inscription "Arbeit macht frei" ("Work makes you free") above the camp gates at Dachau – of re-educating and salvaging prisoners for the German Volksgemeinschaft (folk community) through the educative agencies of hard work and discipline.

Richard Grunberger, Hitler's SS (New York, 1970), pp. 21–24.

to round up: to find and arrest people
pitched: intense
at the double: (military use) moving twice as fast as normally
moron: idiot
irascible: easily becoming furious
grapevine: information spreading from one person to another

M 9 Roll call in the Concentration Camp at Dachau
About 225,000 persons were imprisoned for political reasons in the first six years of Nazi rule. Photograph, 1936.

Tasks

1. Make a timeline showing how the Nazis came to power and consolidated their rule (text).
2. Interpret Hitler's body language in the presence of Reich President von Hindenburg (text, M2).
3. Assess the effects of the Reichstag Fire Decree on the election campaign leading up to 5 March 1933 (M6, M7).
4. Grunberger claims that German public knowledge about concentration camps was "widespread and patchy" (l. 64). Explain the discrepancy and its intended effect (M8).

Sources on "the Enabling Act"

M 10 The Enabling Act

The Enabling Act or "Law to Remove the Distress of People and State" (24 March 1933):

The Reichstag has passed the following law, which is, with the approval of the Reichsrat, herewith promulgated, after it has been established that it satisfies the requirements for legislation altering the Constitution.

Article 1. In addition to the procedure for the passage legislation outlined in the Constitution, the Reich Cabinet is also authorised to enact Laws. This applies equally to the laws referred to in Article 85, paragraph 2, and Article 87 of the Constitution.[1]

Article 2. The national laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet may deviate from the Constitution provided they do not affect the position of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat. The powers of the President remain unaffected.

Article 3. The national laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet shall be prepared by the Chancellor and published in the official gazette. They come into effect, unless otherwise specified, upon the day following their publication. Articles 68–77 of the Constitution do not apply to the laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet.

Article 4. Treaties of the Reich with foreign states which concern matters of domestic legislation do not require the consent of the bodies participating in legislation. The Reich Cabinet is empowered to issue the necessary provisions for the implementing of these treaties.

Article 5. This law comes into effect on the day of its publication. It ceases to be valid on 1 April 1937; it also ceases to be valid if the present Reich Cabinet is replaced by another.

1 These concerned the authority of parliament over taxation.

Translation from J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., Nazism, A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, 1919-1945, Vol. 1 (New York, 1983), pp. 161–62.

M 11 The Enabling Act – An Assessment

British historian Michael Burleigh considers the consequences of the Enabling Act (2000):

Hitler was never the nation's representative, but the self-styled embodiment of its unified will. Only a country in the depths of economic disaster, and with a historical and philosophical culture prone to Salvationist rhetoric and mystification, could take this at all seriously. Poetry had more pitfalls than prose. The nation was occasionally encouraged to express a childlike faith in the Führer's decisions, largely for external consumption. A parliament which voted *to emasculate* itself became a redundant *prop* on the dictatorial mise en-scène. In elections on 12 November 1933, the "Führer's list" of the Nazi Party and its "guests" received 92 per cent of votes cast, rising to 99 per cent in two subsequent elections. The Reichstag met infrequently whenever Hitler determined, passing some seven laws before the outbreak of war, notoriously the 1935 Nuremberg Laws. The Reichstag no longer debated anything, since the only speaker was Hitler; the uniformed delegates were there to assent with enthusiasm. Since sessions concluded with the national anthem or the Horst Wessel Song, wits called the 876 deputies "the world's best-paid male-voice choir". Around eighty former members of the Weimar Reichstag died as a result of Nazi persecution; over 160 experienced exile.

Representative democracy was replaced by referenda. These reaffirmed *unanimity* between a leader guided by his own destiny and a people who were invited to endorse this mysterious communion rather than express personal choices. Plebiscites registered yes votes of 90 per cent or more for departure from the League of Nations or supporting the 1938 Anschluss with Austria. They were a purely propagandistic exercise, since Hitler felt bound not by majorities his regime could *rig*, but by such nebulous entities as "destiny", "history" or "Providence" which guided his steps. By 1936 he used the metaphor of a "sleepwalker", unerringly going forth, oblivious to danger, conscience or doubt. By definition, only he knew where Providence was leading him; the people were simply expected to follow.

Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich (London, 2000), pp. 155–157.

to emasculate: to reduce power
prop: support
unanimity: complete agreement
to rig: to influence
to glower: to look very angry

"The Night of the Long Knives" (29 June 1934)



M 12 **"They salute with both hands now"**

This David Low cartoon from 3 July 1934 shows Hitler (with a smoking gun) and Goering (shown as Thor, the god of war) *glowering* at terrified SA men with their hands up. Some SA men already lie dead on the ground. Goebbels (Propaganda Minister) is shown as Hitler's poodle (British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent, www.cartoons.ac.uk).

Tasks

1. Assess why so many deputies of democratic parties voted for the Enabling Act (text, M10, M11).
2. Analyse the legal implications of the Enabling Act with regard to the Weimar Constitution (text, M10, M11).
3. Describe your first impression of the cartoon. Then examine the details more closely (M12). Explain why the cartoonist, David Low, was especially disliked by the Nazi leadership.

Nazi Ideology


Franz Eher Nachf. G. m. b. H.
Deutschvölkische Verlagsbuchhandlung
München
4½ Jahre Kampf
gegen Lüge, Dummheit und Feigheit
Eine Abrechnung von Adolf Hitler
Leitspruch

M 1 The Original Working Title of "Mein Kampf"
4 ½ Years of Struggle Against Lies, Stupidity and Cowardice. A Settling of Accounts by Adolf Hitler, 1924

Background

The NSDAP was formed in 1919 as the German Workers' Party ("Deutsche Arbeiterpartei"), and renamed the National Socialist German Workers' Party ("Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei") in 1920. Among all the antidemocratic movements that shook Germany after 1918, the Nazi Party became undoubtedly the most significant. Although its rise can also be traced to Germany's defeat in the Great War and the economic difficulties of the Weimar Republic, its roots go back further. Weak democratic traditions and strong authoritarian structures, especially within the political elites, contributed to the Nazis' rise from a minority group to the country's leading party which brought the entire state and society under its control.

Hitler and Nazi Ideology

Adolf Hitler also played a considerable role in the Party's rise. After his attempted coup d'état of Munich in 1923, Hitler was arrested and sentenced to prison in Landsberg, where he began to formulate the principles of Nazi ideology in "Mein Kampf". "Landsberg", he once said, was "my university paid for by the state". In "Mein Kampf" Hitler laid down his version of the essential principles and characteristics of Nazi ideology. However, what he wrote was often not based on his own thinking but on quite commonly held beliefs, so that "Mein Kampf", with its resentful style and *ranting* tone cannot be considered an intellectually acceptable work of political theory. The following principles formed the foundation of Hitler's ideology:

- racism combined with anti-Semitism and Social Darwinism
- the ideology of blood and soil and the quest for living space ("Lebensraum")
- the idea of a people's community ("Volksgemeinschaft") and the "leadership principle" ("Führerprinzip")

Racism and Anti-Semitism

An Austrian citizen by birth, Hitler formed his political views there, especially during his extended stay in Vienna, which was then a multi-ethnic city marked by the presence of Jews from Eastern Europe. Hitler believed in a hierarchy of races in which the Aryan was superior. Hitler claimed the Aryans created a culture separate from lower races, with bearers of culture (a race that could only adopt what a superior race had created) and destroyers of culture (Jews). Hitler's racism was intensified by his belief in Social Darwinism, which saw these races in a permanent struggle against each other for survival. Thus, wars between peoples were a natural part of history. Consequently, it was the Aryans' task to eliminate their enemies if necessary in order to maintain their racial and cultural superiority. In Hitler's view Jews were hardly regarded as human. He often used comparisons and images that linked Jews with *"vermin"* that had to be eradicated. Furthermore, Hitler and the Nazis did not regard Jews as a religious group, but as an ethnicity. This biological anti-Semitism made it impossible for Jews to be accepted as Christians even if they converted. In addition, Hitler regarded Judaism as closely related to Communism and thus responsible for the Russian Revolution. Moreover, Judaism

to rant: to complain loudly and angrily
vermin: pests, like rats or insects; applied (here) to extremely unpleasant, dangerous people
to exterminate: to destroy, to kill

M 2 **Pictures of German Races**
A training session for school helpers in Nürtingen, 1943. School helpers assisted teachers in "Germanizing" eastern regions conquered and settled by the Nazis.

aligned with Communism sought to spread its beliefs and influence throughout the world as part of a Jewish world conspiracy. Hitler claimed that Jewish Bolshevism was responsible for Germany's defeat in the First World War and that Jewish capitalism had brought about the humiliating effects of the Versailles Treaty. Practically all German suffering was blamed on the Jews. In Nazi propaganda they served as scapegoats for the disastrous situation of the German people.

Quest for Living Space ("Lebensraum")

Hitler's concept of "blood and soil" proposed that the German people had to be united behind a common cause: the greatness of the German state. No matter where Germans lived after the humiliation of Versailles, German national unity had to be completed. This meant mainly expansion into Eastern Europe and not by the acquisition of overseas colonies as had been the goal in the days of the Empire. Hitler advocated the vision of an empire for all Germans. Of course, all the territories that had been lost after World War I had to be regained. Unlike Bismarck, who had rejected unification with Austria, Hitler regarded his native land as an essential part of a German Reich.

Expansion into the East was justified in Hitler's ideology because a surplus of Germans was forced to live in an overcrowded territory insufficient for their needs and demands. There was no doubt that this aim would be achieved through war, according to the principles of Aryan superiority and Social Darwinism. Not only was war regarded as a legitimate means of conquering new territories, it was also justified as war against inferior Slavs and Jews. In addition, war would eliminate the evil of Bolshevism and *exterminate* the Marxist world view from which Germany had to be protected. Hitler insisted these principles would never change; his belief that he was chosen to complete a mission was unalterable.

M 3 **"Führer command, we'll follow you!"**
Photograph, August 1934



M 4 **"Yes! Führer we will follow you!"**
Propaganda poster, 1934

People's Community ("Volksgemeinschaft") and the "Führer"

Along with Hitler's fanatical anti-Semitism and his imperialistic policy of acquiring living space by waging war, the idea of a people's community led by a strong, charismatic, and even mythical "leader" ("Führer") was central to his world view.

Hitler believed that all ethnic Germans should be united for a common cause and that all social distinctions and class divisions had to be overcome. The idea of a people's community excluded all those who did not fit the pattern of racial purity and homogeneity, such as political opponents, gypsies, homosexuals, disabled people and, of course, Jews. By emphasizing the need to cooperate for the national good, all differences between ethnic Germans were no longer of importance. Rich and poor, rural and urban, employers and workers were united as though they all shared a common bond. In such a state of imposed harmony, democratic structures with competing political ideas were out of the question. Instead, the country needed an unquestioned leader who was destined to advance Germany into a glorious future. Hitler regarded himself as such a leader, and established a leadership cult that gave him the aura and the image of a redeemer with the obedient German people assembled behind him. This leadership principle was an essential feature of Nazi propaganda and policy.

Conclusion

"Mein Kampf" does not develop a political theory, but is simply a collection of lies and prejudices. Hitler attempted to give it a somewhat scientific character, but it is far from objective and precise. Instead, the book is based on a number of disparate elements which had been floating around for some time and assembled into a rather incoherent package. Hitler did not offer an ideology that had depth and met the demands of empirical science or theoretical evaluation. Its goals were inhumane and denied values like responsibility, empathy, and respect for the lives of others. Hitler himself had never claimed to be an intellectual, a group he found contemptible. "Mein Kampf" was written as a demagogic message to Nazi Party members and the public during the time he was in prison.

M 5 Who is a citizen?

From the 25-point Programme of the NSDAP (1920):

3. We demand land and territory (colonies) to feed our people and to settle our surplus population.

4. Only members of the nation may be citizens of the state. Only those of German blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation. Accordingly, no Jew may be a member of the nation.

5. Non-citizens may live in Germany only as guests, and must be subject to laws for aliens.

6. The right to vote on the State's government and legislation shall be enjoyed by the citizens of the State alone. We demand therefore that all official appointments, of whatever kind, whether in the Reich, in the states or in the smaller localities, shall be held by none but citizens.

We oppose the corrupting parliamentary custom of filling posts merely in accordance with party considerations, and without reference to character or abilities.

7. We demand that the State shall make it its primary duty to provide a livelihood for its citizens. If it should prove impossible to feed the entire population, foreign nationals (non-citizens) must be deported from the Reich.

8. All non-German immigration must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who entered Germany after 2 August 1914 shall be required to leave the Reich forthwith.

9. All citizens shall have equal rights and duties.

Translation from J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., Nazism, A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, 1919-1945, Vol. 1 (New York, 1983), pp. 14–15.

M 6 "Mein Kampf" – An Assessment

British historian Ian Kershaw on "Mein Kampf" (2009):

No policy outline was offered in Mein Kampf. But the book did provide, however *garbled*, the presentation, an uncompromising statement of Hitler's political principles, his "world-view", his sense of his own "mission", his "vision" of society, and his long-term aims. Not least, it established the basis of the Führer myth. For in Mein Kampf Hitler portrayed himself as uniquely qualified to lead Germany from its existing misery to greatness.

Mein Kampf gives an important insight into his thinking in the mid-1920s. By then, he had developed a philosophy that afforded him a complete interpretation of history, of the ills of the world, and how to overcome them. *Tersely* summarized, it boiled down to a simplistic, *Manichean* view of history as racial struggle, in which the highest racial entity, the Aryan, was being undermined and destroyed by the lowest, the parasitic Jew. "The racial question," he wrote, "gives the key not only to world history but to all human culture." The culmination of this process was taken to be the brutal rule of the Jews through Bolshevism in Russia, where the "blood Jew" had, "partly amid inhuman torture killed or let starve to death around 30 million people in truly satanic savagery in order to secure the rule over a great people of a bunch of Jewish literati and stock-market bandits". The "mission" of the Nazi Movement was, therefore, clear: to destroy "Jewish Bolshevism". At the same time – a leap of logic that moved conveniently into a justification for outright imperialist conquest – this would provide the German people with the "living space" needed for the "master race" to sustain itself. He held rigidly to these basic tenets for the rest of his life. Nothing of substance changed in later years. The very inflexibility and quasi-messianic commitment to an "idea", a set of beliefs that were unalterable, simple, internally consistent, and comprehensive, gave Hitler the strength of will and sense of knowing his own destiny that left its mark on all those who came into contact with him. Hitler's authority in his entourage derived in no small measure from the certainty in his own convictions that he could so forcefully express. Everything could be couched in terms of black and white, victory or total destruction. There were no alternatives. And, like all ideologues and "conviction politicians", the self-reinforcing components of his "world-view" meant that he was always in a position *to deride* or dismiss out of hand any "rational" arguments of opponents. Once head of state, Hitler's

garbled: confusing
tersely: in short
Manichean: (here) black-and white-view
to deride: to mock or scorn sth.

Sources on Racism and Anti-Semitism

personalized "world-view" would serve as "guidelines for action" for policy-makers in all areas of the Third Reich.

Hitler's book was not a prescriptive programme in the sense of a short-term political manifesto. But many contemporaries made a mistake in treating Mein Kampf with ridicule and not taking the ideas Hitler expressed there extremely seriously. However base and repellent they were, they amounted to a set of clearly established and rigidly upheld political principles. Hitler never saw any reason to alter the content of what he had written. Their internal coherence (given the irrational premises) allows them to be described as an ideology (or, in Hitler's own terminology, a "world-view"). Hitler's "world-view" in Mein Kampf can now be more clearly seen than used to be possible in the context of his ideas as they unfolded between his entry into politics and the writing of his 'Second Book' in 1928.

Ian Kershaw, Hitler (London, 2009), pp. 148–149.

M 7 **"The Eternal Jew"**

The portrait combines symbols which Nazis connected with Judaism. Poster for the anti-Semitic exhibition "The Eternal Jew" in Munich, 1937.

M 8 Hitler Speaks to the Generals

At a dinner party Hitler outlines his goals and the role of the military (3 February 1933):

The sole aim of general policy: the regaining of political power. The whole State administration must be geared to this end (all departments!).

1. Domestic policy: Complete reversal of the present domestic political situation in Germany. Refusal to tolerate any attitude contrary to this aim (pacifism!). Those who will not be converted must be broken. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Adjustment of youth and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us, and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea. (Realised in the millions of the Nazi movement. It will grow.) Training of youth and strengthening of the will to fight with all means. Death penalty for high treason. Tightest authoritarian State leadership. Removal of the cancer of Democracy!

2. Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles. Equality of rights in Geneva, but useless if people do not have the will to fight. Concern for allies.

3. Economics: The farmer must be saved! Settlement policy! Further increase of exports useless. The capacity of the world is limited and production is forced up everywhere. The only possibility of re-employing part of the army of unemployed lies in settlement. But time is needed and radical improvement not to be expected since living space too small for German people.

4. Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be reintroduced. But beforehand the State leadership must ensure that the men subject to military service are not, even before their entry, poisoned by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or do not fall victim to this poison after their service.

How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps – and probably better – the conquest of new living space in the east and its *ruthless* Germanisation. Certain that only through political power and struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed. The only things that can happen now – settlement – *stopgap measures*.

Armed forces most important and most Socialist institution of the State. It must stay apolitical and impartial. The internal struggle not their affair but that of the Nazi organizations. As opposed to Italy no fusion of Army and SA intended – most dangerous time is during the reconstruction of the Army. It will show whether or not France has statesmen: if so, she will not leave us time but will attack us (presumably with eastern satellites).

General Liebmann, an infantry commander, took notes at the meeting. Translation from J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., Nazism, A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, 1919–1945, Vol. 2 (New York, 1988), pp. 628–29.

ruthless: pitiless
stopgap measure: temporary solution

Tasks

1. Analyse Hitler's ideology and its consequences (text, M8). Conclude with your personal opinion.
2. Choose one of the sources and identify its propaganda value (M2–M4, or M7).
3. Assess the role the Nazi Party assigned to citizenship (M5).
4. The Nazis claimed that Jews were an ethnicity. Explain the difference to a religion. Comment on the discrepancy.
5. In addition to the 1937 exhibition on "The Eternal Jew" (M7), the Nazis also made a propaganda film on the subject in 1940. Find out about it on the Internet and report back to your class.

Sources on the "People's Community" ("Volksgemeinschaft") and the "Führer"

M 9 **"The Nazi Party Safeguards the People's Community"**
"Fellow Germans Turn to the Local Party for Advice and Assistance".
Nazi Party poster, about 1936



M 10 **"Winter Relief – A People Helps Itself!"**
Poster of the Winter Relief, founded in September 1933 and placed under the control of Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels

M 11 **"I have been cast out of the people's community"**
Women's heads are shaved on the market place of Schmölln (Thuringia). The three German women had begun friendships with Polish forced labourers. The Poles were killed.
Photograph, November 1940

M 12 Hitler Cult

British Historian Richard J. Evans on the Hitler Cult (2006):

But it was Hitler who was celebrated above all else. The cult of Hitler had already reached major proportions within the Party by the early 1930s, but now it was propagated in the nation with the full resources of the state and projected not just in words and images, but also in countless small, symbolic ways. From March 1933 onwards, towns rushed to appoint Hitler an honorary citizen. In almost every town across Germany the main square was renamed Adolf-Hitler-Platz by the end of 1933. Already on 20 April 1933 the Leader's forty-fourth birthday saw flags and banners in every German town, garlands hung outside houses in villages all over the land, shop windows carrying special displays to mark the occasion and even public transport decorated with celebratory *bunting*. Parades and torchlit processions brought the celebrations into the streets, while the churches held special services to wish the Leader well. Goebbels's propaganda machine pumped out rhetoric comparing Hitler to Bismarck, while the Bavarian Minister of Education, Hans Schemm, went still further, describing him as "the artist and master-builder whom the Lord God has given to us", creating "a new face of Germany" that gave the people its "final shape" after "the events of two thousand years": "In the personality of Hitler, a millionfold longing of the German people has become reality." Posters and magazine illustrations, newsreels and films proclaimed Hitler as the man from the trenches, with the common touch, not only a many-sided genius with a sense of destiny, but also a humble, even simple human being who had few needs, *spurned* wealth and display, was kind to children and animals and dealt compassionately with old comrades fallen on hard times. Soldier, artist, worker, ruler, statesman, he was portrayed as a man with whom all sectors of German society could identify. Many ordinary Germans were overwhelmed by the scale and intensity of this propaganda. The emotion that overcame Luise Solmitz when she stood on the street awaiting Hitler's arrival in her home town of Hamburg was typical: "I shall never forget the moment when he drove past us in his brown uniform, performing the Hitler salute in his own personal way ... the enthusiasm [of the crowd] blazed up to the heavens ..." She went home, trying to digest the "great moments I had just lived through".

The embedding of the Hitler cult in everyday life was nowhere more obvious than in the introduction of the German greeting – "Hail, Hitler! (Heil Hitler)" – to be used on all official correspondence by state employees from 13 July 1933. It was reinforced by the Hitler salute, the upstretched right arm, sometimes accompanied by the barking-out of the same German greeting, which was also compulsory, this time for all citizens, when the national anthem or the Horst Wessel Song were being sung. "Anyone not wishing to come under suspicion of behaving in a consciously negative fashion will therefore render the Hitler greeting", the decree proclaimed. Such rituals not only cemented the formal solidarity of the regime's supporters but also isolated those who stood apart from the regime. And they gave a further boost to Hitler's standing. After the death of Hindenburg and the subsequent plebiscite on the headship of state on 19 August 1934, accompanied by the slogan "Hitler for Germany – the whole of Germany for Hitler", the Leader-cult knew no more limits. Goebbels's rapid propaganda spin on the "Night of the Long Knives" only won the Leader more backing, as the man who had supposedly saved Germany from disorder yet again, crushed excessive ambition amongst the Party 'big-shots' and restored decency and morality to the Nazi movement. From now on, whatever popular criticism there was of the regime was likely to be directed against Hitler's satraps; the Leader himself was largely immune.

Richard Evans, The Third Reich in Power 1933–1939 (London, 2006), pp. 122–124.

bunting: cloth or paper decorations in the colours of the national flag
to spurn: to refuse to accept

Tasks

1. Discuss the Nazi view of the people's community (text, M9–M11).
2. Make a list of ways in which the "Hitler cult" was expressed (text, M12).

Nazi Foreign Policy: Lies and Deception Pave the Road to World War II

Introduction and General Considerations

From the beginning of his dictatorship foreign policy lay at the very heart of Hitler's ambitions. Most historians agree that his aim was not only the revision of the Versailles Treaty, but also to make Germany into a world power at the expense of other European nations. Expansion – or in Hitler's words the "quest for living space" in Eastern Europe – in combination with the idea of racial superiority was the predominant element and the driving force behind his foreign policy. In *hindsight*, his objectives and methods should have been recognized by observers clearly and early enough. Convinced of the destiny of the Aryan race to dominate the world due to its supposed moral and intellectual superiority, Hitler indicated in his writings that a successful foreign policy would lead to war from a very early stage on. He insisted in "Mein Kampf" that only the "welfare" of the German people counted for him. Therefore, any advantageous solution was justified and "religious" or even "humanitarian" ideals had to be rejected to achieve it. His aims and ambitions deserved to be realized, even by the use of force.

in hindsight: looking back or in retrospect

When Hitler came to power he had to adapt his strategy to the circumstances of the German role in international diplomacy. He knew that his official foreign policy would have to diverge from his real aims. So he used propaganda to deceive and lie to the other powers in Europe about his true objectives. Thus, he claimed his peaceful intentions in public speeches and even signed peace treaties with other countries while secretly rearming. This dual strategy blinded politicians from abroad and domestic opponents simultaneously. The strategy of deception was demonstrated in the organization of the Olympic Games in 1936. While the Games were staged as a magnificent propaganda event to improve Hitler's domestic and international reputation as a peacemaker, Germany's heavy industries were secretly preparing for war.

M 1 **"Adolf in the Looking-glass"**
English cartoon by Bernard Partridge, Punch, 5 December 1934

The International Situation in 1933

By January 1933, when Hitler came to power, revision of the Treaty of Versailles had already begun. Britain and France withdrew their military forces from the Rhineland and reparations payments were again reduced at the Lausanne Conference in 1932. The United States, in the middle of economic depression, no longer focused on Europe. The Soviet Union was struggling with the results of the Great War and the Russian Revolution. In the Far East Japanese expansion into Manchuria had revealed the weakness of the League of Nations, which especially absorbed the attention of Britain. Finally, in Fascist Italy the policies of Dictator Benito Mussolini opened the door to an alliance with Germany.

Hitler's Policy of Revision and Rearmament

In spite of an international situation which favoured his goals, Hitler knew that he had to take his first steps cautiously. Germany's army under the conditions of the Versailles Treaty was still too weak and Germany's position in Europe too isolated. So his initial measures were intended to relieve Germany of the "fetters of Versailles". First, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933 on the grounds that it was not treated on equal terms with France in the question of

M 2

disarmament. More importantly, Hitler regarded the League of Nations as an obstacle to further expansion. To demonstrate his desire for peace he also concluded a non-aggression pact with Poland (January 1934) – a treaty that weakened the Eastern European defense system created by France and had only temporary significance to Hitler – and an Anglo-German Naval Pact in June 1935. Apart from half-hearted protests, the European governments tolerated this policy. They also accepted the re-introduction of compulsory military service (March 1935) and the occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland (March 1936), as Hitler declared these measures to be purely defensive. When the people of the Saar voted in favour of rejoining Germany at the beginning of 1935, the Nazis celebrated another victory. This was soon followed by a decision to make Germany's rearmament and the existence of an air-force public. The occupation of the Rhineland was an especially risky move against the advice of German generals. Had the French intervened, the German troops would have been hopelessly outnumbered and would have had to withdraw. Thus it was a diplomatic and strategic triumph for Hitler, showing European attempts of appeasement had completely failed. It was also a clear sign for Nazi Germany that the Treaty of Versailles was null and void. Seen from this viewpoint, Hitler's next move was only too logical – the "Anschluss" of Austria that was also forbidden by the 1919 peace treaty. On 12 March 1938 German troops crossed the Bavarian-Austrian border, officially to restore order. They were welcomed with enthusiasm by ecstatic crowds. Both Britain and Italy had signalled their neutrality. On 13 March 1938 Hitler announced the union of the two countries in a "Greater Germany". Following a massive propaganda campaign, this step was confirmed in a plebiscite by 99.7 per cent of Austrians.

The Failure of Appeasement: The Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia and Poland

Following the creation of a "Greater Germany" and the European toleration of Hitler's early foreign policy, the Nazis turned their attention to the Sudetenland. Hitler's strategy was to exploit the ethnic situation there. A German minority group of about three-and-a-quarter million people were said to demand that the Sudetenland be joined with Germany because they were oppressed by the Czechs. Many western politicians found these plans compatible with the Germans' right of self-determination. What they did not realize at this stage was that the Nazis would not stop their expansion after winning the Sudetenland, but would claim all of Czechoslovakia and even other territory later. In an attempt to appease Hitler once again, the western powers, especially Britain under the leadership of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, pursued a policy to avoid military conflict by pressing the Czech government to give up the Sudetenland in return for peace. Chamberlain believed that the crisis could be solved by negotiations. Indeed, the matter was formally resolved in the Munich Agreement (September 1938). Britain, France, Italy and Germany participated in the conference, but not the Czechoslovakian government. The "compromise" allowed Germany to annex the Sudetenland, but the European powers guaranteed the new borders of Czechoslovakia. On his return to London Chamberlain naively declared, "I believe it is peace for our time."

Unsurprisingly, the Nazis then moved to take over the rest of Czechoslovakia. Under the pretense that other minority groups in Czechoslovakia sought his support, in March 1939 Hitler sent troops into the country, annexed Bohemia and Moravia, and turned them



M 3 **"Stepping Stones to Glory"**

English Cartoon by David Low, Evening Standard, 8 July 1936. One contemporary who consistently argued that Hitler intended to go on and would not stop until he was stopped was cartoonist David Low. Low hated Hitler, and the feeling was returned with such intensity that Hitler tried to get Low's cartoons forbidden – so it is arguable that his cartoons "touched a nerve".

retaliation: revenge
lethal: very dangerous, fatal
staggering: extremely surprising

into German protectorates. Despite British and French guarantees to Czechoslovakia, neither country intervened nor took military action. However, both guaranteed the independence of Poland and Belgium. Also, Britain and France began to rearm, as appeasement and efforts to maintain the peace had clearly failed. Nazi foreign policy reached a turning-point in the occupation of Czechoslovakia: For the first time Germany occupied territory inhabited by a non-German majority population.

M 4 **Ribbentrop in Moscow**
The German Foreign Minister signs the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact on 23 August 1939. In the background on the left is Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, Stalin is on the right.

Unleashing World War II

The threshold to a general European war was reached when Nazi Germany concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, the "Hitler-Stalin Pact" (23 August 1939). Both countries pledged to remain neutral in case of a military conflict. The pact included a secret protocol which determined German and Soviet spheres of interest in Eastern Europe. Germany gained free access to western Poland and Lithuania, the USSR to eastern Poland and the Baltic. From the Nazi point of view the agreement prevented a war on two German fronts. On 1 September 1939 Germany attacked Poland, allegedly in *retaliation* for a Polish attack on the German radio station Gleiwitz. The attack was staged to justify German military reaction as an act of defense, since Poland had received guarantees from Britain and France. Hitler apparently believed that both western powers were not yet prepared to fight. To his surprise, they declared war. Germany had provoked a large-scale military conflict. But despite the guarantees to Poland, British and French armies could not intervene. Poland was conquered and divided between Germany and the Soviet Union within four weeks.

While German forces were engaged in Poland, the western front remained calm. Britain and France hesitated to begin hostilities. In May 1940 the German military campaign against France began. Violating the neutrality of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Germany conquered France by June. The north of the country was occupied; a pro-German government in Vichy ruled the south. British and other Allied forces stationed in France were caught up in the German advance, but were evacuated in a dramatic rescue in Dunkirk. The Nazis expected the fall of France to force Britain into peace negotiations. In spite of *lethal* German air raids on British cities, the new Prime Minister Winston Churchill continued the fight. Along with the Commonwealth forces, Britain alone opposed the Axis powers in 1940. When the aerial Battle of Britain failed, Nazi Germany faced its first setback in a military conflict that had seen a series of successful "Blitzkrieg" campaigns. The German invasion of the USSR (starting on 22 June 1941) which ultimately failed, remarkably in the Battle of Stalingrad (August 1942 – February 1943), marks the turning-point of World War II. From then on, German troops retreated on all fronts. In addition, the US entry into the war (December 1941) expanded the productive and manpower reserves of the Allies. Nevertheless, the war dragged on with a *staggering* loss of life to civilians and soldiers. On 8 May 1945, German forces surrendered unconditionally. With the continent in ruins, the Second World War came to an end.

M 5 **Invasion of Poland**
German soldiers, September 1939

Sources on Munich and Czechoslovakia, 1938

M 6 The British Ambassador in Germany to Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, 1938

Nevile Henderson served as British Ambassador to Germany between 1937 and 1939. During the late summer of 1938, Henderson wrote a series of personal letters to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, concerning the crisis over Czechoslovakia (22 August 1938):

I feel so strongly also on the big British issue. Have we or have we not got to fight Germany again? The followers of the Crowe tradition in your Department argue and have long argued that it is inevitable. I regard that attitude as nothing short of disastrous. It may prove to be inevitable, but it seems to me a suicidal policy fatalistically to accept it as so. If we fight Germany this year or next over the Sudeten question, we shall probably beat her but it will mean that we shall have to go on fighting her again and again, until one day we may be ourselves beaten. [...] It may well, in spite of all the *croakers*, be the same with Germany if we can avoid fighting them about such a bad case as the Sudeten. However badly Germany behaves, it does not make the right of the Sudeten any less justifiable. [...] Never again are those blocks of Germans on Germany's frontier going to be misgoverned by Czechs as they have been during the past twenty years. That seems to me also inconceivable and we have no earthly or heavenly right to force them to be so. The Teuton and the Slav are irreconcilable – just as are the Briton and the Slav. [...] Moreover however badly the Germans behave, one must also condemn [Czech president] Benes and his military enthusiasts. Their position is quite untenable and as such one has immense sympathy for them. [...] What is Hitler going to do? When all, as in this country, depends on the decision of a single individual, one must be guided, under Providence, by one's own instinct and impression. [...] I believed that it was useless to appeal to Hitler for a modification of his military arrangements. It is one of my duties to put myself under the German skin, if I can, and to report to you how they feel. Their whole experience of Benes is that he cannot be trusted and that whatever he may say he always gets out of it. And they believe that the Czech military want war now when they believe that they can drag France and ourselves in rather than later, when the international position may be less favourable to them. That being the case if I were a German I would also be prepared for all eventualities, seeing that the Czech military are determined that no concessions shall be made to the Sudeten.

It stands to reason that Hitler himself must equally be prepared for all eventualities. But from there to say that he has already decided on aggressive action against Czechoslovakia this autumn is, I think, untrue. He still hopes to get what he wants by peaceable means and what he wants now is a Swiss cantonal system for the Sudeten to enable them to live their own life and not to be *harried* all the time by minor Czech officials. That the plums thereafter will drop ripe from the tree into the German Reich is another question. Every German, however moderate, believes this to be inevitable in the long run and since in politics geography always has the last word, it is more than likely. But for the moment a quiet life for the Sudeten would, I believe, satisfy Hitler; but if Benes won't give enough, then he may lose all. [...] I would fight Germany tomorrow for a good cause but I refuse to contemplate our doing so for the Sudeten. If they were Hungarians or Poles or Roumanians or the citizens of any small nation, all England would be on their side. They are Germans, so we shut our eyes to realities and are influenced by other considerations, some honourable, some chivalrous but many egotistical or inspired by fear.

Source: Documents on British Foreign Policy, (London, 1949), Third Series, vol. II, no. 665, pp. 131–4. Also at www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pv/munich/czdoc07.html

M 7 The Munich Agreement

Participants after the signing on 29 September 1938. In the front row (from the left): Arthur Neville Chamberlain, Edouard Daladier, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini und Count Galeazzo Ciano

M 8 Former British Ambassador Henderson

Nevile Henderson writes 1940:

As a coup it was a brilliant success, but in every other respect it constituted an irreparable political *blunder*. Godesberg was in comparison an unimportant and minor one. By the occupation of Prague, Hitler put himself once for all morally and unquestionably in the wrong and destroyed the entire arguable validity of the German case as regards the Treaty of Versailles. After Prague, Nazism ceased to be national and racial and became purely dynamic and *felonious*. By his *callous* destruction of the hard and newly won liberty of a free and independent people, Hitler deliberately violated the Munich Agreement, which he had signed not quite six months before; and his undertaking to Mr. Chamberlain, once the Sudeten had been incorporated in the Reich, to respect the independence and integrity of the Czech people. Thereafter Hitler's word could never more be trusted nor could the most pacifically minded disregard the rape of Prague. It was a repetition of Belgium, 1914, in another form; and it is no exaggeration to say that in 1939, also, the war has been caused by the deliberate tearing up by Germany of a scrap of paper. Up till that March, as I wrote in my final report, the German ship of state had flown the German national flag. On those Ides of March, its captain defiantly hoisted the skull and crossbones of the pirate, and appeared under his true colors as an unprincipled menace to European peace and liberty.

As long as National Socialism remained an article for internal consumption or even confined its aspiration to those solid blocks of Germans who lived on its immediate frontiers, the morality of the German case was a debatable proposition. As far as internal affairs went, the Government of Germany was the concern of the German people, nor would the British nation or the British Empire as a whole have ever willingly consented to go to war in order to refuse the application, where it might be possible and just, of the principle of self-determination. It was not until the theory of German nationalism was extended beyond Germany's own frontiers and the principle of self-determination, having served its purpose, was abandoned in favor of the theory of Lebensraum (or unlimited elbowroom for Germany regardless of others) that the Nazi philosophy and its urge for domination exceeded the limits compatible with peace. Prague revitalized France, consolidated England and the Empire, and produced a common front against future German aggression. Its occupation laid the foundation of the present struggle for the ideal of the maximum of freedom and justice as against unprincipled power politics and world dominion.

Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937–1939 (New York, 1940), pp. 218–219.

M 9 Invasion of Czechoslovakia

15 March 1939

croaker: people making noise like a frog makes
to harry: to put under pressure
blunder: a careless and embarrassing mistake
felonious: criminal
callous: heartless

Tasks

1. Compare Henderson's attitude towards the Germans and the Czechs (M6, M8).
2. Henderson claims his duty is "to put [himself] under the German skin" (ll. 34–35). Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this type of diplomacy (M6).

World War II – Map and Timeline



M 10

World War II: Timeline	
1 September1939	German invasion of Poland
17 September 1939	Soviet invasion of Poland
6 October 1939	Polish surrender
10 May 1940	Germany begins campaign against France via neutral Benelux states
22 June 1940	German-French armistice signed
11 November 1942	Vichy France, German puppet state in southern France, founded
August 1940 – May 1941	Battle of Britain
September 1939 – May 1945	Battle of the Atlantic (longest continuous military campaign in World War II)
June 1940 – May 1943	North African Campaign
22 June 1941	German invasion of the Soviet Union ("Operation Barbarossa")
7 December 1941	Japanese attack Pearl Harbor (U.S. enters the war)
31 January 1943	German defeat at Stalingrad
6 June 1944	Allied invasion of Normandy ("D-Day")
12 January 1945	Soviet Army reaches the Oder River in Germany
13 – 15 February 1945	Allied bombardment of Dresden
25 April 1945	U.S. and Soviet Armies meet at the Elbe River
30 April 1945	Hitler commits suicide
8 May 1945	German unconditional surrender (ends war in Europe)
6 and 9 August 1945	Atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
2 September 1945	Japanese surrender formalized (ends war in the Pacific)

M 11

M 12 Civilian Life and Death in the Leningrad Blockade (1941–42)

The author describes the duties of the Komsomols, members of the Communist Youth organization, who checked on people living in Leningrad during the blockade (2003):

The sights which met the eyes of the youth brigades in the frozen and *bleak* flats of Leningrad were almost beyond the power of a Dürer or Hogarth to depict. [...]

[A young woman named Anna Ivanovna Shakova] had been wounded at the front and then took a job with a Komsomol brigade. One evening she went with a friend to an old house on Maly Prospekt. They entered a dark apartment and found a woman lying dead with an overcoat thrown over her body. On the bed there was a large bundle, wrapped in a tablecloth. Inside they found a nursing child, alive, whimpering and sucking on an empty nipple. They brought the baby to the nursery. No one in the apartment knew the child's name, all the neighbors were dead. "I told them to write down my name," Anna said. "Let him carry my name through the years." Before the winter ended she had taken in two more babies. She had a family of three and was not yet married.

In the great Kirov metallurgical plant there were about five thousand workers, still alive, still technically on the payroll, most of them living in the icy, shell-torn buildings, too weak to work, almost too weak to live.

After the blockade was lifted one of the girls, Anna Vasileyeva, a *chubby*, red-cheeked youngster, told of her life. She was a "Putilov girl", that is, her family for at least two generations had been workers in the Putilov, now the Kirov, plant. Her father and two brothers worked at the factory. The family lived in a house in a nearby suburb, close enough so they could walk to work.

When the war started, Anna, only fifteen, began to work at Kirov, too. When the Nazis swept almost to the Kirov gates in September, 1941, Anna's family had to abandon their house in the suburbs – it was in German-occupied territory. Then her father and one brother were killed by a German shell. The other brother went into the Red Army. Anna and her mother went to live in a flat in town. One day she came back from work to find her mother had been blinded by *slivers* of flying glass from a shell hit on a nearby apartment. By January no work was being done at Kirov. No one was able to work. There was no power, no heat, no light. Several of the stronger girls, Anna among them, made up a brigade. Each day one or two started from Kirov with a child's sled. They visited three or four flats where their relatives lived – to see if they were alive, to remove any dead, to bring a little food, to light a fire or heat some water, whatever they could do. In late afternoon they would come back to the little room where their comrades huddled around a tin stove.

"Here is the way it was," she said, "The first thing you would do was to look around to see if everyone was there, if your friends were all alive." It was the same each morning. When you awoke from your troubled, hungry, freezing sleep, you looked around the circle.

"Then," she said, "you'd notice someone sitting in a chair beside the stove. At first he would look all right. Then you'd look closer and see that he was sitting there dead. That was the way it was."

Anna Vasileyeva was seventeen. She had survived. No one else in her family had.

Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days. The Siege of Leningrad (New York, 2003, 2nd ed.), pp. 488–90.

bleak: cold and unfriendly
chubby: slightly fat
sliver: a small piece

Tasks

1. Describe the course of the war in Europe using the map as a guide (M10, M11).
2. Research the Leningrad blockade on the Internet and report back to your class.
3. Choose one of the two tasks (M12):

a) Characterize 15-year-old Anna, a girl younger than you.

b) Consider the effect of the Leningrad blockade on the young people who survived.

Discrimination, Persecution and the Holocaust

M 1 **Humiliating a Jewish Student in Marburg**
Photograph, 24 August 1933

After the Nazis Came to Power (1933)

Although anti-Semitism in Germany and Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries was common, the Nazi treatment of Jews was far more extreme. Under the Nazis anti-Semitism became state doctrine and a central element of policy. Unlike the older anti-Semitism within German and European societies which made Jews the scapegoats of economic or social trouble, Nazi propaganda portrayed Jews as racially and nationally inferior. As the Nazis saw it, the superior Aryan German was being tested in a struggle against Jewish evil.

Anti-Jewish actions began shortly after Hitler came to power. In the spring and summer of 1933 violence and outbursts were directed against Jews and their property by local Nazi groups and SA units. For example, in Berlin Eastern European Jews were seized and physically abused, as happened in Breslau, Straubing or Mannheim, where the SA also closed Jewish shops. These local actions were largely uncoordinated until the Nazis organized a nationwide boycott of Jewish businesses on 1 April 1933. Nazi propaganda presented these activities as disciplined and peaceful; however, they were far from it. Jews were attacked, harassed or arrested. When the police did not intervene it was clear that Jews were losing legal protection.

Discriminatory Legislation (1933–1935)

1933 saw the transition from spontaneous local outbursts of violence against Jews to explicit anti-Semitic legislation. These laws and decrees aimed at excluding Jews from public life. Thereafter steps originally taken against Jews were applied to other minority groups, so that marriages between Aryans and gypsies or blacks were forbidden. Later decrees removed teachers, doctors, lawyers and other professionals from their jobs and deprived them of their civil liberties. The intention was to make life for Jews so unbearable in Germany that they voluntarily

M 2 **"Germans! Defend yourselves! Do not buy from Jews!"**
Boycott of Jewish businesses, 1 April 1933

Legal Discrimination against Jews, 1933–35	
Law	**Content**
"Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service" (7 April 1933)	"Non-Aryan", a coded term for Jews, and those whose political loyalty to the regime was questionable could be dismissed as civil servants or public employees. Exceptions were possible for those who were civil servants before 1914, who had been soldiers during the war, or whose fathers or sons had died in military action during the war. "Non-Aryan" was defined in a separate document on 11 April 1933 as a person who had one Jewish parent or grandparent. From this point on, official documents attesting to a person's "Aryan status" ("Ahnenpaß") were required by law.
"Nuremberg Laws" (15 September 1935)	The "Reich Citizenship Law" distinguished between those of Aryan blood, who were full citizens, and "non-Aryans", who were non-citizens and had fewer rights. A differentiated definition of "Jew" distinguished between "full Jews" and "mixed" racial identities. Three Jewish grandparents, membership in a Jewish synagogue or marriage to a "full Jew" made one a "full Jew". The "Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour" prohibited marriage and sexual relations between Jews and persons of "German or kindred blood". Jews were not allowed to employ female Aryan household servants under the age of 45.
"Law for the Protection of the Hereditary Health of the German People" (18 October 1935)	The law forbade Germans to marry if they could infect their spouses or children with a genetic disorder. Couples had to be licensed by the health authorities in order to marry. The law continued a concern with racial hygiene that had begun with the "Law for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased Offspring" (14 July 1933).
"First Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law" (14 November 1935)	"Mixed" racial Jews (one-quarter and one-half Jews) continued to be citizens. Jews had no right to vote or to hold public office. The exceptions set out in the "Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service" in July 1933 allowing some Jewish civil servants and public employees to remain in their jobs were removed. All Jewish officials were to retire by the end of 1935.

M 3

left the country. However, by 1938 only 150,000 Jews out of 500,000 had emigrated, partly because doing so essentially meant a complete loss of property. In addition, other countries did not permit Jews to immigrate. In 1938 Poland, for example, refused to allow Polish Jews who had lived abroad for more than five years to return to their original homeland. The Polish government feared a large number of Jews fleeing from Austria to Poland after the "Anschluss" with Germany. Therefore, when Germany expelled these Polish Jews, they were forced to live in an unhygienic and inhumane no-man's-land along the German-Polish border.

Radicalization of Persecution (1937–1938)

In 1936 the Olympic Games in Berlin led the Nazi regime to avoid overt anti-Semitic measures which would have had a negative impact on the international reputation of Germany. But local discrimination and persecution continued as Jewish businesses were boycotted daily and Jews were refused access to theatres and other public places. After Hitler attacked "Jewish Bolshevism" in a speech at a Nuremberg Party Rally in 1937, public violence against Jews increased. Jewish businesses were restricted and Jews were obliged to have their property registered. In June 1938 "criminals" and "anti-social persons" were arrested, among them 1,500 Jews who were taken to the Buchenwald concentration camp. The same summer Jews were banned from professions in financial services (e.g. as stockbrokers), law and medicine.

But the worst was still to come. On 7 November 1938 a 17-year-old German-born Polish Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, whose parents had been expelled from Hanover to the area near the Polish border, shot a German diplomat, Ernst von Rath, in Paris. Nazi propaganda insisted the incident was part of a Jewish plot against Germany and not an individual act. Goebbels used it to organize a pogrom on 9 November 1938 that was later called "The Night of Broken Glass"

M 4 **Burning Inventory of the Synagogue in Mosbach**
Photograph, November 1938

("Reichskristallnacht") on account of the broken glass littering the streets. The pogrom was the widest-spread anti-Semitic disturbance seen in Europe since the Middle Ages. Afterwards the Jewish community itself was fined 1 billion reichsmarks to compensate for the damages caused by the riots. Further persecution followed, including imprisoning 30,000 Jews in concentration camps and banning Jews from German economic life effective as of 1 January 1939. The persecution continued to affect all aspects of life (see table). Between November 1938 and the outbreak of World War II about 115,000 Jews emigrated from Germany. Many went to Palestine, the United States or other states in Europe. Jewish property was confiscated and put into the hands of German businessmen, who clearly profited from "Aryanization" and the November pogrom. As Jewish cultural and economic life was being wiped out the Nazis turned to how to "manage a final account with the Jews" (Hermann Göring, 10 November 1939).

Deportation and Extermination: the Holocaust (1939–1945)

With the outbreak of the Second World War (September 1939) the persecution of the Jews intensified and entered a horrifying and barbaric final stage. Whereas in Germany the Nazis had used discrimination to force as many Jews as possible into emigration, these tactics could not be applied to the large number of Jews (10 million) who lived in the newly conquered territories in Eastern Europe. The "solution to the Jewish question" turned to planned mass murder, at first mainly by shootings during the occupation of Poland and by killing people with gas in mobile vehicles after the invasion of the USSR. Specialized paramilitary groups, "death squads" ("Todeskommandos") or "task groups" ("Einsatzgruppen"), followed regular troops and massacred civilians, often Jews. The Nazis regarded this as part of an inevitable fight against the evils of Bolshevism which Nazis portrayed as a Jewish conspiracy. Hitler termed the war against the Soviet Union "a war of extermination" with no room for mercy. The army cooperated with German security organizations under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler (commander of the SS) and Reinhard Heydrich (chief of the Security Police, "Sicherheitsdienst", SD).

M 5 **Jewish Women and Children in Auschwitz**
Photograph, 1944

Ghettos became transitional holding areas for Jews who were transported to them in cattle wagons. There they lived in unsanitary conditions, threatened by disease, starvation, forced labour and the omnipresent arbitrary and unpredictable violence of German or indigenous guards. For example, ghettos were established in Budapest, Krakow or Warsaw, with hundreds of thousands crammed into very small living quarters. Inhabitants risked death if they tried to escape.

The successful German military campaign against the Soviet Union in late summer 1941 led to concrete plans to destroy the whole Jewish population. The logistical problems in organizing and coordinating measures to exterminate millions of Jews were enormous. On 20 January 1942 Heydrich invited high representatives of the ministries, the Party and the SS to Berlin for the infamous Wannsee Conference. The conference protocol presented the "final solution" ("Endlösung") in euphemistic terms, but to all present the meaning of the words was evident. No one objected to the results of the conference.

Between spring 1942 and autumn 1944 Jews from all over Europe were deported to extermination camps like Treblinka, Auschwitz, and Sobibor in Eastern Europe. These camps were not designed for the exploitation of workers like the concentration camps in Germany, but for the rapid elimination of Jews by gassing them. The crematoria in the camps were built by German firms to burn the masses of dead bodies from the gas chambers. Prisoners who were not murdered upon arrival had to work under inhumane conditions. Many of these workers died of diseases, maltreatment, hunger, or as victims of medical experiments. It is estimated that about six million Jews were killed during the war.

The Holocaust and Historiography

Considering the barbaric enormity of the Holocaust and its unimaginable toll of victims, many historians have investigated the origins of anti-Semitic terror in Nazi Germany. Historical research has mainly focused on whether the Holocaust was planned from the beginning of the Nazi dictatorship (if not earlier) or whether it developed in the course of events. There are two lines of argumentation:

The "intentionalists" maintain that Hitler had always intended to eradicate the Jews and that the Holocaust was the inevitable result of very early aims beginning with the foundation of the Nazi Party. The orders for state-organized mass murder came from Hitler himself and his plans provided a "straight road to Auschwitz".

The "functionalists" or "structuralists" argue that there was no such plan, but that the war, either with its initial victories or later defeats in the Soviet Union, led to radical changes. Especially lower ranks in the Nazi hierarchy gradually turned to committing mass murder on an unthinkable scale. The functionalists call this development a "twisted road to Auschwitz".

However, neither group disputes the reality of the Holocaust on a vicious scale nor the responsibility of those who took part, especially Hitler. Perhaps a synthesis of the two schools is possible. There was indeed pressure from below but Hitler as the driving force turned his followers into blindly obedient executioners. What remains is that the Holocaust is a barbaric example of genocide and a lasting burden on Germany.

The Way to the Extermination Camps – Deportation of German Jews

M 6

M 7

M 8

M 9

M 10

Deportation of Jews in Wiesbaden
On 29 August 1942 Jews in Wiesbaden had to gather at the synagogue in the Friedrichstrasse and be registered (M6, M7). The following day they were deported from the grounds of a slaughterhouse (M8, M9, M10). The photographer was presumably a police officer.
Photographs, 29 and 30 August 1942

M 11 Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine

The German engineer Hermann Graebe witnessed mass executions in the Ukraine in 1942:

On October 5, 1942, when I visited the building office at Dubno, my foreman told me that in the vicinity of the site, Jews from Dubno had been shot in three large pits, each about 30 metres long and 3 metres deep. About 1,500 persons had been killed daily. All the 5,000 Jews who had still been living in Dubno before the pogrom were to be liquidated. As the shooting had taken place in his presence, he was still much upset.

Thereupon, I drove to the site accompanied by my foreman and saw near it great mounds of earth, about 30 metres long and 2 metres high. Several trucks stood in front of the mounds. Armed Ukrainian militia drove the people off the trucks under the supervision of an S.S. man. The militiamen acted as guards on the trucks and drove them to and from the pit. All these people had the regulation yellow patches on the front and back of their clothes, and thus could be recognized as Jews.

My foreman and I went directly to the pits. Nobody bothered us. Now I heard rifle shots in quick succession from behind one of the earth mounds. The people who had got off the trucks – men, women and children of all ages – had to undress upon the orders of an S.S. man, who carried a riding or dog whip. They had to put down their clothes in fixed places, sorted according to shoes, top clothing and underclothing. I saw a heap of shoes of about 800 to 1,000 pairs, great piles of underlinen and clothing.

Without screaming or weeping, these people undressed, stood around in family groups, kissed each other, said farewells, and waited for a sign from another S.S. man, who stood near the pit, also with a whip in his hand. During the fifteen minutes that I stood near I heard no complaint or plea for mercy. I watched a family of about eight persons, a man and a woman both about fifty with their children of about one, eight and ten, and two grown-up daughters of about twenty to twenty-nine. An old woman with snow-white hair was holding the one-year-old child in her arms and singing to it and tickling it. The child was cooing with delight. The couple were looking on with tears in their eyes. The father was holding the hand of a boy about ten years old and speaking to him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed to the sky, stroked his head, and seemed to explain something to him.

At that moment the S.S. man at the pit shouted something to his comrade. The latter counted off about twenty persons and instructed them to go behind the earth mound. Among them was the family which I have mentioned. I well remember a girl, slim and with black hair, who, as she passed close to me, pointed to herself and said "23." I walked around the mound and found myself confronted by a tremendous grave. People were closely wedged together and lying on top of each other so that only their heads were visible. Nearly all had blood running over their shoulders from their heads. Some of the people shot were still moving. Some were lifting their arms and turning their heads to show that they were still alive. The pit was already two-thirds full. I estimated that it already contained about 1,000 people. [...]

Hermann Graebe, Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine, from: Sources of the Western Tradition, Volume II, from Renaissance to the Present, edited by Marvin Perry a.o. (Boston, 1995), p. 386f.

M 12 Mass Executions

The original photograph caption said: "Jews digging graves".

Mass murders of Jews in the occupied Soviet Union were often committed in public. Many soldiers even took photographs of the crimes. Photograph, 1941, presumably in the Ukraine

The Holocaust and Historiography

M 13 An Assessment

American historian Christopher Browning writes in his standard work, "The Origins of the Final Solution. The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy 1939–1942" (2005):

What was Hitler's role in this fateful evolution? As the ultimate embodiment of Nazi ideology as well as the constant inciter and mobilizer of the party faithful, Hitler had certainly legitimized and prodded the ongoing search for final solutions. His obsession with the Jewish question ensured that the Nazi commitment would not slacken, that the search for a solution one way or another to this self-imposed problem would not fade away into obscurity or be indefinitely postponed. No leading Nazi could prosper who did not appear to take the Jewish question as seriously as Hitler did himself. Thus Hitler, simply by his existence, exerted a continuing pressure on the political system, which induced a competition among the faithful and ambitious to advance ever more radical proposals and to carry out Jewish policy in an ever more brutal and comprehensive manner. For many – the "true believers" – this commitment to the Final Solution was a deeply felt conviction. For the unquestioning loyalists, it was a matter of completely identifying with Hitler. For *eugenicists* and planning experts, it was the opportunity to realize an agenda of their own that overlapped with that of Hitler. For technicians of many sorts, it was a chance to display their skills. And for countless others, it was a cynical exercise in political careerism, opportunism, and accommodation, in the end the results were the same. The commitment to some kind of final solution *permeated* the entire regime, and acceptance of such a priority on the part of the regime characterized much of the German population at large.

But Hitler's role was also more immediate. From September 1939 to October 1941 he was an active and continuing participant in the decision-making process. Indeed, not a single significant change in Nazi Jewish policy occurred without his intervention and approval. Two basic conclusions can be drawn about this participation. The first concerns Hitler's mode of operation. To make his wishes known, he would give signals in the form of relatively vague and inexplicit statements, exhortations, and prophecies. Others, especially Himmler, responded to these signals with extraordinary *alacrity* and sensitivity, bringing to Hitler more specific guidelines for his approval. [...] A second rather consistent pattern is the chronological correlation between victory and radicalization, indicating that the emergence of the Final Solution was influenced and shaped not only by Hitler's enduring obsession with the Jewish question but also by the changing circumstances and the periods of elation and victory euphoria in which the Third Reich found itself. [...]

Nazi racial policy was radicalized at points in time that coincided with the peaks of German military success, as the euphoria of victory emboldened and tempted an elated Hitler to dare ever more drastic policies. With the "war of destruction" in the Soviet Union underway and the imminent prospect of all Europe at his disposal, the last inhibitions fell away. Hitler's final hesitations in August 1941 – to wait until "after the war" – were overcome in late September and early October, with the last great military encirclements that still promised an early victory.

But Germany's string of military successes finally came to an extraordinarily abrupt end in late October. [...] There was no open road to Moscow. But the tide of war turned too late for European Jewry. The Soviet Union was saved but the Jews of Europe were not. The Nazis were now committed to a program of mass murder which, though conceived in the euphoria of victory, would be implemented in defeat. Lebensraum and Final Solution, Hitler's twin obsessions, had evolved and radicalized under the spur of victory and opportunity. In defeat, the evolution was over. Henceforth Hitler would cling grimly to the vision of Lebensraum and Final Solution that had been reached in the fall of 1941, bringing about the destruction first of European Jewry and then of Germany itself.

Christopher Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution. The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy 1939–1942 (London, 2005), pp. 424–427.

eugenicist: supporter of the movement to improve humans by controlling hereditary factors
to permeate: to penetrate
alacrity: eagerness

M 14 Reflections of a Survivor

Elie Wiesel (born 30 September 1928 in Romania), American author, Holocaust survivor and Nobel Peace Laureate, spoke in the Berlin Reichstag building in November 1987:

The atrocities committed under the law of the Third Reich must not and will not be forgotten; nor will they be forgiven.

I have no right to forgive the killers for having exterminated six million of my kinsmen. Only the dead can forgive, and no one has the right to speak on their behalf.

Still, not all Germans alive then were guilty. As a Jew, I have never believed in collective guilt. Only the guilty were guilty.

Children of killers are not killers but children. I have neither the desire nor the authority to judge today's generation for the unspeakable crimes committed by the generation of Hitler.

But we may – and we must – hold it responsible, not for the past, but for the way it remembers the past. And for what it does with the memory of the past.

Memory is the keyword. To remember is *to forge links* between past and present, between past and future.

It is in the name of memory that I address myself to Germany's youth. "Remember" is the commandment that dominates the lives of young Jews today; let it dominate your lives as well. Challenged by memory, we can move forward together. Opposed to memory, you will remain eternally opposed to us and to all we stand for.

I understand: of course, I understand: it is not easy to remember. It may be even more difficult for you than it is for us Jews. We try to remember the dead, you must remember those who killed them. Yes – there is pain involved in both our efforts. Not the same pain. Open yourselves to yours, as we have opened ourselves to ours.

You find it hard to believe that your elders did these deeds? So do I. Think of the tormentors as I think of their victims. I remember every minute of their agony. I see them constantly. I am afraid: if I stop seeing them, they will die. I keep on seeing them, and they died nevertheless.

I remember: 1942, in my childhood town, somewhere in the Carpathian Mountains. Jewish children were playing in the snow, others studied hard at school. They were already decreed dead here in Berlin, and they did not know it.

There is something in all this I do not understand – I never will. Why such obstinancy on the part of the killer to kill so many of my people? Why the old men and women? Why the children?

You, young men and women in Germany, must ask yourselves the same questions.

A people that has produced Goethe and Schiller, Bach and Beethoven, chose suddenly to put its national genius at the service of evil – to erect a monument to its dark power called Auschwitz.

Elie Wiesel, Reflections of a survivor, from: Sources of the Western Tradition, Volume II, from Renaissance to the Present, edited by Marvin Perry a.o., Boston 1995, p. 395.

to forge links: to develop a successful relationship

Tasks

1. Summarize Browning's explanation in thesis Form (M13).
2. Verify or disprove Browning's claims using information available on the Internet (text, M13).
3. Examine the stylistic features Browning uses to emphasize his message (M13).
4. Write down your personal feelings, impressions, and opinions of Wiesel's reflections (M14).
5. Find arguments supporting either the "intentionalists" or the "structuralists" in the historical discussion of the Holocaust (text, M1–14).

German Resistance to Nazism

Obstacles to Resistance

After the Nazis came to power all political parties were dissolved and most organizations came under Nazi control. Only the churches and the army retained some degree of independence and autonomy. Although several disparate groups tried to resist the Nazi dictatorship, their success was not effective beyond expressing dissent to Nazi ideology and policies for quite different reasons. The Nazis' system of coordination, with its careful surveillance of the population and substantial threats of arrest, torture or death kept millions from openly resisting. Indeed, the system was so dangerous that even the slightest verbal protest could be regarded as a form of resistance. On the other hand, the Nazi insistence on the values of the community, with its virtues of loyalty, obedience and a sense of duty left many Germans reluctant to resist, despite the loss of freedom and the pressure they experienced.

The first groups to begin active resistance were German Communists and Social Democrats. They had also been first to oppose the Nazi movement. However, within fascist systems opponents must try to remain as anonymous as possible, because only a person whom the regime considers harmless (or loyal beyond question) can resist effectively. Therefore, most people connected with the resistance to the Nazis could act only in secret, so as not to arouse the suspicion of the authorities. Once a member of the resistance was revealed, he or she was immediately endangered, as was the entire group.

Young people between the ages of 14 and 21 formed various resistance groups which were oppressed by the regime. Working class and Communist youth groups like the "gangs" ("Meuten") in Leipzig refused to participate in the official Nazi youth organizations in the 1930s, preferring their earlier experiences in Communist, socialist, or German Youth Movement ("Bündische Jugend") groups prior to the Nazis. The gangs were persecuted and largely disbanded by 1939. The "Edelweiss Pirates" in Cologne, Düsseldorf, and other western German

M 1

The German Resistance in Brief	
May 1933	Protestant churches in Germany disagree on the Nazi regime
1933–1936	political opposition and resistance, especially from Communist, Social-Democratic and Socialist Workers' parties
Autumn 1938	German army officers close to General Beck plan a coup d'état during the Sudeten crisis
November 1939	Georg Elser tries to assassinate Hitler in Munich
1941	Bishop von Galen preaches in Münster against euthanasia (the killing of the ill and/or handicapped)
May 1942	SS-Lieutenant general Heydrich assassinated in Prague
1942–43	Leaflet campaign of the "White Rose" (the Scholl siblings)
	Destruction of the Communist resistance and espionage organization "the Red Orchestra"
July 1943	"National Committee for a Free Germany" founded in Moscow
20 July 1944	Attempted assassination of Hitler in his military headquarters

M 2 **Bishop Graf von Galen**
The Bishop of Münster criticized the euthanasia programme in his sermons. Photograph, about 1945–46

M 3 **Dietrich Bonhoeffer**
Bonhoeffer, a Protestant pastor and theologian, hanged for his resistance to the regime on 9 April 1945. Commemorative postage stamp, 1995

cities claimed to be apolitical. Like the Leipzig groups they rejected the paramilitary character of Nazi youth organizations in favour of earlier German Youth Movement ideals. After an anti-Nazi leaflet action in 1942 the Pirates were raided by the Gestapo; in 1944 thirteen youths were executed without trial in Cologne-Ehrenfeld. A cultural form of resistance was organized by the "Swing Kids" ("Swingjugend") in Hamburg and Berlin in the 1930s. These largely middle-class young people expressed their interest in American swing music and rejected membership in Nazi youth groups. Over 300 members of the Swing Kids were arrested in 1941; the leaders of the group were imprisoned in concentration camps.

The Role of the Churches

Both the Catholic and Protestant churches were not prepared to oppose the Nazi regime at first. Catholics were silenced by the concordat negotiated between the regime and Rome in 1933. Protestants were divided between two main groups – the "German Christians" who supported the Nazi ideology and the dissenting "Confessing Church" ("Bekennende Kirche"). Nevertheless, there was protest and resistance on a more individual and local level by church representatives.

The outstanding example of Catholic protest was Münster's bishop Clemens August Graf von Galen. He preached against the Nazi euthanasia programme, which murdered ill and handicapped patients. Von Galen's protest and his calls for Catholic opposition forced the Nazis to interrupt the programme in 1941.

Protestant dissidents were Paul Schneider and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, both members of the "Confessing Church". Schneider protested Nazi attempts to interfere in theological matters. He was arrested and murdered in Buchenwald in 1939. Bonhoeffer opposed the euthanasia programme and persecution of the Jews. His participation in the plot of 20 July 1944 to assassinate Hitler led to his arrest and execution shortly before the war ended.

The "White Rose"

The "White Rose" was a non-violent resistance group made up of mostly young people, especially students. They were active in Munich between June 1942 and February 1943 and led by Hans (aged 25) and Sophie Scholl (21). They were also supported by Kurt Huber (49), a professor of philosophy and musicology. Unlike Huber, some of the young members were initially attracted by the Nazi regime. But they later became disgusted by the brutality and barbarism of the dictatorship, especially after the Battle of Stalingrad with its large number of casualties. Their dissent began when Hans Scholl read a copy of Bishop von Galen's sermon against Nazi euthanasia policies. Their horrified reaction to these practices led them to start a leaflet campaign calling upon the public to remove Hitler from power. Altogether they published six leaflets -- a seventh was only a draft which could not be published and distributed after the group's arrest.

The sixth leaflet, written by Huber, brought the group down. After the first leaflets appeared, the Gestapo was anxious to find the people behind the campaign to prevent the protest from spreading further. However, the style and the allusions used in the leaflets, quoting the Bible, Goethe and Schiller, addressed the German intelligentsia rather

M 4 **The Scholl Siblings**
At the Munich train station Sophie says good-bye to her brother Hans (second from left), who has been ordered to the eastern front. Photograph, 1942

M 5 **Claus von Stauffenberg**
(on the far left) in the Wolf's Lair headquarters. Photograph, 15 July 1944

than a broad section of German society. On 18 February 1943, the day of Joseph Goebbels's infamous Sportpalast speech on "total war", Hans and Sophie Scholl distributed a suitcase of leaflets in the empty atrium and corridors of the University of Munich, where students leaving their lecture rooms would find them. They were observed by the custodian Jakob Schmidt, who reported them to the police. They were arrested and interrogated by the Gestapo. The Scholls and Christoph Probst were the first of the group to appear before the People's Court ("Volksgerichtshof") under the judge Roland Freisler. They were convicted of treason, sentenced to death and executed the same day at Stadelheim Prison. More trials against other dissidents followed; Huber was executed on 13 July 1943. The sixth "White Rose" leaflet was smuggled out of Germany by Helmuth James Graf von Moltke. It was copied in Britain and dropped in millions of copies over Germany by Allied airplanes.

The Army and the Bomb Plot of 20 July 1944

Nazi long-term political and military goals, such as the conquest of living space, the reintroduction of military conscription, and the elimination of Marxism and Social Democracy, required the support of the army. At a confidential meeting on 3 February 1933 Hitler explained his plans to the High Command of the Reichswehr. He was certain that the officers present, with their conservative convictions and their scepticism of liberal values, would support his plans for rearmament. Indeed, the High Command demonstrated approval from the very beginning. Upon the death of President Paul von Hindenburg (2 August 1934), Hitler assumed his functions, among them as commander-in-chief of the army. Additionally, the oath of allegiance that soldiers had sworn to the constitution was changed into an oath of loyalty to Hitler. Later, when some officers realized that the war was lost and resistance was actually necessary to prevent the worst, they were torn between loyalty to Hitler and their guilty consciences, a conflict that may have delayed measures of resistance. At first, opposition to Hitler and Nazi policies stemmed from the fact that Hitler often mingled military issues with what the generals feared could lead to defeat. Later, the barbarism of the regime, the atrocities to Jews and other civilians, the German army's human losses, and the increasing defeats on the battlefield combined to inspire the moral considerations which played a major role in the Stauffenberg plot.

In 1943 and 1944 the German military situation deteriorated on nearly all fronts. The conspirators, among them officers of the General Staff, planned a bomb attack on Hitler. This was by no means the first such plot, but previous attempts had ended in failure. A group of officers, including Claus von Stauffenberg, determined to assassinate Hitler at his headquarters in East Prussia. On 20 July 1944 a bomb exploded during a conference there, killing several officers. However, Hitler survived. Stauffenberg and his close circle of conspirators were promptly arrested and executed, others followed soon thereafter. The failure of this "Operation Valkyrie" ended any military resistance to Hitler and the Nazis. It was up to the Allied troops to put an end to the war and Nazi horror on 8 May 1945.

M 6 An Assessment

British historian Michael Burleigh considers the concepts of post-war Germany envisioned by various members of resistance groups (2001):

Whatever criticisms may be made of how the various resistance circles construed the future, and it is important to remember that their ideas were tailored to an emergency, with any possibilities for further adaptation cut short by their judicial murder, it is crucial to emphasise that they overwhelmingly shared a belief in the need to restore the rule of law and judicial independence, and to end arbitrary policing and denunciation [...].

Instead of criticising resistance plans ahistorically in terms of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic, it is fairer to view them as products of specific historical experiences; of compromises and tactical accommodations; or in terms of the wider constituencies they were hoping *to rally*, in the event of success in removing Hitler. It seems *invidious* to censure retrospectively a man such as Hassell for not *espousing* views congruent with post-war democracy, since his formative experiences predated even the Weimar Republic. There may be respectable political reasons for doing this, but they do not make good history. Ideas which are easy to parody as "reactionary" made sense both in terms of German experience under the Nazis and when compared with subsequent transitions from authoritarianism to democracy elsewhere. For example, restricting the universal *franchise* to people of mature years, and eligibility for the Reichstag to the over-thirty-fives, seems eccentric if one overlooks the marked tendency for young people in the Weimar Republic to support the two totalitarian parties or leftist splinter groups. What can be dismissed as an arrogant belief that their fellow citizens needed to be educated up for democracy was also shared by most forms of liberalism, and indeed by the democratically elected Allied governments, as they demonstrated during the occupation of post-war Germany. [...]

The most developed plans for Germany's post-Nazi future stemmed from the prolific pen of Carl Goerdeler, and from the meetings which Moltke convened at Kreisau [...], although it is important to emphasise that the Kreisauer Circle was more than an agreeable series of smart weekends in country houses. [...]

The Kreisauer Circle encompassed an impressive range of individuals from diverse backgrounds, whose key common attribute was a capacity to transcend the tribal allegiances of the past. Many had experience in the youth movement or in *alleviating* poverty in distressed areas. A significant number had family ties and friends in Britain and the United States, notably Moltke and Adam von Trott zu Solz, or had studied and travelled abroad, in some cases becoming interested in Confucianism or Indian mysticism. [...]

Others were leading administrators, economists and theologians with a developed sense of social responsibility. So far from being armchair radicals, the Kreisau Circle included people whose careers had been ruined by Nazism; Jesuit priests who had had up to one hundred interviews with the Gestapo; or [...] socialists [...] freed after years in concentration camps.

Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich. A New History (London, 2001), pp. 696–698.

to rally: to gather or assemble
invidious: giving offense, unfair
to espouse: to support
franchise: the right to vote
to alleviate: to relieve

Tasks

1. Explain Burleigh's views on the plotters' concepts of post-war Germany (M6).
2. State your own opinion of Burleigh's argument, giving reasons for your thinking.
3. Use the Internet to find information on the Kreisau Circle. Work in groups and report back to the class.

German Resistance to Nazism – 20 July 1944

M 7 "Operation Valkyrie"

British historian Alan Bullock comments on the resistance of 20 July 1944:

No complete figure can be given for the number of those executed after 20 July: a total of 4,980 has been accepted as the best estimate that can be made. Many thousands of others were sent to concentration camps. The investigations and executions of the Gestapo and S.D. went on without interruption until the last days of the war, and the sittings of the People's Court under the notorious Nazi judge, Roland Freisler, continued for months. The first trial, held on 7 August, resulted in the immediate condemnation of Field-Marshal von Witzleben, Generals Höppner, Hase, and Stieff, together with four other officers, and they were put to death with great cruelty, by slow hanging with a noose of piano wire from a meat-hook, on 8 August. The executions as well as the trial were filmed from beginning to end for Hitler to see the same evening in the Reich Chancellery. With a handful of exceptions, saved largely by luck, all those who were at all active in the plot, on the civilian as well as the military side, were caught and hanged. This was to be expected, but Hitler and Himmler used the opportunity to imprison or kill many who had only the flimsiest connexion, or none at all, with the conspiracy, but who were suspected of a lack of enthusiasm for the regime. In some cases whole families, such as those of Goerdeler, Stauffenberg, and Hassell, were arrested. Among others sent to concentration camps were Dr Schacht and General Halder, both of whom had been living in retirement. Few who had ever shown a trace of independence of mind could feel safe.

By the autumn sufficient evidence had been collected to rouse Hitler's suspicions of Rommel. After a slow recovery from his injuries, in October, Rommel received a brief message from the Führer offering him the choice between suicide and trial before the People's Court. For the sake of his family, Rommel chose the former. The cause of his death was announced as heart failure, due to the effects of his accident, and the Führer accorded him a State funeral. Hitler was not prepared to admit that the most popular general of the war had turned against him: 'His heart,' declared the funeral oration, which Rundstedt was called upon to read, 'belonged to the Führer.'

It was against the Officer Corps that Hitler's resentment was most sharply directed. To the defeatism, cowardice, and conservatism which – as he convinced himself – had *balked* him of victory, the generals had now added the crime of treason. Had Hitler been free to give full rein to his anger, he would have made a clean sweep and imprisoned or shot every general within sight. But in the middle of a grave military crisis this was more than he could afford to do. However reluctant he was to concede it, he still needed the Officer Corps to win the war for him. Nor would his own prestige allow him to admit that the Army no longer had complete faith in his leadership. In public, therefore, elaborate measures were taken to conceal the split between the Army and its commander-in-chief. In his broadcast of 20–21 July Hitler insisted that only a small clique of officers was involved, and this was repeated by Goebbels in the report to the nation which he broadcast a few days later. Goebbels described the plot as a stab in the back aimed at the fighting front and crushed by the Army itself.

Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny (Harmondsworth, 1962), pp. 750f.

to balk: to stop short, frustrate

M 8 Memorial to the Resistance Group of 20 July 1944

The memorial to the German resistance is in the former army headquarters in the Bendlerblock in Berlin.



M 9 **"Valkyrie"**
Poster for the film, 2008

Tasks

1. Find biographical information about one of the resistance members mentioned in this unit on the Internet.
2. Determine the goals of the group the resistance member belonged to and the results of his or her efforts to oppose Nazism.
3. Assess the effectiveness of resistance against the Nazis in class (text).
4. Discuss in groups whether violence, including the killing of human beings, can be justified to combat tyranny. Make notes on your arguments and report to the class.
5. Interpret the poster for the film (M9).
6. Write a critique of the film "Valkyrie", considering its value as a contribution to the historical subject matter.

Horrific Losses at War's End (1943–1945)

The intensity of fighting increased as World War II progressed. In military terms the western front was a rather simple manoeuvre – in 1940 Germany had defeated France and occupied most of Western Europe. However, the German military plans of blitzkrieg ran into more difficulties after the campaign against the Soviet Union began in 1941. Surprised by the German attack, the USSR was at first unable to repel the advancing German front. But the German strategists had prepared for neither a long campaign nor for harsh weather conditions. When the initial plans for a quick victory failed, the German forces were troubled by inefficient supply lines and growing Soviet military strength. The Battle of Stalingrad became the turning point in the eastern theatre of war, when German forces were surrounded and finally surrendered in January 1943. Yet even this catastrophic defeat did not bring the war to a halt.

The final phase of fighting took many more civilian and military lives than in the early years of German tactical successes. Today it is estimated that 5.3 million German soldiers died in the war. Of these, over two thirds (3.8 million) died on the eastern front, with more than 800,000 German troops killed in the last four months alone. Soviet deaths far exceeded the German losses – at least 20 million Soviet soldiers and civilians were killed. This legacy affected German-Soviet relations long after the war ended.

D-Day: (military) the day on which a new offensive is to begin
to crush: to defeat completely
materiel: (military) arms, ammunition, and equipment in general

Summer 1944: *D-Day* and Operation Bagration

After the Soviet Union allied with Britain and the US in 1941, Stalin repeatedly asked the Western Allies to open a front in the west to relieve intense Nazi pressure on the USSR. Instead, the British and American commands fought German troops in Northern Africa and then moved on to Sicily and Italy in 1943. Not until mid-1944 was the second, western front opened. Operation Overlord, which included the

M 1 D-Day (Part of Operation Overlord)
Soldiers and equipment landing after the first wave of the invasion in Normandy on the US "Omaha" beach. Photograph, 7–8 June 1944

D-Day invasion of Normandy (6 June), coordinated the aerial support and landing of thousands of Allied troops on the German fortified coast in France. This largest amphibious invasion ever undertaken came with great risk. The Germans occupied the higher ground so the Allied forces could easily have been destroyed during their landing on the shore. Beginning on 22 June the Soviet summer campaign (Operation Bagration) *crushed* the German armies in the Belorussian Soviet Republic and eastern Poland in the most calamitous German defeat of the war. The loss of German men and *materiel* on the eastern front was far greater than the losses inflicted by the Western Allies at the same time. The tide in the war had turned.

As military deaths increased, so did civilian suffering and deaths. Not only were civilians caught up in hostilities as armies moved through the territory, but the strategy of total war no longer differentiated between civilian and military targets. This is especially clear in the aerial bombardments of civilian populations.

Total War: Aerial Bombardment

Aerial bombings could destroy the enemy's industrial and military capacity, thus shortening the war. In addition, military planners speculated on psychological effects. If civilians were put under enough pressure, they would turn on their political leaders and demand an end to the fighting. Both the Axis and the Allies used aerial bombings to try to achieve these goals; for example, German raids were used to break British willpower in the London Blitz, while the Allied fire bombings on Hamburg (1943) and Dresden (1945) were also viewed in psychological terms. The psychological effect of aerial bombardments remains controversial. Some argue that the tactic backfired (as in the Blitz), with air raids reinforcing the determination of the civilian population to continue the war effort. Others, such as Albert Speer and Karl Dönitz, considered the Allied air raids responsible for serious shortages that slowed the German war effort.

Allied restrictions on air raids directed at civilian targets were continually reduced until even atomic bombs were used on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima (6 August 1945) and Nagasaki (9 August). The Japanese emperor declared surrender on 15 August and the war parties signed the final document on 2 September, ending the war on all fronts. Military planners have used these atomic bombings to justify the bombing of civilian targets. Despite the catastrophic destruction which resulted, President Truman insisted that his orders had saved many American soldiers' lives. Of course, the first use of atomic weapons in World War II made the threat of using them again during the years of the Cold War a peril to mankind.

M 2 Flight and Expulsion
German women with belongings and children fleeing along a street in Danzig during the fighting. Photograph, March 1945

Civilian Flight and Expulsion

With the Soviet winter campaign that began on 12 January 1945, the European war entered its final and most destructive stage. With the advance of the Red Army, German civilians fled in large numbers despite the fact that local Nazi leaders officially forbade them to do so. As the German occupation withdrew from areas which it had administered, Germans were expelled. Some Germans had lived in these territories, especially in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, for generations. Ethnic and racial categories the Nazis had propagated

were directed against these Germans. Women, children, the sick, and the old were forced to abandon their homes and flee on foot or with only modest transport, starting in deepest winter. By 1950 an estimated twelve million Germans had become refugees and expellees, of whom nearly two million died. The world war the Nazis had started returned to Germany in full force.

M 3 **Berlin, 2 May 1945**
The Soviet flag is raised on the Reichstag building. Photograph by Yevgeny Khaldei

German Unconditional Surrender

Destruction in Germany went beyond anything experienced before. As the Allied armies moved into European states abandoned by the Nazi administration, they found the remains of concentration camps, devastated cities, scorched countryside, and traumatized local civilians. Inside Germany the last resources for military personnel (youngsters and old men) were mobilized and ordered into battle against trained Allied soldiers. Cities and countryside were decimated in these last battles, but the authorities refused to accept defeat. Hitler rejected his own responsibility by committing suicide (30 April). Representatives of the Allied forces signed the final unconditional surrender document together with the representatives of the three German military services in Berlin-Karlshorst shortly before midnight on 8 May 1945, ending the war in Europe.

The War's Legacy Extends to the Peace

When the war finally wound down, the warring parties were exhausted. Nations had experienced death and destruction on an unimaginable scale. US President Truman, who drove through Berlin in an open car on 16 July 1945, wrote in his diary, "I have never seen such destruction." Estimates of deaths in World War II vary, but the figure of 55 million is generally accepted.

As the war was coming to a close, the United Nations was established to guarantee the future peace of the world. The former European "great" powers were destroyed and destitute. New nations created within their empires, especially in the cases of France and Britain, claimed their independence and led to a decline among the colonial powers. The vacuum in global diplomacy was taken up by two new superpowers, the US and the USSR, which soon discovered their own rivalries. Four powers (Britain, France, the US, and the USSR) were to administer affairs in defeated Germany, a task which quickly brought disputes. An inability of the powers to cooperate eventually led to the political division of both Germany and Korea, with both spheres of interest showing considerable potential for renewed military conflict. However, the atomic legacy of the war meant that a future war might escalate into nuclear catastrophe for both superpowers, and, indeed, for all of humanity.

War's End in Germany: Defeat or Liberation?

Germans at the end of World War II were traumatized. While some felt humiliated by the unconditional surrender and complete military defeat, others rejoiced at the liberation from Nazism. Germans in the postwar period struggled to come to terms with these opposing points of view.

M 4 A Discussion

British and American authorities agreed before the war that civilians should not be targeted in aerial bombing attacks. However, the German air forces attacked Warsaw, Rotterdam, and London as the war began, and the British bombed civilian targets in turn. When the US joined the Allies, their commanders stuck to "precision bombing" of only military targets. As the war continued, American tactics changed. The development is discussed in the documentary film shown on The American Experience, "The Bombing of Germany" (PBS), 8 February 2010. This excerpt from the film deals with the bombing of civilian targets:

Narrator:[1944] The Wehrmacht had launched a massive and unexpected counter-offensive – the Battle of the Bulge – which cost the Americans more lives than any other battle of the war. [...]. Now there were fears that Hitler might have one more surprise, perhaps big enough to turn the tide of war.

Tami Davis Biddle, Historian: There's a great deal of pessimism that starts to enter into Allied High Command, they start to think that the war may drag on, well into the summer and into the autumn of 1945. And this is a very frightening scenario.

Donald L. Miller, Author: The focus has to be Japan. We've got to finish off the Germans. There's this idea of an enemy they can't understand. An enemy that is beaten but won't surrender.

Narrator: There is intense pressure coming from the highest levels of command to bring the war in Europe to an end. Even Roosevelt, who had long decried the bombing of civilians, was now prepared to accept massive aerial bombardment.

Tami Davis Biddle, Historian: And so what Allied planners do at this moment in time, this crucial moment in December and January of 1944–1945 is to look around and say: What instruments do we have to end this thing? To get this over with? And they recognized that if the war's going to end the Soviet winter offensive has got to make progress.

Narrator: That January, with the backing of Eisenhower, Spaatz [US General and highest US commander in Britain] revived Operation Thunderclap, the all-out assault on German morale he had once vehemently opposed. This time it would include attacks on transportation hubs in Leipzig and Dresden, to put pressure on German defenses on the Russian front. But the centerpiece of the operation, reversing years of American strategic policy, would be a massive air assault on Berlin. [...]

Narrator: On February 3rd 1945, 1,003 bomber crews were briefed for the largest American air mission of the war: an attack on Berlin – a city of nearly four million people. [...] The February 3rd raid killed approximately 3,000 civilians. 120,000 Germans lost their homes. [...]

Donald L. Miller, Author: With this raid, the 8th Air Force crosses a moral threshold. And that moral threshold is, we will not deliberately bomb civilians. [...].

Narrator: The war in Germany raged for three more brutal months. Months that saw the city of Dresden destroyed in a firestorm just weeks before American bombers burned Tokyo. Months that saw 200,000 Russian soldiers killed in the final assault on Berlin – an assault made possible, in no small part, by Allied bombing. In the end, the Nazi surrender that had seemed so close for months finally came, in May. The American air strategists could now devote their full attention to the urgent task of defeating Imperial Japan. The war had brought utter destruction to Germany, the nation that began it, and death to more than a hundred thousand British and American airmen. Half a million German civilians were killed by [the] Allied bombing campaign, adding to more than 20 million civilian deaths in Europe as a result of this war.

Tami Davis Biddle, Historian: When democracies go to war and they find themselves in total wars, they have to work through a set of moral choices that are sometimes extremely difficult and extremely painful. Fighting Nazi Germany, in the end, meant fighting all out; meant utilizing every resource that we had. But in order to defeat this enemy we had to make some choices that were in some ways regrettable.

Donald L. Miller, Author, Masters of the Air: Wars are uncontrollable and no one knows how and why they get out of control, but they do. [...]

Conrad Crane, Historian: I see this idea of just killing civilians and targeting civilians as being unethical – though the most unethical act in World War II for the Allies would have been allowing themselves to lose.

www-tc.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/media/uploads/special_features/download_files/bombing_transcript.pdf [16 Nov 2013]

The End 1944–1945 – An Assessment

M 5 "Cowardly Capitulation"

British historian Ian Kershaw considers why Germans were ready to fight to the point of total destruction (2012):

Finally, but far from least, we come to Hitler himself. He never deviated from what had been the leitmotiv of his political existence, that there would never, ever, be a "cowardly" capitulation and internal revolution as there had been in 1918. He consequently and consistently refused all entreaties from his paladins to consider a negotiated settlement. For him, that could only follow a victory, not a defeat. There was never a chance of that, once the *vice* closed on the Third Reich after the major enemy successes, east and west, from June 1944 onwards. The Allied demand for "unconditional surrender" simply played to his mentality and convictions. "Heroic" total destruction was for him infinitely preferable to what he saw as the coward's way out of capitulation. The plight of the German people did not concern him. They had proved weak in the war, and deserved to go under. After the failure of the Ardennes offensive, he was clear-sighted enough to see that his last card had been played. But he clutched at one straw after another in desperation and impotence to turn the tide that was about to engulf him. Suicide was the obvious and likely way out. In fact, it became the only way out. It was simply a matter of time, and of timing, so that he could not be captured by the Russians. It was also the easy way out for him, since he knew that whatever happened he had no future after the war. But as long as he lived, his power – if over a rapidly diminishing Reich – could not be challenged, as Göring and Himmler learnt even in the very last days of his life.

Hitler's personality was self-evidently scarcely insignificant to Germany's continued fight. Generals and political leaders alike found him absolutely intransigent if they proposed any alternative course of action. Even in the last weeks some went in to see him demoralized and disconsolate and came away with new enthusiasm and determination. Under a different head of state, say Göring (until his *ousting* on 23 April 1945 Hitler's designated successor), it seems highly likely that Germany would have sued for peace at some point earlier than May 1945. It is indeed questionable whether in the event of Hitler's earlier demise Göring (or Himmler, the only other feasible candidate to have succeeded) would have had the internal authority with the generals to continue the prosecution of the war. Such a counter-factual scenario only emphasizes once more how much Hitler's insistence on the continuation of the war provided the major obstacle to halting it. This cannot, however, be regarded solely as a matter of Hitler's domineering personality – his intransigence, his detachment from reality, his readiness to take the country and German people down with him to total perdition – however important this was. Beyond this is the question of why the power elite was prepared to allow him to dictate in such disastrous fashion to the end.

Of the reasons why Germany was able and willing to fight on to the end, these structures of rule and underlying mentalities behind them are the most fundamental. All the other factors – *lingering* popular backing for Hitler, the ferocious terror apparatus, the increased dominance of the Party, the prominent roles of the Bormann-Goebbels-Himmler-Speer quadrumvirate, the negative integration produced by the fear of Bolshevik occupation, and the continued readiness of high-ranking civil servants and military leaders to continue doing their duty when all was obviously lost – were ultimately subordinate to the way the charismatic Führer regime was structured, and how it functioned, in its dying phase. Paradoxically, it was by this time charismatic rule without charisma. Hitler's mass charismatic appeal had long since dissolved, but the structures and mentalities of his charismatic rule lasted until his death in the bunker. The dominant elites, divided as they were, possessed neither the collective will nor the mechanisms of power to prevent Hitler taking Germany to total destruction. That was decisive.

Ian Kershaw, The End, Germany 1944–45 (London, 2012), pp. 396–400.

vice: also vise, a clamp that holds sth. in place
ousting: being forced out of office
lingering: lasting

"Defeat or Liberation?"



M 6 **"Defeat... Victory... Liberation ... Collapse ...""**
Drawing by F. Behrendt, 1985

Tasks

1. Comment on the arguments made during the documentary film concerning aerial bombardment of civilian targets (M4).
2. Explain why the war continued for as long as it did (text, M5).
3. Assess how Germans were affected differently by the surrender and the continuing influence of the event on their lives after 1945. Work in groups, make notes and report to the class whether you consider the war's end a defeat or liberation (text, M6).

Conclusion

The Third Reich lasted for only twelve years, but in that relatively short time, it caused immeasurable damage to Germany, Europe, and the world.

Domestically, Germans were reduced to servile status in a Nazi state which operated through fear, oppression, conformity, murder, and – in some cases – opportunism. Hitler's unrestrained pursuit of power together with his charismatic claims to leadership fed a form of despotism which allowed no opposition and tolerated no criticism. The extermination of ideologically determined groups on an industrial scale had no historical precedent. A return to civil society was only possible after the despot had died.

Although Germans had felt humiliated after 1918, the end of the Second World War was incomparably harsher. Unconditional surrender had clearly marked the utter defeat of the armed forces. The total war fought for goals of conquest and racial extermination had turned to total collapse. German cities were reduced to ashes and piles of ruins; millions were either dead, wounded, refugees, or homeless. The economy was completely dysfunctional. Hunger and illness could not be averted – a public health catastrophe seemed unavoidable. Neither political leaders nor political representation remained. Germans had to deal with the psychological burden caused by a legacy of barbaric actions which would not be forgotten. Misery, adversity, and poverty characterized a country living in chaos, ruled by occupying forces. The recovery after 1945 was indeed a "miracle".

For generations ever since, questions surrounding National Socialism have endured: How was it possible? Who was responsible? How can such a development be avoided in future?

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Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London, 1985)

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William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (London, 1960)

Timeline

1920	Adolf Hitler presents the programme of the NSDAP in Munich
1933	
30 January	President von Hindenburg appoints Hitler Chancellor
28 February	Reichstag Fire Decree
24 March	Enabling Act
7 April	Law to Restore the Professional Civil Service
20 July	Concordat with the Vatican
1934	
26 January	German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact
1935	
15 September	The Nuremberg Laws
1936	Olympic Games in Berlin, Four Year Plan prepares for war
1938	
12 – 13 March	German troops occupy Austria
29 – 30 September	Munich Conference and Agreement
9 – 10 November	"Night of Broken Glass" pogroms
1939	
15 March	Annexation of the remainder of Czechia as a German "protectorate"
23 August	"Hitler-Stalin Pact"
1 September	Invasion of Poland, the Second World War begins, first mass murders of Polish Jews
1940	
10 May	German western offensive against France starts
1941	
22 June	German troops invade the USSR German task forces of security police and SD execute Jews, gypsies, and Communist functionaries
11 December	German declaration of war on the USA
1942	
20 January	Wannsee Conference in Berlin on the "final solution" of the Jewish question in Europe
End of June	First "selection" of deportees in Auschwitz
1944	
6 June	Allied invasion in Normandy
22 June	Soviet summer offensive "Operation Bagration" begins in Belarus
20 July	Attempted assassination of Hitler
1945	
27 January	Soviet troops liberate the concentration camp at Auschwitz
30 April	Hitler commits suicide in Berlin
7–9 May	Unconditional surrender of the German armed forces

The "Big Three" in Potsdam, 1945

Berlin Blockade, 1948



"Believe it or Knout"
Cartoon on the Korean War, 1950

Protest in East Berlin
17 June 1953

Hungarian Revolution, 1956



Building the Berlin Wall, 13 August 1961

Germany and Bloc Confrontation 1945–1963

As a result of the National Socialist catastrophe Germany faced unprecedented destruction at the end of World War II. German military forces surrendered unconditionally, political structures within the country collapsed, and the country fell under the occupation of the Allies (Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and France). The occupying powers were responsible for the welfare of the civilian population, providing essential food and supplies during the grim deprivation of the early postwar years. To do so the Allies had to cooperate closely in the administration of the country. Their cooperation was also necessary if other goals, such as the restoration of democracy, reparations, restitution of the costs of war, and the securing of peace, were to be achieved.

Early Allied optimism was undermined by the divergent objectives of each of the powers. As time went on, changing Allied perspectives made cooperation impossible. Germany became a strategic and ideological target for both sides during the following Cold War. Indeed, Allied tensions grew so strained that Germany was divided. Division affected the city of Berlin directly, as Cold War tensions were physically on view there and could provide grounds for aggression at any moment.

The two newly founded German states developed along lines which their patron powers set out for them. Nevertheless, German political leaders did not act as the puppets they were often assumed to be. Instead, they proved successful in manipulating their respective Allied powers to assure positive results for themselves and their constituencies.

From 1945 on Germany remained an international flashpoint. At several junctures both sides in the Cold War feared that another world war might break out over Germany. Part of the focus of this book is to show how this catastrophe was avoided.

A number of bloc confrontations after 1945 contributed to global tensions, which in turn affected the situation in Germany. In Eastern Europe (1945-48) countries along the Soviet border were pulled into the Soviet sphere of influence, transforming their political and social organisation. An international crisis occurred when an attempted revolution in Hungary (1956) was put down militarily. Asia became a flashpoint area when a Communist regime in China emerged from a civil war (1945-49); war in Korea (1950-53) led to the deaths of millions. Anti-colonial conflict in Indochina contributed to bloc tensions and ended in a lengthy war in Vietnam (1945-75). Finally, a missile crisis in Cuba (1963) nearly resulted in nuclear disaster.

However, as the focal point of the Cold War gradually shifted away from Western Europe, Germany found itself in a relatively calm situation by 1963. Of course, new tensions could always disturb this relative serenity at any time.

Allied Agreements on Germany

to haunt: to visit often, as a ghost
impenetrability: quality of not being able to be pierced or penetrated, as a strong fortress
disruption: breakdown
decartelization: making cartels illegal

The Allies in World War II: Pretending to be a United Front

Despite their mutual distrust of each other, the wartime Allies – Britain, the Soviet Union and the US – had to rely on each other. All three repeatedly insisted that they would fight collectively until victory was achieved. This was not an idle thought: The conclusion of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Soviet Union and the German Reich in August 1939 *haunted* the Allies throughout the war. When Britain and the Soviet Union formed an alliance following the German offensive against the USSR in 1941, it specifically insisted that neither country conclude a separate peace with Germany. After the US officially joined the alliance later the same year, the Allies continued to stress the *impenetrability* of their united front.

At war's begin German and Japanese military operations were unexpectedly successful. As the war continued Allied superiority in raw materials, production facilities, and larger populations overwhelmed the Axis Powers. A lengthy war could not be won by the Axis if the Allied alliance remained stable. However, that was uncertain. The Allies were ideological incompatible; the British and American democratic leaders were deeply sceptical of Soviet communism, and their scepticism was returned by Stalin. Intense distrust of the alliance partners characterized nearly all negotiations among the Big Three. In their public statements, however, the Allies asserted their solidarity throughout the war and during the conferences on the fate of postwar Germany.

M 1

Allied Conferences before Potsdam

Allied Conferences	Main Results
Casablanca **14–24 January 1943**	• Allies agree to demand "unconditional surrender" from Germany • strategy for European theatre of war discussed
Tehran **28 November–1 December 1943**	• none of the Allies will leave the alliance unilaterally • Polish borders to be moved westward • front in Western Europe to open by spring of 1944 • European Advisory Commission created to assist Allied Control Council in Berlin and in administration of defeated Germany
Yalta **(also called the Crimea Conference)** **4–11 February 1945**	• Polish borders set along the Oder and Neisse Rivers (in the west), along the Curzon Line (in the east) • reparations agreed to, but no final sum mentioned • France adopted as fourth occupying power with territory granted from British and US zones

M 2 The "Big Three" in Yalta
Photograph (seated, from left) of Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference, 1945

The Potsdam Conference, 17 July to 2 August 1945

At war's end agreement on the major differences among the Allies could no longer be postponed. They disagreed at Potsdam about crucial issues in the future of Germany: National unity, reparations, economic recovery, proper and fair treatment of the population. The country's *disruption* after the war created problems of unprecedented dimensions. The Allies didn't know how to deal with the desolate situation or couldn't agree on which steps should follow. So they muddled their way through the conference, papering over their differences with apparent compromises and statements of good will which later proved ineffective.

The Potsdam Conference was radically altered by historical circumstances. Franklin Roosevelt died suddenly after the Yalta meeting, leaving his successor, Harry S Truman, to lead the US delegation at Potsdam in his diplomatic debut. Winston Churchill arrived in Potsdam at the close of a British general election; when the ballot count was completed, the Conservative Party had lost. Churchill was forced to leave Potsdam; the new Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee replaced him as the leader of the British delegation. Thus, the only member of the Big Three remaining from the wartime Allied agreements was Soviet Premier Josef Stalin.

Discussions at Potsdam concerned issues raised during the previous wartime conferences. Demilitarization, democratization, *decartelization* and denazification posed no real difficulties, at least on the surface. However, serious disagreement arose concerning reparations and the German-Polish borders. In the question of the borders, the Red Army had already occupied Poland and Eastern Europe and established the territorial facts before the conference began. British and American negotiators could only insist on the promise of free elections to determine the legitimate Polish government. As for

M 3 **The "Big Three" in Potsdam**

Photograph (seated, from left) of Attlee, Truman and Stalin at the end of the Potsdam Conference, 1945

reparations, the Soviet Union pursued an agreement on a specific sum, but British and US negotiators refused to affix a financial value to reparations.

No central German government was planned, although weak mechanisms were proposed to maintain political unity. Germans in all the zones were to be treated equally and Germany was to remain one economic unit. However, because each occupying power administered its zone of occupation separately – a provisional solution to unresolved questions surrounding reparations and the political restructuring of the country – the opportunity for economic and political division remained open.

M 4

Europe after the Second World War

Year military alliance joined

1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

1955 Warsaw Pact

Iron Curtain

National border

Capital

GDR German Democratic Republic





M 5 **"Whatever you call it – "**
Cartoon by David Low, Evening Standard, 15 July 1941. Low comments on the mutual assistance pact between Churchill and Stalin on 12 July 1941.

M 6 **"Now supposing we all try to go somewhere together ..."**
Cartoon by David Low, Evening Standard, 7 August 1942

Allied conferences

M 7 Casablanca

Excerpt from the Conference Statement made by Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca, 1943:

In an attempt *to ward off* the inevitable disaster, the Axis propagandist [sic: propagandists] are trying all of their old tricks in order to divide the United Nations. They seek to create the idea that if we win this war, Russia, England, China, and the United States are going to get into a cat-and-dog fight.

This is their final effort to turn one nation against another, in the vain hope that they may settle with one or two at a time – that any of us may be so *gullible* and so forgetful as to be duped into making 'deals' at the expense of our Allies.

To these panicky attempts to escape the consequences of their crimes we say – all the United Nations say – that the only terms on which we shall deal with an Axis government or any Axis factions are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: "Unconditional Surrender." In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty, barbaric leaders [...].

In the years of the American and French revolutions the fundamental principle guiding our democracies was established. The cornerstone of our whole democratic edifice was the principle that from the people and the people alone flows the authority of government.

It is one of our war aims, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter, that the conquered populations of today be again the masters of their destiny. There must be no doubt anywhere that it is the unalterable purpose of the United Nations to restore to conquered peoples their sacred rights.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/casablan.asp [11 Feb 2010].

M 8 Churchill vs. Roosevelt

Wilson D. Miscamble, British historian, considers the disagreements between Churchill and Roosevelt (2007):

It is essential in understanding America's Soviet policy to grasp how Roosevelt differed from Churchill. The essence of the British leader's stance was encapsulated in his oft-quoted remark that 'if Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.' He willingly worked with Stalin to defeat the common foe and sought to establish a genuine relationship with the Soviet leader. [...]

Yet, in the end, he knew well that when he dealt with the Soviet tyrant he dealt with the 'devil' and that the Soviet system was vile. Here lay the crucial difference between Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. Churchill proved willing throughout the war to negotiate geopolitical deals with the Soviets, but Roosevelt rejected this approach and ambitiously aimed higher. He hoped to domesticate and to civilize the Soviet "devil" to adopt the American way. "Churchill," as Patrick Glynn [US arms control official during the Reagan presidency] persuasively argued, "while hopeful that long-term relations between the Soviet Union and the West might be improved as a result of the war, understood the essential nature of the Soviet regime and of Stalin. Roosevelt, whatever his other virtues and abilities, never did."

[...] Churchill found Roosevelt's approach [based on concessions and personal relations rather than on a hard-headed political-military strategy] worrying to put it mildly. He had come to realize that the American president 'did not intend to insist to breaking point on self-determination for the nations of Eastern Europe.' At the same time his concerns about the Soviets deepened. On his way to the Tehran conference, he explained to British minister Harold Macmillan that 'Germany is finished. [...] The real problem now is Russia, although he lamented, "I can't get the Americans to see it." [...]

He suffered as America's windy rhetoric about opposing spheres of influence continued, while the Soviet Union *inexorably* marched westward obviously intent on establishing their power and influence. In May 1944, even as he continued his efforts to deal with the Soviets, he [wrote], "I fear that very great evil may come upon the world. [...] The Russians are drunk with victory and there is no length they may not go."

Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 52–56.

to ward off: to prevent
gullible: easily tricked
inexorably: impossible to stop

Germany and the Potsdam Conference

M 9



M 10 Potsdam Conference

Excerpt from the Protocol of the Potsdam Conference, 1 August 1945:

II. The Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period

A. Political Principles.

1. ... [S]upreme authority in Germany is exercised ... by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces ....

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes ... by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany ....

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves ....

(iii) ... to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the ... reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis ....

9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(i) local self-government shall be restored ... on democratic principles ....

(ii) all democratic political parties ... shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany....

(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established.

B. Economic Principles.

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms ... shall be prohibited and prevented.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power ....

13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. ...

III. Reparations from Germany.

1. Reparation claims of the USSR shall be met ... from the zone ... occupied by the USSR ....

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones ....

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the USSR from its own zone of occupation, the USSR shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 per cent of ... industrial capital equipment ... in exchange for an equivalent value of [raw materials] ....

(b) 10 per cent of ... industrial capital equipment

Germany and the Potsdam Conference

... without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

VII. Poland ...

B. Western Frontier of Poland.

... The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, *pending* the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories cast [sic: east] of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

XII. Orderly Transfer of German Populations.

The Three Governments ... recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm [August 2002].

M 11 What is Germany?

From American notes on the second plenary meeting of the Potsdam "Big Three", 18 July 1945:

Churchill: What do we mean by Germany? If we mean pre-war Germany, I agree to such.

Stalin: Germany is what has become of her after war. No other Germany exists. Austria is not a part of Germany.

Truman: Why not say the Germany of 1937?

Stalin: Minus what she has lost. Let us for the time begin regard Germany as a geographical section.

Truman: But what geographical section?

Stalin: We cannot get away from the results of the war.

Truman: But we must have a starting point.

Stalin: Do you wish to restore German administration to Sudan line [the Sudetenland]?

Truman: I said Germany of 1937.

Stalin: It may be so understood from a formal point of view. If German administration appears in Koenigsberg, we would expel it.

Truman: We said territorial changes are to be made at the peace conference.

Stalin: Let us fix the western frontier of Poland. I have difficulty of [in?] saying what is the frontier of Germany now. No frontier guards, no troops. The country is broken up into four occupation zones.

Truman: I am still suggesting we shall proceed from Germany of 1937.

Stalin: We shall proceed from there as a starting point.

Churchill: I agree.

Truman: That is the Germany of the Versailles Treaty. So it is agreed that the Germany of 1937 should be the starting point.

Extract from the Protocol of the Potsdam Conference, Meeting of 18 July 1945, Cohen Notes, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), Volume II (1945), p. 96.

http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945Berlinv02&isize=M&page=96 [11 April 2009].

M 12 An Assessment

W.R. Smyser, American diplomat, assesses the results of the Potsdam Conference:

At Potsdam, the Big Three faced their differences for the first time. At Tehran and Yalta, which took place while they still needed each other to fight Hitler, they had been able to make grand statements about the future of Germany and Europe while postponing or delegating issues on which they disagreed. By Potsdam, that was no longer necessary or possible. They no longer *deluded* themselves or anyone else.

Potsdam became a *contentious* summit precisely because the Big Three could no longer postpone problems – not because Truman had replaced Roosevelt or Attlee would replace Churchill, but because disagreements could no longer be concealed. Eden complained that the Soviet Union used the meeting to "grab as much as she can get". The Potsdam meetings contained the first really *acrimonious* debates of any Big Three gathering.

Nonetheless, the Big Three did make an important bargain by indirection, as they had at Yalta. Stalin got what he wanted most, a forward border between Germany and Poland. The Americans and the British got what they wanted most, a *viable* future Germany. Although Byrnes [US Secretary of State] may have angered the British and the Soviets, he proposed the formula that worked. Truman and Attlee agreed to let Poland take about one-quarter of prewar German territory, but they saved the German economy from the hyperinflation and depression that had followed World War I. By insisting that each state take its reparations largely from its own occupation zone, they freed their own zones and thus most of Germany from Soviet reparations demands.

Truman, Byrnes, Attlee and Bevin [British Foreign Secretary] yielded German land, land which Hitler's armies had already lost, but they preserved the German economy and the German state. It was not a great bargain. But, as in all bargains, each side paid what it had to pay to get what it wanted most.

At Potsdam, the struggle against Germany ended and the struggle over Germany began. Although the Big Three no longer spoke of dismemberment or even wanted it, they actually instituted it. Without a common policy, each occupying power did what it wanted to do in its own occupation zone. The zones became the dismemberment areas, with some zonal boundaries becoming the functional equivalent of state boundaries.

Potsdam, the last of the Big Three summits, projected a united German state but left a divided one. It projected Allied cooperation but reflected Allied division. It could not solve the German question, leaving that question for the occupiers and for the occupied.

W.R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin. The Cold War Struggle over Germany (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1999), pp. 25–26.

pending: waiting to be dealt with
to delude: to deceive or trick
contentious: controversial
acrimonious: bitter
viable: capable of growing or developing

Tasks

1. Choose one of the two cartoons and interpret it (M5, M6).
2. Portray the difficulties in Allied cooperation evident in the Casablanca Statement (text, M7).
3. Assess the impact of the changing relationships among the Allied leaders on the results of the conferences dealing with Germany from 1943 through 1945 (text, M1, M8).
4. Draw a mind map of the main provisions of the agreement reached at Potsdam (M9, M10).
5. Present a dramatic reading of the conversation among Truman, Churchill and Stalin. Give your opinion on whom you find convincing and why (M11).
6. Evaluate Smyser's interpretation of the success and failure of the Potsdam Conference (M12).

Allied Cooperation and its Failure

The End of Allied Pretense: From Cooperation to Confrontation

When the Potsdam Conference ended, Allied cooperation was crucial in achieving the agreed goals of dismantling, democratization, demilitarization, decartelization and denazification in Germany. But cooperation was hampered by the different priorities each power set to achieve these goals.

Allied Priorities after 1945

USSR	US	Great Britain	France
reparations	security / punishment	reparations / recovery	security / revenge
Only recently have Western historians gained access to Soviet archives. Therefore, the exact Soviet intentions in Germany are still uncertain. At Potsdam the Soviets wanted a fixed sum of German reparations, but this was rejected by the others. It was agreed that the Soviet Union was to be provided with an additional twenty-five per cent of the capital goods from the Western zones.	The main goal of American policy was to weaken Germany militarily for security reasons. As the Nazis were morally discredited, US policy was directed at the punishment and re-education of Germans until September 1946, when US Secretary of State Byrnes indicated a change of course in a policy speech held in Stuttgart.	Britain needed reparations to pay for wartime damages, but the German economy had to be revived quickly to enable payments. This was uncomfortable strategically. The British recognized tensions with the Soviet Union early and regarded Germany as a possible bulwark to Soviet plans of expansion in Western Europe.	France sought security and compensation from her difficult neighbour. French historical interest in incorporating German territory along common borders was revived during the postwar period. As France had not been present at the Potsdam Conference, her governments did not feel bound to uphold its premises.

M 1

Dismantling and Demilitarization

The varying Allied priorities led to differing practices within the zones of occupation. Unlike the French, the Americans and the British did not take dismantled industrial plant in Germany as reparations, but concentrated on destroying military facilities. The Soviet authorities interpreted the Potsdam Agreement as broadly as possible: Not only were industrial facilities dismantled extensively, but reparations were taken from current production as well, thus slowing the economic recovery of the Soviet zone considerably.

to reckon: to pay a debt or account
at sb.s discretion: according to sb.s judgment

A Last *Reckoning* with National Socialism: Denazification

Denazification, ridding Germany of National Socialist party organizations and institutions, was considered necessary to further democratization and demilitarization. A 1946 Control Council directive required all adult Germans to fill out a questionnaire about their activities during the Nazi era. Respondents were then separated into one of five different categories, from major offenders through to the non-incriminated.

Despite early US interest in denazification, American authorities changed their attitude in the emerging Cold War. After the outbreak of the Korean War, US occupation forces stopped their prosecution of Nazis and turned instead to countering Soviet advances. Later hearings were often merely summary proceedings.

Seeking Justice for Terrible Crimes: The Nuremberg Trials

The first – and only – trial of major war criminals agreed on at Potsdam was held at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg from late 1945 until October 1946. The court dealt with twenty-four German

M 2 **"Lady Justice"**
German cartoon on the Nuremberg Trial, 1946:
"I can't say anything about Nuremberg – I wasn't there at the time."

political and military leaders in addition to six Nazi organizations accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the separate zones of occupation, lesser Nazi figures were prosecuted *at the discretion* of the occupying Allies. From 1946 to 1949 twelve subsequent trials were held by US military tribunals in Nuremberg, but in 1951 the American High Commissioner amnestied many of those convicted. After 1949 such trials were placed in the jurisdiction of German courts.

Scholars have questioned how effective denazification actually was – the trials tended to reinforce German sympathies and proved counter-productive. Over the long term, however, changes in thinking did occur. Whether these were due to denazification efforts or were brought about by other factors is debatable.

Assuring a Peaceful Germany in Future: Democratization

Ideologically, the varying definitions of "democracy" among the powers made it impossible to achieve agreement on this goal. Each power within its zone instituted the form of democracy compatible with its definition.

Disagreement over Reparations Leads to the Bizone

According to the Potsdam Agreement, distribution of reparations throughout the zones was a function of the Control Council. However, the Soviet Union regarded dismantling as a matter of Soviet autonomy in its separate zone and thus outside of Control Council supervision. Thus, the Control Council could not provide for equitable treatment in all four zones. Especially the Americans objected to this, as funding for the US zone was ineffective and financially irresponsible while dismantled plant was turned over to the Soviets at the same time. In May 1946 the US Deputy Military Governor in Germany, Lucius B. Clay, interrupted the dismantling for reparations in the American zone, hoping that this would force the economic opening of all the zones. When this failed, US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes turned to the creation of the British-US Bizone on 1 January 1947.



M 3 **"Re-education"**
"Haven't I seen him before?", British cartoon by Vicky (Victor Weisz), 1947

1947 – Year of Decision		
	event	**result**
January	Bizone begins operations	British – US cooperation throughout both zones
February	Hoover report	necessary support of German civilian population outlined
March	Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow	none
March	Truman speech to Congress	Truman Doctrine stated
June	Munich Conference of Minister-Presidents	German efforts to coordinate provinces in East and West fails
June	Marshall speech at Harvard University	Marshall Plan proposed
July	Representatives of 16 Western European countries (excluding fascist Spain and the Soviet Union) discuss European recovery.	European Recovery Program (ERP) formulated; Stalin forbids Eastern European countries to participate or to accept ERP funds.
August	Zhdanov speech to Cominform in Warsaw	capitalist – communist bloc rivalry stated
November	Council of Foreign Ministers in London	none
December	People's Congress meets in East Berlin	German representatives discuss German unity; further participation forbidden by Western Allies

M 4

Problems of Currency Reform

The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan marked the change in American policy in Germany. Whether this change came about through increasing confrontation with the Soviet Union, US humanitarian concern, or more materialistically, the hope of better trade relations in a recovered European market, is debated among historians today. No matter what its causes, the new policy was impossible to implement without currency reform in Germany – a problem which the Control Council had proved unable to address.

M 5 **Currency Reform**
Shop window display after currency reform, 1948

As the Western Allies moved to reform the currency in their zones, the Soviet Union protested and left the meeting of the Control Council on 20 March 1948. The new currency was secretly printed in the US, then transported to the Western zones. The Western Allied commanders set the date for the exchange of old and new currencies on Sunday, 20 June 1948. Forty reichsmarks per capita were exchanged for forty new German marks (a month later twenty additional marks were allowed). At the insistence of Ludwig Erhard, Director of Economics in the Bizone, price and production controls adopted by the military governors were abolished. Shops suddenly filled with previously hoarded goods; the black markets abruptly closed down.

On 23 June the Soviet zone reformed its own currency. The Soviet authorities had no new printed bills to distribute, but glued coloured labels on to the old reichsmark bills. In the Soviet zone seventy reichsmarks per capita were exchanged at the rate of 1:1 for the new currency. However, the lack of goods kept the market from flourishing; remaining black markets were visible proof that the new currency reform was not as successful as in the West.

On 24 June, the new Western currency was introduced into the three Western sectors of Berlin. The Soviet authorities claimed financial authority for all of Berlin and insisted that only the Eastern mark could

be used throughout the city. To back up their claim, the Soviets closed all roads, railways, and waterways leading to West Berlin.

Naked Confrontation: The Berlin Blockade

The Soviet blockade of Berlin lasted from 24 June 1948 until 12 May 1949. It was the first major confrontation of the Four Powers after 1945 and could easily have provided the spark for war. The resolve of the Western Allies to overcome the blockade was uncertain at first. British Military Governor Sir Brian Robertson suggested that West Berlin could be supplied from the air, as had been undertaken during a previous Soviet blockade in April. US Military Governor General Lucius Clay viewed maintaining forces in Berlin as an impractical military goal, but argued that US prestige in Germany and Europe was ultimately at stake. French reluctance to the airlift was overcome as the blockade continued.

M 6 **Berlin Blockade**
Children welcome an Allied plane landing in West Berlin, 1948

The logistical difficulties involved in the airlift were enormous. West Berlin had just two airports – Tempelhof and Gatow. Only three air corridors were available, through which an estimated 4,000 tons of coal, foodstuffs, and other articles had to be flown daily. No such large airborne military operation had ever before been attempted. Planes, mechanics, handling personnel had to be found; it was uncertain whether the required German personnel could be completely trusted. The Soviets expected the airlift to end in complete failure with the Western Allies' retreat from Berlin.

Instead, the airlift was an impressive success. Germans served competently and loyally as maintenance crews, mechanics, and workmen. A third airport at Tegel was built within three months. Logistical solutions were found to the *stacking* and frequency of flights, reliance on instrument flight rules, standardization of loads, reduced airfield turnaround times, standardized maintenance checks, and improved air traffic control. By August 1948 more than 4,500 tons of cargo were delivered to West Berlin daily. The record was reached on 11 April 1949, when 12,899 tons were delivered within twenty-four hours.

to stack: to put planes into a waiting pattern before landing

The Berlin Airlift succeeded, but an estimated 101 persons died during its course. The Western Allies had demonstrated their determination to defend their zones and sectors of West Berlin in the face of Soviet aggression; however, Four Power cooperation was no longer tenable. Germans who had regarded the Western Allies as enemies and occupiers now saw them as defenders and friends.

Reluctance Abandoned: France Joins the Bizone

On 8 April 1949 France agreed to cooperate with the Bizone as a condition of participating in the Marshall Plan, despite the fact that she had formally protested its establishment in 1947. With the Trizone now complete, plans to create a separate West German state accelerated. German unity was no longer – at least for the time being – a Western Allied goal.

Changing U.S. Perspectives on the Occupation of Germany

M 7 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067

Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany; April 1945 (JCS 1067):

4. Basic Objectives of Military Government in Germany:

a. It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany's ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.

b. Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives. In the conduct of your occupation and administration you should be just but firm and *aloof.* You will strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and population.

c. The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essential steps in the accomplishment of this objective are the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their forms, the immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment, the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, with continuing control over Germany's capacity to make war, and the preparation for an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis.

http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga3-450426.pdf [5 August 2002].

M 8 "The Potsdam Conference resulted in really nothing"

Excerpts from an interview with Lucius B. Clay, then US Deputy Military Governor in Germany, on early American policies in postwar Germany, 16 July 1974:

CLAY: JCS-1067 would have been extremely difficult to operate under. If you followed it literally you couldn't have done anything to restore the German economy. If you couldn't restore the German economy you could never hope to get paid for the food that they had to have. By virtue of these sort of things it was modified constantly; not officially, but by allowing this deviation and that deviation, et cetera. We began to slowly wipe out JCS-1067. When we were ordered to put in a currency reform this was in direct controvention [sic: *contravention*] of a provision of JCS-1067 that prohibited us from doing anything to improve the German economy. It was an unworkable policy and it wasn't changed just without any discussion or anything by those of us who were in Germany. It was done by gradual changes in its provision and changes of cablegrams, conferences, and so on. [...]

INTERVIEWER: To what extent did you and your people try to get East-West trade going?

CLAY: We tried very hard to get East-West trade going. The initial effort was to get a common utilization of the food supplies, because East Germany was a surplus food production area. When we couldn't get any food out of East Germany, it was quite obvious that there was nothing else to divide. I mean that we would have been foolish to open up trade in the things that they wanted when we couldn't get out of them the food that we had to have. We couldn't get any willingness on their part to share in the food production of East Germany. I think this was another one of the fundamentals which led us to believe that we couldn't possibly get together. At Potsdam I think President Truman began to realize that it was no longer any use of sitting there and negotiating; they weren't getting anywhere. There wasn't any real way of working out an agreement with Stalin, and the Potsdam Conference resulted in really nothing.

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clayl.htm#transcript [14 August 2010], pp. 15–20.

M 9 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1779

Excerpt from JCS 1779, 11 July 1947:

The basic interest of the United States throughout the world is just and lasting peace. Such a peace can be achieved only if conditions of public order and prosperity are created in Europe as a whole. An orderly and prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany as well as the necessary restraints to insure that Germany is not allowed to revive its destructive militarism.

From JCS 1779, in Documents on Germany 1944–1985, US Department of State, p. 124.

M 10 The Hoover Report

Former US President Herbert Hoover's report to Truman on German Food and Agricultural Requirements, 17 February 1947:

It may come as a great shock to American taxpayers that, having won the war over Germany, we are now faced for some years with large expenditures for relief for these people. Indeed, it is something new in human history for the conqueror to undertake. [...]

Entirely aside from any humanitarian feelings for this mass of people, if we want peace; if we want to preserve the safety and health of our Army of Occupation; if we want to save the expense of even larger military forces to preserve order; if we want to reduce the size and expense of our Army of Occupation – I can see no other course but to meet the burdens I have here outlined. [...]

If Western Civilization is to survive in Europe, it must also survive in Germany. And it must be built into a cooperative member of that civilization. That indeed is the hope of any lasting peace.

After all, our flag flies over these people. That flag means something besides military power.

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hoover/europe.htm#doc57a [17 May 2010].

M 11 The Truman Doctrine

US President Truman in an address to a joint session of the Congress, 12 March 1947:

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

[...] The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we *falter* in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world – and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp [13 August 2010].

aloof: at a distance
contravention: violation
to falter: to stumble or hesitate

M 12 "Noses Left", cartoon by David Low, 1947

Tasks

1. Outline the main reasons for the failure of Allied cooperation in Germany (text, M1, M4).
2. Evaluate Clay's opinion (M8).
3. Assess the motives of the Hoover Report and the Truman Doctrine (text, M10, M11).
4. Interpret Low's opinion of the Marshall Plan.

Soviet Perspectives on the Postwar World

M 13 "Speech to Moscow Voters"

Joseph Stalin, Soviet Premier, "Speech to Moscow Voters", 9 February 1946:

It would be wrong to think that the Second World War broke out accidentally, or as a result of *blunders* committed by certain statesmen, although blunders were certainly committed. As a matter of fact, the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present day monopolistic capitalism. Marxists have more than once stated that the capitalist system of world economy contains the elements of universal crises and military conflicts, that, in view of this, the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and war catastrophes. The point is that the uneven development of capitalist countries usually leads, in the course of time, to a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that group of capitalist countries which regards itself as being less securely provided with raw materials and markets usually attempts to change the situation and to redistribute "spheres of influence" in its own favour – by employing armed force. As a result of this, the capitalist world is split into two hostile camps, and war breaks out between them. [...]

Can it be maintained that before entering the Second World War our country already possessed the necessary minimum of the material potentialities needed to satisfy these main requirements? I think it can. To prepare for this immense task we had to carry out three Five Year Plans of national economic development. It was precisely these three Five Year Plans that enabled us to create these material potentialities. At all events, the situation in our country in this respect was ever so much better before the Second World War, in 1940, than it was before the First World War, in 1913. [...]

Now a few words about the Communist Party's plans of work for the immediate future. As you know, these plans are formulated in the new Five Year Plan, which is to be adopted in the very near future. The main tasks of the new Five Year Plan are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of our country, to restore industry and agriculture to the pre-war level, and then to exceed that level to a more or less considerable extent. Apart from the fact that the rationing system is to be abolished in the very near future (loud and prolonged applause), special attention will be devoted to the expansion of the production of consumer goods, to raising the standard of living of the working people by steadily reducing the prices of all commodities (loud and prolonged applause), and to the extensive organization of scientific research institutes of every kind (applause) capable of giving the fullest scope to our scientific forces. [...]

As regards long-term plans, our Party intends to organize another powerful uplift of our national economy that will enable us to raise our industry to a level, say, three times as high as that of pre-war industry. We must see to it that our industry shall be able to produce annually up to 50,000,000 tons of *pig iron* (prolonged applause), up to 60,000,000 tons of steel (prolonged applause), up to 500,000,000 tons of coal (prolonged applause) and up to 60,000,000 tons of oil (prolonged applause). Only when we succeed in doing that can we be sure that our Motherland will be insured against all *contingencies.* (Loud applause.) This will need, perhaps, another three Five Year Plans, if, not more. But it can be done, and we must do it.

http://marxism.halkcephesi.net/Stalin/volume%2014%20to%2018/speech020946.htm [2 Nov 2010].

M 14 "Report on the International Situation to the Cominform"

Andrei Zhdanov, Soviet statesman, "Report on the International Situation to the Communist Information Bureau", 22 September 1947:

The fundamental changes caused by the war on the international scene and in the position of individual countries have entirely changed the political landscape of the world. A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct becomes two major trends in postwar international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A. Allied with it are Great Britain and France. [...]. The imperialist camp is also supported by colony-owning countries, such as Belgium and

Holland, by countries with reactionary anti-democratic regimes, such as Turkey and Greece, and by countries politically and economically dependent upon the United States, such as the Near Eastern and South American countries and China.

The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, *to hatch* a new imperialist war, to combat socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements everywhere.

In the pursuit of these ends the imperialist camp is prepared to rely on reactionary and anti-democratic forces in all countries, and to support its former adversaries in the war against its wartime allies.

The anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies. It also includes countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. The anti-imperialist camp is backed by the labor and democratic movement and by the fraternal Communist parties in all countries, by the fighters for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies, by all progressive and democratic forces in every country. The purpose of this camp is to resist the threat of new wars and imperialist expansion, to strengthen democracy and *to extirpate* the *vestiges* of fascism. [...]

Of immense importance are the joint efforts of the diplomacy of the U.S.S.R. and that of the other democratic countries to secure a reduction of armaments and the outlawing of the most destructive of them – the atomic bomb.

Soviet foreign policy proceeds from the fact of the coexistence for a long period of the two systems – capitalism and socialism. From this it follows that cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and countries with other systems is possible, provided that the principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations once assumed are honored. Everyone knows that the U.S.S.R. has always honored the obligations it has assumed. The Soviet Union has demonstrated its will and desire for cooperation.

http://www.gilderlehrman.org/teachers/seminar_docs/coldwar_doc2.html [16 August 2010].

blunder: careless or embarrassing mistake
pig iron: crude iron before refined to make steel
contingency: uncertain event
to hatch: (here) to plan in secret
to extirpate: to wipe out
vestige: a trace or mark of a vanished or lost place, idea, or civilization



M 15 Soviet Cartoon
Early Cold War
(undated, no artist given)

Tasks

1. Compare and contrast the main arguments in Stalin's speech and Zhdanov's report (M13, M14).
2. Interpret the Soviet cartoon (M15) in light of the arguments made by Stalin and Zhdanov (M13, M14).

The Berlin Blockade



M 16 **The Berlin Airlift,** drawing of 1948

M 17 **"The United States is Keeping its Word"**

American reporter James Reston on the meaning of the Berlin Blockade, The New York Times, 19 September 1948:

U.S. Air Lift Educates Germans and Russians
Our Power to Supply Berlin Has *Bolstered* Our Diplomatic Position

Berlin, Sept. 18 – The Berlin airlift not only is a magnificent technical achievement but in many ways it is the most effective educational force the United States has in Europe today.

The Germans may not pay much attention to United States lectures on democracy, but they have not ignored the idea behind the men and planes that are feeding their former capital city. [...]

Russian Objective

The objective of the Russian blockade was fairly obvious. The Russians are evidently convinced that they cannot break the development of the Western German Government and the consolidation of Western Germany into the economy of the West. They are, therefore, seeking in every way possible to consolidate their own position in Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany. To this end they put the squeeze on Berlin. They cut off supplies from one sector to another. They cut the electric power. They even stopped the flow of medical supplies – all on the pretext of "technical difficulties" on the main railway routes from Western Germany into the former capital.

Their hope evidently was that within a short time the Germans would be forced by the shortages to take radical measures to break the blockade; that they would demand the withdrawal of the Western powers and thus leave Berlin and the whole of Eastern Germany to the Soviet Union.

The thirty-four-day supply of goods and the airlift defeated this strategy and the dramatic quality of the air operation has certainly heartened and emboldened the Berliner.

These Berliners are not the apathetic, gray-faced persons this reporter saw here a year ago. They are probably not quite as reliable, either, as many of the United States officials here think they are.

But something has happened to them. They are certainly stronger. They are certainly going through a process of reading both sides of the question – something new for this generation of Germans.

Berlin Impressed

All the evidence available suggests that their love of Marshal Vassily D. Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Governor, and the Russians is not unlimited.

People living under a siege – even former enemies – are naturally drawn together, and hungry men naturally tend to support those who feed them against those who blockade their supplies. For the moment, therefore, the feeling between the United States officials and the Germans is perhaps slightly on the dreamy side. Nevertheless the planes overhead night and day are a fairly strong argument in favour of the United States and for the moment the Berliner seems impressed.

In the wider sphere of European politics, too, United States officials feel the airlift has had a considerable effect.

Berlin has become, unfortunately, the symbol not of the German problem but of the Russian problem and United States efforts here have undoubtedly been reassuring to the West. The feeling seems to be that the United States is keeping its word, and that is always a refreshing thing, especially in these parts.

http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F30716F63458157A93CBA81782D85F4C8485F9 [21 August 2010].

M 18 "Rejoicing in Berlin"

Australian newspaper report of the end of the Berlin Blockade, 13 May 1949:

Berlin people really knew the blockade was off when at one minute past midnight last night –

- The big Soviet-controlled Klingenberg power station switched on the lights in the Western sectors of the city; and
- Soviet-controlled Berlin radio announced: "At this moment, all traffic and trade restrictions between the Soviet zone of Germany and the Western zone and within Berlin imposed since January 1, 1948, are being lifted on the orders of the four occupation Powers."

Cheering Crowds in City

Berlin is the happiest city in the world to-day.

After months of tension and austerity and the recent days when skepticism tempered the hopes of more than two million people besieged in the Western sectors, the whole city is lit with jubilation today.

Great crowds – singing, laughing, and cheering every Allied vehicle – are parading the ruin-lined streets decorating tramcars with bunting garlands and slogans – "Berlin lives again," and "hail to the new era."

With trains, lorries and a never-ending stream of airlift planes pouring supplies into the city's *larder,* West Berlin is tasting normal life for the first time for 11 months. [...]

Germans praised

General Lucius Clay, the retiring United States Military Governor in Germany, spoke of the significance of the lifting of the blockade when he addressed the Berlin City Assembly today.

"The end of the blockade does not merely mean that trains and trucks are moving again," he said. It has a deeper significance.

The people of Berlin have earned their right to freedom and to be accepted by those who love freedom everywhere.

"The people of Berlin," he went on, "ranked with the American and British pilots who fed the city as the real heroes of the blockade."

The Soviet-controlled Berlin Radio announced that all Berliners were invited to a mass demonstration in the Soviet sector to-day "to manifest the will of Berlin for a united capital and an undivided Germany."

The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 May 1949. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/airlift/sfeature/press_10.html [21 August 2010].

to bolster: to make sth. stronger
larder: place where food is stored, pantry

Tasks

1. Explain the reactions of West Berliners to the situation in the city, 1948–49 (text, M5, M6).
2. Ask your grandparents or other older people you know what they remember about the currency reform in 1948. Report to your class on your results (text, M5).
3. Assess Reston's analysis of the Berlin situation in 1948 (M17).
4. Analyse the Sydney Morning Herald's report on the end of the Berlin Blockade (M18).
5. Speculate on the identity and intentions of the artist who made the drawing (M16). Follow the guidelines under "Working with Pictures and Objects" (p. 319) at the end of this volume.

A British Perspective – Working with Memoirs

M 19 "We were fighting a battle over the soul of Germany"

Interview with former British Military Governor Lord Brian Robertson (1970):

[W]hen we went into Germany and found the country beaten to its knees – not enough food, not enough coal, and very miserable, no government – we went in under instructions, as indeed did the American mission. Basically their instructions were not much different from ours. But they differed in some important respects. Our instructions, broadly, were that the Germans must be put in their places, that we must denazify them, that we must remove the weapons of war and the means of obtaining new ones. We must be careful because the country would be starving, and it might be full of disease, and our troops must be careful and we shouldn't allow troops to fraternize, as it was called, with the German Frauleine. We had to try to stop that and, of course, were quite unsuccessful. The Americans had much the same instructions, in different words, of course.

I think that it is reasonable to say – perhaps General Clay mightn't agree with me altogether – but I think it's reasonable to say that we ourselves realized that these instructions were no good, rather more early than did the Americans. The Americans were going through, at that time, a period, a sort of honeymoon period, with the Russians. [...]. I recall a conversation I had with General Lucius Clay in the very early days. He said, 'Brian, it's just too bad isn't it; whenever I really think that I've got something to put you in your place, that darn fool Sokolovsky throws the whole kitchen stove at our heads.'

And this was true, that the Americans in the early days, I think at least I'm right, were completely misled by the Soviet attitude. They were very shocked, when in due course they found what indeed was the Soviet attitude. The thing which made them realize it, more than anything else, was the Soviet attitude towards the Potsdam Agreement and common economic policy for Germany. It was necessary that we should go through that period. Otherwise, the Americans, I think, would never have realized what was at the back of all this. Whereas, as I say, I think that we woke up to the truth of the situation a little more early, and that applies particularly to the question of food and coal.

On the other hand, when they had seized what the true situation was, the Americans were more quick than we were, and this is an important aspect of the thing, to realize the importance of turning over authority to the Germans. We clung onto the thing too long. We rather fancied ourselves as colonial administrators, I suppose, and we were pretty good at it. But we kept too many people there, and too long. And it led to quite a lot of trouble in the end. Denazification was a thing which we didn't turn over to the Germans until very late, whereas the Americans did earlier.

The truth of the matter was that in those early days we were fighting a battle over the soul of Germany. And we didn't realize that; if we lost that battle, well, Germany might have been where she is today, but she might be on the other side, as it were, of the Oder-Neisse line entirely.

From an interview with Lord Robertson for the Truman Library, 11 August 1970, pp. 2–5, at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/robertsn.htm [10 Jan 2010].

Tasks

1. Assess Robertson's critique of US and British dealings with the Germans and Soviets (M19).
2. Comment on the difficulties memoirs may present to a historian, using examples from Robertson's text (M19).

Founding Two German States

Two German States Emerge from Allied Failure to Cooperate

The decision to found two separate German states was not taken lightly. Germans especially resisted the idea and were only persuaded through Allied pressure. The question that arises is: How much choice did Germans have in designing their constitutions and in maintaining national unity?

In the West: The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

The three Western Allies called for a constitutional convention in West Germany just before the Berlin airlift began. The Western foreign ministers discussed plans for founding a separate state and presented them to the minister presidents of the provinces ("Länder") in the Western zones at a meeting in Frankfurt am Main on 1 July 1948. The eleven minister presidents did not agree, to the surprise of the Western military governors, who called a meeting on 26 July to discuss the difficulties raised. These were 1) what the constitution should be called, 2) whether a referendum should be held to ratify it, and 3) when provincial borders should be set and representatives to the constitutional assembly chosen. By mid-August a small preliminary council drew up a list of topics for the constitutional convention. That convention, called the Parliamentary Council, began its proceedings in Bonn on 1 September 1948. The document written, the Basic Law, was approved by the military governors and went into effect on 23 May 1949, when the Federal Republic of Germany was proclaimed with Bonn its seat of government.

M 1 Konrad Adenauer in the Assembly of the Parliamentary Council
Adenauer (CDU) was elected president of the Council at its constituent meeting, 1 September 1948

The Parliamentary Council revised the Weimar Constitution to prevent a rise of National Socialism in future. The powers of the president were limited and a constructive vote of no-confidence was required to remove a chancellor from office. The assembly pointedly emphasized the temporary nature of the new constitution and West German state, leaving open the option for German unity at a later date. The electoral system (not technically a part of the Basic Law, but included in the Federal Election Law) combined majority and proportional representation.

M 2

Uncontroversial and Controversial Issues before the Parliamentary Council	
Uncontroversial	**Controversial**
founding a democratic state in peaceful Europe	equal rights for men and women
abolition of capital punishment	rights of parents
parliament • elected directly • plays a main role in legislation • plays a role in selection of president	rights / role of religious organizations
rejection of plebiscites	selection of the second legislative chamber (senate / council) role of second chamber in passing legislation rights of provinces federal / provincial fiscal authority federal / provincial areas of jurisdiction majority / proportional representation text of the preamble



Der Parlamentarische Rat hat das vorstehende Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in öffentlicher Sitzung am 8. Mai des Jahres Eintausendneunhundertneunundvierzig mit dreiundfünfzig gegen zwölf Stimmen beschlossen. Zu Urkunde dessen haben sämtliche Mitglieder des Parlamentarischen Rates die vorliegende Urschrift des Grundgesetzes eigenhändig unterzeichnet.

BONN AM RHEIN, den 23. Mai des Jahres Eintausendneunhundertneunundvierzig.

PRÄSIDENT DES PARLAMENTARISCHEN RATES

I. VIZEPRÄSIDENT DES PARLAMENTARISCHEN RATES

II. VIZEPRÄSIDENT DES PARLAMENTARISCHEN RATES

M 3 **The Basic Law**

The last page with the original text of the Basic Law, 1949

Public opinion took little notice of the new constitution being written. Debates on fiscal structure and the jurisdictions of federal versus provincial governments were heated in the Parliamentary Council, but hardly concerned a population faced with pressing day-to-day problems. However, one issue did generate more than cursory public attention – the question of equal rights for men and women. Equal rights necessarily led directly to debates on the status of the family and the rights of parents (Art. 6), as well as public versus private/religious schools and the role of religious instruction in schools (Art. 7, Art. 140, Art. 141) in the Council. When the final vote was taken (53 approved, 12 rejected the Basic Law), it was these social questions which proved most disagreeable for the nay-sayers. All of the provincial parliaments except Bavaria approved the Basic Law.

When the first elections to the Bundestag were held on 14 August 1949, two parties (out of sixteen) attracted the most votes. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), together with its associated party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU) won 139 seats; the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) followed with a total of 131 seats. Theodor Heuss, a member of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), was elected the first Federal President. The President of the Parliamentary Council, Konrad Adenauer (CDU), was elected the first Federal Chancellor by a majority of only one vote. Adenauer was 73 years old at the time of his election, and many anticipated his retirement within a short time. Nevertheless, he remained in office until 1963.

In the East: The German Democratic Republic (GDR)

The Soviet military administration modelled its zone on the Soviet Union, beginning with the return of exiled Communist groups accompanying the Red Army in April 1945. The "Sovietization" of the zone was completed within a relatively short period of time.

The Sovietization of the Eastern zone increased the pressure on the Western Allies to found a separate state. Although such plans had begun early in the Soviet zone, it was not until the Western plans were being realized that steps toward separation were taken in the East. A

indictment: official accusation of a crime

M 4

Typical Phases of Sovietization

The "Sovietization" of the satellites was carried out in six phases:

1. Communist minorities gathered nationalist resistance in "patriotic fronts", which after the occupation were supported by the Red Army.
2. "Provisional governments" were established; exiled Communists, schooled in Moscow, received key positions in state and Communist party.
3. Following relatively free elections, coalition governments with bourgeois heads were formed: the Communist party secured the Ministry of the Interior and thereby obtained the disposal of police power. Beginning of reconstruction: popular land reforms and nationalization of industry.
4. Bourgeois parliamentary majorities were eliminated by terror, denunciation, compulsion and the *indictment* of bourgeois politicians; Socialist unity parties under Communist leadership were formed, "bloc politics" were practiced and new coalition governments were formed with "fellow-traveling" parties, leaders of the opposition were eliminated (some of them fleeing to the west).
5. Formation of Communist governments, confirmed in controlled popular elections based on unity lists. Persecution of the Church and internal purges of the Communist party: show trials of "deviators" (Titoists and others).
6. Conforming of the people's democracies to the Soviet example: collectivization of agriculture, supra-regional economic planning and military commands. ...

From The Penguin Atlas of World History, Vol. 2 (London: Penguin, 1978), p. 231.

The Sovietization of the Eastern German Zone of Occupation, 1945–50	
Political changes	**Social and economic changes**
April 1945: emigrant cadres (for example, the "Ulbricht Group") return to East Germany as political advisors of the Soviet army 10 June – 5 July 1945: founding of new parties at request of Soviet Union • Communist Party of Germany • Social Democratic Party of Germany • Christian Democratic Union • Liberal Democratic Party of Germany Communist Party proposes a "special path to socialism"; rejects uniting with Social Democrats at present 14 July 1945: "United Front of Antifascist-democratic Parties" (="Antifa-Block") 21 April 1946: Union of the Communist Party (Pieck) with the Social Democrats (Grotewohl), forming the Socialist Unity Party ("Sozialistische Einheitspartei", SED) Autumn 1946: Local and provincial elections result in 47.5 % for Socialist Unity Party from June 1948: Socialist Unity Party becomes "new type of party" (= cadre party), featuring • democratic centralism • politburo • political conformity • party commissions expel opposition March 1949: Elections for the 3rd People's Congress: Unity list leads to 66.1 % "yes" vote 7 October 1949: "National Front" • political registration of house and farm communities • Socialist Unity Party determines candidates for parliament, judges and jurors from 1950: parliamentary elections function only as confirmation of party decisions (99 % elections)	Land reform: large landowners' estates divided and distributed to small farmers, agrarian production societies (= "Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft", LPG) Initiative against war criminals and Nazi activists Industrial reform: expropriation and nationalization of 75 % of industrial capacity, 25 % placed in Soviet ownership Nationalization of the banks Judicial reform: "people's judges" under control of the Socialist Unity Party Educational reform: • "people's teachers" • comprehensive schools • education free of charge Health reform: medical treatment free of charge

M 5

M 6 "Government of the Eastern Zone"
Cartoon on the founding of the GDR by Felix Mussil in "Hannoversche Presse", 1949

preliminary draft of a constitution was drawn up by the Socialist Unity Party in 1946 and discussed at three separate People's Congresses up to 1949. The procedures followed in these assemblies were questionable from a democratic point of view – agendas and membership were co-opted from the previous assemblies, while elections assumed largely proclamatory functions. Following approval of the constitution on 30 May 1949, the German Democratic Republic was formally proclaimed on 7 October 1949. Wilhelm Pieck became the first (and only) President of the republic; Otto Grotewohl became the first Minister President. Real power in East Germany was held by the Socialist Unity Party, whose General Secretary (in 1950) was Walter Ulbricht. Berlin remained the capital of the country. Elections to the People's Chamber were postponed until 1950, presumably because the voting for the Third People's Congress in May 1949 had not produced results as reliable as the authorities had anticipated.

The East German Constitution of 1949 never reflected the political reality of the country. The constitution did not provide for an independent judiciary, nor did political authorities respect the constitution's provisions, changing them arbitrarily when desired. Legal critics considered it essentially meaningless as a constitutional document. Amended often, it was replaced in 1968 by a new constitution which incorporated the "socialist changes" the country had undergone since 1949. This document was amended significantly in turn in 1974.

Establishing a Constituent Assembly in the West

M 7 "London Documents"

Excerpt from The London Documents, June 1948:

DOCUMENT I: Constituent Assembly

The Military Governors of the US, UK and French Zones of Occupation in Germany, in accordance with the decisions of their respective Governments, authorize the Ministers President of the states of their respective zones to convene a constituent assembly to be held not later than September 1, 1948. [...]

The constituent assembly will draft a democratic constitution which will establish for the participating states a governmental structure of federal type which is best adapted to the eventual re-establishment of German unity at present disrupted, and which will protect the rights of the participating states, provide adequate authority, and contain guarantees of individual rights and freedoms. [...]

The ratification will take place by each participating state by means of a referendum requiring a simple majority of the voters in each state under such rules and procedure as it may adopt. When the constitution has been ratified by two-thirds of the states, it will come into force and be binding upon all states. Thereafter, any amendment to the constitution must be ratified by a like majority of the states. Within thirty days following the coming into force of the constitution, the institutions for which it provides shall be established.

From The London Documents (July 1, 1948), in Beata Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945–1954 (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 315–18.

M 8 Reply of the Ministers President

Excerpt from the reply of the Ministers President in Koblenz to the London Documents, 10 July 1948:

The Ministers-President are convinced that the critical difficulties under which Germany suffers today can be overcome only if the German people are enabled to administer their affairs on the broadest territorial basis possible at any given time. They welcome, therefore, the Occupying Powers' determination to combine the areas of Germany which are subject to their jurisdiction into a unified territory to which the population itself shall give a vigorous organization which makes it possible to preserve the interest of the whole without prejudicing the rights of the *Laender*.

The Ministers-President believe, however, that notwithstanding the granting of the fullest possible autonomy to the population of this territory, everything should be avoided that would give the character of a state to the organization which is to be established. They are, therefore, of the opinion that the procedure to be followed for this purpose should make it clear that a provisional establishment only is involved, an institution, furthermore, which owes its formation solely to the temporary state of affairs in relation to the present occupation of Germany.

Because of the inability of the four Occupying Powers to reach unanimity regarding Germany thus far, the Ministers-President must take special care to avoid in the pending reorganization, anything which could widen further the rift between west and east. In the light of the present circumstances, they are convinced that the procedure they suggest is suitable to provide the administration of the area of Germany under the jurisdiction of the three western occupying powers with the instrument best fitted to overcome the present difficulties.

The same considerations were decisive in the proposal of the Ministers-President to refrain from a referendum. A referendum would give to the basic law the kind of weight which should be reserved to a final constitution. The Ministers-President wish once more on this occasion to stress the fact that in their opinion a German constitution cannot be created until the whole German people find it possible to constitute itself through free self-determination; until such time measures for a provisional organization only can be taken. [...]

The Ministers-President gave especially serious consideration to the problems related to the regulation of the exercise of powers by the occupation authority. They noted with satisfaction the intention that their relations to the Occupying Powers be put on a clear legal basis. However, the Ministers-President think that it is an urgent necessity that the Military Governors proclaim an occupation statute before the body which is entrusted to draft the basic law for the area of the three Western Zones starts its activities; only then will this body have a firm foundation for its work. Furthermore, they think that the Occupation Statute should express clearly that the organizational changes which are now intended are ultimately based on the will of the Occupying

Powers. This must lead to consequences different from those which would follow if the changes were an act of free self-determination of the German people. [...]

The Ministers-President do not want to end this letter without thanking the Military Governors for, through their initiative, widening the possibilities for a progressive democratic development which can unfold only when a people deciding freely can accept responsibility and determine its own affairs. They affirm that they, as much as the Military Governors, will do everything which can serve the peace of the world and the unity of a free and democratic Germany.

From Decisions of the Conference of Minister Presidents in Koblenz (July 10, 1948), in Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume II, Germany and Austria (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 385–388.

M 9 Allied Reaction to the Koblenz Proposals

Frankfurt, 14 July 1948, Telegram of US Political Advisor for Germany (Murphy) to the US Secretary of State, Secret:

While [US Military Governor] Clay's first reaction has been that the counterproposals of the Ministers President should be flatly rejected and they should be informed that the proposals made to them as a result of the London meeting are governmental procedures which the Ministers President have no authority to modify, I hope that as a result of today's meeting with the Ministers President of the US zone that there may be some relaxation in this position. Friedrich [Governmental Affairs Advisor, OMGUS] and Litchfield [Director of Civil Administration Division, OMGUS] over the weekend contacted some of the Ministers President and are persuaded that they held the view that the proposals made to them on June 30 were in the nature of suggestions calling for an expression of their ideas. [...]

I believe that it was not the intention of the Ministers President to reject the London proposals and this is confirmed by both Friedrich's and Litchfield's conversations.

With reference to the German desire to call the constitution a "basic law for the uniform administration of the occupation zones of Western Germany," Germans pointed out that in so doing they follow French tradition. In 1875 French representatives under Prussian military occupation also declined to call the constitution then enacted in that name, using instead the title "organic law." According to the same sources, Ministers President were under impression that French Government would not object to postponement of constitution and substitution of provisional program. [...] It also believed that some of the Ministers President understood that British Government would be ready to *acquiesce* in the changes they were suggesting.

There is also little doubt that the Berlin situation and the current tension between the western powers and the Soviet Union are exercising a profound effect on German thought. This was demonstrated by the urgent recommendations made by Berlin's Mayor Frau Schroeder that the Coblenz conference avoid precipitate action relating to establishment Western German Government because it would have effect of splitting Berlin and provoking more drastic Soviet measures against Berlin population in western sectors.

It is hoped that with the current meetings at Frankfurt that the Military Governors may be able to adjust matters on a Military Government level and that their conversations with the Ministers President will enable them later to regulate their resolutions in closer harmony with the London proposals.

United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948: Germany and Austria, Volume 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 395–396.

to acquiesce: to accept passively

Tasks

1. Find out why some topics in the Parliamentary Council raised controversy and others did not (M2).
2. Make a list of the main arguments in the documents and assess their importance for the German people (M7–M9).
3. Divide into small groups and examine the minutes of the discussion at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2852. Explain the difficulties raised by the demand for a popular referendum to approve the new constitution and evaluate its final outcome. Give a report of your findings to the class.

Gender Equality in the Basic Law

M 10



M 11 Formulations of Rights for Men and Women

• In the Weimar Constitution (1919):
Article 109
All Germans shall be equal before the law.
Men and women shall, in principle, have the same civil rights and responsibilities.

• In the Basic Law (1949):
Article 3
All persons shall be equal before the law.
Men and women shall have equal rights.

http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/artandhistory/history/factsheets/german_constitutions.pdf [16 Sept 2010].

M 12 A Comment

Robert G. Moeller, American historian, analyses difficulties in including equal rights in the Basic Law (2004):

Whatever the ideological divisions among postwar political parties, they shared one thing in common: their representatives to the Parliamentary Council were almost all men. State legislatures sent only four women to Bonn, slightly more than six percent of all delegates. In contrast, thirty years earlier women had made up ten percent of the delegates to the Weimar National Assembly. The *Frauenüberschuss* did not register in an oversupply of women in the corridors of political decision-making. Despite the organizational initiatives among some women at the local level immediately following the war, the creation of a national non-partisan women's organization by the late forties, and pressure from women for an expanded role in all political parties, when it came to political decision-making at the national level in postwar West Germany, there was apparently no "scarcity of men." The composition of the Parliamentary Council clearly reflected the sentiments of Germans, recorded by postwar public opinion polls, that women need not concern themselves with the business of politics. The state legislatures that sent delegates to the Parliamentary Council agreed that the representation of women's concerns did not require the presence of large numbers of women representatives.
Initial guidelines for the Grundgesetz, which emerged from discussions among the heads of state governments in all the Allied-occupied zones in the summer 1948, did not include any direct treatment of women's status. Some postwar state consititutions had guaranteed women civil equality, and in some cases this was extended to equal rights and wages in the workplace as well. But in the drafts handed on to the delegates sent to Bonn, it was thought that women were adequately covered by general language that ensured all citizens equality before the law and banned discrimination of all sorts.
By the time the Parliamentary Council concluded its deliberations, however, the Basic Law explicitly promised that "men and women have the same rights." This marked a giant step beyond the equal-rights clause of the Weimar constitution and a victory for the SPD, which had mobilized public opinion in what the SPD's Frieda Nadig called the "battle for equal rights."

Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood. Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley, CA: U. of California Press, 1996), pp. 45–46.

M 13 Elisabeth Selbert's Tactics in the Parliamentary Council

The Anglo-German scholar Eva Kolinsky on Selbert's role (1995):

[Elisabeth Selbert] had been the woman whose perseverance in the Parliamentary Council ensured that the Basic Law included a commitment to full (not merely political) equality. As a lawyer, Elisabeth Selbert knew that finding the right wording was only the beginning, since the text would constitute the foundation for all future legislation. Without the explicit constitutional commitment to equality the need to reform the

BGB [Bürgerliches Gestzbuch=German Civil Code] and legislate on equality for women in the family, in employment and other social spheres would not have arisen with the same urgency.

It is important to remember that Elisabeth Selbert did not win her battle for equality simply through reasoned debate within the Parliamentary Council. The policy makers at the time (including her female colleagues) did not object openly to the principle of equality but seemed inclined to retain the text of the Weimar constitution. Caught in the *quagmire* of legal and constitutional infighting and without proper support even from her own party, Elisabeth Selbert turned to the public for help, [...] informing the press that full equality was likely to be withheld from women, a message which enraged a sufficient number of organisations (trade unions and women's associations), parliamentarians in the regions and especially women members of the German public to produce a wave of protest. Apparently, petitions, letters, pleas and appeals arrived by the truck load (in German: Waschkörbe voll) at the Museum König. Faced with so forceful a statement of popular sentiment, the opposition to Elisabeth Selbert collapsed and her wording became the authorised wording in the Basic Law.

Eva Kolinsky, ed., Women in 20th-century Germany: A Reader (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 65.

quagmire: predicament, a very difficult situation

M 14 Photograph of the Four Women in the Parliamentary Council

From left to right: Friederike Nadig (SPD), Elisabeth Selbert (SPD), Helene Weber (CDU) und Helene Wessel (Zentrum). Only Selbert was trained as an attorney. Wessel was originally a schoolteacher, Weber and Nadig worked with youth agencies and other social institutions.

Tasks

1. Describe the significance of the population pyramid in the discussion of gender equality at the writing of the Basic Law (M10).
2. Discuss the differences in meaning between the articles of the Weimar Constitution and the Basic Law (M11).
3. Interpret the initial lack of support for equal rights among members of the Parliamentary Council, giving reasons for your opinion (M12, M13).
4. Find out more about the four women in the Parliamentary Council and report to your class on your results. Use the Internet (M14).
5. Make a presentation on the progress of equal rights in Germany since 1949. Use the Internet for your research.

Developments in East Germany

M 15 Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl and Walter Ulbricht in 1946
Pieck and Grotewohl shake hands in East Berlin, 22 April 1946, to seal the merger of the German Communist Party (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED). Seated on the right is Walter Ulbricht.

M 16 "Farms for 'New Farmers' from Materials from Demolished Barracks and Manor Houses"
Propaganda poster, May 1948

M 17 Tearing Down the Barn and Farmhouse on the Hesserode Estate in Thuringia, Photograph by Herbert Hensky, 1948



M 18 "Leading Germany the Wrong Way"
British cartoonist Leslie Gilbert Illingworth on the founding of East Germany, The Daily Mail, 12 October 1949

M 19 The East German "Historical Mission"

SED plans for national unity as assessed in "The Encylopedia of the Cold War" (2008):

[T]he SED [...] assumed that in the near future, East and West Germany would be unified through the extension of the GDR system to the FRG. This program for communist-led unification was related to the GDR's firm incorporation into the Soviet bloc – believed to be the most important tool for promoting unification. This thinking clearly reflected a belief in the "historical mission" of the GDR, including the plan to spread the new order to the as yet *inchoate* FRG by way of a pan-German "anti-imperialist" Popular Front. In light of the still comparable standard of living in the FRG and the GDR's own promising social programs, it seemed an open question who would prevail in the intra-German rivalry. In the early Federal Republic there were certain tendencies, such as opposition to the Western integration and rearmament policies of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, that could be interpreted as favourable to the Popular Front strategy. The forward concept of the SED was manifested in the offensive orientation of its activities in the West, which aimed for a communist-controlled National Front in West Germany and a subservient peace movement. The end goal remained a unified socialist Germany. Compromises and partial measures contradicted the interests of the SED, which openly rejected the Western maximum goal of free elections across Germany and tacitly rejected Soviet proposals for German neutrality.

Ruud van Dijk, ed., Encyclopedia of the Cold War, article on "East Germany (German Democratic Republic)", by Michael Lemke, translated by Ruud van Dijk (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2008), pp. 354–355.

M 20 "Historical Mission"

Wilhelm Pieck on the East German historical mission (1959):

The historical significance of the founding of our peace-loving state for the German people and the peoples of Europe increases with the continuing growth of Fascism and militarism in Germany's Western zone. Hitler's followers again hold positions of power and attempt to draw the nations of Western Europe into atomic war to advance their revanchist plans. They see West Germany as a staging point and advance base for atomic war. Under the leadership of Hitler's criminal generals, they seek to build the strongest military power in Western Europe and are beginning to arm themselves with atomic rockets. They reject any agreement with our republic to reunify Germany, seek to annex the German Democratic Republic, and carry out outrageous chauvinistic *rabble-rousing* against Germany's eastern and western neighbors in pursuit of their revanchist territorial demands. The German militarists who have twice driven the peoples of Europe and Germany into bloody world wars apparently cannot imagine Germany free from war. They are preparing a new war in the Western zone.

Wilhelm Pieck, in Ten Years of the German Democratic Republic (Berlin: Ministerrat der DDR, 1959), translated by Randall L. Bytwerk, at http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/ddr10.htm [8 Nov 2010].

inchoate: just beginning to develop
to rabble-rouse: to stir up hatred or violence among masses of people

Tasks

1. Match the typical phases of "Sovietization" to the developments in the Eastern zone of occupation (text, M4, M5).
2. Analyse the decision to combine the SPD and KPD to one party, the SED, in 1946 (text, M4, M15).
3. Contrast the plans for farm reconstruction with the problems it raised in reality (M16, M17).
4. Interpret the cartoon (M18).
5. Assess the perceived "historical mission" of the GDR (M19, M20).

International Crises in the Cold War

Bloc Building during the Cold War

Germany was directly affected by the disintegrating relations between the former Allies after World War II. Both the USSR and the US had extended their spheres of influence considerably during the war. After military actions had ceased, the two powers faced each other in a perilous situation. Because the war had been immensely destructive, both tried to deal with the new situation without immediately turning to war, instead using different types of aggressive action (coercion, threats, intimidation) to reach their goals – a Cold War. Both increasingly tried to consolidate their spheres of interest into firm blocs, which led to precarious conflicts with possible "hot" resolutions. How instable was the international situation during the Cold War?

Sovietization of Eastern Europe

As the Red Army moved through Eastern Europe, it promoted Communist political parties and the founding of "people's republics" along the western borders of the Soviet Union. It is impossible to tell for certain what Stalin thought at the time, but various theories have been advanced to explain this development:

- Poland and Germany were part of a security zone to act as a buffer for attacks from the west of the Soviet Union
- East Germany was a stepping stone in the future Sovietization of all of Western Europe
- East Germany could serve as a bargaining point for later negotiations with the Western Allies

M 1 "Free Elections"
Protest in East Berlin, 17 June 1953

As the Sovietization of her eastern neighbours progressed, the Soviet Union emerged as the hegemonic power over economically, militarily and politically dependent "satellite" states. Expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence into Asia, Africa and South America provoked alarm in the West, which was answered by the 1949 founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Similarly, the USSR reacted with alarm at Western global expansion.

Although free elections for Poland were agreed on at Potsdam, Polish Communists took control of the government with the support of the Soviet army. The exiled wartime Polish government in London did not return to the country; Poland became a satellite state of the Soviet Union.

In a ministerial reshuffling of the government, Communists assumed control over political decision-making under Czechoslovak president Beneš. The sudden death of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk following the "bloodless coup" led to long-standing suspicion of the events in the West.

After Stalin's death on 5 March 1953, local uprisings tested the resolve of the new Soviet leaders to put down national movements demanding liberalization in the satellite states. The State Treaty of Austria in 1955, which guaranteed Austrian neutrality and led to the withdrawal of Allied troops in the country, led many in Eastern Europe to believe that Stalinist strong-arm policies in their own countries might be weakened.

In June 1953 people in East Berlin and throughout East Germany rebelled when work norms were raised – workers were informed

M 2 Hungarian Revolution
Photograph, 1956

that they would have to work more for the same pay. East German police and Soviet troops put down the insurrections with force. West Germans celebrated a national holiday, the "Day of German Unity", on 17 June in remembrance of the uprising until reunification in 1990.

In Hungary in late October 1956, civilians took control of the government away from the Communist Party and the Security Police. However, in early November, a large Soviet force invaded the country and reimposed control, killing many and forcing at least 200,000 Hungarians into exile. Although called upon to help, the Western nations did not interfere. The "Hungarian Revolution" had failed.

Developments in the Far East

China was invaded by the Japanese in 1937 and occupied until 1945. Resistance to the Japanese was led by Chiang Kai-shek in collaboration with his former Communist rivals. Upon the Japanese defeat, the Communists, led by Mao Zedong, turned against the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) under Chiang and resumed the brutal civil war in China. Chiang fled with the rest of his army and about two million of his supporters to Taiwan, where he set up a separate state, the Republic of China, while claiming to represent all of China. Mao proclaimed the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949.

Disagreement over which Chinese state should assume the permanent seat in the UN Security Council led the USSR to boycott Security Council meetings from January to August 1950. Without the Soviet Union present to object to the resolution, the Security Council sent UN troops to Korea in June 1950.

During World War II France proved too weak to defend French Indochina against Japanese attack. The Viet Minh, a nationalist group led by Ho Chi Minh, resisted the Japanese conquerors and gained control over the territory by war's end. In September 1945, Ho proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but a force of British, French, Indian, and captured Japanese soldiers re-established French control. A bitter war ensued in which the French army was decisively defeated at Dien Bien Phu. In the 1954 Geneva Accords, France renounced claims to her former colony; three states (Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam) were founded; Vietnam was partitioned and an election to unify the country was scheduled for 1956. This election was never



M 3

held. Instead, the southern Republic of Vietnam was supported by the US throughout a long military involvement lasting until 1975.

Conflict in Korea erupted when North Korean soldiers invaded South Korea on 26 June 1950. The action took the US by surprise, as withdrawal of American troops had begun in 1949, following the Soviet withdrawal from North Korea in 1948. The UN Security Council approved the sending of a peacekeeping contingent during the Soviet boycott of its meetings after January 1950. US High Commander in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, was entrusted with the command of UN troops in Korea. The North Korean attack was extraordinarily successful at first, but MacArthur's unusual military tactics drove the North Koreans behind the 38th parallel and back to the Chinese border. At this point, Chinese soldiers from what Mao termed the "People's Volunteer Army" interfered directly in the military operations. The prospect of countless Chinese troops fighting in the difficult Korean terrain intimidated military planners. MacArthur proposed pursuing the Chinese beyond Korea's borders and deploying atomic bombs. Truman refused; MacArthur was replaced as Supreme Commander. In 1953 an armistice designated a demilitarized zone between North and South Korea along essentially the 38th parallel. Peace treaty talks have failed ever since; Korea remains divided to the present day.

proxy war: war fought in or over another country, instead of between opponents directly
confines: limits

East and West confronted each other in this *proxy war* in Korea, but the powers' goals remained unclear. The USSR supported the Chinese and North Koreans, but took part only in aerial operations. The US cooperated internationally within the *confines* of a UN peacekeeping mission, as US President Truman tried to keep the hostilities from escalating into a global conflict. Evaluation of the conflict is difficult even today, and widely varying assessments are made of it.

On the Verge of Nuclear War: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

The US attempted to counter Soviet expansion by instituting leaders more reliable to American concerns. The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) removed the elected leaders in Iran in 1953 and in Guatemala in 1954, replacing them with perceived anti-Communists. When Communist Fidel Castro overturned a corrupt Cuban government in 1959, the CIA planned a military operation against Castro to be carried out by exiled Cubans from Florida with US aerial support. The short "Bay of Pigs" invasion ended in humiliating failure for the US. It was followed by an even greater threat to US security – a Soviet build-up of intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. US President

M 4 **London Demonstration 1962**

Protesters stage a sit-in during the Cuban Missile crisis, 24 October 1962

John F. Kennedy demanded the removal of the Soviet missiles and placed a naval embargo on Cuba to back up his demands. After hectic negotiations Soviet Premier Khrushchev reached an understanding with Kennedy: The Soviet naval convoy en route to Cuba was recalled, while Kennedy secretly agreed to remove US missiles in Turkey and Italy after the crisis was over. One positive result of the Cuban crisis was the later agreement to install a security hotline in Washington and Moscow, so both sides were in direct contact in case of confrontation.

M 5



The Korean War

M 6 Truman on Korea

US President Truman's statement about Korea, 26 June 1950:

I conferred Sunday evening with the Secretaries of State and Defense, their senior advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the situation in the Far East created by unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea.

The government of the United States is pleased with the speed and determination with which the United Nations Security Council acted to order a withdrawal of the invading forces to positions north of the thirty-eighth parallel. In accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, the United States will vigorously support the effort of the Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace.

Our concern over the lawless action taken by the forces from North Korea, and our sympathy and support for the people of Korea in this situation, are being demonstrated by the cooperative action of American personnel in Korea, as well as by the steps taken to expedite and augment assistance of the type being furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

Those responsible for this act of aggression must realize how seriously the government of the United States views such threats to the peace of the world. Willful disregard of the obligation to keep the peace cannot be tolerated by nations that support the United Nations Charter.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/truman/psources/ps_korea.html [22 August 2010].

M 7 UN Security Council Resolution 83

27 June 1950:

The Security Council, having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, having called upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security, recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Adopted at the 474th meeting by 7 votes to 1 (Yugoslavia). [Two members (Egypt, India) did not participate in the voting; one member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent.]

Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 16, 474th meeting, p. 2 (document S/1507). http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f20a2c.html [27 Sept 2010].

M 8 "Le Monde" on Korea

26 June 1950:

[O]nce again the facts show – as if such a demonstration were needed after the tragedy in China – that US weapons and dollars are not sufficient to stand in the way of the Communist advance through Asia. Moreover, the international community was misled when it believed, on the strength of optimistic assurances, in the solidity of the government presided over by Mr Syngman Rhee. Its weakness lies in one major fact: that the splitting of Korea into two parts has, since 1945, been a deep wound for the Korean people. The North's propaganda in favour of national unification has never ceased to have a profound effect in the South. Furthermore, in an atmosphere of political anarchy, and divided into numerous factions, the South Korean Government could survive only through relying on a strong police force, whose role in the State made South Korea a country that was far from being 'democratic' and a legitimate champion of freedom. [...]

Happily, it is hardly likely that the Korean crisis will degenerate into an international conflict, with the United States itself endeavouring, it seems, to contain the danger. Nevertheless, it will certainly have considerable *ramifications* in Asia and a profound influence upon US policy in this part of the world. The tragedy will, at least, not have been in vain if it makes the United States finally confront the realities of the Asian situation, and if, in particular, it puts an end to their hesitations and *prevarications* in South-East Asia.

Excerpt from "La guerre sur le 38e parallèle", in Le Monde, 27.06.1950, No 1685; 7e année, p. 1. Translated by the Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE). http://www.ena.lu/war_38th_parallel_le_monde_26_june_1950-2-8875 [24 Sept 2010].

M 9 "Pravda" on Korea

28 June 1950 :

The Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic has been able repeatedly to demonstrate its consistency in defence of the interests of the Korean people, their democratic development, their independence, their patriotic aspirations for unity. Even at the beginning of this month, the Single United Democratic Front and the Presidium of the Supreme National Assembly of Korea in Pyongyang, expressing the will of the Korean people, came forward with a proposal to carry out the peaceful unification of the country. The South Korean clique of Syngman Rhee answered this proposal on June 25 by beginning *fratricidal war.* [...]

As is clear from the aforementioned statement by Truman, he has instructed the air and naval forces of the United States to give armed "assistance" to the army of Syngman Rhee, the traitor to the Korean people. At the same time the American President has instructed the American Seventh Fleet to "prevent an attack on Formosa", which is an order for the actual occupation by American armed forces of part of the territory of China.

This order signifies that the Government of the United States of America has undertaken a direct act of aggression against the Korean People's Democratic Republic and against the People's Republic of China.

The Soviet Union and the Korean Question: Documents (London: Soviet News, 1950), pp. 87–88. http://www.ena.lu/american_ruling_circles_gone_direct_acts_aggression_pravda_28_june_1950-2-11542 [24 Sept 2010].

ramification: consequence
prevarication: lie
fratricidal war: war in which brothers kill each other
knout: a leather scourge, whip
portent: omen, sign

M 10 "Believe it or *Knout*"

British Cartoonist Leslie Illingworth on the Korean War, published 12 July 1950 in Punch

M 11 "The *Portent*"

British Cartoonist Leslie Illingworth, published in Punch, 1950

Tasks

1. The Hungarian "revolution" is called an "uprising" elsewhere. Find a term you find appropriate, giving reasons for your choice.
2. Comment on the photograph's symbolism (M2).
3. Evaluate the military progress made during the Korean War (text, M3).
4. Compare and contrast the views on Korea (M6–M9).
5. Choose one of the cartoons and interpret it (M10, M11).
6. Describe the strategic concerns raised by the East-West conflict (M5).

The Cuban Crisis

M 12 US President Kennedy's Television Address to the Nation

22 October 1962:

This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet Military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. [...]

For many years both the Soviet Union and the United States, [...] have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. [...]

But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles – in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy – this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil – is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe. [...]

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. [...]

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man. [...]

[I]t is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why this latest Soviet threat – or any other threat which is made independently or in response to our actions this week – must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed – including in particular the brave people of West Berlin – will be met by whatever action is needed. [...]

The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are – but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high – and Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission. [...]

http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/jfk-cuban.htm [29 Sept 2010].

M 13 Soviet Premier Khrushchev's Letter to Kennedy

24 October 1962:

You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather issuing an ultimatum, and you are threatening that if we do not obey your orders, you will then use force. Think about what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this!

What does it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean for us to conduct our relations with other countries not by reason, but by yielding to tyranny. You are not appealing to reason; you want to intimidate us. [...]

You want to force us to renounce the rights enjoyed by every sovereign state; you are attempting to legislate questions of international law; you are violating the generally accepted standards of this law. All this is due not only to hatred for the Cuban people and their government, but also for reasons having to do with the election campaign in the USA. What morals, what laws can justify such an approach by the American government to international affairs? Such morals and laws are not to be found, because the actions of the USA in relation to Cuba are outright piracy. [...]. Therefore, Mr. President, if you weigh the present situation with a cool head without giving way to passion, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot afford not to decline the despotic demands of the USA.

[...] I have no doubt that if anyone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you – the USA, you would reject such an attempt. And we likewise say – no. [...]

Our instructions to Soviet sailors are to observe strictly the generally accepted standards of navigation in international waters and not retreat one step from them. And, if the American side violates these rights, it must be aware of the responsibility it will bear for this act. To be sure, we will not remain mere observers of pirate actions by American ships in the open sea. We will then be forced on our part to take those measures we deem necessary and sufficient to defend our rights. To this end we have all that is necessary.

http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/x2jfk.html [29 Sept 2010].

M 14 Robert Kennedy Talks with Dobrynin

US Attorney General Robert Kennedy (the President's brother) reports to Secretary of State Dean Rusk on his conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on 27 October 1962. This memorandum was written on 30 October 1962:

[I] explained to him that in the last two hours we had found that our planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2's had been shot down and the pilot killed. I said these men were flying unarmed planes.

I told him that this was an extremely serious turn in events. We would have to make certain decisions within the next 12 or possibly 24 hours. There was a very little time left. If the Cubans were shooting at our planes, then we were going to shoot back. This could not help but bring on further incidents and that he had better understand the full implications of this matter. [...]

I said that he had better understand the situation and he had better communicate that understanding to Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he had misled us. The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming, privately and publicly, that this would never be done. I said those missile bases had to go and they had to go right away. We had to have a commitment by at least tomorrow that those bases would be removed. This was not an ultimatum, I said, but just a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did not remove those bases then we would remove them. His country might take *retaliatory* action but he should understand that before this was over, while there might be dead Americans there would also be dead Russians. [...]

He then asked me about Khrushchev's other proposal dealing with the removal of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that there could be no quid pro quo – no deal of this kind could be made. This was a matter that had to be considered by NATO and that it was up to NATO to make the decision. I said it was completely impossible for NATO to take such a step under the present threatening position of the Soviet Union. [The following typed sentence at the end of this paragraph was crossed out:] "If some time elapsed – and per your instructions, I mentioned four or five months – I said I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactory."

Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no deal of any kind and that any steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately.".

http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc_misc_transcripts.html [29 Sept 2010].

retaliatory: getting revenge

Tasks

1. Assess the international impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis (M4)
2. Contrast the American and Soviet points of view (M12, M13).
3. Evaluate Robert Kennedy's memorandum, considering the difficulties this source presents to a historian (M14).
4. Stage a mock debate in class between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev after the Cuban Missile Crisis has ended.

Developments in Both German States 1949–1963

Consolidation Difficulties in the Shadow of the Cold War

In 1949 both East and West Germany had to be stabilized and consolidated militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Konrad Adenauer, the West German Chancellor, and Walter Ulbricht, from 1953 the East German First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party, integrated their countries into their respective blocs by the mid-1950s. However, German national unity remained a *vexing* problem during the period from 1949-1963.

M 1

German Integration in East and West, 1950–1961

	general conditions	Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)	German Democratic Republic (GDR)
1950	KOREAN WAR		– joined Comecon – Görlitz Treaty (recognition of Oder-Neisse border)
1951	KOREAN WAR	European Coal and Steel Community (= Montanunion)	
1952	KOREAN WAR Soviet Note on Germany	– European Defense Community Treaty (EDC, = "Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft" /EVG), coupled with – Treaty on Germany (general treaty)	
1953	June 17: Berlin uprising		
1954	Soviet Note on Germany	– EDC fails to pass French parliament – Treaties of Paris	Soviet Union declares GDR sovereign
1955	– international treaty on Austrian neutrality – irritation in Berlin	– admittance to NATO – Statute of Occupation ends	international treaty between Soviet Union and GDR: restoration of sovereignty
1956		plebiscite → Saar settlement: beginning of reconciliation (1963 → German-French Friendship Treaty)	admittance to Warsaw Pact
1957		European Economic Community (EEC, = "Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft" / EWG) / Euratom	
1958-1961	Berlin Crisis	– by 1959: Saar to FRG – 13 August 1961: Berlin Wall built	
		→ Western integration	→ Eastern integration

In West Germany: Adenauer's "Policy of Strength"

Adenauer set four goals for his government: 1) German unity, 2) economic consolidation, 3) military security, 4) national sovereignty. Although the three latter goals seemed to contradict the first, Adenauer insisted that German unity could only be achieved through a "policy of strength", i.e., making West Germany strong enough to overcome all obstacles to unity. The initial steps in this development were suggested by French political leaders: Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman proposed cooperation within the European Coal and Steel Community, René Pleven military co-operation within the European Defense Community. The EDC ("Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft", EVG) passed the Bundestag after heated debate, but the French National Assembly unexpectedly denied its ratification. Instead, the West German military was integrated into NATO, which led to the end of the Allied Statute of Occupation and recovery of West German national sovereignty.

M 2 **"His Comrades – Our Allies"**
Recruitment poster for the West German army, 1956

vexing: making you feel annoyed or worried
to temper: to soften or moderate
to covet: to desire or prize sth.



M 3 **"Brothers in Class – Brothers in Arms"**
Recruitment poster for the East German army, 1965

Western integration seemed endangered when the Soviet Union offered the Western Allies a peace treaty with Germany on 10 March 1952. The offer was hotly debated, as its proposal of a united, neutral Germany directly contradicted the EDC and other measures supporting more cooperation with the West. Controversy about Soviet intentions surrounding the note continues in Germany to this day.

Upon joining NATO formally in 1955, West Germany pursued further integration in the West, becoming a founding member of the European Economic Community (EEC, "Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft", EWG), which transformed later into the European Union (EU). Before Adenauer resigned in 1963, he concluded the German-French Friendship Treaty, resolving the bitter antagonism between the two countries.

The Basic Law considered West Germany the legal successor of the former German Reich. Adenauer's government insisted that the West German government represented all Germans. In the 1955 formulation of the "Hallstein Doctrine" countries recognizing East Germany diplomatically were threatened with the loss of diplomatic relations with Bonn.

In East Germany: Ulbricht Introduces German Socialism

Following the early Sovietization of the Soviet zone, Walter Ulbricht consolidated his political position within the Socialist Unity Party and the East German politburo. Under his leadership the 1952 Second Party Congress adopted a Soviet-style system: The party set economic production guidelines with five-year plans; heavy industry, the chemical industry and generation of energy took precedence over consumer production. By 1955, 83% of industrial production was concentrated in state-owned businesses [volkseigene Betriebe, VEB]. Small businesses and trades were grouped into "trade organizations" [Handelsorganisationen, HO]. Trade unions and mass organizations, especially those involving young people, associated closely with the Socialist Unity Party.

Soviet leaders, including Stalin, attempted to *temper* Ulbricht's enthusiasm for his Communist goals. But Ulbricht, convinced of his policies, was unmoved. After Stalin's death, the new Soviet leadership called for a reversal of some of Ulbricht's plans. This set off considerable confusion within East Germany and the Socialist Unity Party in early June 1953, and contributed to the workers' uprising the same month.

East Germany joined the Comecon, an economic umbrella among the Communist states of Eastern Europe. The *coveted* goal of national sovereignty was proclaimed several times during this period – in the Görlitz treaty of 1950, in the Soviet declaration of East German sovereignty in 1954, and in the Soviet-East German treaty of 1955. Fear of German military strength hindered the creation of a formal East German military at first, but in 1956 East Germany was integrated as a full member in the Warsaw Pact.

German Crises and their Consequences

In June 1953 an uprising started in East Berlin and quickly spread throughout the GDR. Workers protested the raising of work norms – work hours were increased by the regime, but pay remained the same. Soviet military intervention put down the protesters (numbered at 500,000 in recent studies). Ulbricht remained as East German leader,



M 4 **Berlin Crisis**
Kennedy and Khrushchev hold up the Brandenburg Gate together
Cartoon by Fritz Behrendt, 1962

despite his *intransigence* before and during the crisis. The Western Allies did not try to interfere in a situation considered an internal East German affair.

After the first Berlin crisis in 1948–49, the Allied occupation of the city continued with little disruption. Strategically, the Western presence in the city faced a constant Soviet threat. Of course, West Berlin, located deep within the territory of East Germany, also posed a strategic problem for the Soviet bloc.

Within Berlin access to all sectors of the city was assured to the Four Powers and to Germans as well. Goods were plentiful in the Western sectors; food and housing were inexpensive, but scarce, in the Eastern sector. Along the German-German borders *lethal* fortifications prevented East Germans from leaving the country. Anyone could avoid these dangers simply by travelling to West Berlin. The increasing numbers of East Germans fleeing embarrassed the Soviet bloc and disabled the East German economy.

After Stalin's death, hopes of resolving the German problem were dashed at a 1955 summit meeting in Geneva. However, in the same year the State Treaty on Austria ended the Allied occupation there on condition that Austria remain neutral permanently. As for Germany, the new Soviet leaders insisted that the two German states deal with unification themselves. Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's eventual successor, issued an ultimatum to the three Allied powers in Berlin in 1958. When following negotiations on a German peace treaty and the status of Berlin failed, Khrushchev, under pressure from Walter Ulbricht, authorized the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. This action could have forced another dangerous international confrontation. The selected sources reveal how such confrontation was avoided and at what price for those involved.

In East Germany, economic and political consolidation became possible when the stream of East German refugees to the West stopped. In West Germany, leaders eventually increased contact and cooperation with East Germany, especially when family matters were affected. West German firms hired substantial numbers of "guest workers" from southern and south-eastern Europe after the Wall kept East Germans from fleeing. West Germans slowly came to see Eastern Europe and the GDR as an important, heretofore neglected market.

intransigence: stubbornness, bloody-mindedness
lethal: fatal, deadly

M 5 **John F. Kennedy in Berlin**
US President Kennedy, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Mayor Willy Brandt together in West Berlin
Photograph, 26 June 1963

1963 – Western Europe Calms Down

By 1963 the situation in Germany calmed considerably. Berlin no longer functioned as a flashpoint between East and West, although the potential for confrontation in the divided city never entirely subsided. In the summer of that year, U.S. President Kennedy visited West Germany and West Berlin, the occasion for his "*Ich bin ein Berliner*" speech. Konrad Adenauer, whose weak reaction to the building of the Berlin Wall cost him public support, retired in favour of his successor, Ludwig Erhard.

Walter Ulbricht instituted a series of economic reforms, the New Economic System, in hope of winning support from his East German citizenry. Lyndon B. Johnson, Kennedy's successor, increased American military engagement in Vietnam, as both superpowers turned to areas of conflict outside of Western Europe.

M 6 Ulbricht's Central Role in the Sovietization of East Germany

Historian Wilfried Loth writes (1998):

Walter Ulbricht [rather than Stalin] must be regarded as the person mainly responsible for real existing socialism in the GDR. As little as the person and politics of Ulbricht are to be understood without the long conditioning through the Comintern, as little as he could have triumphed without like-minded comrades and fewer assistants freely offering their services: it was he who first of all sought to carry out the Bolshevik Revolution on the soil of the Soviet Occupation Zone. The GDR is inconceivable without him. Subjectively only a model student of Stalin's, he was in fact a revolutionary in his own right – one driven by a mixture of ideological sense of mission and thirst for power; since his arrival in Berlin, concerned with submission and control, adaptable but skilfully exploiting every chance to push through his conceptions. That he believed himself to be in agreement with Stalin, did not hinder him from actually pursuing his own course – by interpreting instructions from Moscow in his own way, by accepting stimulus from the SMA [Soviet Military Administration] in so far as it fitted into his concept, and by using the frequent vagueness of Moscow's signals in order to introduce his own influence.

After Stalin's death, Ulbricht regarded himself as his own master, at least the equal of the various successors in the Kremlin. Only in extreme situations was he aware that his revolution ultimately rested upon the presence of Soviet troops. Apart from those situations, he only too gladly took the appearance of forced adaptation for historical progress – as he understood it. Incidentally, with his cadre regime, which created the fiction of a "workers' and peasants' state", he contributed in a decisive degree to the perpetuation of the division between East and West – and thus to the permanent presence of Soviet troops, which were in turn the prerequisite for maintaining his fiction.

Wilfried Loth, Stalin's Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question, and the Founding of the GDR, translated by Robert F. Hogg (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 174.

M 7 A Comment

British historian William Carr assesses Adenauer's role in German history (1991):

A controversial figure over whose foreign policy historians will probably argue as hotly as they have done over Stresemann's, Adenauer left the imprint of his personality on the GFR [=FRG]. And, despite the negative features of "chancellor democracy", it is greatly to his credit that he reconciled the older generation to a pluralist democracy which after over forty years is remarkably stable. It has been said of him that he was the first German statesman who succeeded in overcoming "the unconscious tendency of his fellow countrymen to believe that statesmen could only be taken seriously when they wore a uniform". But, like Bismarck in his last weeks of office, Adenauer demonstrated by his actions that he could not conceive of Germany without him.

William Carr, A History of Germany 1815–1990 (London: Arnold, 1991), p. 382.

Tasks

1. Compare the military, diplomatic, and economic integration of West and East Germany into their respective blocs 1949–63 (text, M1).
2. Compare the two recruitment posters (M2, M3).
3. Summarize Loth's portrait of Walter Ulbricht (M6).
4. Summarize Carr's portrait of Konrad Adenauer (M7).
5. Contrast the approaches these historians use in dealing with their subjects (M6, M7).
6. Evaluate the historians' assessments of Ulbricht's and Adenauer's places in German history (M6, M7).

The East German Uprising of 1953

M 8 Reasons for Defections

Memorandum by L. Beria on East Germans fleeing to West Germany, 6 May 1953:

Top secret, Copy #9. To the CPSU CC PRESIDIUM
As is known, in recent days the press of the American-English bloc has *raised a racket* regarding the question of mass defections to West Germany by the inhabitants of the German Democratic Republic. [...]
During the second half of 1952 and the first quarter of this year the number of defections to West Germany by inhabitants of the GDR has genuinely increased. According to data from the Central administration of the GDR national police, during the first half of 1952, 57,234 people defected to West Germany, during the second half of the year, 78,831 people defected, and during the first quarter of this year, 84,034 people defected. Among those who defected during the first quarter of this year, there were 1,836 members of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and 1,781 members of the Union of Free German Youth.
According to available data, the increase in the number of defections to the West is explained not only by increased hostile propaganda among the GDR inhabitants carried out by West German organs, but also by the desire of various groups of peasants to avoid entering into agricultural industry cooperatives currently being organized, by fears among the small and middle-size private businessmen that their personal property and assets will be confiscated, by the desire among a number of youth to avoid serving in the GDR armed forces, and by the difficulties experienced in the GDR with regard to the supply food and merchandise available to the inhabitants. [...]

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034FB65-96B6-175C-9D0A197BE5A3B29A&sort=Collection&item=Germany%20in%20the%20Cold%20War [18 Nov 2010].

M 9 "Provocations ... to Impede ... Unification"

Statement by the Government of the GDR on the Berlin Uprising, 17 June 1953:

Measures taken by the government of the German Democratic Republic to improve the situation of the population have been answered by fascist and other reactionary elements in West Berlin with provocations and serious disruptions to order in the democratic sector of Berlin. These provocations are intended to impede the unification of Germany.
The grounds for the walkout by Berlin construction workers disappeared yesterday with the decision on the question of work quotas.
The unrest that ensued is the work of agents provocateurs and fascist agents of foreign powers and their accomplices from German capitalist monopolies. These forces are dissatisfied with the democratic power in the German Democratic Republic, which is organizing improvements in the situation of the population.
The government appeals to the people:
1. To support measures for the instant restoration of order in the city and to create conditions for normal and peaceful work in the factories.
2. Those guilty of instigating the unrest will be taken to task and severely punished. The workers and all honest citizens are asked to seize agents provocateurs and hand them over to the state authorities.
3. It is necessary for the workers and the technical intelligentsia to take measures, in collaboration with the state authorities, to restore normal working conditions.

Statement by the Government of the GDR (June 17, 1953), Neues Deutschland (June 18, 1953); reprinted in Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945–1954 (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 590.

Tasks

1. Compare the reliability of Beria's memorandum (M8) with the GDR government's statement (M9).
2. Debate in class which date – 17 June (East German uprising in 1953) or 3 October (unification of Germany in 1990) – should be celebrated as a German national holiday today.

East Germans Flee to the West, 1949–1961		
Year	Number of persons	% of persons under age 25
1949	129,245	–
1950	197,788	–
1951	165,648	–
1952	182,393	–
1953	331,390	48.7
1954	184,198	49.1
1955	252,870	49.1
1956	279,189	49.0
1957	261,622	52.2
1958	204,092	48.2
1959	143,917	48.3
1960	199,188	48.8
1961	207,026	49.2
total	2,738,566	–

Source: Monatsmeldungen des Bundesministeriums für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte; Jürgen Rühle/Gunter Holzweißig, Der 13. August. Die Mauer von Berlin, 3. Aufl., Köln 1988, p. 154.

M 11 **Building the Berlin Wall 1961**

The government of the GDR erects a wall through the middle of Berlin, hermetically sealing off the city's Eastern sector from its Western sectors. Construction, supervised by the East German police and army, begins on 13 August 1961, Photograph, Harzer Strasse, 13 August 1961.

M 10

M 12 **Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt asks Kennedy to intervene in Berlin**

Berlin, August 16, 1961, midnight:

Dear Mr. President:

After developments last three days my city, wish convey to you in personal, informal letter some of my thoughts and viewpoints.

Measures of Ulbricht regime, supported by SovUnion and other East Bloc countries, have almost fully destroyed remnants Four-Power status. While in past Allied Commandants have even protested against parades by so-called Peoples' Army, this time, after military occupation of East Sector by Peoples' Army, they have limited themselves to delayed and not very vigorous step. Illegal sovereignty of East Berlin government was acknowledged by acquiescing in the restrictions of the number of crossing points and of entry into the East Sector. I regard this *encroachment* as the most serious in the postwar history of this city since the blockade.

This development has not changed will to resist of West Berlin population, but has tended to arouse doubts as to determination of three powers and their ability to react. In this connection the decisive factor is that the West has always specifically invoked the existing Four-Power status.

I am well aware that existing guarantees for freedom of population, presence of troops and free access apply only West Berlin. However, this is matter of a deep wound in life of German people and of being forced out of spheres of common responsibility (Berlin and Germany as a whole) affecting whole Western prestige. See political psychological dangers in two respects: (1) inactivity and mere defensive posture can bring about crisis of confidence in Western powers; (2) inactivity and mere defensive posture can lead to exaggerated self-confidence on part of East Berlin regime whose newspapers already today boast of success its demonstration of military power.

SovUnion has achieved half its free city proposals through use German Peoples' Army. The second act is a question of time. After second act Berlin would be like a ghetto, which has not only lost its function as refuge of freedom and symbol of hope for reunification but which would also be severed from free part Germany. Instead of flight to Berlin, we might then experience beginning of flight from Berlin.

In this situation I consider it proper that Western powers, while demanding re-establishment Four-Power responsibilities, proclaim at same time a

The Berlin Wall

three-power status for West Berlin. Three powers should reiterate guarantee their presence in West Berlin until German reunification and, if necessary, have this supported by plebiscite population West Berlin and FedRep. Must also be said clearly that German question is in no way settled for Western powers but that they must insist upon peace settlement corresponding to right of self-determination of German people and security interests of all concerned. Would also consider advisable that West on own initiative bring Berlin question before UN, at least on basis that USSR has violated Declaration Human Rights in most flagrant manner. Appears better to me put USSR in position of guilty party than to have to discuss same theme after motion by other states.

I expect from such steps no significant material change present situation and recollect not without bitterness declarations rejecting negotiations with USSR on basis one should not negotiate under pressure. We now have state of accomplished *extortion*, and already I hear it will not be possible turn down negotiations. In such situation, when possibility of initiative for action is already so small, it is all the more important at least to demonstrate political initiative.

After acquiescence in Sov step which is illegal, and has been termed illegal, and in view many tragedies occurring today East Berlin and SovZone, we will not be spared risks of ultimate decision. It would be welcomed if American garrison were to be demonstratively strengthened.

I consider situation serious enough, Mr. President, to write to you in all frankness as is possible only between friends who trust each other completely.

From Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Document 117, pp. 345–346.

M 13 Kennedy's Letter in Reply to Brandt

Washington, August 18, 1961:

Dear Mayor Brandt: I have read with great care your personal informal letter of August 16th and I want to thank you for it. In these testing days it is important for us to be in close touch. For this reason I am sending my answer by the hand of Vice President Johnson. He comes with General Clay, who is well known to Berliners; and they have my authority to discuss our problems in full frankness with you.

The measures taken by the Soviet Government and its puppets in East Berlin have caused revulsion here in America. This demonstration of what the Soviet Government means by freedom for a city, and peace for a people, proves the hollowness of Soviet pretensions; and Americans understand that this action necessarily constitutes a special blow to the people of West Berlin, connected as they remain in a myriad of ways to their fellow Berliners in the eastern sector. So I understand entirely the deep concerns and sense of trouble which prompted your letter.

Grave as this matter is, however, there are, as you say, no steps available to us which can force a significant material change in this present situation. Since it represents a resounding confession of failure and of political weakness, this brutal border closing evidently represents a basic Soviet decision which only war could reverse. Neither you nor we, nor any of our Allies, have ever supposed that we should go to war on this point.

Yet the Soviet action is too serious for inadequate responses. My own objection to most of the measures which have been proposed – even to most of the suggestions in your own letter – is that they are mere *trifles* compared to what has been done. Some of them, moreover, seem unlikely to be fruitful even in their own terms. This is our present judgment, for example, on the question of an immediate appeal to the United Nations, although we shall continue to keep this possibility under lively review. [...]

I have considered with special care your proposal of a three-power status for West Berlin. My judgment is that a formal proclamation of such a status would imply a weakening of the four-power relationship on which our opposition to the border-closing depends. Whatever may be the immediate prospects, I do not believe that we should now take so double-edged a step. I do agree that the guarantees which we have pledged to West Berlin should be continuously affirmed and reaffirmed, and this we are doing. [...]

More broadly, let me urge it upon you that we must not be shaken by Soviet actions which in themselves are a confession of weakness. West Berlin today is more important than ever, and its mission to stand for freedom has never been so important as now. [...]

From Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Document 120, p. 352–353.

M 14 A Comment

British historian Tony Judt on the results of the Berlin crisis (2005):

Officially the West was horrified. For three days in October 1961 Soviet and American tanks confronted one another across the checkpoint separating their respective zones – one of the last remaining links between them – as the East German authorities tested the Western powers' willingness to affirm and assert their continuing right of access to the eastern zone in keeping with the original Four-Power Agreement. Faced with the intransigence of the local American military commander – who refused to recognize any East German right to impede Allied movements – the Soviets reluctantly granted the point; for the next thirty years all four occupying powers remained in place, although both sides conceded de facto administration of their respective zones of control to the local German authorities.

Behind the scenes many Western leaders were secretly relieved at the appearance of the Wall. For three years Berlin had threatened to be the flashpoint for an international confrontation, just as it had been in 1948. Kennedy and other Western leaders privately agreed that a wall across Berlin was a far better outcome than a war – whatever was said in public, few Western politicians could seriously imagine asking their soldiers to "die for Berlin". As Dean Rusk (Kennedy's Secretary of State) quietly observed, the Wall had its uses: "the probability is that in realistic terms it would make a Berlin settlement easier."

The outcome of the Berlin crisis showed that the two Great Powers had more in common than they sometimes appreciated. If Moscow undertook not to raise again the question of Allied status in Berlin, Washington would accept the reality of East German government there and would resist West German pressure for nuclear weapons. Both sides had an interest in stability in central Europe; but more to the point, the US and the USSR were both tired of responding to the demands and complaints of their respective German clients. The first decade of the Cold War had given German politicians on either side of the divide unparalleled *leverage* over their patrons in Washington and Moscow. Afraid of losing credibility with 'their' Germans, the Great Powers had allowed Adenauer and Ulbricht to *blackmail* them into 'hanging tough'.

Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), p. 253.

to raise a racket: to make loud noises
encroachment: taking another's possessions or rights secretly or by small steps
extortion: using force or threats to take property from sb.
trifle: sth. of little importance
leverage: influence
to blackmail: to demand money or a certain action in exchange for keeping quiet about sth.

Tasks

1. Explain why the Berlin Wall was built (M10, M11).
2. Summarize the main arguments
   a) in Brandt's letter (M12),
   b) in Kennedy's reply (M13).
3. Compare the tone of both letters (M12, M13).
4. Agree or disagree with Judt's assessment, giving reasons for your opinion (M14).
5. Make a Power Point presentation on the building of the Berlin Wall and its consequences.

Literature

Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953–1961, Princeton 2003.

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Conclusion

At the end of World War II, the Allies (Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and France) had varying goals in Germany. These differences in policy were impossible to overcome despite many statements of good intentions. The "Sovietization" of Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany raised suspicion among the Western powers. Accordingly the West, led by the US, secured its sphere of interest by offering support to countries considered vulnerable to Soviet advances. The issue of reparations shattered Allied unity. The Western Allies stopped reparations payments to the Soviet Union when the continued dismantling of industrial plant in their zones made recovery impossible and assistance endless.

Allied goals were vague. There was neither agreement on the definition of "democracy" nor on how long the Allied occupation would last. The geographic position of the Soviet Union provided strategic advantages which the Western powers could challenge only through a lengthy occupation. Eventually, the United States committed herself to the long-term involvement demanded by the situation.

Crises in Germany punctuated the period from 1945 to 1961, nearly always concerning the status of Berlin. This was the case with the currency reforms in 1948 leading to the Berlin Blockade and Airlift, the 1953 uprising in East Germany which started in East Berlin, and the prolonged Berlin Crisis of 1958–61 ending with the construction of the Berlin Wall. The division of Germany itself was a long process, drawn out over various decisions made after 1945. Historians still debate whether the division of Germany began with the Potsdam Agreement, which separated the country into zones of occupation, or whether "real" division began later. Nevertheless, Germans themselves continued to express their desire for national unity throughout the period, a standpoint which became weaker in the long years of separation after the Wall was built.

The struggle between the two power blocs during the Cold War did not stop with Germany. The globe itself was divided into spheres of influence under bloc leadership. Communist regimes were founded in the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe and in Asia, especially in China. War broke out unexpectedly in Korea, later more gradually in Vietnam. The Cuban Missile Crisis very nearly led to nuclear catastrophe. Statesmen engaged in frightening threats, posturing their way to perceived success. Finally, this approach was recognized by both sides as counter-productive, and efforts were made to tone the Cold War down.

In the context of this long-term confrontation, the German leaders who emerged after 1945 in East and West could be regarded as mere secondary players in a global dispute. However, they were keen observers and clever manipulators of their protectors. By 1963 both East and West Germany had rebuilt their political systems and were transforming their economies into powerhouses in their blocs – an outcome utterly unexpected in 1945.

1939 September	German attack on Poland starts World War II
1941	British-Soviet alliance, joined by US in late 1941
1943 January	Casablanca Conference (GB, US, USSR)
Nov. – Dec.	Tehran Conference (GB, US, USSR)
1945 February	Yalta Conference (GB, US, USSR)
8 May	German unconditional surrender
1945 – 48	People's Republics founded in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia
July – August	Potsdam Conference (GB, US, USSR)
14 November	Nuremberg Trials of German war criminals begin
1946 April	Socialist Unity Party (merging of SPD and KPD) formed in Soviet zone
1947 11 March	Truman Doctrine formulated
5 June	Marshall Plan proposed
1948 20 June	currency reform in Western German zones
23 June	currency reform in Soviet zone
24 June – 12 May 1949	Berlin Blockade
1 July	Western Allies instruct Trizone Ministers-President to write West German constitution
1 September	Parliamentary Council begins talks on West German "Basic Law"
1949 4 April	NATO founded
23 May	Federal Republic of Germany and Basic Law proclaimed
14 August	first elections held in FRG: Konrad Adenauer (CDU) becomes Chancellor, Theodor Heuss (FDP) becomes President
1 October	Mao Zedong proclaims the People's Republic of China
7 October	German Democratic Republic proclaimed; Otto Grotewohl becomes Prime Minister, Wilhelm Pieck becomes President
1950 26 June	North Korea invades South Korea; UN troops sent to Korea (Korean War begins)
1951 18 April	Treaty of Paris establishes European Coal and Steel Community (France, FRG, Italy, Benelux)
1953 5 March	Stalin dies
17 June	popular uprisings in GDR and East Berlin
1955 9 May	FRG joins NATO
14 May	Warsaw Pact founded, GDR member
1955 – 75	US involvement in South Vietnam gradually increases, leading to Vietnam War
1956 November	Hungarian uprising put down by Warsaw Pact
1957 1 January	Saar becomes province of West Germany
25 March	Treaties of Rome (France, FRG, Italy, Benelux) establish the European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community
1959 1 January	Fidel Castro overthrows US-supported dictator Fulgencio Batista in Cuba
1961 17 – 19 April	US invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs fails
1961 13 August	Berlin Wall built
1962 14 – 28 October	Cuban Missile Crisis
1959 – 1976	Sino-Soviet split: diplomatic relations between People's Republic of China and USSR broken off



"Prague Spring" Demonstrators surround Soviet tanks, 21 August 1968

Vietnam War
Napalm explodes near a US patrol. Undated photograph

Chancellor Willy Brandt laying a wreath at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial, 7 December 1970

East German leader Erich Honecker's state visit to Bonn, 1987

Strike leader Lech Walesa speaks to workers at the Lenin Wharf in Gdansk, 1980

Border crossing at Bornholmer Straße in Berlin, 9 November 1989

Germany and World Détente 1963–1990

From 1963 to 1990 the United States and the Soviet Union fluctuated diplomatically between confrontation and détente. Consequently, both German states coordinated their policies with those of their respective superpowers.

Developments such as the Prague Spring, the US war in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion and then occupation of Afghanistan strained international relations. At the same time, Soviet and American efforts to limit nuclear weapons achieved a degree of success.

Both German states had to adapt to the fixed division caused by the building of the Berlin Wall. At first, West German leaders continued to follow the conservative principles laid out by Konrad Adenauer. Later, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik set off considerable controversy before the new policy's success became clear. In East Germany, leaders silenced domestic opposition by trying to provide a high standard of living on the one hand and by suppressing popular opinion on the other. West German offers of rapprochement and reform movements in Eastern Europe proved worrisome to the East German regime.

Although radically different from each other politically, both German states dealt with remarkably similar issues in domestic policies during the period. Peace movements, women working outside the home, environmental problems, and the legacy of the Nazi past were central concerns in both West and East Germany. Domestic terrorism, impossible within the repressive East German regime, threatened democratic structures in West Germany. Much later it was discovered that the East German authorities supported and sheltered West German terrorists on the run from the police. Eventually the Federal Republic overcame the threat without a full-scale restriction of constitutionally guaranteed rights, a fact which enhanced and reinforced the country's stature as a democratic state.

Challenges to Soviet power in Eastern Europe continued throughout the period, most notably the Polish labour movement Solidarity (Solidarnosc). Despite the political suppression of the trade union, popular support for it remained so strong that the Polish government was forced to return to negotiations with Solidarity in 1989. Increasingly, the USSR was unable to hinder such developments. Moreover, the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, proposed reforms within the Soviet Union itself. His early disarmament offers met with scepticism in the West, but proved successful later. Gorbachev's reforms were controversial in the USSR, the Chernobyl accident raised further questions about his credibility. Nevertheless, Soviet reforms allowed other Eastern bloc countries their own reforms. East German political hardliners became increasingly isolated in Eastern Europe.

Improvements in international relations during the 1980s had unexpected results. Beginning in the summer of 1989, a series of developments led to the peaceful unification of Germany – a dramatic historical event.

The International Situation in a Bipolar World 1963–1988

International Relations after 1963: Moving Toward Détente

The improvement in West Germany's relations with her eastern neighbours after 1969 ran parallel with attempts of the superpowers US and USSR to achieve détente globally. Consolidation of their spheres of influence and the desire to reduce the dangers created by proxy wars led the powers to seek serious solutions to threatening international problems.

M 1 Table

Disarmament Achievements and Setbacks, 1967–1988

Year	Occasion	Parties	Result
1967	After French forces are withdrawn from NATO command in 1966, the Harmel Report calls for NATO to pursue a course of *deterrence* and détente in Europe	NATO partners	Further meeting in Reykjavik called for 1968
1968	Reykjavik meeting of NATO calls for bilateral / multilateral talks to solve European problems cooperatively. The German question is given priority.	NATO partners	Signal is given, but Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia ends these initiatives for détente.
1969	USSR expresses its interest in disarmament talks upon the election of Richard Nixon as President of the US	USSR and US	Talks begin in Helsinki in November 1969
1969–1972	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) held in Helsinki	USSR and US	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim agreement (for five years): Offensive and defensive weapons systems are restricted, curbing an expensive arms race in both countries.
1972	US starts talks with the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) after an opening of "ping-pong diplomacy" in 1971. The broken diplomatic relations between both countries resume in 1979.	US and PRC	Nixon visits PRC, thus increasing pressure on the USSR to continue arms limitation talks further.
1973–1979	SALT II in Geneva	USSR and US	Treaty is signed in 1979, but ratification by the US is postponed as a reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
1982	Reagan elected US President, announces that the US will follow the unratified SALT II provisions on condition that the USSR does the same.	US	SALT II is effectively in force.
1983	Reagan announces a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to develop a defensive anti-ballistic missile system in space. Sceptics call it the "Star Wars" initiative.	US	A new front in the arms race is opened.
1986	Reagan claims that the USSR has violated SALT II.	US	SALT II is no longer in force.
1988	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (signed in 1987) is ratified by both sides after long talks beginning in 1981.	USSR and US	Intermediate-range (500 to 5,500 km) missiles are eliminated.
1988	Gorbachev announces the unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces	USSR	Soviet forces, including Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Europe, are reduced.

The path to détente was interrupted by conflicts of interest.

deterrence: prevention of military aggression, especially by threat of retaliation
flashpoint: a place where violence is likely to develop

International Disturbances

As the superpowers stabilized their regional interests, international disturbances centred on those areas where the sphere of influence was either not clearly secured or appeared endangered. Several *flashpoints* developed between 1963 and 1988, analysis of only a few examples is provided here.

The Prague Spring and Soviet Response 1968

Czechoslovakia was clearly a part of the Soviet satellite system in Eastern Europe after the establishment of a communist government in a coup d'état in February 1948. However, by early 1968 calls for a liberalization of the Czechoslovak society and economy were heard. Czechoslovakia suffered economic difficulties starting in the early 1960s because the Soviet model of industrialization with its insistence on nationalization and central planning was not attuned to the already well-developed and successful Czechoslovak industrial situation. In addition, dissident writers such as Pavel Kohout, Milan Kundera and Vaclav Havel began to see a positive reception to their work.

Alexander Dubcek, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party from 5 January until 21 August 1968, implemented reforms to decentralize administrative authority and improve civil rights in questions of free speech, a free press and travel. The reforms were known as the Prague Spring. Warsaw Pact troops put an end to the reforms in August when they invaded the country, replaced the government and installed a loyal communist regime. Although there were many protests to the invasion, the populace was powerless to confront the pact troops and tanks. The West did not intervene, as Czechoslovakia was a clearly defined member of the Soviet bloc. Leonid Brezhnev explained his reasons for the Soviet invasion by outlining his foreign policy principles, known in the West as the "Brezhnev Doctrine".

M 2 **"Prague Spring"**
Demonstrators surround Soviet tanks. Photograph, 21 August 1968

American Involvement in Vietnam, 1954 to 1975

During the Cold War US governments from 1954 to 1975 misunderstood the civil war in formerly French Indochina as a struggle between freedom and communism. US support of the government of South Vietnam after the partition of the country in 1954 increased to prevent communist domination in Asia. The "domino theory" of Cold War foreign policy proposed that if one country fell into a communist sphere of influence, the next would follow virtually automatically. Thus, American leaders feared US influence throughout all of Asia was endangered.

Although American military advisors were sent to South Vietnam during the Kennedy administration, a succession of military coups made political stability impossible. US policy since the Korean War maintained that American troops should not become involved in a ground war in Asia, so American intervention concentrated on the use of air power and strategic bombings. Because the jungle *foliage* made it difficult to detect North Vietnamese troop movements from the air, *defoliation* herbicides were sprayed from planes, destroying not only plant life over large areas, but also killing and injuring people caught in the chemical mist or its *residue*. One particularly *reviled* military tactic was the random use of napalm – a jellied form of petroleum which caused terrible burns and was specifically designed for anti-personnel use.

foliage: the leaves of a plant or tree
defoliation: to remove foliage, usually by chemical means
residue: leftover matter
to revile: to criticize harshly, attack with words
to deploy: to put soldiers into action
to inch: to move slowly and gradually

In 1964 two incidents between North Vietnamese artillery and US naval ships in the Gulf of Tonkin led to a resolution in Congress which granted President Johnson the power to conduct military operations in the area without a formal declaration of war. It was later found that no North Vietnamese attacks had occurred, but the resolution allowed Johnson to escalate military actions in South Vietnam. In March 1965, Johnson ordered 3,500 US Marines to be *deployed* to South Vietnam as the beginning of the American ground war. By December 1965 US deployment reached 200,000 men. However, the US troops had not been trained in guerrilla warfare; even though the Americans and their allies had more troops than their enemies, they were ultimately outmatched by the well-trained, committed North Vietnamese and partisan fighters.

The war destroyed Johnson's presidency. His plans for US social reforms (the "Great Society") could not be financed together with the large military expenditures. The growing anti-war movement contributed to his loss of popular support. The war was one of the first military campaigns shown daily on television – when spokesmen claimed that victory was near, television demonstrated the opposite in graphic coverage. A "credibility gap" eroded the trustworthiness of the US authorities.

The war also damaged the US reputation abroad. Massacres such as My Lai, where entire peasant villages were murdered by US soldiers, shocked world opinion. US officers appeared unable to maintain control over their recruits; they kept massacres secret and denied responsibility for orders which had led to innocent deaths. Military courts were unable or unwilling to punish US soldiers according to international standards set after 1945.

Richard Nixon began his first term as President in 1969 with plans to withdraw US soldiers and enable the South Vietnamese to defend their country alone – a process known as "Vietnamization". Nixon tried to

M 3



The Vietnam War 1964–1973

Democratic Republic of North Vietnam, controlled by communists since autumn 1970
Vietcong
Pathet Lao
Red Khmer

0 100 200 km

M 4 **Vietnam War**
Napalm explodes near a US patrol. Undated photograph

reactivate peace negotiations with the North Vietnamese begun under Johnson. At the same time, he ordered massive secret aerial bombing in neutral Cambodia to cut off North Vietnamese military supplies to South Vietnam. In 1971 the South Vietnamese army invaded neutral Laos as well with the goal of interrupting Northern supply routes, but the poorly planned campaign ended in defeat.

US public opinion opposing the war grew: Demonstrations attracted large crowds, and media criticism became more pronounced. On 13 June 1971, the "New York Times" began publishing a series of articles revealing the Pentagon's secret history of the war written in 1967–68. These "Pentagon Papers" revealed various ways in which US governments had deceived the public on Vietnam. The Nixon administration halted publication by court order, but these efforts to keep the documents secret were circumvented by the press, when the "New York Times" passed the papers to the "Washington Post", then to various other newspapers in turn. On 30 June 1971 the Supreme Court overruled the government and allowed publication of the documents.

Paris Peace Talks and End of Vietnam War

US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese politburo member Le Duc Tho negotiated the peace settlement in a series of meetings in Paris. Although begun in 1968, the talks made little progress until 1972. The North Vietnamese appeared to be seeking a military victory rather than negotiating seriously, so Nixon reacted by ordering massive bombings of North Vietnam in December 1972 to force the Paris talks to proceed. This led to an agreement based on the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina: A ceasefire was set for the end of January 1973; US forces were to be withdrawn; prisoners of war were to be freed and free elections were to be held in South Vietnam; reunification of Vietnam was to take place in gradual steps through peaceful means. After the US withdrawal, the South Vietnamese government proved unable to defend itself. Essential American support was not provided as had been promised, largely because the Nixon administration was threatened by the Watergate scandal. (Nixon resigned to avoid impeachment on 9 August 1974.) On 29 April 1975 evacuation of all US diplomatic, military and civilian personnel from Saigon was ordered; the North Vietnamese army occupied the city the following day.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Throughout its history, Afghanistan, a land-locked country located on important trade routes, had suffered invasions and pressures from its neighbours. This situation became more entangled in the 19th and 20th centuries when the expanding Russian empire threatened British interests in India. In the "Great Game" British and Russian spheres of influence *inched* closer to each other until they eventually met in Afghanistan. The country experienced a variety of European and Asian attacks, complicated by internal political and ethnic conflicts. In 1973 the king was removed in a bloodless coup; in 1978 the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) assumed control of the government. It instituted a Marxist regime which suppressed Islam, supported a secular state, and persecuted the former elites. Consequently, the PDPA government had virtually no popular support in the tribal Islamic country.

M 5 "Vietghanistan"
"Welcome to Vietghanistan" "Leonid, are you sure we are not lost?" Caricature by Horst Haitzinger, 1980

The decision to invade was controversial among Soviet leaders. Some, among them Andrei Gromyko, Alexei Kosygin and Yuri Andropov, opposed the idea early on. Their views did not prevail. Instead, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan on 24 December 1979 in response to a call of help from the Soviet-supported Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Soviet soldiers had to put down a rebellion of Afghan guerrillas, the Mujahideen, and foreign "Arab-Afghan" volunteers who were financed largely by the US and Saudi Arabia and supplied by Pakistan. US President Jimmy Carter responded by breaking off détente negotiations, placing a trade embargo on goods to the USSR, and leading a boycott of the Summer Olympic Games held in Moscow in 1980. American efforts to support the Afghan insurgents – equated with "freedom fighters" no matter what their political goals were – began with financial assistance even before the Soviet invasion and continued to increase as it progressed. In 1986 the Reagan government even supplied the Mujahideen with high-tech Stinger surface-to-air missiles.

Western observers called the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 "the Soviet Vietnam". Indeed, Soviet involvement lasted for nearly ten years and ended as badly as the US venture in Vietnam. The model for involvement was also similar to the American action: At first, Soviet civilian and military personnel advised a communist-friendly government in Afghanistan. When the Afghan government appeared to lose control over the country, more direct Soviet military assistance was provided, which meant that the Soviet soldiers were caught in a *quagmire* of Afghan resistance from the Mujahideen. The rebels were especially successful outside the urban centres, where their knowledge of terrain and local factors far exceeded Soviet capabilities. American aid to the Mujahideen was extensive, although it was sorely regretted later when US troops became involved in Afghanistan themselves. Moving to cut losses that could not be continued, Mikhail Gorbachev began withdrawing Soviet troops on 15 May 1988; the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan on 15 February 1989.

quagmire: a complicated situation, a swamp

Sources on the Prague Spring

M 6 The Brezhnev Doctrine, 1968

In a speech at the Fifth Congress of the United Polish Workers' Party on 13 November 1968, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev announced a new foreign policy for the Soviet Union. In the West, this policy was known as the Brezhnev Doctrine:

The experience of the socialist countries' development and struggle in these new conditions during the past few years, including the recently increased activity of forces hostile to socialism in Czechoslovakia, reminds the communists of socialist countries with fresh force that it is important not to forget for one moment certain highly important, time-tested truths. [...]

Socialist states stand for strict respect for the sovereignty of all countries. We resolutely oppose interference in the affairs of any states and the violation of their sovereignty. [...]

It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has really done a good deal to strengthen the sovereignty and autonomy of the socialist countries. The CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] has always advocated that each socialist country determine the concrete forms of its development along the path of socialism by taking into account the specific nature of their national conditions. But it is well known, comrades, that there are common natural laws of socialist construction, deviation from which could lead to deviation from socialism as such. And when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country – a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole – this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries.

It is quite clear that an action such as military assistance to a fraternal country to end a threat to the socialist system is an extraordinary measure, dictated by necessity; it can be called forth only by the overt actions of enemies of socialism within the country and beyond its boundaries, actions that create a threat to the common interests of the socialist camp. [...]

Let those who *are wont to* forget the lessons of history and who would like to engage again in recarving the map of Europe know that the borders of Poland, the GDR [German Democratic Republic] and Czechoslovakia, as well as of any other Warsaw Pact member, are stable and *inviolable*. These borders are protected by all the armed might of the socialist commonwealth. We advise all those who are fond of *encroaching* on foreign borders to remember this well!

The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Columbus, Ohio, 1968); http://modernhistorian.blogspot.com/2008/11/on-this-day-in-history-brezhnev.html [7 Jan 2011].

to be wont to: to be in the habit of doing sth.
inviolable: (here) permanent
to encroach: to take possessions from sb. else



M 7 "On the Path to Virtue"

West German caricature, 1968

M 8 Lying to the Secret Police

An excerpt from the novel "The Unbearable Lightness of Being" by Milan Kundera (1984). Tomas, a talented surgeon, is asked to renounce a letter to the editor he wrote in the early days of the Prague Spring. He refuses and has to leave his position at a hospital in Prague as a result. Later he becomes a general practitioner in a clinic on the outskirts of Prague:

One day, at the end of office hours, he was visited by a man of about fifty whose portliness added to his dignity. He introduced himself as representing the Ministry of the Interior, and invited Tomas to join him for a drink across the street. [...] He then went into a long speech about how much he admired Tomas and how the whole Ministry was distressed at the thought of so respected a surgeon dispensing aspirin at an outlying clinic. He gave Tomas to understand that although he couldn't come out and say it, the police did not agree with

Sources on the Prague Spring

drastic tactics like removing specialists from their posts.

Since no one had thought to praise Tomas in quite some time, he listened to the plump official very carefully, and he was surprised by the precision and detail of the man's knowledge of his professional career. How defenceless we are in the face of flattery! Tomas was unable to prevent himself from taking seriously what the Ministry official said.

But it was not out of mere vanity. More important was Tomas's lack of experience. When you sit face to face with someone who is pleasant, respectful, and polite, you have a hard time reminding yourself that nothing he says is true, that nothing is sincere. Maintaining non-belief (constantly, systematically, without the slightest vacillation) requires a tremendous effort and the proper training – in other words, frequent police interrogations. Tomas lacked that training.

The man from the Ministry went on: [...] "And who was it you talked to?"

"One of the editors."

"What was his name?"

Not until that point did Tomas realize that he was under interrogation. All at once he saw that his every word could put someone in danger. Although he obviously knew the name of the editor in question, he denied it: "I'm not sure."

"Now, now," said the man in a voice dripping with indignation over Tomas's insincerity, "you can't tell me he didn't introduce himself!"

It is a tragicomic fact that our proper upbringing has become an ally of the secret police. We do not know how to lie. The "Tell the truth!" imperative drummed into us by our mamas and papas functions so automatically that we feel ashamed of lying even to a secret policeman during an interrogation. It is simpler for us to argue with him or insult him (which makes no sense whatever) than to lie to his face (which is the only thing to do).

When the man from the Ministry accused him of insincerity, Tomas nearly felt guilty; he had to surmount a moral barrier to be able to persevere in his lie: "I suppose he did introduce himself," he said, "but because his name didn't ring a bell, I immediately forgot it."

"What did he look like?"

The editor who had dealt with him was a short man with a light brown crew cut. Tomas tried to choose diametrically opposed characteristics: "He was tall," he said, "and had long black hair."

"Aha," said the man from the Ministry, "and a big chin!"

"That's right," said Tomas.

"A little stooped."

"That's right," said Tomas again, realizing that now the man from the Ministry had pinpointed an individual. Not only had Tomas informed on some poor editor but, more importantly, the information he had given was false.

Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), pp. 180–85. Translated from the Czech by Michael Henry Heim.



M 9 **"Say that you called me!"**
West German caricature by Peter Leger on the Prague Spring, 1968

Tasks

1. Summarize the principles of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" (M6).
2. Compare and contrast the cartoons (M7 and M9).
3. Analyse Tomas's behaviour in the text excerpt (M8).
4. Discuss: The secret police caused social and political problems in the Soviet bloc.

M 10 What really happened in the Tonkin Gulf?

McNamara asks Giap about the Tonkin Gulf incident (1995):

When former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara met the enemy's leading strategist Thursday, he raised a question he'd saved for 30 years: What really happened in the Tonkin Gulf on Aug. 4, 1964?

"Absolutely nothing," replied retired Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap.

Both sides agree that North Vietnam attacked a US Navy ship in the gulf on Aug. 2 as it cruised close to shore. But it was an *alleged* second attack two days later that led to the first US bombing raid on the North and propelled America deep into war.

Many US historians have long believed the Johnson administration fabricated the second attack to win congressional support for widening the war. But for McNamara, Giap's word was the *clincher*.

"It's a pretty damned good source," he said after the meeting. [...]

"You lost ... 3,200,000 people," McNamara told Giap. "We lost 58,000." He said the conference would help "ensure that our nations and other nations learn how to avoid such conflicts in the future."

1995 Copyright Nando.net, 1995 Associated Press; http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/world198_4.html [15 Jan 2011].

M 11 "I killed the general with my camera."

Photographer Eddie Adams in 1998:

I won a Pulitzer Prize in 1969 for a photograph of one man shooting another... The general killed the Viet Cong; I killed the general with my camera. Still photographs are the most powerful weapon in the world. People believe them, but photographs do lie, even without manipulation. They are only half-truths. What the photograph didn't say was, "What would you do if you were the general at that time and place on that hot day, and you caught the so-called bad guy after he blew away one, two or three American soldiers?" General Loan was what you would call a real warrior, admired by his troops. I'm not saying what he did was right, but you have to put yourself in his position.

...This picture really messed up his life. He never blamed me. He told me if I hadn't taken the picture, someone else would have, but I've felt bad for him and his family for a long time. I had kept in contact with him; the last time we spoke was about six months ago, when he was very ill. I sent flowers when I heard that he had died and wrote, "I'm sorry. There are tears in my eyes."

http://www.famouspictures.org/vietnam-execution/ [21 January 2015].

to allege: to declare, especially without proof
clincher: a statement that is decisive

M 12 "Murder of a Vietcong by Saigon Police Chief"
Photograph by Eddie Adams, 1 February 1968

Sources on the Vietnam War – Analysing Photographs

M 13 **Evacuation of Saigon – The Fall of Saigon?**

Photograph by Hubert Van Es, 29 April 1975.

Although this photograph is often described as Americans trying to flee from the roof of the US Embassy in the last helicopter leaving Saigon, the crowd was made up of Vietnamese fleeing from an apartment building for employees of the US Agency for International Development at 22 Gia Long Street in Saigon. Helicopters continued to evacuate people from Saigon for several hours after the departure of the helicopter in the photograph. Regardless of the factual errors often attributed to it, the photograph has become *iconic* in its depiction of the desperation and haste of the US departure from Saigon in 1975.

iconic: famous, exemplary, typical

Tasks

1. Explain the importance of Giap's information (M10) in the history of the Vietnam War.
2. Together with a small group, interpret one of the two photographs (M12, M13).
3. Assess the reliability of photography as a historical tool in the past and in the present.

Source on Afghanistan

M 14 To Invade Afghanistan or Not?

From a discussion of the Soviet politburo meeting in March 1979:

During March 1979, tensions heightened. In that month, a major rebellion broke out in the western city of Herat, and a sizable portion of an Afghan army division defected to the mujahideen, along with much of their heavy equipment. Moscow and Kabul both worried that the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] could lose control altogether. The Afghan communists requested the immediate dispatch of Soviet combat forces to assist in putting down the rebellion (an implicit admission by the PDPA that its own troops were now becoming unreliable). The Politburo met on 17 and 18 March in an atmosphere of crisis, with Brezhnev presiding.

In the 17 March meeting, key Soviet decision-makers weighed requests for combat troops. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko argued: "We must proceed from a fundamental proposition: under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan. For sixty years now we have lived with Afghanistan in peace and friendship. And if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns against the Soviet Union, this will result in a sharp setback to our foreign policy."

Similarly, Premier Alexei Kosygin stated: "We must put up a struggle for Afghanistan." The mood in the Politburo seemed favorably disposed to intervention in support of the PDPA. No mention was made, however, about any strategic *advantages* [emphasis in the original] that might flow from a Soviet combat presence in Afghanistan. Nor was access to warm water ports or to the Persian Gulf mentioned. The concerns raised at the 17 March meeting were defensively oriented, i.e., preserving a preexisting sphere of influence, rather than seeking bases for future expansion.

On March 18, after Politburo members had had time to reflect on the situation, the consensus moved sharply against direct intervention, with the recognition that such intervention could prove costly. This time it was KGB chief Yuri Andropov who set the tone: "We must consider very, very seriously the question of whose cause we will be supporting if we deploy our forces into Afghanistan. It's completely clear to us that Afghanistan is not ready at this time to resolve all of the issues it faces through socialism. The economy is backward, the Islamic religion predominates, and nearly all of the rural population is illiterate. We know Lenin's teaching about a revolutionary situation. Whatever situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation. Therefore, I believe that we can suppress a [mujahideen] revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, and that is for us entirely inadmissible. We can not take such a risk. [Speaking again later in the day] the people do not support the government of Taraki [PDPA premier]. Would our troops really help them here? In such a situation, tanks and armored cars cannot save anything."

Andropov was followed by Gromyko, who evidently had also changed his mind from the previous day:

"I completely support Comrade Andropov's proposal to rule out such a measure as the deployment of our troops into Afghanistan. The [Afghan] army there is unreliable. Thus, our army when it arrives in Afghanistan, will be the aggressor. Against whom will it fight? Against the Afghan people first of all, and it will have to shoot them – the situation in Afghanistan is not ripe for a revolution. And all that we have done in recent years with such effort in terms of détente, arms control, and much more – all that would be thrown back. One must ask, and what would we gain? Afghanistan with its present government, with a backward economy, with inconsequential weight in international affairs. On the other side, we must keep in mind that from a legal point of view too we would not be justified in sending troops."

From David N. Gibbs, "Reassessing Soviet motives for invading Afghanistan: A declassified history," Critical Asian Studies, Volume 38, Issue 2, June 2006, pages 239–263.

to defect: to join an opposing group

Tasks

1. Analyse the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan (text, M5, M14).
2. Compare and contrast with the US engagement in South Vietnam (text).

Political Developments in West and East Germany 1963–1988

West German Adjustment to the Building of the Berlin Wall

M 1 The Grand Coalition
Willy Brandt (SPD), Helmut Schmidt (SPD) and Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU), Photograph, 1966

Konrad Adenauer insisted that the primary goal of his government was the reunification of Germany. When the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, this goal appeared shattered. But it was impossible for Adenauer's immediate successors to reject the long-sought aim of national unity. At the same time thinkers in the opposition Social-Democratic Party proposed a course of rapprochement in German-German relations, a direction opposed by conservative Germans. When Erhard's government coalition (CDU/CSU/FDP) failed in 1966, it was followed by a "Grand Coalition" of the largest parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) in the Bundestag. Starting a new course in foreign relations, the Grand Coalition recognized Romania (in 1967) and Yugoslavia (in 1968) diplomatically. Both were atypical of the Eastern bloc: Romania, although a Soviet satellite, became unreliable within the Eastern bloc after 1964; Yugoslavia had diverged from Soviet leadership since the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 and was a member of the non-aligned movement founded in 1961. The Kiesinger government's continued claim of the FRG as sole representative of all of Germany ("Alleinvertretungsanspruch") blocked the path to improved relations with other Eastern European nations.

M 2 Brandt in Warsaw
Chancellor Willy Brandt laying a wreath at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial. Photograph, 7 December 1970

Willy Brandt and the New Eastern Policy

The impetus for a new direction in West German dealings with Eastern Europe came with the election of the Social-Liberal coalition in 1969. Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel (FDP) actively pursued what was termed "Ostpolitik"; at the same time the CDU/CSU opposition in the Bundestag sounded alarm over measures which departed from earlier approaches to East-West relations. The Brandt government countered that no claims had been renounced which the factual situation had not already proved unattainable.

The new Ostpolitik concentrated on improving relations between the FRG and her eastern neighbours, an undertaking burdened by the enmity still remaining in the postwar period. The policy accepted the national borders then in existence (essentially revoking German claims to territory lost in the post-war agreements), renounced the use of force in international affairs, and insisted on improving relations as a means of achieving peace. The series of treaties began with the Moscow Treaty with the Soviet Union (August 1970), then progressed to the Warsaw Treaty with Poland (December 1970), the Basic Treaty between both German states (December 1972), and the Prague Treaty with Czechoslovakia (December 1973). In the Moscow and Warsaw agreements, the Oder-Neisse border was specifically mentioned as inviolable. In the Prague Treaty, German territorial claims from the Munich Agreement of 1938 were formally revoked. Combined with the 1971 Four Powers Agreement of the Allies on Berlin, Ostpolitik contributed to a substantial advance in détente and enabled West German diplomatic and trade relations in Eastern Europe which had been cut off during the years of bloc confrontation. In 1971 – an early

1970: Moscow Treaty
Warsaw Treaty
1971: Four Powers Agreement
1972: Traffic Treaty
Basic Treaty
1973: Prague Treaty

Note: The Moscow, Warsaw and Prague Treaties were signed by the West German and Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovakian governments respectively, the Four Powers Agreement by the former Allies. The Traffic and Basic Treaties were signed by the West and East German governments.

M 3 **Table of Treaties 1970–1973**

stage in Ostpolitik – Chancellor Willy Brandt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his achievements in détente.

The German-German Basic Treaty, 1972

The Basic Treaty was the most controversial of all the Ostpolitik treaties because the FRG appeared to recognize the GDR diplomatically, although both governments insisted that they held different interpretations of the "national question". The wording of the treaty tried to avoid issues of national identification by calling the diplomatic representatives of both German states "permanent representatives" rather than "ambassadors". Both German states were also free to join the United Nations as separate states, essentially bringing an end to West German claims to represent all of Germany. The measures taken went so far that the province of Bavaria called upon the Federal Constitutional Court to determine whether the Basic Law, which defined West Germany as the legal successor to the German Reich of 1938, was violated by the treaty. In its 1973 decision the Constitutional Court distinguished precisely, insisting that the government of the FRG was obligated to uphold the Basic Law's goal of achieving national unity, but that it was up to the elected political leaders to decide how this goal should be reached.

Daily life improved for many after the treaties were signed. Families which had been separated since the Wall was built could visit again within restrictions. West Germans, who had had to use public transport on earlier family visits, were permitted to drive their own cars on visits to the GDR, taking presents and supplies for their relatives as well. Travel between West Berlin and West Germany was made easier – searches at the GDR border diminished; in the following years the poorly maintained transit routes were rebuilt and improved.

From Schmidt to Kohl

In April 1974 Günter Guillaume, a close personal aide to Chancellor Willy Brandt, was arrested as an East German spy. Brandt resigned his post and was replaced by his Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt on 16 May 1974. Schmidt had a political reputation as an outspoken and decisive man of action; he faced acute challenges as chancellor. Economic problems caused by the 1973 oil crisis, in which several oil producing states reduced their export quotas, demanded much of Schmidt's attention. In addition, his government had to deal with a virulent wave of domestic terrorism. In questions of defence, Schmidt was an emphatic supporter of the NATO dual-track decision ("Nato Doppelbeschluss") – an issue which put his government at odds with the left wing of his own party and with thousands of demonstrators who opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons in West Germany. On 1 October 1982 his government was brought down by a constructive vote of no-confidence in favour of Helmut Kohl (CDU), who formed a new government with the FDP. New elections in 1983 confirmed the decision.

The CDU/CSU had bitterly opposed the Ostpolitik of the 1970s, leaving the impression that the policy would not be continued under their auspices. Despite these reservations, however, the outlines of the Ostpolitik from the Social-Liberal coalition remained constant during the Kohl government.

M 4 **"This chancellor creates trust." Work, peace, the future. Together we succeed.**
Election poster, 1983

M 5 **Walter Ulbricht (1893–1973)**
Elected General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party in 1950, Ulbricht led the GDR for twenty years according to conservative Stalinist principles. Photograph, about 1955

M 6 **East German Leader Erich Honecker's State Visit to Bonn**
Photograph, 1987

East German Consolidation after the Building of the Wall, 1963–1988

The Berlin Wall stopped the collapse of East Germany through the loss of its productive population. It was then up to the party to consolidate the economy and catch up with the standard of living in West Germany, which remained the reference against which East Germans measured their progress. Under the leadership of Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party, a "new economic system" (NÖS) was introduced between 1961 and 1965. Economic planning was to be decentralized to increase workers' productivity. The reforms were only half-heartedly undertaken and were abandoned as unworkable by 1970.

Restrictions within the cultural sphere were relaxed after the Wall was built. However, a harsher course for artists and intellectuals reappeared in 1965 to combat the misunderstood "freedom of nihilism, half-anarchism, pornography and other methods of the American way of life" which was supposedly destroying the cultural life of East Germany.

Reaction to Prague Spring in East Germany

When the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia as a reaction to the "Prague Spring" in 1968, the hopes of many East Germans for liberalized reforms in the Eastern bloc were disappointed. In the weeks after the invasion, over 2,000 protests were registered by the police and over 1,200 persons were sentenced by the courts. A majority of the protesters were younger than thirty and workers, rather than students or school pupils. The dissent generated by the invasion was to prove lasting and grew with later developments.

From Ulbricht to Honecker

Unable to persuade the Soviet Union to insist on the full diplomatic recognition of East Germany as a condition of concluding the Bonn Ostpolitik treaties, Ulbricht fell out of favour with the Soviet authorities. He resigned as First Secretary "for reasons of health" and was replaced by Erich Honecker on 3 May 1971.

Honecker concentrated on increased East German cooperation with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with Bonn, revitalizing the East German cultural scene, building adequate housing for the populace, and reducing working hours. At first, his ambitious plans seemed quite successful. He signed the new Ostpolitik treaties with Bonn, although his insistence on full diplomatic recognition of the GDR was not reciprocated. He assured GDR artists and intellectuals that there would be "no taboos" in cultural politics. A massive building program resulted in modern prefabricated housing units erected near urban centres – the flats were highly regarded in a country which had suffered from inadequate housing since 1945. Rent was usually cheap, because the flats were built with government funds.

In September 1987 Honecker paid an official visit to Bonn. It was the first and only visit by an East German head of state, and it raised sensitive diplomatic issues. While East German leaders viewed the visit as acceptance of East German statehood, Helmut Kohl insisted that unification remained his government's goal.

M 7 "Change Through Rapprochement"

From a speech by Egon Bahr (SPD) at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing (15 July 1963):

The American strategy for peace can also be defined by the formula that Communist rule should be changed, not eliminated. The US approach to improving East-West relations helps change the status quo by first attempting not to change it. This sounds paradoxical, but it opens up possibilities, whereas the previous policy of pressure and counter-pressure led only to a solidification of the status quo. The confidence that our world is the better one, the stronger one in the peaceful sense of the word, the one that will prevail, makes it conceivable to try to open up ourselves, to encourage the other side to do so, and to renounce previous notions about liberation. [...]

The first conclusion to be drawn from applying this strategy for peace to Germany is that the policy of all-or-nothing must be ruled out. Either free elections or nothing, either all-German freedom of choice or an obstinate "no," either elections as the first step or rejection – all this is not only hopelessly antiquated and unreal, but in a strategy of peace it is also meaningless.

Today it is clear that reunification is not a one-time act that will be put into effect by a historic decision on an historic day at an historic conference, but rather a process involving many steps and many stations. If what Kennedy said is right, that the interests of the other side also need to be recognized and considered, then it is certainly impossible for the Soviet Union to let the Eastern Zone be snatched away from it for the purpose of strengthening the West's potential.

The Zone must be transformed with the approval of the Soviets. [. . .]

If it is correct, and I believe it is correct, that the Zone cannot be snatched away from the Soviet sphere of influence, then the logical consequence is that every policy aimed directly at toppling the regime over there is hopeless. This conclusion is *excruciatingly* uncomfortable and runs counter to our feelings, but it is logical. It means that changes and alterations coming from the current regime are the only ones that are attainable. It is an illusion to believe that economic troubles might lead to a collapse of the regime. [. . .]

The American President has advocated the approach that we should generate as much trade as possible with the Eastern bloc countries without endangering our security. If one applies this approach to Germany, an unusually wide field opens up. It would be good, at the outset, if we could define this field according to our capacities and limits. I think they exceed all known estimates. If it is correct that intensifying East-West trade (with the qualification mentioned above) lies in the West's interest, and I believe it is correct, then it is also determinately in Germany's interest. [...] The goal of a policy like this, of course, cannot be to *blackmail* the Zone, for no Communist regime, and certainly not one as endangered as the one in the Zone, can let its character be changed by economic relations. But, after all, not even the Americans made this demand when they gave loans to Poland, and this is also not the meaning of the American wish for intensified trade with the East. Our concern right now is the people, and the *exhaustion* of every conceivable and responsible attempt to ease their situation.

Material improvement would have to have a relaxing effect in the Zone. [. . .]

We have also said that the Wall is a sign of weakness. One might also say that it was a sign of the Communist regime's anxiety and urge for self-preservation. The question is whether there might be opportunities to gradually move these thoroughly justifiable concerns far enough away from the regime that loosening the borders and the Wall becomes feasible, because the risk is tolerable. This is a policy that can be summarized by the formula: change through rapprochement.

I am firmly convinced that we have enough self-confidence to pursue a policy like this without illusions, a policy, moreover, that fits *seamlessly* into the Western concept of the strategy for peace, for otherwise we will have to wait for miracles, and that is no policy at all.

Egon Bahr, "Wandel durch Annäherung" ["Change through Rapprochement"], speech delivered on July 15, 1963 at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing; Translation: Jeremiah Riemer. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Chapter8Doc1Intro.pdf [22 May 2008].

excruciatingly: painfully
to blackmail: to force sb. to do sth. by threat
exhaustion: using up
seamlessly: easily, smoothly

Sources on the New "Ostpolitik" – Assessing Perspectives

M 8 Willy Brandt on the New Ostpolitik

The West German Foreign Minister and later Chancellor clarified the new policy to a largely Western readership in 1968:

Our foreign policy toward Eastern Europe is concerned with two closely linked areas: the Soviet Union, and the European states to the east and southeast of Germany which are connected with the Soviet Union in many ways. [...]

A third area indissolubly linked with this East European policy is the other part of Germany. This does not involve foreign policy in the exact sense of the word, for neither part of Germany is a foreign country to the other. However, the East German régime is so completely interlocked with the group of states led by the Soviet Union that any East European policy disregarding the German problem would be unrealistic. [...]

One reality with which we must come to terms is the division of Europe and the attachment of its parts to one of the heavily armed power blocs. The split runs right down the middle of the continent and divides Germany in a way that is dangerous, artificial and unjust, for it prevents a people from living as a nation according to its own will. We know, however, that this division will not vanish overnight and that, as far as one can tell, it will be overcome only in conjunction with a general improvement in East-West relations in Europe. Thus, we not only have to take this time element into account politically, but we also have to make a greater effort to find rules by which the two parts of Germany can live side by side.

At the same time, we reject any German policy that lessens the solidarity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or limits the decisive participation of the United States in safeguarding freedom.

Willy Brandt, "German Policy Toward the East", Foreign Affairs, April 1968, also available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19680401faessay46305/willy-brandt/german-policy-toward-the-east.html [7 December 2008].



M 9 "Signature of the Year"

Cartoon by (West) German Hanns Erich Köhler, 8 December 1970

M 10 Position of the CDU/CSU Opposition

Letter from Dr. Rainer Barzel, Parliamentary Party Chairman of the CDU/CSU, to Willy Brandt (10 August 1970:

Dear Mr. Federal Chancellor,

The CDU/CSU Parliamentary Party has expressed its standpoint on policy towards Western and Eastern Europe in the attached unanimous resolution of May 26, 1970. This resolution remains the guiding principle of our decisions.

From the very beginning, we have viewed the efforts towards a speedier and more complete union of free Europe and those towards a reconciliation with the states of Central and Eastern Europe as parts of an undivided whole.

We have also assessed in context the efforts of the Federal Government towards the securing of free Berlin, the improving of the situation in Germany as a whole, and the proposed treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hereto, our standpoint remains firm.

In consequence, we recommended that the Federal Government should only affix its signature to the initialled German-Soviet treaty if satisfactory solutions had been found to the other questions, and above all to the Berlin and intra-German problems.

We are prepared to state in detail during confidential talks with the Federal Government what the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Party understands by satisfactory solutions to these questions, and to bring about understanding on these points.

The German-Soviet treaty draft fulfils some of the expectations of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Party,

but allows considerable *misgivings* to persist. The CDU/CSU Parliamentary Party is so far unable to detect a balanced relationship between the contribution of the Federal Government and the contribution of the Soviet Union. It still sees no advantage for the people of divided Germany. By contrast with the policy of previous Federal Governments, which, for example, led to a reconciliation with France, and in so doing laid the foundation for the European Community, we are unable to detect in the German Soviet treaty draft constructive elements orientated towards the future, and principles of a better, peaceful status quo for all Europeans.

This draft treaty, its text, interpretation, consequences and context require careful consideration. This requires intimate knowledge of facts and reports. The treaty can finally only be assessed when this examination has been made, and results have been forthcoming on Berlin, on the intra-German question, and on Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Federal Government itself considers that such a treaty can only come into force after a satisfactory solution to the Berlin question. We call on the Federal Government – also in regard to the number 1 guiding principle set down as a binding declaration of intent in the talks with the Soviet Union, by which all agreements of the Eastern Policy form one undivided whole – to make available to the Bundestag all these arrangements and agreements as a unified whole. The CDU/CSU Parliamentary Party will at all events judge all details in context, and in consequence does not consider the time is yet ripe for a final vote on the draft of the German-Soviet treaty.

Our judgment will, as we have repeatedly stressed, depend on whether the German question remains open on essential points, and whether an improvement in relations, a lessening of existing tensions and improvements for those people concerned, are all achieved.

We expressly stress once more that the unification of free Europe and the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance are and remain for us the basis of every Eastern Policy. Our overall judgment will also depend on whether progress becomes possible in these fields.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Rainer Barzel

http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/2bd984db-b0b8-46a1-badc-a59e0a0e69b4/06025c22-9e5e-48f1-ad0e-266ca3020bf9/en [24 November 2011]. Translation from the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government.

M 11 East German Resistance to Ostpolitik

The journalist Klaus Wiegrefe writes in "Der Spiegel" (7. August 2010):

Siegfried Suckut, an expert on the GDR, has analyzed previously unnoticed Stasi [Ministry of State Security] documents. They were written in 1969 and 1970, before meetings between the senior Stasi officials working for Minister of State Security Erich Mielke and their KGB counterparts. [...] According to these documents the East Germans used their propaganda skills to undermine Brandt. Dozens of pages contain accusations that Brandt wanted to "restore the power of the capitalist monopoly in the GDR," and that he sought to achieve a "political and ideological softening and degradation of the socialist nations."

East German Socialists apparently feared that Brandt's policies would appeal to their Soviet comrades. They repeatedly warned them "never to underestimate the growing dangers of social democracy and revisionism!" Even in 1970, while Bonn and Moscow negotiated a treaty to renounce the use of force in settling disputes, the Stasi was up in arms, according to the documents. The East Germans argued that the social-liberal government of West Germany was trying to "*drive a wedge* between the USSR and the GDR."

The KGB, on the other hand, promoted détente. Yuri Andropov, the organization's coolly calculating chairman, hoped to enlist Bonn's help in modernizing the backward Soviet Union.

Andropov – who would later become a champion of President Mikhail Gorbachev – sent the first signal to Brandt that Moscow wanted to talk. [...]

What is so astonishing about the rediscovered documents is how self-confident the Stasi was in its criticism of the more powerful Soviets. Notes Mielke used for a meeting with Andropov in the summer of 1970 included openly skeptical questions, like: "Is Brandt's demagoguery of peace and détente being correctly assessed in the USSR?"

When supporters of Ostpolitik, like then-SPIEGEL publisher Rudolf Augstein and author Günter Grass, spoke at a symposium with Soviet representatives, the Stasi wrote *caustically* that it would be "interesting to discover the reasoning

misgivings: fears and doubts
to drive a wedge: to separate
caustic: burning, biting

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and objectives behind discussions with such softening specialists."

The documents also *refute* the theory that GDR spies, according to the propaganda machine of the East German Communist Party, the SED, consistently operated as "scouts of peace." After the fall of the Berlin Wall, [East German spymaster Marcus] Wolf even claimed that he and his staff had manipulated information from the West to prevent it from being used by East German hardliners in the SED. Nothing could have been further from the truth.

In fact, the documents indicate that the Stasi used its intelligence to paint a negative picture of Ostpolitik for the KGB. Stasi officials cited several internal remarks made by the chancellor or his cabinet ministers to prove that they were trying to "roll up the GDR from behind" (Brandt) or force it "into a corner" (then Foreign Minister Walter Scheel). [...] According to the documents [...] the KGB *laid down the law* at the end of 1970. By that time, Scheel and his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, had signed the so-called Treaty of Moscow. West Germany concluded a similar agreement with Poland a few months later. Andropov made it clear to the Stasi that it should "evaluate this in a positive way."

Mielke then informed senior Stasi officers that West Germany's treaties with the East, which the Stasi had sharply criticized until recently, were in fact an "expression of the growing strength of the socialist countries."

A "Grotesque Situation"

In this respect, it is not surprising that the Stasi *bribed* at least one member of the West German parliament, the Bundestag, a year later to ensure that a vote of no confidence against Brandt, supported by the conservative Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, would fail. (It did.) Based on the new documents, expert Suckut suspects that the East Germans were following orders from the KGB, because the East Germans' aversion to Brandt was "too great."

According to a credible witness, the KGB generals responsible for East Germany had $1 million dollars in bribe money at their disposal. Suckut also cites a comment made by SED leader Erich Honecker a few days after the failed no-confidence vote. The party leader found it a "grotesque situation" that the East Germans, of all people, "had to appear as the strongest *backers* in stabilizing the Brandt administration."

Reported by Klaus Wiegrefe in "Der Spiegel", 7 August 2010; http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,705118,00.html [20 May 2012]. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan.

M 12 **"New Look in Moscow – and in East Berlin?"**
Dutch cartoon by Fritz Behrendt, 1973

to refute: to disprove
to lay down the law: to determine
to bribe: to pay sb. to do sth. illegal or wrong
backer: supporter

Tasks

1. Choose one of the documents (M7, M8, M10, M11). Determine the perspective of the author and show how this affects the arguments presented.
2. Discuss in groups or in class the pros and cons of the new Ostpolitik and give reasons for your arguments (text, M7–M11).
3. Assess East German reactions to the new Ostpolitik (text, M11, M12).
4. Write an essay or report to the class about your findings of Brandt kneeling before the Warsaw Ghetto memorial and the (inter)national reactions – use the Internet.

Domestic Developments in West Germany 1963–1988

M 1 **"The Greens – ecological, social, grassroots democratic, nonviolent"**
Federal election poster, 1983

M 2 **Bonn, 10 October 1981**
Peace demonstration of 300,000 people for disarmament and détente in Europe

Between 1963 and 1988 unusual developments in West Germany set off an intense domestic debate. Unlike in East Germany, where public debate was quickly suppressed by the authorities, in West Germany movements could voice their concerns loudly and in public. Proponents of domestic change sought active participants and found them, often in large numbers. The resulting unrest was difficult to channel and some of its turns seemed to threaten the foundations of democratic society.

The Peace Movement

In the 1950s large groups of demonstrators participated in Easter marches ("Ostermärsche") to protest the remilitarization of West Germany. During the 1970s demonstrations against the American war in Vietnam were common, especially among university students. By 1980 the "Krefeld Appeal" supported by the Green Party, churches, trade unions, and some Social-Democrats, demanded that the government revoke its acceptance of the stationing of US middle-range missiles. The peace movement gathered 300,000 protesting demonstrators in Bonn in October 1981; when the NATO dual-track decision went into effect in 1983, the peace protesters and associated celebrities organized effective demonstrations, including a blockade of the American base at Mutlangen (Baden-Württemberg) for months to prevent the stationing of nuclear rockets there.

Environmental Concerns

The first non-governmental environmental organization was founded in 1975, renaming itself the BUND ("Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland") in 1977. The Green Party was founded in 1980 to ensure environmental protection at the political level. By 1983 the Greens had won seats in the Bundestag; from 1985–87 Joschka Fischer was appointed the first Green provincial minister in Hesse. Intense debate within the party centred on problems of representative versus direct democracy last considered during the early years of the Weimar Republic – a renewed political discussion of issues which had disappeared from public view.

Women's Rights

The introduction of reliable *contraception* in the 1960s led to new concepts of sexual freedom. A newly founded women's movement demanded gender equality in all of society, especially in families and in occupations. The prevalent model for the role of women had been the "housewife marriage", with women who worked outside the home criticized as "female double wage-earners", their children as "latchkey children" ("Schlüsselkinder"). The new women's movement was a dramatic development in this context. Women *incriminated* themselves, insisting that they had had abortions and demanding that the legal code be changed to make abortion legal on demand. "My body belongs to me" became a feminist slogan. In 1974 a law for abortion on demand in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy was passed by the Bundestag, but the law was declared unconstitutional because the

contraception: method to prevent pregnancy
to incriminate: to accuse sb. of a crime

M 3 **"Revoke § 218"**
Demonstration in Bonn calling for a referendum on paragraph 218 of the criminal code, 21 September 1975

rights of unborn children had to be protected as an essential guarantee of the Basic Law. Only medically or socially indicated abortions could be permitted.

The 1968 Movement: Extra-Parliamentary Opposition

The Grand Coalition was problematical in its political composition and in its regulation of domestic policy. The Chancellor, Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU), had been a Nazi party member and had worked in monitoring and influencing foreign radio programmes in the Foreign Ministry, while his Vice-Chancellor, Willy Brandt (SPD), had been a leftist socialist exiled in Scandinavia during the "Third Reich". The coalition consisted of an overwhelming majority of CDU/CSU and SPD mandates (together both coalition partners had 398 seats), with only 49 FDP members of the Bundestag making up the opposition. Thus, an "extra-parliamentary opposition" ("Außerparlamentarische Opposition", APO) expressed its political opposition in the street. A striking number of later West German civic and political leaders emerged from this opposition, as did a small group of virulent terrorists, who called the entire structure of West German democracy into question.

Passage of the Emergency Act

On the insistence of the Western Allies, the Kiesinger government initiated a constitutional amendment on emergency powers to restrict civil liberties in case of war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. Such an amendment required a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag, which the Grand Coalition easily had. The Emergency Act ("Notstandsgesetze") raised unfortunate memories of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution with its similar emergency powers. Opponents feared that the act might function as a new version of the 1933 Enabling Act. The proposed act was called the "NS laws" by the demonstrators who turned out in large

M 4 **An Iconic Photograph**
This photograph of Benno Ohnesorg being assisted by another student, Friederike Hausmann, after he was shot during a demonstration in West Berlin in 1967 is among the most iconic images in Germany, 7 June 1967

numbers in protest against it, but it was passed by the Bundestag on 30 May 1968.

The Shooting of Benno Ohnesorg

The diplomatic visit of the Shah of Iran to Berlin on 2 June 1967 set off a series of events unparalleled in West Germany. Students protesting Iranian violations of human rights were beaten by the Shah's agents, who were not restrained by the Berlin police. As the demonstrations intensified, a student, Benno Ohnesorg, was shot by a policeman, Karl-Heinz Kurras. Political leaders and the Berlin press, foremost the Axel Springer publishing house, claimed that the police had acted in self-defence. Following further protests and riots, Berlin Mayor Heinrich Albertz (SPD) took responsibility for the June events and resigned in September 1967. Judicial proceedings against Kurras found him blameless. In 2011 it was revealed that he had been an agent of the East German Stasi at the time of the shooting.

West Berlin and the Student Movement

West Berlin was demilitarized, so young men could avoid the West German military draft by taking up residence there, especially during their student years. However, older city residents and the Springer press criticized the lifestyles of student leaders, like Rudi Dutschke, and young people sharing flats together, like the "Kommune I". On 11 April 1968, Dutschke was shot on Berlin's Kurfürstendamm by a right-wing house painter, Josef Bachmann. Students attributed responsibility for the incident to the Springer press and blockaded the delivery of Springer papers throughout West Germany. Dutschke survived, but died in 1979 as a result of injuries sustained in the shooting.

Domestic Terrorism in West Germany

The events in West Berlin led others to more violent forms of protest. An underground group calling itself the Red Army Faction ("Rote Armee Fraktion", RAF) committed crimes in order to destroy the foundations of the democratic structure of the Federal Republic. They claimed responsibility for a series of fires, bombings, kidnappings and murders. Victims were prominent members of West German society, especially jurists and businessmen. The terrorist activity peaked in 1977 with the murders of the Federal Attorney General (Siegfried Buback), the chairman of the Dresdner Bank (Jürgen Ponto), and the President of the German Employers' Association (Hanns Martin Schleyer).

Originally the terrorists kidnapped Schleyer and demanded the release of eleven imprisoned RAF members as ransom. When the Schmidt government did not fulfil the demand, a group of Palestinian terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa plane from Majorca en route to Frankfurt and redirected it to Mogadishu, Somalia. There the GSG9, an elite counter-terrorism unit of the West German Federal Police founded after the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972, freed the 86 passengers and crew. Three of the RAF leaders (Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe) committed suicide in their prison cells upon hearing of the results of the action. Schleyer's murdered body was found the following day.

West German criminal law was amended to provide more supervision of lawyers and their defendants, prison conditions were adapted to

M 5 **Prisoner of the RAF**
The kidnapped President of the German Employers' Association, Hanns Martin Schleyer, 1977

M 6 **"The Millionth Guest Worker"**
The Portuguese worker, Armando Rodrigues de Sá, is given a moped upon his arrival in Cologne, 1964

make communication among prisoners and the outside world more difficult. From 1972 on, civil servants and employees working in civil services had to assure their loyalty to the "free democratic order" of the Basic Law as a condition of employment.

The West German Economic Powerhouse

The development of the West German economy throughout the years 1963 to 1988 was unusually positive. The apparent prosperity and productivity in West German economic life no doubt made the entire political and economic system attractive to East Germans. However, problems arose during the period.

In 1961 the Berlin Wall cut off West German access to potential Eastern European markets and eliminated workers from East Germany. A solution to the labour problem was found in bilateral treaties with various Mediterranean countries for temporary guest workers to West Germany. The economic downturn set off by the 1973 oil crisis ended the recruitment of guest workers.

Although the economy recovered fairly quickly by 1974, public debt exploded at this time due to pressure from social programmes. Reliable contraception reduced family size, while older adults lived longer. Therefore, a larger number of retirees with dynamic pensions (i.e., *pegged to* increases in the cost of living) had to be supported by fewer workers. Other programmes such as benefits to families with children ("Kindergeld") and the payment of unemployment benefits added to the public debt.

to be pegged to: to link a currency or financial index to another
accounting of: coming to terms with

Dealing with the National Socialist Past

Immediately after 1945 a widespread *accounting of* the National Socialist past did not occur in the Federal Republic. The Nuremberg trials aroused more solidarity with the accused than horror of their actions, because the trials were considered the work of the Allies – the result was merely victors' justice in the eyes of many. In films and on television, German sufferings during the war, during the mass expulsions, and German resistance to the Nazis were emphasized in portrayals of National Socialism. By the late 1960s these views began to change.

The "1968ers" pointed out the connection between leading public figures and their earlier Nazi roots. Amateur groups began to write history "from below" about daily life, to build historical monuments, or to recall memories of victims of Nazi oppression. Interest in Nazi topics was growing, aided by the Majdanek trial from 1975 to 1981 and by the 1978 debate in the Bundestag on extending the statute of limitations for Nazi crimes. In November 1978 the 40th anniversary of the "Night of Broken Glass" was observed publicly at several different ceremonies throughout the country after months of intensive preparation. In January 1979 the four-part US series "Holocaust" was aired, depicting two families (one Jewish, one "Aryan") interwoven in the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Surprisingly, one-half of all adult West Germans watched the series, which had been criticized as an emotional, commercial soap. The series clearly aroused the empathy of its audience – many expressed shock and dismay at the viciousness of the Nazi persecution. "Holocaust" became a milestone for many West Germans.

M 7 **"Holocaust"**
Actress Meryl Streep as Inga Helms Weiss in a scene from the US television series, 1979

M 8 **"Under the gowns / Is the musty odour of a thousand years"**
Student protest during the ceremony to install a new rector at Hamburg University, 9 November 1967

M 9 **"My 1968" – Luise F. Pusch**

Luise F. Pusch, born in Gütersloh in 1944, studied English, Latin and linguistics at Hamburg University from 1963 to 1972. She did a doctorate in 1972 and qualified as a professor in 1978. She has made a name for herself as a specialist in feminist linguistics, and since 1985 has been involved in publishing, focusing on the themes of feminist linguistics and women's biography research:

What did I – a student in Hamburg – think of the "1968" movement at the time? – I thought the famous demonstration with the banner proclaiming "Under the gowns / Is the musty odour of a thousand years" was very good. A fresh headwind to counter the rigid patriarchal structures of the university was long overdue. Back then, I wanted to work as an assistant lecturer at the uni, but it was not possible to apply for these sought-after positions. Instead, a woman had to find some way of attracting the professor's attention, portraying herself in a positive light. The situation, in other words, was entirely feudal – a professor, just like a king, could bestow or withdraw his favour, and careers and opportunities in life depended on his favour. These "courtly" structures were abolished by the 1968 movement, and a good thing too.

The most important change brought about by the 1968 movement was in my eyes the fact that the macho behaviour of the 1968 student patriarchs was partly responsible for women *making the break* and, finally, starting to do their own thing [...]. In other words, the key change was the start of the second women's movement in Germany and elsewhere. [...]

Essentially, I regard the 1968 movement as an organization of young men who wanted to snatch power away from the old established men. Once they had more or less succeeded in doing so, the 1968 members were satisfied and became just like those who they had previously fought against. Women played virtually no role in this whole drama, which is why the movement interested me little at the time and continues to interest me little today.

The sexual liberation which was allegedly likewise initiated by the 1968 movement primarily served male heterosexual interests and sought to make female sexual availability – from as young an age as possible – the norm; anything else was considered "inhibited". The sexual liberation of women (both lesbian and straight) and of gay men did not come about until much later, and was entirely separate from the 1968 movement.

Translation: Chris Cave, Copyright: Goethe Institute, online editorial team; http://www.goethe.de/ges/pok/dos/dos/wdp/mei/en3031505.htm [20 April 2012].

to make the break: to change one's life or routine

Sources on the 1968 Movement in West Germany

M 10 "My 1968" – Franziska Becker

Franziska Becker, born in 1949, passed her university-entrance exams in 1968 and, a year later, began to study Egyptology in Heidelberg. She soon broke off her studies and completed a training as an assistant medical technician. From 1972 to 1976 she studied at the Academy of Art in Karlsruhe. From 1973 she was active in Heidelberg's women's movement and made use of her artistic talents on posters and in various activities. Since 1977 she has been a freelance cartoonist (e.g., for EMMA, Titanic, Stern, Psychologie Heute). Since 1980 she has also been publishing her own books. In 1988 she was awarded the Max and Moritz Prize as the best German comic artist. Franziska Becker lives and works in Cologne, in the Bergische Land and in Philadelphia:

For me the '68 movement meant liberation from the constraints of the *smug*, hypocritical, bourgeois way of life (and from many a sadistic old Nazi teacher). I also recall crazy, fun outfits and nice-looking men with long hair. Back then I had spiky, bleached blonde hair with long curls at the front, and I listened to loud music. My mother was a great Beatles fan, much to the horror of my father who listened to classical music. "1968" – that was zest for life and new friendships that still exist today, staying up for nights on end, talking, cooking, going for walks, taking part in "street theatre" against redevelopment of the old city centre, consumption mania, but also making fun of ourselves in the diverse political and esoteric movements. [...]

The most important and lasting contribution of the '68 movement for me was without doubt the women's movement at the beginning of the 1970s. That was when my politicisation actually happened. My personal and most important contribution at that time was making it easier for women to laugh, also and above all about themselves. Moreover, I can say that I never fell for false or questionable authorities, I was never fooled by left-wing or psycho gurus and I never allowed my viewpoint to be clouded by "questions of faith".

When I now look back, I think that many things then were good and important: the search for new forms of education for everyone, facing up to and debating the Nazi era, questioning authorities and hierarchies, criticism of consumption, the new living forms, the acceptance of one's own body and sexuality, talking about and fighting against abortions that endangered health, civil disobedience, citizens' action groups, critical journalism etc. But there was also a lot of self-righteousness, petty quarrelling, dogmatism, a past that has been suppressed with regard to the support of terrible regimes such as, for example, that of Pol Pot in Cambodia, as well as the triggering of the pornographication of our society. Interestingly, many of the "68ers" later pursued streamlined careers in the so-called "piggish system", took good care of their *cronies* and secured themselves state pensions.

Translation: Heather Moers, Copyright: Goethe Institute, online editorial team; http://www.goethe.de/ges/pok/dos/dos/wdp/mei/en3031459.htm [20 April 2012].

smug: self-satisfied
crony: a friend, sb. with "connections"

Tasks

1. For many years observers criticized the Grand Coalition in 1966–69 for destabilizing West German society. Comment on this criticism, using evidence from the text to prove your arguments.
2. Use the Internet to do further research on Ohnesorg and Kurras. Report on your results to your class.
3. Compare and contrast the views of Luise Pusch (M9) and Franziska Becker (M10) on the 1968 movement in West Germany.
4. As an alternative to Task 3, choose another report on the 1968 movement found under www.Goethe.de (Dossier 1968) on the Internet. Select one and assess the information given in written form.
5. Using the Internet, find out in what year a married West German woman could decide by herself whether to take or keep a job, to apply for her own banking account, and to manage her own business affairs. Then evaluate the progress of the women's rights movement in Germany (text, M9–10, M12).

Domestic Developments in East Germany 1963–1988

Peace Movements

In East Germany two peace movements stood at cross-purposes. The first, the government supported movement, propagated peace as a political goal of a socialist government, often by criticizing Western military actions. A second "unofficial" peace movement was supported by the only remaining institution not subsumed by the East German state organizations – the Lutheran church. Members questioned actions of the Soviet bloc directed against Eastern movements like the Czechoslovak Prague Spring (1968) or the Polish trade union Solidarity (1980). The regime suppressed the unofficial movement, even forbidding the use of posters and slogans such as "swords into ploughshares" which had been official slogans before the unofficial movement embraced them in the 1980s. Any use of the idea of "peace" which could be understood as criticism of the East German political system was strongly opposed by the regime.

M 1 **"Swords into Ploughshares"**
In 1980, a quotation from the Bible – "swords into ploughshares" – became the symbol of the independent peace movement. Printed on fabric, it was considered a "textile surface finishing" and not subject to censorship. Thousands of young people sewed it on their jackets to protest the increasing militarization of the GDR. Despite the ban on the movement, it was supported by the Protestant church.

Environmental Concerns

As a result of the Helsinki Accords from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, various groups saw opportunities to achieve the civil and human rights propagated by the Accords throughout many countries of Eastern Europe, including the GDR. East German groups began to criticize the Soviet style of socialism within their country and suggested ways to improve living standards and attain more political freedom. The political authorities regarded the criticism as attacks on the political system. In 1979 the People's Chamber intensified punishment for political crimes in the criminal code, especially with the vaguely worded paragraphs 106 dealing with "anti-state rabble-rousing" ("staatsfeindliche Hetze") and 120 with "public denigration" ("öffentliche Herabwürdigung"), so that nearly any critical citizen could be prosecuted.

In 1986, the Lutheran church in East Berlin provided space for a collection of books and materials on environmental topics – an "environmental library", which became an information centre for

M 2 **"Environmental Library"**
Wolfgang Rüddenklau, member of the East German opposition, in the environmental library at the Church of Zion (Prenzlauer Berg). On the chairs are illegally printed brochures and booklets called "environmental writings" ("Umweltblätter"), 25 June 1987.

M 3 **Woman Factory Worker**
A skilled worker in a textile mill in Saxony making bathing suits, 1966

dissidents. Members of this group then founded the "Ark" in 1989, a network of environmental groups throughout the GDR.

Women's Rights

Equal rights for women were publicly propagated from the state's beginning, largely because women workers were necessary for a functioning economy. East Germany had the world's highest percentage of employed women (46.7 per cent in 1966, nearly 80 per cent in 1980; in comparison, only 36.2 per cent of the employed in West Germany in 1966 were women). Accordingly, child care facilities in East Germany were widely available and usually connected directly with the firms where children's parents worked. Westerners criticized such arrangements as early child indoctrination.

On 9 March 1972 the East German Law Concerning Abortion was passed, granting abortion on demand within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. Although opposed by both churches and some physicians, the law was passed by the parliament with 14 members voting no and 8 members abstaining – until 1989, this was the only law not passed unanimously in the People's Chamber. This was also the first German law which approved abortion on demand, rather than medically or socially indicated abortion.

Communist Internal Criticism

Public criticism in the GDR was most embarrassing for the regime when it came from fellow communists. Guitarist and songwriter Wolf Biermann, although rejected for Unity Party membership in 1963, posed a sensitive problem for the East German leadership for a number of years. His father, a bona fide communist and member of the resistance, was murdered in Auschwitz in 1943. When Biermann sang about the differences between theory and reality in East German life, his performances were restricted, then forbidden entirely; he could not get his songs past the official recording studios. The authorities finally seized their chance and expatriated him following his performance in a concert in Cologne on 13 November 1976.

The reaction to the expatriation came as a shock to the authorities: An open letter written by twelve East German artists and signed by over one hundred celebrities protested against Biermann's punishment. A series of repressive measures was taken against those who had signed, leading many to emigrate to the West, ending Honecker's brief cultural policy of "no taboos".

The East German government was embarrassed by other communists as well. Traditionally the Unity Party commemorated the deaths of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg every January in a mass demonstration in East Berlin. During the demonstration in 1988 some participants were prevented from carrying a banner proclaiming Luxemburg's criticism of the Bolsheviks, "Freedom is always the freedom of dissenters". The critics were arrested and expatriated, but the public protest at a mass-staged official demonstration marked the first stirrings of the Peaceful Revolution of 1989 in East Germany.

M 4 **"Bring Biermann Back to the GDR"**
East German poster, 1976

Economic Stagnation

East Germany lacked essential energy resources, so the economy was especially dependent on Soviet oil supplies. When the price of oil

M 5 **"The GDR is the State of Peace and National Dignity"**
Slogan of the Unity Party on factory ruins in the district of Erfurt, about 1982

boomed in the late 1970s, Soviet oil realized a high profit in the world market. The Soviet Union reduced its oil contingent to the GDR, a gap which was closed through the sale of valuable East German antiques and art treasures to Western buyers and through extensive West German loans to the GDR. In actuality, East Germany lived beyond its means – it needed to export more than it could produce to pay for the goods and energy it had to import. One possible course of action to survive was to reduce the standard of living among a population which already complained about its reduced circumstances.

M 6 **National Memorial at Buchenwald**
After 1958 the East German memorial was extended to make the largest monument of a concentration camp in Germany. Fritz Cremer's sculpture of freed prisoners stands in front of the Freedom Tower.

Dealing with the National Socialist Past

Anti-fascism was political doctrine in the GDR; the authorities claimed that Nazis had been completely removed from East German social and political life. Anti-Semitism was declared nonexistent in the GDR. The regime refused to pay funds for crimes to Israelis or to other Holocaust victims. When the fascist past was considered, the focus was on communists and leftist members of the resistance to the Nazis. Because the GDR had broken with its Nazi roots entirely, it was deemed unnecessary to deal with the Nazi legacy. The anti-fascist doctrine made it impossible for East Germans to come to terms with the past in a meaningful way, and assisted the later appearance of neo-Nazi tendencies in the region today.

Theorists of totalitarianism claim that Soviet communism and National Socialism are similar – an argument completely rejected by East German authorities. Nevertheless, public life in the GDR had much in common with Nazi public life, including frequent mobilization of the masses, flags and political slogans displayed in the streets, the official campaigns and parades, a constant police presence, the cult of the leader, the aggressive tone of propaganda, and the militarization of society.

Sources on 1968 in East Germany

M 7 Florian Havemann on 1968 in East Germany

Florian Havemann, the son of the prominent East German dissident Robert Havemann, looks back at the year 1968:

There was not only a 1968 in the West. [...] I belong to the tiny group of people who could be called 68ers from the East. There were maybe 200 of us in all, not more. You didn't know absolutely everyone, but you knew most of them – at least you had heard of or recognized them, or knew their nicknames.

Due to the conditions in the GDR – which, in comparison with the West, was not free – these (at most) 200 people, who could have easily and would have gladly gathered together in a medium-sized cultural *venue*, were never able to assemble and discuss their cause, their goals, and their problems, much less achieve agreement and strength in all these areas. The medium of these eastern 68ers, the medium of their exchange, remained conversation – often of a very intense nature – in small groups, which could only be called informal discussion circles. The forum for larger gatherings was parties. This small group tried to be everything and do everything – everything that was also part of 1968 elsewhere. It attempted to experiment with a different kind of art and culture, to try a different approach to living and child-rearing; it experimented with sexual liberation, different types of relationships between the sexes; it also experimented with new sorts of highs and with conceptualizing and practicing a new form of politics. Of course that was *a bit much* [emphasis in the original] for such a small group, one that, on top of everything else, was hindered by conditions, by political circumstances. [...]

If it can be said, in retrospect, that the cultural-revolutionary aspect of the 1968 movement in the West had the most significant impact, then it should be noted that this was always the main focus for those of us in the East, even from the very beginning. We followed the development of 1968 in the West, of the student movement, as best we could. There was also some direct personal contact – people such as Langhans, Teufel, and Kunzelmann from the K-1 commune came to our parties, and later Rudi Dutschke as well. For us, they were people we felt connected to, but they were only part of a movement that included much more. Bob Dylan and Jimi Hendrix were equally – if not more – important. This music created a connection that reached all the way into the provinces, to a much larger group, the so-called Beat Fans, who were being persecuted by the state, and who could *boast* the only truly functioning illegal organization of the time: the record club.

I have often asked myself whether our eastern 1968 was just an offshoot, a *dépendance* [italics in the original] of the western 1968. I have also asked myself if our 1968 was truly our own and unique, if it occurred simultaneously with the western 1968 only by chance and had little to do with it, or if common concerns stemming from parallel causes and motivations did in fact exist.

The conditions governing our actions were totally different. I think about the flyers, about forty of which *landed me* in prison for agitation against the state – and they had not even been handed out! – and then I think about the culture shock I experienced when I went into the cafeteria at the Technical University in West Berlin for the first time and saw hundreds of different flyers lying on tables, flyers that no one read or seemed interested in at all. [...]

The reasons for becoming politically active were also different. In the West, it was the Americans and the Vietnam War, the Emergency Laws, and higher education policies that had sparked protest. For those of us in the East, there were manifold small reasons, those unreasonable demands to agree with things that no reasonable person could approve of, so that firstly it was not really about differing political views, but whether people wanted to preserve their own moral integrity and were willing to pay the price for it. The fascist past had a different meaning for us. The accusation made by most 68ers in the West: that their parents were at least bystanders, if not more, during the Nazi period, was not relevant for us. Our mothers and fathers were either active in the Nazi resistance or had spent the Nazi years in exile or emigration. The question posed to us was whether the development of GDR society did not demand that we follow the heroic example of our parents, which meant to act conspiratorially and resist this development, which we viewed as anti-socialist. [...]

Those of us who grew up in the GDR, and thus did not participate in the heroic struggles leading up to the creation of this country and who don't belong to its founding generation, saw lives ahead of us in a country marked by an ever-growing bureaucracy that continually restricted everyone's range of motion – not only those who were directly subjugated by it, but also political actors as well. We saw lives that would be determined by technology and technical necessities. We were not and could not feel comfortable with that; in any case, it no longer sparked any enthusiasm in us whatsoever. ... Before us lay an intellectual desert, since the socialism that we were served was not anything that could inspire or motivate us as young socialists.

This desert, with its petty bourgeois structures, was lacking everything broad and great, yet it continued to spread out around us. [...] In any case, it was not the socialism that any of us had imagined, and we could not imagine that the founders of the movement, Marx, Engels, and Lenin, could have intended such a dull and tedious socialism, one that seemed to restrict human productivity more than liberate it. [...]

My friend Thomas Brasch had a long conversation with Erich Honecker shortly after Biermann was expatriated. They talked about whether Brasch could and should leave the GDR as well. After the two had spoken for a while and Brasch had described his experiences in the GDR, Honecker made a significant statement: he said that he felt the same way as Brasch, and that he, too, had imagined socialism in a totally different way – so the understanding was there. But: there was no opportunity to discuss this question openly in the GDR; there couldn't be any in this kind of state. [...] In the GDR, we spoke of *Bonzen* [italics in the original], bigwigs, and when we speak now of the 68ers of the East, we are speaking of the bigwig children, of the sons and daughters of top-ranking GDR officials, and thus we are speaking of this peculiar GDR aristocracy, this socialist nobility that existed. It was our existence that seemed to have no meaning. What we lacked was a task that would have satisfied the ambition inspired by the deeds, by the heroic example, of our parents. As surprising as it may sound, there was no place for us in this GDR society, at least not as the children of our parents. And in this respect, one must ask if the comparison with an aristocracy is fitting. It could be viewed as something positive, that these people who ruled in the GDR did not work towards passing the whole business – that is, the power – down to their children, their direct descendants. Still, I would say that their inability to integrate this group – to which I belonged – into the system marked the beginning of the end of socialism. ...

No matter how the details of the Prague Spring were viewed – and this was strongly dependent on the information available at hand – it was clear the moment the invasion occurred that something decisive was happening, that a chance for socialism had been destroyed. Later, it would become apparent that this had been its final chance. But that was not clear at the time.

Florian Havemann, "68er Ost" ("68ers from the East"), lecture given on 29 August 2003 at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation on Franz Mehring Platz, Berlin; reprinted in UTOPIE kreativ, no. 164 (June 2004), pp. 544–56. Translation: Allison Brown; http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Chapter6Doc15.pdf [18 Dec 2011].

venue: place where an event happens
to boast: to be proud of sth.
to land sb. in sth.: to get sb. into trouble

M 8 Robert Havemann and Wolf Biermann
Regime critic Robert Havemann (1910–1982), Florian's father, with Wolf Biermann in Havemann's home in Grünheide, 1972

Sources on Daily Life in East Germany

M 9 "Shopping" – A Comment

British historian Mary Fulbrook on class divisions in buying consumer goods in East Germany (2005):

What [made] a difference to people's lifestyles was the [sheer lack of] availability of desired consumer goods. This raised two other factors to a status of crucial importance. First, "connections," often known as "Vitamin B" [for Beziehungen]: if one had a good relationship with a network of individuals in key positions – workers who could "liberate" crucial parts and materials from their places of work; shop assistants who could "bend under the counter" to pull out scarce items [Bückwaren]; car mechanics, plumbers, electricians and other handymen who could assist in repairs and the more complicated aspects of a DIY job – then life was made a great deal easier. "Friendships" would be cultivated with those potentially of assistance, in a society where such mutual aid was a key ingredient in creating the physical preconditions for material well-being. And workers with skills were of course particularly in demand in such a situation. Secondly, access to Western currency was of comparable importance – even encapsulated in the *quip* [variously attributed to the guitarist and singer Wolf Biermann, and the dissident thinker Wolfgang Harich] that, in contrast to Marx's original reference to individual needs, the operating slogan of "actually existing socialism" ran along the lines "from each according to his ability, to each according to the residence of his aunt". Deutschmarks could open a lot of doors, both unofficially and, increasingly, also officially in the state-fostered pockets of Western consumer society. Ironically, the classes that could not participate fully in the developing consumer society of the GDR were precisely the politically privileged functionary classes. By virtue of their positions, they could not have Western contacts, and hence they had no access to Western currency and the associated use of the Intershops. If they were high enough in the political hierarchy, of course, the position was quite different: provisions for Politburo members in Wandlitz and in the central bureaucracies in Berlin were rather special. But below this level, East Germans with a degree of political responsibility and visibility were excluded by virtue of the communist rules of political correctness from the modest oases of consumerism that the GDR of the 1970s and '80s was able to offer to "ordinary" workers with appropriate incomes and connections. All this, then, further complicated the class structure of the GDR.

Mary Fulbrook, The People's State. East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 230–31.

M 10 In Front of an Intershop, 1979

M 11 An East German Joke

Political scientist Steven Kelman repeats an East German joke in "The New Yorker" (30 September 1972):

There is a joke here about an East German who dies and goes to Hell. On arrival, he discovers that Hell is divided into East Hell and West Hell. Since he has spent all his life in the East, he naturally decides to look first at West Hell. When he enters, he sees a very unhappy scene – people whining, crying, flagellating themselves. He goes up to someone and asks what is wrong. Slowly and dejectedly, the man answers, "We are to be nailed to a wooden cross and burned, and therefore we are unhappy." Not finding this prospect to his liking, the East German goes to take a look at East Hell. Here the scene is quite different – dancing, drinking, a real party atmosphere. He asks someone what is going on. "Well, we're supposed to be nailed to a wooden cross and burned" is the nonchalant reply. "So why are you all so joyful?" the man asks, and the answer is "Look, when the day comes, there won't be any hammers. And if there are hammers there won't be any nails. And if there are hammers and nails, the Devil will have a Party meeting."

Steven Kelman, "Letter from East Germany," The New Yorker, 30 September 1972, p. 105.

quip: funny or clever remark

Domestic Issues in Both German States, 1963–1988		
Issue	**East Germany**	**West Germany**
peace	• official movement criticizes Western military actions • unofficial movement criticizes Soviet suppression of civil reforms in the East	• Easter marches for peace → demonstrations against the US in Vietnam • dual-track NATO decision (1983) → massive demonstrations, blockade of US military bases in Germany
the environment	• criticism of environmental problems is regarded as an attack on the political system → criminal code is reformed to include such "crimes" • an environmental library opens in East Berlin (1985) in a room provided by the Lutheran church • in 1989 the Ark, a network of environmental groups, is founded	• non-governmental organizations, like BUND, are founded by 1977 • in 1983 the Green Party wins seats in the Bundestag
women's rights	• men and women have equal rights • most women are employed outside the home • child care is state organized and supported • in 1972 abortion is legally available on demand within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy	• new women's movement demands more rights, implementation of Article 3 of Basic Law • a (growing) minority of women are employed outside the home • child care remains essentially a private concern • in 1974 abortion is permitted within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy if medically or socially indicated
dealing with the Nazi past	• no significant debate on the Nazi past • emphasis is placed on the oppression of Communists and members of the resistance to the Nazis • official anti-fascist doctrine makes it impossible for East Germans to account for the Nazi past in their own lives	• generational conflict over the legacy of National Socialism begins in the 1970s • in 1979 the US TV-series "Holocaust" produces a widespread empathy for Nazi victims • interest in discussion of Nazi wrongs expands • social history becomes popular among amateur groups

M 12

Tasks

1. Assess the regime's reaction to the use of the slogan "swords to ploughshares" in the 1980s (text, M1).
2. Summarize Havemann's comparisons and contrasts between the 1968 movements in East and West Germany (M7).
3. Option: Look up Robert Havemann on the Internet. Write a report on his achievements and legacy today.
4. Analyse the regime's problems in providing consumer goods for East Germans (text, M9, M10, M11).
5. East German leaders praised their "classless society". Assess the more complicated class structure in the GDR that Fulbrook presents (M9).
6. Compare and contrast the approaches to domestic issues sketched in the table (M12). Find proof of your arguments in the text.

Changes in the Eastern Bloc 1980–1988

Solidarity in Poland: An Independent Trade Union in a Communist Country

The situation in Poland presented problems to the Eastern bloc after the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia. Throughout the 1970s, strikes were organized by illegal trade unions. The economic problems in Poland were pressing – complaints increased when food prices rose. By 1980 Solidarity (Solidarność), an independent trade union, was founded. Solidarity called the Polish Communist trade union into question, but by August 1981 its success in strikes at shipyards in Gdansk and other cities forced the Polish government to recognize its demands and agree to let the union exist legally. Solidarity quickly recruited ten million members (then one-fourth of the Polish population) by the end of 1981.

On 13 December 1981 the Polish General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had replaced the civilian leader of the government in February, declared martial law in Poland. Jaruzelski later claimed the step (as Western observers at the time also interpreted it) as a preventive measure to avoid invasion by Warsaw Pact troops. Soviet and Polish documents now available suggest that Jaruzelski could not count on Soviet troops to support his government's position against Solidarity. Lech Walesa and other Solidarity leaders were arrested; Walesa was held for eleven months. During the period of martial law about ninety demonstrators and strikers were killed by military forces and paramilitary police. The media were censored, demonstrations banned, independent organizations outlawed, schools and universities supervised, telephones and mail monitored, national industries and businesses placed under military administration. Civilians accused of illegal activities were tried in military courts. In October 1982 Solidarity was outlawed. However, the Polish leaders were unable to

M 1 Change in Poland
Strike leader Lech Walesa speaks to workers at the Lenin Wharf in Gdansk, 1980

change the desolate economic situation in the country. Walesa was given the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983, but sent his wife, Danuta Walesa, to the ceremony in his place out of fear that he would be forbidden to return to Poland.

Internationally, Poland was isolated. The US imposed economic sanctions on the country, vetoed its admission to the International Monetary Fund, and denied it most-favoured nation status in trade relations. Western political leaders of all parties – from conservatives Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher to communists Enrico Berlinguer (Italy) and Santiago Carrillo (Spain) – supported the independent trade union. The Catholic Church provided crucial assistance to Solidarity, most prominently through the Polish priest Karol Wojtyla, who had been elected Pope John Paul II in 1978. In the Soviet bloc, Poland was treated as an outcast – GDR leaders were especially concerned that the "Polish bacteria" could spread to East Germany as well.

Martial law was lifted in July 1983, but restrictions on civilian life remained. Solidarity continued underground, while the Polish government proved unable to solve the economic problems. Prices were raised, leading to the emigration of an estimated 700,000 Poles between 1981 and 1989. By 1989 the Polish authorities were once again forced to negotiate with Solidarity.

After the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 and the Prague Spring in 1968, the response to the Polish Solidarity movement suggested that the Soviet bloc was no longer fully in charge of its satellite states. The policies of glasnost and perestroika introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev after 1985 seemed to be putting more pressure on the Soviet Union than it could bear.

Soviet Leadership and Domestic Problems

By the early 1980s the aged members of the Soviet politburo could not provide leadership for an extended period of time: Leonid Brezhnev (died in November 1982) was replaced by Yuri Andropov (died in February 1984), then by Konstantin Chernenko (died in March 1985). When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary, he was the youngest member of the politburo (54) and the only Soviet leader who had been born after the Russian Revolution. Gorbachev's selection as party leader signalled the passing of Soviet leadership to a younger generation. He turned his attention to the complex structural problems of the USSR, calling for "glasnost" (openness), "perestroika" (restructuring), "demokratizatsiya" (democratization) and "uskoreniye" (economic acceleration) to deal with the political and economic stagnation from the Brezhnev years. As domestic reform could only be achieved by reducing military expenditures, Gorbachev stressed his willingness to retreat from Afghanistan if the process of détente could be reactivated. Western leaders, foremost among them US President Ronald Reagan, were sceptical at first.



M 2 **Mikhail Gorbachev (*1931)**
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (March 1985 to August 1991) and President of the Soviet Union (March 1990 to December 1991)

The Chernobyl Disaster and Glasnost

On 26 April 1986 one of the nuclear reactors at Chernobyl exploded and burned after an experiment to test the cooling capacity backfired. The accident became a crucial measure of Gorbachev's glasnost policies. The first signs of the mishap were not reported by the Soviet authorities, but came from Swedish scientists monitoring unusual

M 3 Chernobyl Reactor Accident, 26 April 1986
View of the destroyed reactor, May 1986

nuclear emissions. When they suspected Soviet origins, the Soviet authorities admitted that a nuclear accident had occurred. Chernobyl is considered the most serious nuclear reactor accident in history. Gorbachev admitted that mistakes had been made in the Soviet nuclear energy programme, but the delayed reaction to the accident demonstrated that glasnost would be a long-term project for the Soviet Union.

Strategic Defense Initiative Pushes Disarmament Forward

Talks between the USSR and US to limit intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) began in 1981, but made no progress for several years. Gorbachev's proposals to reduce nuclear weapons were rejected by Western leaders, who doubted his sincerity. US President Ronald Reagan announced a "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) in 1983 which would protect the US from nuclear attack. The SDI proposal was promptly termed "Star Wars" after the popular film and many scientists criticized it as technically unworkable. More importantly, however, SDI made the doctrine of mutually assured destruction obsolete – according to the doctrine both powers were certain to be annihilated in a nuclear war, so engaging in one was unthinkable. But if Soviet missiles could be destroyed in space, the US might survive a nuclear attack. Thus, a renewed arms race with enormous costs appeared unavoidable.

The outlines of a breakthrough emerged after the Reykjavik summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in 1986, despite its apparent failure at the time. Nevertheless, in Reykjavik both sides had been willing to make concessions, which made the INF Treaty possible in 1987. The removal of intermediate- and short-range nuclear and conventional warheads from Europe and their limitation globally have contributed to securing peace. Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin's declaration in 2007 that the INF Treaty no longer serves Russian interests has put a damper on the progress made earlier.

M 4 US President Ronald Reagan at the Brandenburg Gate
12 June 1987

M 5 Resistance to the Military Government

US journalist Lawrence Weschler reports (1983) on his recent trip to Poland and reactions to Polish government propaganda after the state of martial law was declared on 13 December 1981:

One afternoon, I was visiting a screenwriter friend who had his radio tuned to the Third Channel, Poland's youth-oriented station. During my earlier visits to Warsaw, in 1981, the radio had often featured *disconcertingly apt* Western rock songs: Gloria Gaynor's "I Will Survive," Bob Dylan's "When You Gonna Wake Up?," Simon and Garfunkel's "America" ("She said the man in the gabardine suit was a spy. I said, 'Be careful, his bow tie is really a camera'"). This trip, things were toned back to the seemingly irrelevant: the empty disco pulse of "That's the kind of love I have for you," or Billy Idol's "Hey little girl, what have you done?" At one point, the music gave way to a half hour of what *was billed* as free discussion. "Listen," my friend said. "We call this whipping up foam – lots of words but completely empty, nothing of substance." The earnest young *panellists* were saying things like "I think the situation should be improved. It needs improving. Life is not very easy in Poland, but I think we should take up responsibility for the country, we young people. What do you think, Comrade?" "There!" my friend interrupted. "They always do that, they're never able *to pull it off* completely: ordinary people in Poland never call each other 'Comrade.'" Does it work, though? Does the propaganda wear people down, confuse and demoralize them? "People have ceased to buy newspapers," according to an article in the underground journal "Tygodnik Wojenny". Government newspapers fail to sell up to eighty per cent of their printed copies – especially in Warsaw and in Krakow. "The circulation of Trybuna Ludu [the Communist Party daily] has already been reduced from 1.5 million to 750,000." [...] As for the television news, most Poles during the sixteen months of Solidarity assimilated one of the movement's main slogans, "Television lies," and few people *are taken in* outright. In the town of Swidnik last spring, people instituted the custom of an evening promenade, everybody in town out walking in the warm crepuscular light during the seven-thirty evening news. The authorities soon forbade this practice, and people responded, throughout the town, by ritually cleaning their carpets, beating them at the windows, every evening at seven-thirty. There was nothing the authorities could do about that. Some people in Warsaw call the news "The Children's Hour" or "Fantasy on Parade."

Lawrence Weschler, "A Reporter at Large. A State of War – I", The New Yorker, 11 April 1983, pp. 72–73.

disconcertingly: making sb. feel confused, surprised
apt: suitable
to be billed: to be advertised, described
panellist: member of a panel discussion
to pull it off: to succeed at sth.
to be taken in: to be tricked into believing sth.

M 6 Nobel Peace Prize

Mrs Danuta Walesa reads her husband's acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize (1983):

Your Majesty, Honourable Representatives of the Norwegian people,
You are aware of the reasons why I could not come to your Capital city and receive personally this distinguished prize. On that solemn day my place is among those with whom I have grown and to whom I belong – the workers of Gdansk.
Let my words convey to you the joy and the never extinguished hope of the millions of my brothers – the millions of working people in factories and offices, associated in the union whose very name expresses one of the noblest aspirations of humanity. Today all of them, like myself, feel greatly honoured by the prize.
With deep sorrow I think of those who paid with their lives for the loyalty to "Solidarity"; of those who are behind prison bars and who are victims of repressions. I think of all those with whom I have travelled the same road and with whom I shared the trials and tribulations of our time.
For the first time a Pole has been awarded a prize which Alfred Nobel founded for activities towards bringing the nations of the world closer together. The most ardent hopes of my compatriots are linked with this idea – in spite of the violence, cruelty and brutality which characterise the conflicts splitting the present-day world.
We desire peace – and that is why we have never resorted to physical force. We crave for justice – and that is why we are so persistent in the struggle for our rights. We seek freedom of convictions – and that is why we have never attempted to

Sources on Poland and Solidarity

enslave man's conscience nor shall we ever attempt to do so.

We are fighting for the right of the working people to association and for the dignity of human labour. We respect the dignity and the rights of every man and every nation. The path to a brighter future of the world leads through honest reconciliation of the conflicting interests and not through hatred and bloodshed. To follow that path means to enhance the moral power of the all-embracing idea of human solidarity.

I feel happy and proud that over the past few years this idea has been so closely connected with the name of my homeland.

In 1905, when Poland did not appear on the map of Europe, Henryk Sienkiewicz said when receiving the Nobel prize for literature: "She was pronounced dead – yet here is a proof that She lives on; She was declared incapable to think and to work – and here is proof to the contrary; She was pronounced defeated - and here is proof that She is victorious".

Today nobody claims that Poland is dead. But the words have acquired a new meaning.

May I express to you – the illustrious representatives of the Norwegian people – my most profound gratitude for confirming the vitality and strength of our idea by awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to the chairman of "Solidarity".

From Nobel Lectures, Peace 1981–1990, Editor-in-Charge Tore Frängsmyr, Editor Irwin Abrams, World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 1997; http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1983/walesa-acceptance.html [6 February 2012].

M 7 **Nonviolent Protest**
Workers at the Lenin Wharf in Gdansk, 1980

M 8 Nonviolence as Strategy: Can It Work in the Eastern Bloc?

Author Jonathan Shell considers nonviolence in "The New Yorker" (1986):

Ever since Gandhi led India to independence through nonviolent action, it has become something of a cliché to say that nonviolence could succeed only against a parliamentary democracy like England – that it would have failed against a totalitarian power, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany. Inasmuch as Poland has not attained its independence – or, for that matter, even aimed at it – this assumption still holds. And it seems only reinforced when one reflects that the regime in Poland today, though brutal, is far more moderate than the regime of either Stalin or Hitler. Nevertheless, it is now a matter of record that by far the most effective resistance movement ever launched against a totalitarian regime [Solidarity] was completely nonviolent. Nonviolent action, far from being helpless in the face of totalitarianism, turns out to be especially well suited to fighting it. Hence it would be misleading to suggest that the Poles made a free choice of non-violence over violence, as though they had been offered an opportunity to overthrow the regime by violence but had turned it down on the ground of moral principle in favour of non-violence. Rather, from the outset violence was recognized by almost everybody to be completely useless to the movement. Addressing the question of why the movement adopted nonviolent means, [Solidarity activist Adam] Michnik writes, "No one in Poland is able to prove today that violence will help us to dislodge Soviet troops from Poland and to remove Communists from power. The U.S.S.R. has such enormous military power that confrontation is simply unthinkable. In other words: we have no guns." The decision against violence, then, was made not so much by the Poles themselves as by their historical situation. The greatness of the Polish movement lies not in a decision to renounce violence – although the self-discipline required to flawlessly maintain a policy of nonviolence in the heat and anger for the struggle deserves great credit – but in its discovery of peaceful means that still offered hope.

Jonathan Shell, "Reflections: A Better Today", The New Yorker, 3 February 1986, pp. 62–63.

M 9 Perestroika

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev outlines Perestroika (excerpt) to the Party Conference in Moscow (28 June 1988):

In raising the question of cardinally reforming the political system, we must proceed above all from a clear understanding of which of its qualities have stood the test of time and are needed by us today, and which, on the contrary, have to be reduced to a minimum or overcome completely.

This, it seems to us, should imply the accomplishment of the following basic tasks.

First, everything must be done to include millions upon millions of people in administering the country in deed, not in word.

Second, the maximum scope must be given to the processes of the self-regulation and self-government of society, and the conditions must be created for the full development of the initiative of citizens, representative bodies of government, party and civic organizations, and work collectives.

Third, it is necessary to adjust the mechanism of the unhindered formation and expression of the interests and will of all classes and social groups, their coordination and realization in the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet state.

Fourth, the conditions must be created for the further free development of every nation and nationality, for the strengthening of their friendship and equitable cooperation on the principles of internationalism.

Fifth, socialist legality, law and order, must be radically strengthened so as to rule out any possibility of power being usurped or abused, so as effectively to counter bureaucracy and formalism, and reliably guarantee the protection of citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms, and also the execution of their duties with respect to society and the state.

Sixth, there must be a strict *demarcation* of the functions of party and state bodies, in conformity with Lenin's conception of the Communist Party as a political *vanguard* of society and the role of the Soviet state as an instrument of government by the people.

Finally, seventh, an effective mechanism must be established to assure the timely self-*rejuvenation* of the political system with due consideration for changing international and external conditions, a system capable of increasingly vigorous development and of introducing the principles of socialist democracy and self-government into all spheres of life.

Just now it is often being said and written by people in various localities that perestroika has not reached them; they ask when this will happen. But perestroika is not manna from the skies – instead of waiting for it to be brought in from somewhere, it has to be brought about by the people themselves in their town or village, in their work collective. What are needed today more than ever are deeds, actions, not talk about perestroika. Much here depends on our personnel, on leaders at the district, town, region, republic and all-union level.

New York Times, 29 June 1988. The translation is from Tass, the Soviet press agency.

demarcation: border, division
vanguard: forerunner, leader of a movement
rejuvenation: to make a system younger, effective again



M 10 "Don't rush things, Comrade Gorbachev!"
("Party elites, inefficiency, alcoholism, corruption, dogmatism")
Caricature by Fritz Behrendt, about 1989

Sources on Perestroika and the Chernobyl Reactor Accident

M 11 Gorbachev Speaks to the United Nations General Assembly:

Gorbachev surprised his audience with the following announcement (7 December 1988):

Today I can inform you of the following: The Soviet Union has made a decision on reducing its armed forces. In the next two years, their numerical strength will be reduced by 500,000 persons, and the volume of conventional arms will also be cut considerably. These reductions will be made on a *unilateral* basis, unconnected with negotiations on the mandate for the Vienna meeting. By agreement with our allies in the Warsaw Pact, we have made the decision to withdraw six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and to *disband* them by 1991. *Assault* landing formations and units, and a number of others, including assault river-crossing forces, with their armaments and combat equipment, will also be withdrawn from the groups of Soviet forces situated in those countries. The Soviet forces situated in those countries will be cut by 50,000 persons, and their arms by 5,000 tanks. All remaining Soviet divisions on the territory of our allies will be reorganized. They will be given a different structure from today's which will become unambiguously defensive, after the removal of a large number of their tanks. [...]

http://astro.temple.edu/~rimmerma/gorbachev_speech_to_UN.htm [28 January 2012].

M 12 "This brutally destroys the pretty picture of our enemy!" Caricature by Horst Haitzinger for the 1988 annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Hamburg

M 13 Chernobyl, not Perestroika, Caused Soviet Union to Collapse

Mikhail Gorbachev discusses the relationship between Chernobyl and changes in the Soviet Union under his leadership (2006):

The nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl 20 years ago this month, even more than my launch of perestroika, was perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union five years later. Indeed, the Chernobyl catastrophe was an historic turning point: there was the era before the disaster, and there is the very different era that has followed. [...]

The Chernobyl disaster, more than anything else, opened the possibility of much greater freedom of expression, to the point that the system as we knew it could no longer continue. It made absolutely clear how important it was to continue the policy of glasnost, and I must say that I started to think about time in terms of pre-Chernobyl and post-Chernobyl.

The price of the Chernobyl catastrophe was overwhelming, not only in human terms, but also economically. Even today, the legacy of Chernobyl affects the economies of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Some even suggest that the economic price for the USSR was so high that it stopped the arms race, as I could not keep building arms while paying to clean up Chernobyl.

This is wrong. My declaration of January 15, 1986, is well known around the world. I addressed arms reduction, including nuclear arms, and I proposed that by the year 2000 no country should have atomic weapons. I personally felt a moral responsibility to end the arms race. But Chernobyl opened my eyes like nothing else: it showed the horrible consequences of nuclear power, even when it is used for non-military purposes. One could now imagine much more clearly what might happen if a nuclear bomb exploded. According to scientific experts, one SS-18 rocket could contain a hundred Chernobyls.

http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2006/04/gorbachev_chern.html [28 January 2012].

unilateral: one-sided
to disband: to dissolve
assault: attack

M 14 "Tear down this wall!"

US President Ronald Reagan at the Brandenburg Gate (12 June 1987):

Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe. From the Baltic, south, those barriers cut across Germany in a *gash* of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs, and guard towers. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same – still a restriction on the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state. Yet it is here in Berlin where the wall emerges most clearly; here, cutting across your city, where the news photo and the television screen have imprinted this brutal division of a continent upon the mind of the world. Standing before the Brandenburg Gate, every man is a German, separated from his fellow men. Every man is a Berliner, forced to look upon a *scar*.

President von Weizsacker has said, "The German question is open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed." Today I say: As long as the gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind. [...] General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!

I understand the fear of war and the pain of division that afflict this continent – and I pledge to you my country's efforts to help overcome these burdens. To be sure, we in the West must resist Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of *unassailable* strength. Yet we seek peace; so we must strive to reduce arms on both sides. [...]

While we pursue these arms reductions, I pledge to you that we will maintain the capacity to deter Soviet aggression at any level at which it might occur. And in cooperation with many of our allies, the United States is pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative-research to base deterrence not on the threat of offensive retaliation, but on defenses that truly defend; on systems, in short, that will not target populations, but shield them. By these means we seek to increase the safety of Europe and all the world. But we must remember a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other. And our differences are not about weapons but about liberty. When President Kennedy spoke at the City Hall those 24 years ago, freedom was encircled, Berlin was under siege. And today, despite all the pressures upon this city, Berlin stands secure in its liberty. And freedom itself is transforming the globe. [...]

And I invite Mr. Gorbachev: Let us work to bring the Eastern and Western parts of the city closer together, so that all the inhabitants of all Berlin can enjoy the benefits that come with life in one of the great cities of the world. [...]

http://www.reaganlibrary.com/reagan/speeches/wall.asp [12 March 2009].

gash: cut, wound
scar: permanent mark where sth. has been damaged
unassailable: impossible to defeat

Tasks

1. Describe briefly the Polish role in the disintegration of the Soviet bloc in the years 1963 to 1988 (text, M1, M5, M6).
2. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of nonviolent over violent change (M8).
3. Use the Internet to compare the nuclear disasters in Chernobyl (1986) and in Fukushima (2011). Report on your results in class.
4. Assess the problems Gorbachev faced in reforming the Soviet system (text, M9, M10).
5. Comment on the Western reaction to Gorbachev's suggestions (text, M11, M12).
6. Interpret one of the two cartoons (M10, M12).
7. Analyse Gorbachev's explanation of the collapse of the Soviet Union (M13).
8. Discuss the role Reagan's speech at the Brandenburg Gate (1987) played in the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall (text, M14).
9. If you were writing a textbook of this period, which of the events would you consider essential? Which could you leave out? Explain your choices.

German Unification 1989–1990

M 1 **East Germans Fleeing**
Around 600 East Germans took advantage of a "pan-European picnic", during which a gate on the Austro-Hungarian border was opened symbolically, to flee to the West, 19 August 1989

Dramatic Developments Surprise the World

Initially, the steps leading to German unity occurred uneventfully. However, once the process began, it developed an astonishing speed. Wide-sweeping political, social and economic changes washed away the stability of the old order, setting tremendous euphoria free at the same time. Many feared a violent end to a promising beginning; all hoped to avoid disaster. That both East and West managed to find a peaceful solution to this potentially destabilizing situation is a lasting achievement in international affairs.

Opening the Austro-Hungarian Border

In May 1989 a Communist reformist government in Hungary announced the removal of its fortified border to Austria, and on 27 June the Foreign Ministers Gyula Horn (Hungary) and Alois Mock (Austria) cut open the barbed wire fence between their countries. East German tourists in Hungary took the opportunity to flee to the West through the open border. On 10 September Horn declared the Hungarian border open for East Germans to cross – in the next few months 50,000 East Germans did so.

A potentially difficult situation developed at the West German embassy in Prague, where eventually 4,000 East Germans entered the compound and asked to be transferred to the FRG. On 30 September, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher announced to the crowd that their transport had been arranged, but that they would have to pass through East Germany on their way. The embassies in Warsaw and Budapest faced similar problems with East German refugees, as did the office of the West German permanent representative in East Berlin. Thousands of East Germans voted with their feet and left for the West.

Public Dissatisfaction in East Germany

Public incidents expressing dissatisfaction with the regime occurred occasionally in East Germany, but the effect of such actions was usually short-lived. Two incidents which caused more substantial dismay both occurred in 1976. In August the Lutheran pastor in Zeitz, Oskar Brüsewitz, set himself afire in protest of restrictions on religious freedom. In November Wolf Biermann's expatriation caused greater difficulty for the regime, which was surprised by the solidarity artists and writers showed for Biermann.

Protesters found a powerful weapon in dissenting at the mass assemblies held on national occasions, such as the commemoration of the deaths of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in January. Protesters carrying placards quoting Luxemburg and the GDR constitution on 17 January 1989 were promptly restrained, arrested and expatriated. The warning from the Ministry of State Security was clear – public dissent would result in swift reprisals. However, the expatriation of oppositional leaders backfired and new ways to express dissatisfaction were found.

Independent committees monitored the results of municipal elections in the GDR on 7 May 1989 and proved that the official election results (98.85 % for the SED candidates) had been falsified. Following up on

M 2 **"Freedom of Travel, the Press, Speech"**
Demonstration in Leipzig, October 1989

M 3 **The 40th Anniversary of the Founding of the GDR**
Reviewing stand with Erich Honecker and Mikhail Gorbachev, 7 October 1989

decrepit: old and in bad condition
lignite: a soft, dark brown type of coal
recrimination: a situation in which people accuse or criticize each other

these charges, groups of protesters met at Alexanderplatz in Berlin on the 7th of every month to demand that the municipal elections be cancelled and held under free, democratic conditions. Recurring public dissent in East Germany signalled that the regime had lost its ability to frighten its citizens – a factor which eventually led to its complete undoing.

Leipzig – A Bastion of Protest

Leipzig proved especially suitable for political demonstrations. The GDR's international industrial fair in Leipzig attracted foreign visitors and press twice yearly. The open display of goods during the fair underlined their unavailability to normal East Germans and emphasized the hypocrisy of the official declarations of progress in the GDR. Unlike the capital showcase in Berlin, Leipzig was fairly *decrepit* in 1989; the industrial use of *lignite* power and chemical production plants in the region had created a shocking level of environmental pollution. When some of the worst polluters were shut down in the late 1980s, workers worried about their jobs joined the protesters. Finally, the relatively small inner city provided an effective staging area for demonstrations.

Prayer Meetings for Peace in the Nikolaikirche

The Lutheran pastors of St. Nicholas's Church in Leipzig had organized a series of prayer meetings for peace on Monday evenings beginning in 1982. By March 1989 at the opening of the trade fair, these prayer meetings became a serious problem for the East German authorities. International camera teams filmed the police and Stasi beating demonstrators and peaceful congregants. Despite official attempts to stop the meetings, the Monday prayers continued. Because the church seats quickly filled with people, congregants had to wait quietly in front of the church to hear the proceedings inside. Large groups holding candles were surrounded by security police with helmets and water cannon – the discrepancy could not have been clearer. From 25 September to 16 October the Monday crowds grew steadily in size. By 9 October an estimated 70,000 to 80,000 gathered in the streets of Leipzig. As the fear of violence grew, many decided that only large numbers could prevent bloodshed and joined the protestors.

Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of the GDR

The refugees fleeing and the growing protest demonstrations embarrassed the East German authorities prior to the scheduled fortieth anniversary celebrations of the founding of the GDR on 7 October. Planned mass assemblies made the authorities nervous, as any large gathering also offered dissidents a public forum. While on a state visit to East Berlin from 6 to 7 October, Gorbachev warned his SED audience, "If we lag behind, life will punish us straight away." (His press secretary Gennadi Gerassimov translated the thought as, "Life punishes those who come too late!" – "Wer zu spät kommt, den bestraft das Leben.") Unity Party leaders feared that demonstrators in East Berlin might suddenly storm the Wall, leading to bloodshed and international *recriminations*.

M 4 **Demonstration at East Berlin's Alexanderplatz**
4 November 1989

After Gorbachev's state visit ended, the police and Stasi beat and arrested many during the continuing demonstrations, but the numbers of protesters only increased.

The "Turnaround"

The protests spread to cities all over East Germany; in Leipzig the Monday demonstrations increased from an estimated 70,000 to 80,000 on 9 October to 100,000 to 120,000 on 16 October and then to 300,000 protesters shouting "we are the people" on 23 October.

On 18 October Erich Honecker resigned "for health reasons". He was replaced as General Secretary of the Unity Party by Egon Krenz, who referred to a "turnaround" ("Wende") in East Germany in his acceptance speech. Krenz was further designated chairman of the State Council and National Defense Council on 24 October.

Events proceeded dramatically: On 3 November the GDR authorities approved the emigration of East Germans fleeing through Czechoslovakia. On 4 November the largest group of East Germans in history (estimates range from one-half to one million) met at a demonstration organized by artists in Berlin at Alexanderplatz and demanded freedom of opinion, democracy in the GDR, and the end of the Unity Party's claim to lead the country. Politburo members who addressed the crowd were booed into silence. The writer Stefan Heym summed up the experience, "It was as if someone had pushed the windows open after all the years of greyness and bad air, of big phrases and bureaucratic arbitrariness, of official blindness and deafness."

A Press Conference with Unintended Consequences

Early in the evening of 9 November at a press conference in East Berlin, the spokesman for the politburo, Günter Schabowski, announced that travel restrictions to the West had been revoked. Schabowski insisted under questioning that travel to West Germany and to West Berlin were available to East Germans "immediately". It was not clear from his statements whether travelers would be leaving the country permanently or only temporarily.

M 5 **Press Conference**
Günter Schabowski, regime spokesman, at the legendary press conference on 9 November 1989

The press conference was televised live by the East German broadcaster ADN; Schabowski's announcement was taped and broadcast on the West German channels ZDF and ARD as well. At first hundreds, then thousands, gathered at the gates along the Wall to test the reported opening of the borders. The border guards had not been informed of the changes; they also received no instructions on how to deal with the crowds. Faced with a highly *volatile* situation, the guards eventually opened the gates and let the crowds pass, later abandoning their posts entirely. One of the world's most dangerous borders was opened without a shot being fired. Some found it difficult to believe what had happened – eyewitnesses called it simply "madness" ("Wahnsinn").

The Question of German Unity Raised

Demonstrations in East Germany continued, even after the Wall opened. As the size of the groups increased, one slogan changed from "we are the people" to "we are one people". The new slogan appeared in the Leipzig demonstration on 9 October for the first time, and was then taken up by others. Leipzig protesters later explained that they had

volatile: a situation that can suddenly change and become more dangerous

meant the inclusion of the Stasi and police at the demonstrations, but many interpreted it as a call to national unity. However, the immediate focus of political leaders in both German states in November 1989 was to stabilize a collapsing state and stop the flow of refugees from East to West Germany.

The entire East German state apparatus began to disintegrate following the fall of the Wall. Minister-President Willy Stoph resigned on 13 November; he was replaced by Hans Modrow, a Unity Party leader from Dresden with a reputation as a reformist. On 18 November a new coalition government was set up, but by early December the Party's entire Central Committee and the politburo resigned. On 6 December Egon Krenz resigned all his party and government offices, leaving Modrow the effective leader of East Germany. New elections – the first free elections ever held in East Germany – were scheduled for 18 March 1990.

In these elections, the West-CDU backed Alliance for Germany won 48 percent of the popular vote. The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), formerly the Unity Party, was soundly defeated at 16.4 percent. Lothar de Maizière (CDU), the leader of the new coalition government, had campaigned for German national unity and proceeded immediately toward that goal.



M 6 **"D...M... immediately!"**
The German mark (DM) was the West German currency. Caricature by Hans-Jürgen Starke, 1990

A Window of Opportunity

The developments from November 1989 to October 1990 took place within an unusual diplomatic framework. Internationally, any potential global incident might restrain the willingness of negotiators to come to terms if dealings were extended for a longer time. Gorbachev's reforms led to difficulties within the USSR; all the Western governments ultimately had to face regular elections which might change the outcome of lengthy negotiations. A window of opportunity to achieve German unity had been opened, but it was not clear whether it might quickly close.

Path to Unity: New Constitution or Accession?

The question of how to accomplish unification led to discussion in both German states. Some – especially Green Party members and Social Democrats in the FRG, as well as figures among the new political groups in the GDR, most notably New Forum – wanted to take more time to consider alternatives and possible legal variations. These observers favoured a constitutional assembly, as foreseen in Article 146 of the Basic Law, in which features from both German states could be combined. The governing coalitions in West and East Germany pushed for the more expedient accession of the GDR into the Federal Republic as outlined in Article 23. Emerging developments pressed for quick action: Domestically, people who had left the GDR earlier began legal proceedings to regain their property there, setting off alarms within the East German populace.

On 18 May 1990 leaders of both countries signed an agreement on monetary, economic and social union, which introduced the (West) mark as the currency of East Germany on 1 July. The complexities of transforming the Eastern planned economic and social system to the West's were considerable. East Germans found themselves in a completely new social, political and economic system practically



M 7

overnight. East Berlin and West Berlin united to one city-state. In addition, five East German states (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia) which had been replaced by centralized GDR administrative units were reinstituted on 23 August. On the evening of 22 to 23 August, the East German People's Chamber voted (294 to 62) to join the Federal Republic. A treaty of unification was signed on 31 August; it was ratified by large majorities in the Bundestag and People's Chamber on 20 September 1990 and in the Bundesrat the following day.

Parallel to these inner-German developments, negotiations continued with and among the Four Powers. From 1945 on the Powers had exercised control over affairs affecting all of Germany – that control still remained in effect.



M 8 **"March of the Fourth Reich"**
British caricature by Bill Caldwell in the "Daily Star", 1990

Varying Opinions among the Four Powers

As had so often been the case, the leaders of the Four Powers were not in agreement about the future of Germany. Gorbachev was willing to let the Germans do as they wanted. However, it was not clear whether the Soviet Union would agree to a unified Germany within NATO. US President George H. W. Bush supported German unity, but insisted on German membership in NATO. French President François Mitterrand varied his opinion, depending on his conversational partner. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opposed German unity entirely, fearing the accepted borders in Europe according to the Helsinki Accords of 1975 might be revoked. Thatcher warned Gorbachev that German unity would weaken the USSR – a *prescient* view of the situation, as later developments showed.

The difficult issues demanded especially capable diplomatic negotiators. Leaders in Bonn were disturbed when the Four Powers met to discuss German affairs without including them. When German initiatives (such as Kohl's confederation plan of November 1989) were voiced, leaders of the Four Powers objected to the Germans' taking affairs into their own hands. By February 1990 the formula "two plus four" gained acceptance – both German states and the Four Powers negotiated together. Kohl overcame French resistance to unity by agreeing to German membership in the European Economic and

prescient: farsighted, having foresight

Monetary Union (EMU) which introduced the euro as its financial accounting currency in 1999. (The euro was introduced in banknotes and coins throughout the euro zone in 2001.)

Germany and the Future of NATO

Since 1952 Soviet foreign policy had maintained that German unity and NATO membership were incompatible. If the USSR forced a united Germany to leave NATO, the entire alliance seemed endangered – a result unacceptable to the Western powers. At this point Kohl showed great skill in his diplomacy with Gorbachev. Extensive West German food shipments to the Soviet Union in January 1990 eased shortages there, and a West German credit of five billion marks to the USSR helped stabilize Gorbachev's leadership before the 28th Communist Party Congress in early July.

NATO invited Gorbachev and the Warsaw Pact to establish new, friendly relations in the London Declaration (July 1990). A few days later the 28th Party Congress renewed its support of Gorbachev. The Soviet leader could now make concessions on the military alliance. He worked out the final details of an epochal agreement between Germany and the USSR at a meeting with Kohl in mid-July. German military strength would be reduced to 370,000 soldiers. Germany would remain in NATO, but the alliance would not be active in East Germany until the Soviet troops there were completely withdrawn in 1994. Germany would pay costs to build housing, provide transport and retrain Soviet troops withdrawn from East Germany. In all 55 billion marks were paid to the Soviet Union. Considering the size of the German economy, it was a small price to pay for national unity.

The Two Plus Four Treaty, the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany", was signed on 12 September 1990 in Moscow. It defined the borders of the new united Germany, declared the country's sovereignty, its rejection of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the size of its military forces, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops by 1994. The Four Powers relinquished all of their rights and responsibilities regarding Germany, setting the stage for the final act: German unity was declared and celebrated on 3 October 1990. It truly was the end of the Cold War.

M 9



Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig

M 10 The City of Leipzig

US historian Charles S. Maier describes the influence of Leipzig's geography in the events of 1989 (1997):

Leipzig's geography allowed focused dramatic confrontations. The city of 600,000, second largest in the GDR, was big enough to *muster* crowds, but less *inchoate* than sprawling East Berlin. The old center of Leipzig has an inner city perhaps a kilometre wide enclosed by a broad ring street following the site of old walls. Inside the ring, as of 1989, were the desolate squares with which straitened socialist planners had coped with World War II destruction, but also a mix of a few restored buildings – the sixteenth-century city hall, the churches – and modern structures. [...] On the ring at the southeast stand the monuments of 1960s and 1970s GDR modernism: the successfully designed Gewandhaus or concert hall, the opera theatre, and a seventeen-story tower for the university alongside a lower structure with a large bas relief of Marx and Engels. On the outside of the ring, too, is the Main Station, the largest "sack" terminal (i.e., trains have to back out) in Europe: a broad, handsome turn-of-the-century structure. In front of the station lies the wide northern segment of the ring called the Platz der Republik, perhaps two hundred meters long, where the masses assembled. And finally inside the old city on different sides of the tourist Rathskellar [sic: Auerbachs Keller], where Goethe's Faust and Mephistopheles confronted the students, are the two major late Gothic churches. St. Thomas's, Bach's home church, under the conservative pastor Hans-Wilhelm Ebeling, played no role in the growing protests. Closer to the eastern Ring, St. Nicholas's or the Nikolaikirche, *gussied up* during the rococo with side balconies and carved palm leaves to cover its stone columns, all repainted in white, apple green, and mauve, became the center for the dissidents, its reformist pastor sheltering peaceniks and environmentalists. These sites became the amphitheatre of protest, as on September 25, spilling out from the Nikolaikirche to the Karl Marx Platz on the Ring, between Gewandhaus and Opera at a point equivalent to four o'clock, thence counterclockwise to the Platz der Republik (one o'clock) to the Tröndlinring (at eleven o'clock) tens of thousands of demonstrators assembled.

Charles S. Maier, Dissolution. The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 137.

to muster: to bring together in one place, to gather
inchoate: just beginning to develop
to gussy up: to decorate
to heed: to follow
ploy: trick

M 11 "Monday Demonstration"
Over 100,000 people took part in the demonstration in Leipzig on 16 October 1989

M 12 Two Assessments of the Demonstrations

a) East Germany's "Peaceful Revolution" didn't occur overnight, but the Monday Demonstrations of September and October, 1989 brought matters to a head in Leipzig and other cities of the German Democratic Republic, or GDR. After months of "Peace Prayers" in Leipzig's Nikolaikirche and other public protests, some 70,000 people gathered in the streets of downtown Leipzig on October 9 to demand reform from the SED [German Communist Party] regime. Thousands of police and military personnel were on hand to stop the demonstrations, and soldiers with machine guns were posted on rooftops to intimidate the protesters. Fortunately for the citizens, cries of "No violence" were *heeded*, and one organizer's *ploy* was particularly effective: The pastor of the Nikolaikirche suggested that marchers carry candles, which require two hands: one to hold the candle, the other to protect the flame from blowing out. With two hands occupied, protesters wouldn't be tempted to throw rocks!

b) "We had planned everything. We were prepared for everything. But not for candles and prayers." Horst Sindermann, former GDR official.

Source: The Events in Fall 1989, Nikolaikirche Leipzig; http://europeforvisitors.com/germany/leipzig/leipzig-monday-demonstrations-1989.htm [16 February 2012].

M 13 A Comment

US historian Charles S. Maier on the Leipzig demonstration of 9 October 1989:

October 9, the third mass march, proved decisive. There had been clashes again on the previous Saturday, as police broke up a crowd of 10,000; demonstrators were injured; now the regime assembled tanks and water cannon and apparently prepared hospital beds and blood plasma. Tiananmen Square was still fresh in the minds of both sides, when the SED leaders announced in the most widely sold paper, the Leipziger Volkszeitung, on October 6, that "law and order would be restored once and for all," if necessary with force. On the "prayer wall" in the Thomaskirche where visitors could tack up their written intentions, many expressed their anxiety: "I am afraid that 10/9/89 will be a day like Tiananmen Square in China. And that the rest of the young people will shed their blood for this senseless state. I, we, are frightened." By one o'clock that afternoon, the Nikolaikirche was already full – and surrounded by the police, this time experienced units. Tension was high: from outside there were shouts of, "Gorbi, Gorbi," "We are staying here," "No violence," and "We are the people." Inside there was fear of a violent clash and being arrested.

At five o'clock, however, the balconies were opened for regular worshippers and Pastor Peter Zimmermann – "exhausted and unnerved" – had a statement read, in which Kurt Masur, the conductor of the Leipzig Gewandhaus orchestra, cabaret performer Bernd-Lutz Lange, three district SED secretaries, and he himself pleaded for dialogue. The crowd poured out into the streets: "And now my fear became so great," Susanne Rummel recalled, "that I thought – I have to counteract it somehow. So I went over to the people in the Kampfgruppen [...]. We talked with them, asked them whether we looked like Chaoten or enemies of the state and whether they would really beat us." Gudrun Fischer overcame her husband's reluctance to participate – "I knew that only the largest possible crowd could prevent something bad" – and they flocked to the inner city, listened to the Masur statement ("the first public participation by public leaders in the events that were moving us"), and joined the march. "We are still proud," recalled Sybille Freitag, pensioner, "to have been present on the 9th of October."

[Another demonstrator remarked:]"As the police opened the barriers on the ring that surrounded the inner city and the parade of demonstrators passed the ring unhindered with an astonishing and almost frightening discipline [...]; it was clear that there could be no return to the old GDR".

Charles S. Maier, Dissolution. The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 142–43.

Tasks

1. Explain the effectiveness of the protest demonstrations in Leipzig in the fall of 1989 (text, M10).
2. "[I]t was clear that there could be no return to the old GDR" (M13, ll. 53/54).
   Discuss, referring to the arguments made in the excerpts (M12, M13).

The Fall of the Berlin Wall – Assessing Eyewitness Evidence

M 14 An Eyewitness Report

US historian Hope M. Harrison recalls her weekend in November 1989:

On the afternoon of 9 November 1989, I boarded a plane on a long-planned journey to West Berlin. I was going with a group of graduate students from Harvard and Stanford for ten days on a program sponsored by the city of West Berlin. In an effort to maintain the U.S. commitment to West Berlin, the city paid for the program every year to bring "up and coming" Americans to West Berlin. At the time, I was a pre-doctoral fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. I was working on my dissertation on the building of the Berlin Wall. I wanted to know as much about divided Berlin as possible and was eager for the trip.

Throughout the fall of 1989, East German refugees had been escaping via West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw and across the Hungarian border into Austria. They were all headed to West Germany. Bonn accepted all these refugees as West German citizens entitled to generous social welfare support. In addition, they gave each East German "welcome money" of 100 deutschmarks (worth roughly $55 at the time). Over 50,000 East Germans had fled to West Germany between May and October 1989, and by early November, this had become a crisis for the West German economic and social welfare system. The refugee numbers increased dramatically in early November. In fact, just before I left for West Berlin, 15,000 East Germans fled to West Germany via Czechoslovakia on 4–5 November, and on 7 November, two hundred East Germans left East Germany each hour. The question at the top of my list for all of the West Berlin and West German officials we were going to meet was, "How can you keep this up? What are you going to do about the refugees pouring into your country?"

During the night of Thursday, 9 November, our group flew to Frankfurt. When we boarded the connecting flight to West Berlin on Friday morning, everyone on the plane was reading newspapers with banner headlines declaring, "The Wall Is Open!" I looked around and thought, "Is 10 November the equivalent of April Fool's Day in Germany? What is going on?" I didn't have to wonder for long. The pilot got on the intercom system and announced, "The Wall fell in Berlin last night. We are flying into history."

I could not believe my luck at being in Berlin for this historic occasion, all the more so because of my dissertation topic. My parents, with whom I had spoken many times about the dissertation, were beside themselves with excitement at my timing. *Ich war dabei!* (I was there! as all the quickly manufactured T-shirts and mugs said.)

Euphoria is the only word to describe the mood on the streets of Berlin. People were selling champagne on street corners. On the afternoon of 10 November, in a jet-lagged, yet *ebullient* state, several of us went to Kennedy Platz (the site of Kennedy's 1963 *Ich bin ein Berliner* speech), in front of the West Berlin City Hall, Rathaus Schöneberg, to hear the West German leaders speak about the momentous opening of the Wall. Chancellor Helmut Kohl had flown back hurriedly from Warsaw that morning along with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The West Berlin mayor, Walter Momper, was also on the podium. The most popular speaker of the day, though, was Willy Brandt, who had been the mayor of West Berlin when the Wall went up in 1961 and had gone on to become the West German chancellor. As a historian and as a human being, it was extraordinary to be part of the celebration at Rathaus Schöneberg – to actually be there and feel the emotion of the day, not just read about it in history books.

Back at the hotel for dinner, I befriended one of the West Berlin English teachers hosting us, Claudia Wilhelm. Claudia volunteered to drive me around in her VW Bug the next day. Claudia was and is a Berliner. She was born in the East and fled with her family to the West in 1958. When the Wall came down, she was reunited with family in the East, including some she had not even known about.

Saturday morning, 11 November, Claudia picked me up and drove me to see the celebrations at the Brandenburg Gate and the opening of the Glienecker Brücke, the famous "spy bridge" connecting West Berlin and Potsdam, East Germany. In 1962 the American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers had been traded for the Soviet spy Rudolf Abel in the middle of the bridge. Claudia and I stood amid crowds of cheering West Berliners as East Germans walked across the bridge and into the beautiful Grunewald section of West Berlin

with its forests and lakes. People cheered. People cried. We took pictures. It was incredible.

The next morning, we drove to Potsdamer Platz, the historic center of Berlin and site of Europe's first traffic light in 1924. With the building of the Berlin Wall through the center of Potsdamer Platz, it became a barren, terrifying no-man's land of layers of wall, minefields, guard towers, anti-tank barricades, guard dogs, and guards with a shoot-to-kill order. But on this spectacular Sunday morning, we watched a bulldozer lift up and remove a section of the Wall at Potsdamer Platz. Then we stood with the thousands of people who parted to form a corridor through which East Berliners could walk or drive into West Berlin. It was the most moving experience of my ten days in Berlin. I remember watching one young couple drive through in their green Trabant, or Trabi (the tiny, cardboard-like, exhaust-emitting, popular East German car). They were alternately laughing and crying, and people were reaching through their open car windows to hand the couple money and champagne. The hood of their car was covered with red and white *carnations*. We were all filled with emotion.

All weekend long, it was impossible to drive a car on the main street of West Berlin, the Kürfurstendamm, due to the tens of thousands of East Berliners and East Germans strolling up and down it to get a look at West Berlin's Fifth Avenue. We wanted to take the subway to East Berlin, but it was out of the question to even enter a subway station due to the thousands of people coming in from East Berlin. Monday morning's West Berlin tabloid, *Bild*, had huge headlines in black, red, and gold, the colors of the German flag saying, "*Guten Morgen, Deutschland. Es war ein schönes Wochenende.*" "Good Morning, Germany. It was a beautiful weekend." It certainly was.

Hope M. Harrison, from the preface to Driving the Soviets Up the Wall. Soviet-East German Relations, 1953–1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. xi-xiii.

ebullient: very happy and enthusiastic
carnation: a type of flower



M 15 The Fall of the Berlin Wall
Border crossing at Bornholmer Straße in Berlin, 9 November 1989

Tasks

1. Summarize Harrison's report briefly (M14).
2. Point out the details which show Harrison's professional interest in the events.
3. Analyse the author's usage of words for "emotion" in the text.
4. Ask other eyewitnesses (for example, your parents, grandparents, other relatives, friends of your family) what they remember of 9 November 1989 and report on your results to the class.
5. Assess the accuracy of Harrison's report here.

Four Power Negotiations on Germany – Assessing Perspectives

M 16 The Soviet Union

US historian David H. Shumaker on Gorbachev's acceptance of German unity (1995):

The accelerating dissolution of the East German state, the overwhelming victory of parties favoring unification in the March 1990 GDR elections, and Gorbachev's growing domestic problems inspired world leaders to act quickly to keep up with events. Personal relations between the relevant diplomats and statements contributed mightily to the swift but controlled unification that resulted. [...] But the ultimate Soviet acceptance of a unified Germany in NATO was made possible by Gorbachev's willingness *to incur* the wrath of Soviet conservative opposition. Most of the Western security guarantees that finally accompanied German membership in NATO had been in circulation since early 1990. Gorbachev was willing to make this sacrifice because of his trust in Western leaders, his fundamentally altered vision of international relations, and the multitude of domestic problems demanding immediate attention.

David H. Shumaker, Gorbachev and the German Question: Soviet-West German Relations, 1985–1990 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), p. 129.

M 17 Historic Meeting

Photograph (from left) of US Vice President George H. W. Bush, US President Ronald Reagan, and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev waving to New Yorkers, 7 December 1988

M 18 The United States

Memorandum of a telephone conversation from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to US President George H. W. Bush, 17 November 1989:

Chancellor Kohl: In my talks with [new East German leader] Krenz, I raised the issues of free elections, free trade unions, and freedom of the press. I suggested that we in the FRG will give comprehensive assistance under the condition that these reforms, which the people are expecting, will be carried out. If they do not carry them out, the government will fall. There will be more movement on Saturday and Sunday. I expect more than a million people will visit the FRG. I hope that the opening of the border has had the consequence that travellers do not have to stay but can return to an improving home. In view of world political developments, we will do nothing that will destabilize the situation in the GDR. I had a long conversation with Gorbachev. Of course, the Soviets are concerned. I told Gorbachev that if Krenz does not carry out reforms as in Poland and Hungary, the system will fail.

The President: Thank you for your support in your public comments. It is important that Germans see that they have the support and sympathy of their Allies. [...] Let me say that we appreciate the FRG's stand and your stand personally. In spite of Congressional *posturing*, the U.S. will stay calm and support reforms in just the way you talk about. The euphoric excitement in the U.S. runs the risk of forcing unforeseen action in the USSR or the GDR that would be very bad. We will not be making *exhortations* about unification or setting any timetables. We will not *exacerbate* the problem by having the President of the United States posturing on the Berlin Wall.

www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/.../doc01.pdf [24 January 2015].

to incur: to provoke, bring upon oneself
posturing: acting, dramatizing
exhortation: warning, urging
exacerbate: to make sth. worse

M 19 West Germany, France and Great Britain

US historian Mary Elise Sarotte gives an account of Mitterrand's dinner with Kohl and Thatcher on 18 November 1989:

Mitterand called for a short-notice dinner in Paris on Saturday, November 18. Sitting around the table would be just the leaders of the twelve EC member states. The aides would be at a separate dinner, presided over by Mitterrand's foreign policy adviser Jacques Attali. Clearly, the "grown-ups" were going to speak their minds plainly in advance of the end-of-year EC summit.

Dinner proceeded without serious incident, but according to both Kohl and Attali (presumably informed by Mitterrand afterward), Thatcher made her move over dessert. As a summary written the next day by her private secretary Charles Powell noted, the prime minister made it clear that there could be "no question of changing Europe's borders, which had been confirmed in the Helsinki Final Act. Any attempt to raise this or the issue of reunification would risk undermining Mr. Gorbachev's position [... and] open a Pandora's box of border claims right through Central Europe." Kohl replied by pointing out that NATO had in fact *endorsed* German reunification at a summit in 1970. Thatcher, according to Kohl, snapped that this endorsement happened then because nobody believed it would ever take place; Kohl responded that be that as it may, the NATO decision still stood. His reply angered Thatcher so much, he remembered, that she started stamping her feet in fury. Kohl was on some level grateful to know where he stood: "The Iron Lady wanted to keep the status quo." He also observed that Mitterrand seemed to approve of Thatcher's remarks. The EC – or at least its most powerful members – were going to demand something in return for tolerating Kohl's talk of a united German nation.

Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 64.

M 20 France

a) French President Mitterrand at a press conference in Paris (27 July 1989):

Question: Mr. President, could you imagine the German Question being resolved without the approval of all European countries?

Answer: No, not without the approval of those who today are concerned with the application of the treaties and the Federal Republic's security. The Germans must of course be able to decide freely for themselves, but the approval of the Soviet Union and the western powers will require a true dialogue.

Question: Since Gorbachev visited Germany the right of the people to self-determination is again the subject of much discussion. Is that the proper approach to a solution?

Answer: One thing is for sure: As indisputable as this right is, it cannot be an occasion for a *forceps delivery*, to use a medical metaphor. First, the two German governments must agree. Neither of the two German states can force anything upon the other. This German-German aspect is of fundamental importance. None of the leaders of the Federal Republic whom I have met has ever claimed to be able to force reunification by intensifying tensions in Europe.

Question: Is the Federal Republic not in the process of drifting away from the West? Isn't it trying to



M 21 François Mitterrand (1916–1996)
Photograph, 1986

to endorse: to support
forceps delivery: helping at birth by pulling the child out of its mother's body with tongs

Four Power Negotiations on Germany – Assessing Perspectives

assume a special role, to take the so-called special path [Sonderweg] with an eye toward central Europe and the Soviet Union, despite all the risks of neutralism?

Answer: I have noted that those who have a trained eye for the Federal Republic have indeed noticed an effective shift in public opinion. I personally cannot say anything about that. But nothing indicates that the political leadership, the government, or the Federal Chancellor have changed their standpoint at all – if for no other reason than the continued active politics of the Federal Republic in the European Community of twelve. Let me repeat what I already said about Germany's geographical location and its history. France has always tended toward Mediterranean policies because of its opening to the Mediterranean, to Africa and the Middle East. Who could point a finger at Germany for paying greater attention to the East, to Poland, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia? A Germany that has also regained its strength as a great economic power with world status would of course also want to play a greater political role. That is also not surprising. For me this situation is part of the idea that I have of European and world politics, and it gives me reason also to strengthen France's presence and efforts in the concert of the nations.

Source: French President François Mitterrand on the Issue of German Reunification, Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 27, 1989. The translation is available at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Chapter13Doc14Intro.pdf [6 February 2012].

b) A British political scientist on Mitterrand's role in German unification (1994):

It was hardly surprising that the imminent prospect of German unification (rather than its theoretical long-term possibility) was unlikely to find favour with a French President, given the changing European balance of power it was likely to produce. Once it became clear that German unification would go ahead anyway – whatever the French attitude – Mitterrand drew the logical consequence from this, and officially welcomed the process. But it must be stressed that the Franco-German special relationship had virtually no impact on the process of German unification. Far more important were: the decisions taken by Mikhail Gorbachev (the acceptance that a unified Germany would be in NATO); the role played by the US; and, of course, the determination illustrated by Kohl himself to exploit the issue of unification for its maximum political benefit. Attempts by Mitterrand and other European statesmen to influence events were largely without consequence. Herein lay one of the minor paradoxes of German unification: despite widespread calls for European political union (EPU) and common security and defence policies, the real *leverage* of the Federal Republic continued to be exercised by the two superpowers.

Alistair Cole, François Mitterrand. A Study in Political Leadership (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 155.

M 22 Great Britain

"Der Spiegel" on Margaret Thatcher's opposition to German unity (9 November 2009):

Two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office wants to improve the reputation of the British during this key period in German history. The new documents reveal that Foreign Ministry diplomats were considerably more farsighted than Thatcher, who was led by her gut reaction against Germany. The long-secret papers show that the British government played a far more constructive role in German reunification than had been previously

M 23 Margaret Thatcher (*1925)
Photograph, 1983

thought. Only one person had serious doubts about the change: Margaret Thatcher.

[...] But even the Iron Lady gradually gave up her resistance to reunification when the framework for the Two-Plus-Four Agreement was drawn up, paving the way for the two states to merge. After a meeting in Chequers, Thatcher's country residence, on January 27, Foreign Minister Hurd noted a slight softening in her position. "Usual *diatribe* against German selfishness," Hurd noted in his diary, "but the hankering to stop unification now comes less often, and we are into 'transition' and reducing the British Army of the Rhine."

According to a note believed to be penned by Thatcher or Powell, Hurd voiced a warning to the prime minister on February 23: "The Foreign Secretary said we must not appear to be a brake on everything. Rather we should come forward with some positive ideas of our own," the note said. The authors of the book write of the Foreign Ministry's "war of attrition," which Thatcher slowly wound down.

The fact that France, the Soviet Union and the United States supported German reunification also had an impact on her stance. Gradually Thatcher moved into the German political mainstream – but she never lost her deep-seated suspicion of the Germans.

For example, in March 1990, she invited historians and politicians to a discussion at Chequers to address the question: "How dangerous are the Germans?" At the end of the seminar, her adviser Powell noted that they reached unanimous agreement that "we should be nice to the Germans."

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,druck-648364,00.html [27 February 2012].

leverage: (here) influence
diatribe: criticism (of)



M 24 "Dropping the Pilots"
Caricature by Laurence Clark, "New Zealand Herald", 4 October 1990

Tasks

1. Divide into groups of four, with one member of each group examining the position of one of the Four Powers on the situation in Germany (text, M16, M18–M20, M22). Analyse the diplomatic complexities in each group and compare your results in class.
2. Assess the role Germans played in achieving national unity (text, M19).
3. Interpret the caricature (M24).

Conclusion

German unity arrived like a bolt out of the blue, surprising those directly involved in negotiating it as well as those who simply observed the events from the sidelines. A convergence of harmonious agreements on disarmament and finances among leaders who held each other in esteem opened a window of opportunity for a problem which had been considered closed for many years.

Despite disturbances which threatened to unsettle the established balance of power in Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland) and Asia (Vietnam, Afghanistan), the superpowers US and USSR managed to find a successful path to international cooperation. Détente between the divided German states not only profited from this cooperation, but also contributed to its eventual flowering. The achievement of German unity marks a milestone in international relations – not only the speed of the decisions and the negotiation of difficult interests but also the determination of demonstrators to maintain the peace and of world leaders not to let an unusual opportunity pass were phenomenal.

In 1990 the world seemed a far more secure place than it had been only a short time previously. Of course, the euphoria of the moment passed rather quickly. The frustrations in integrating both German states into one replaced the initial feelings of happiness. The Soviet Union faced severe internal conflicts which ultimately led to its dissolution, and difficult international affairs could no longer be resolved by agile diplomatic cooperation.

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Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe, Princeton 2009.

Timeline

13 August 1961	Berlin Wall built
16 October 1963	Konrad Adenauer (CDU) resigns as Chancellor of the FRG
7 August 1964	Gulf of Tonkin Resolution begins US escalation in South Vietnam
1 December 1966	Ludwig Erhard (CDU) resigns as Chancellor of the FRG, succeeded by Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt (SPD) in a Grand Coalition
20 – 21 August 1968	Warsaw Pact invades Czechoslovakia, ending the Prague Spring
21 October 1969	Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel (FDP) lead a Social-Liberal coalition
3 May 1971	Erich Honecker replaces Walter Ulbricht as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party in the GDR
12 August 1970	Moscow Treaty signed between West Germany and the USSR
7 December 1970	Warsaw Treaty signed between West Germany and Poland
3 September 1971	Four Power Agreement on Berlin signed
10 December 1971	Willy Brandt is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
19 September 1972	both German states join the United Nations
21 December 1972	Basic Treaty between West and East Germany signed
11 December 1973	Prague Treaty between West Germany and Czechoslovakia signed
6 May 1974	Brandt resigns as West German chancellor (Guillaume affair)
30 April 1975	North Vietnamese army occupies Saigon
July – August 1975	Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
16 November 1976	East German songwriter Wolf Biermann expatriated
24 December 1979	Soviet troops invade Afghanistan
13 December 1981	martial law declared in Poland (official response to Solidarnosc)
10 November 1982	Leonid Brezhnev, leader of the USSR, dies; followed in succession by Yuri Andropov and by Konstantin Chernenko
23 March 1983	US President Reagan announces a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
October 1983	Lech Walesa, leader of Solidarnosc, awarded Nobel Peace Prize
11 March 1985	Mikhail Gorbachev becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
26 April 1986	Chernobyl nuclear plant accident
8 December 1987	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between US and USSR signed
15 May 1988 – 15 February 1989	Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan
7 December 1988	Gorbachev announces unilateral reduction of Soviet arms
27 June 1989	Hungarian fortifications on border to Austria removed, resulting in mass exodus of East German vacationers in Hungary
September – October 1989	Monday prayer meetings in Leipzig turn into non-violent demonstrations against the East German regime
7 October 1989	40th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the GDR
18 October 1989	Erich Honecker resigns as leader of East Germany
9 November 1989	the Berlin Wall is opened
18 March 1990	free elections held in East Germany
July 1990	Soviet leader Gorbachev and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl agree on plan for German unification; united Germany may remain a member of NATO
22–23 August 1990	East German People's Chamber votes to join the Federal Republic
12 September 1990	Two Plus Four Treaty signed by the two German states and the Four Powers in Moscow: Allied rights maintained since 1945 are rescinded, Germany may unite
3 October 1990	declaration of German unity

Electoral Campaign in Leipzig
March 1990

Tanks in Moscow
19 August 1991

"Mission Accomplished"
U.S. President George W. Bush speaks on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln after its return from the military "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Photograph, 1 May 2003

German KFOR Soldiers in Kosovo
2004

European Sovereign Debt Crisis
Greeks protest austerity measures, 2011

Germany, Europe and Global Challenges 1990–2013

After German unification in 1990, it was clear that extensive efforts would be necessary to achieve real unity within the country. The goals were set, but the route to attaining them was unknown. No country had ever attempted to transform a planned economy to a market economy before, so there were no models to consult. The process was harsh and disturbing to many; especially eastern Germans were disappointed by what they considered unfair treatment in a historic transition.

That German integration was difficult and would continue for a long time was not surprising. However, at the very time when this integration was taking place, other dramatic and unpredictable events overshadowed it. The dissolution of the Soviet Union (and with it the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe) and the terrorist attacks in the US reset the parameters of international diplomacy. The consequences were far-reaching and affected Germany and Europe alike.

Membership in the EU grew rapidly, raising the criticism of too much expansion at too fast a pace. EU institutions were reformed to counter a perceived lack of democratic legitimacy. Britain remained a reluctant member of the EU and refused to join the "euro zone" for the common currency in 2001. Germany, after profiting from the immediate incorporation of what had been East Germany in the EU, was a reliable proponent of European unity. Together with France, Germany has become a leading power in European affairs.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia prompted the response of NATO. Ethnic cleansing as a military strategy made it impossible for Germany to stand aside in the Balkans. During NATO engagement outside of Europe, German leaders had to weigh the prospects of military action unpopular at home against the disappointment of former military allies. In any case, the German role in world affairs has increased since 1990.

One unanticipated challenge on the economic scene was the threatened collapse of banks and the ensuing financial crisis in the US and Europe. Other global challenges have occurred in the rise of potentially new economic powers (the BRICS states), in migration, and in climate and environmental affairs. An attempt is made here to look at each of these factors briefly. The way to find more information is also given, where appropriate.

dissolution: official ending
retribution: punishment for an evil deed
to depose: to force an official leader out of his position
to solicit: to ask for urgently

International Developments after the End of the Cold War

Fundamental Changes in the International Framework

Unforeseen developments changed both superpowers, the Soviet Union and the US, in fundamental ways at a time when global peace had seemed within reach. First, the *dissolution* of the Soviet Union altered life in the Russian Federation and affected international relations. Second, the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) provoked an American response which restricted democratic rights domestically and sought *retribution* internationally.

The Astonishing Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Except for a brief period at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union could not rely on democratic traditions in a civil society to guide its political life. When Mikhail Gorbachev introduced perestroika and glasnost, he believed that a majority within the Communist Party and within Soviet society would support reforms essential to the survival of the Soviet Union in a globalized world. Events proved him wrong.

Liberalization of the press, for example, opened public discussion of the deficits of the Soviet system. Grievances, corruption, and failed policies were revealed to a public which had always been told that the Party and its leadership functioned perfectly. The Communist Party lost influence rapidly. At the same time national groups, long hidden under the blanket of Soviet integration, demanded their independence. First the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania claimed national sovereignty in 1986. They were followed by the Caucasus republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and later by Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.

In August 1991 an attempted coup d'état on the part of Soviet generals and Communist Party failed. But instead of *deposing* Gorbachev the coup led to the dissolution of the USSR. As soon as Soviet weakness was shown, national groups pushed for independence. On 8 December the leaders of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia declared the Soviet Union dissolved, replacing it with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Gorbachev resisted the move, but by 21 December representatives of all the Soviet republics except Georgia signed the Alma-Ata Protocol, sealing the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union.

M 1 **Tanks in Moscow**
Civilians try to keep troops from advancing, 19 August 1991.

M 2 **Boris Yeltsin (1931–2007)**
President of the Russian Federation, 1991–1999

M 3 **Vladimir Putin (*1952)**
Prime Minister of Russia, 1999–2000, 2008–2012; President of the Russian Federation, 2000–2008, since 2012

Putin on NATO Eastern expansion:

"At one time we were promised that after Germany's unification, NATO wouldn't spread eastward. [...] Our decision on Crimea was partially prompted by this."

From Putin's televised press conference, 17 April 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/world/europe/russia-ukraine.html [25 April 2014].

Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR, declared the office as no longer existent, and turned his remaining official functions over to Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia, on 25 December.

Yeltsin had belonged to Gorbachev's early circle of radical reformers and had won international prestige during the attempted coup. However, as he faced economic troubles and ethnic groups asking to officially leave the Russian Federation, Yeltsin relied on nationalistic ideals and military confrontation to help the threatened state. The brutal suppression of Chechen separatists begun in 1994 has continued under Yeltsin's chosen successor Vladimir Putin, who was elected president in March 2000.

Putin's Reversal of Course

Putin set about reversing Gorbachev's advances toward democratic institutions and governance in Russia. The clearest evidence of this is his circumvention of the electoral system. According to Russian law, the president of the Federation can only serve two consecutive terms in office. When he had exhausted the term limits, Putin supported the candidacy of his party associate Dmitry Medvedev as president and took on the position of prime minister for four years. In 2012 Putin and Medvedev switched offices. Popular opposition to the move was ineffective. Putin's manipulation of the state apparatus awakens memories of previous Soviet oppressive measures. Business corruption is common, critical journalists face difficulties. Trials of opponents such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky and singers in the punk band Pussy Riot have raised worries about human rights. Although these prisoners were released before the Sochi Olympic Games in 2014, Putin's annexation of Crimea and Russian separatist agitation in Ukraine after the Games shocked many.

Bloc Relations after 1990

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was negotiated among the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact beginning in 1989; it was signed and ratified even during the phase of Soviet dissolution, and went into effect on 17 July 1992. The treaty limited the number of conventional weapons in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals), determined that weapons exceeding the treaty's limits would be destroyed, and provided for inspections to assure cooperation. These goals were successfully implemented, but in 2007 Russia announced its intent to suspend the treaty.

NATO expansion in Eastern Europe annoyed Russians. During negotiations on reunification German leaders had assured Gorbachev that NATO would not expand to the Soviet borders. However, the 1990 treaty on Germany merely kept NATO forces out of the territory of the GDR while Soviet troops were still stationed there. After Yeltsin signed a security agreement with NATO in 1997, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined the alliance in 1999. The matter has already produced new historical legends.

Changes in US Policy

Following an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, a United Nations coalition led by US forces repulsed the invaders in a brief military action (Operation Desert Storm) in early 1991. The speedy American

victory contributed to a growing impression that the US remained the sole superpower after the end of the Cold War. Under the leadership of President Bill Clinton the US experienced a phase of remarkable prosperity. Theorists like Francis Fukuyama postulated the "end of history" and the beginning of a new democratic era. US observers referred to a "peace dividend" which would allow the country to turn to pressing social and political needs after the long years of military engagement since 1945. These hopes for domestic renewal came to a swift close with the attacks of 11 September 2001.

M 4 **"9/11"**
Nearly 3,000 died in the attacks.
Photograph, 11 September 2001

Four American passenger planes were hijacked by a group of suicide bombers early on 11 September. Two of the planes were flown into the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a third into the Pentagon, and the fourth crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Osama bin Laden, leader of Al-Qaeda, a militant Islamist organization founded in response to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, claimed responsibility for the attacks in 2004. Bin Laden pointed to the US support of Israel, the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, and the sanctions against Iraq as motives for the attacks. US President George W. Bush proclaimed a "war on terror"; the US, aided by the United Kingdom, the Afghan Northern Alliance, Canada, and Australia, invaded Afghanistan, which was sheltering bin Laden, in October 2001. American involvement in Afghanistan – now the longest war in US history – is scheduled to end in 2014. Especially the shocking abuse of prisoners has provoked public outrage and damaged the US reputation at home and abroad.

President Bush, supported by an outpouring of patriotic enthusiasm, sought to prevent terrorist attacks on US soil in future. The Patriot Act passed by Congress affected civil liberties by expanding intelligence gathering within the US, increasing supervision of financial matters, and enlarging police powers over those suspected of terrorist acts.

In addition a new Department of Homeland Security became responsible for protecting the country from and responding to terrorist acts, man-made accidents and natural disasters; it has a substantial role in immigration matters and customs services. The Transportation Security Administration, which *processes* and inspects passengers and their luggage at US airports, is an agency of Homeland Security.

to process: to deal with, organize

Two Academic Opinions after the End of the Cold War

M 5 "A Troubled *Triceratops*"

The US historian John Lewis Gaddis writes (1997):

A key assumption of the "old" Cold War history was that with the defeat of Germany and Japan, the international system shifted from a multipolar to a bipolar configuration. The great powers of Europe appeared to have committed a kind of collective suicide, leaving the United States and the Soviet Union as even greater superpowers. Whereas earlier history had seen several large states competing within the global arena, the future now lay, or so it seemed, in the hands of only two. Alexis de Tocqueville had predicted in 1835 that Russians and Americans would one day dominate the destinies of half the earth, and in 1945 it certainly looked as though their time had come. This switch from multipolarity to bipolarity also impressed theorists. "Realists" interpreted it to mean that only the balancing of power would ensure peace. By the 1970s, "neo-realists" saw bipolarity as so deeply rooted that stability was sure to result from it. Their most influential spokesman, Kenneth Waltz, foresaw the possibility that the Cold War might someday end – but only because bipolarity would make that possible. The Soviet Union and the United States would dominate the post-Cold War world, he predicted in 1979, for as far into the future as one could foresee. Obviously both the historians and the theorists got it wrong. The error arose, I think, from the way we calculated power during the Cold War years. We did so almost entirely in monodimensional terms, focusing particularly on military indices, when a multidimensional perspective might have told us more. The end of the Cold War made it blindingly clear that military strength does not always determine the course of great events: the Soviet Union collapsed, after all, with its arms and armed forces fully intact. Deficiencies in other kinds of power – economic, ideological, cultural, moral – caused the USSR to lose its superpower status, and we can now see that a slow but steady erosion in those non-military capabilities had been going on for some time. To visualize what happened, imagine a troubled *triceratops*. From the outside, as rivals contemplated its sheer size, tough skin, bristling armament, and aggressive posturing, the beast looked sufficiently formidable that none dared tangle with it. Appearances deceived, though, for within its digestive, circulatory, and respiratory systems were slowly *clogging up*, and then shutting down. There were few external signs of this until the day the creature was found with all four feet in the air, still awesome but now bloated, stiff, and quite dead. The moral of the fable is that armaments make impressive exoskeletons, but a shell alone ensures the survival of no animal and no state.

John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 283–284.

M 6 "The End of History?"

The historian Francis Fukuyama writes (1992):

The distant origins of the present volume lie in an article entitled "The End of History?" which I wrote for the journal The National Interest in the summer of 1989. In it, I argued that a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism. More than that, however, I argued that liberal democracy may constitute the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government," and such constituted the "end of history." That is, while earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions. This was not to say that today's stable democracies, like the United States, France, or Switzerland, were not without injustice or serious social problems. But these problems were ones of incomplete implementation of the twin principles of liberty and equality on which modern democracy is founded, rather than of *flaws* in the principles themselves. While some present-day countries might fail to achieve stable liberal democracy and others might lapse back into other, more primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship, the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved on.

Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992), p. xi.

triceratops: a dinosaur with three horns
to clog up: to become blocked
flaw: defect, weakness

The Changing Situation in Russia

M 7 A Prisoner States his Goals

Mikhail Khodorkovsky summarizes his defense at his second trial (14 December 2010):

I do not exaggerate when I say that millions of eyes throughout all Russia and the whole world are watching the outcome of this trial.

They are watching with hope, the hope that Russia will after all become a country of freedom and the law, a country where the law will be above the bureaucrat.

Where supporting opposition parties will cease to be a cause for repression.

Where the security services will protect the people and the law, and not the bureaucracy from the people and from the law.

Where human rights will no longer depend on the mood of the tsar, whether good or evil.

Where, on the contrary, government will be truly dependent on the citizens, and the courts will depend only on the law and on God. Call this conscience, if you prefer.

I believe that this is how it will be.

I am far from being an ideal person, but I am a person with an idea. For me, as for anybody, it is hard to live in prison, and I do not want to die here.

But if I have to, I will have no hesitation. What I believe in is worth dying for. I think I have shown this.

And my respected opponents? What do you believe in? That the bosses are always right? In money? In the *impunity* of the "system"? I don't know. It's for you to decide.

www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mikhail-khodorkovsky/mikhail-khodorkovsky-final-trial-speech [8 Sept 2012].

M 8 Photograph of Pussy Riot

The band Pussy Riot trying to perform in a Moscow cathedral in February 2012

M 9 Russians Demonstrate Against Putin

From a news report in The Guardian (16 September 2012):

The first major protest against Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, after a summer lull drew tens of thousands of people in Moscow, in a show of *defiance* that opposition sentiment remains strong despite Kremlin efforts *to muzzle* dissent.

[...]

Putin has taken a tougher course against the opposition since his inauguration in May with a series of new repressive laws, arrests and interrogation of activists. In August, a court handed two-year prison sentences to three members of the punk band Pussy Riot for performing an anti-Putin song inside Moscow's main cathedral. [...]

Alexei Navalny, a charismatic anti-corruption crusader and a popular blogger who has been a key driving force behind the opposition protests, urged the demonstrators to show resolve and keep the pressure on the Kremlin with more street protests.

"We must come to rallies to win freedom for ourselves and our children, to defend our human dignity," he said to cheers of support. "We will come here as to our workplace. No one else will free us but ourselves."

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/16/russia-anti-putin-protest-moscow [25 January 2015].

impunity: freedom from prosecution and punishment
defiance: refusal to obey
to muzzle: to keep quiet

M 10 "This is the world's fight."

George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress and the Nation (20 September 2001):

We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war – to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.

[...] Our response involves far more than instant *retaliation* and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. [...]

We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest.

And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.

From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. Our nation has been put on notice, we're not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. [...]

The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it and destroy it where it grows.

Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents, to intelligence operatives, to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our prayers.

And tonight a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I have called the armed forces to alert, and there is a reason.

The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud.

This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom.

This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.

We ask every nation to join us.

[...] Perhaps the NATO charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America's side.

They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror unanswered cannot only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments.

www.historyplace.com/speeches/gw-bush-9-11.htm [11 Sept 2012].

M 11 "A new kind of evil"

Ron Suskind, journalist for the New York Times on George W. Bush's presidency (2004):

Bruce Bartlett, a domestic policy adviser to Ronald Reagan and a treasury official for the first President Bush, told me recently that "[... Bush is] always talking about this sort of weird, Messianic idea of what he thinks God has told him to do." Bartlett [...] went on to say: "This is why George W. Bush is so clear-eyed about Al-Qaeda and the Islamic fundamentalist enemy. He believes you have to kill them all. They can't be persuaded, that they're extremists, driven by a dark vision. He understands them, because he's just like them." [...]. "This is why he dispenses with people who confront him with inconvenient facts," Bartlett went on to say. "He truly believes he's on a mission from God. Absolute faith like that overwhelms a need for analysis. The whole thing about faith is to believe things for which there is no empirical evidence." Bartlett paused, then said, "But you can't run the world on faith." [...].

It was during a press conference on Sept. 16 [2001], in response to a question about homeland security efforts *infringing* on civil rights, that Bush first used the telltale word "crusade" in public. "This is a new kind of – a new kind of evil," he said. "And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while."

Muslims around the world were incensed. Two days later, Ari Fleischer tried to perform damage control. "I think what the president was saying was – had no intended consequences for anybody, Muslim or otherwise, other than to say that this is a broad cause that he is calling on America and the nations around the world to join." As to "any connotations that would upset any of our partners, or anybody else in the world, the

retaliation: revenge
to infringe : to break a law

The Changing Situation in the US

president would regret if anything like that was conveyed." [...].

In the summer of 2002, after I had written an article in Esquire that the White House didn't like about Bush's former communications director, Karen Hughes, I had a meeting with a senior adviser [later identified as Karl Rove] to Bush. He expressed the White House's displeasure, and then he told me something that at the time I didn't fully comprehend – but which I now believe gets to the very heart of the Bush presidency.

The aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based community," which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge from your *judicious* study of discernible reality." I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. "That's not the way the world really works anymore," he continued. "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors [...] and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do."

Ron Suskind, "Without a Doubt", New York Times, 17 October 2004. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05EFD8113BF934A25753C1A9629C8B63&pagewanted=all [7 Sept 2012].

M 12 "Mission Accomplished"

US President George W. Bush speaks on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln after its return from the military "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Photograph, 1 May 2003

M 13 Could 9/11 Have Been Prevented?

Journalist Julian Borger in The Guardian (12 April 2004):

The Bush administration was yesterday striving to play down the political impact of a secret document it was forced to release warning the president, weeks before the September 11 attacks, about "patterns of suspicious activity" in the US "consistent with preparations for hijackings".

The document, a daily intelligence briefing provided to President George Bush on August 6 2001, also mentioned "recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York" and a CIA-FBI investigation into a *tip-off* to the US embassy in the United Arab Emirates *alleging* an al-Qaida cell was in the US "planning attacks with explosives".

The publication of a top-secret Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) while the president in question is still in office is unprecedented, but the White House decided to release the one and a quarter page document after repeated demands by a commission looking into the September 11 hijackings.

The briefing paper, entitled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US", has fast become *exhibit A* in the election-year row over whether the al-Qaida attacks on New York and Washington could have been prevented.

Democrats on the September 11 commission have questioned why the president did not take urgent security measures after receiving the brief at his holiday home in Crawford, Texas. No urgent meetings appear to have been called and the president spent much of the following day playing golf, and bantering nonchalantly with the press.

The White House simultaneously released a "fact sheet" that was twice as long as the PDB, playing down its significance. "The PDB article did not warn of the 9/11 attacks," the fact sheet argued. "Although the PDB referred to the possibility of hijackings, it did not discuss the possible use of planes as weapons."

Mr Bush made his first comment about the document yesterday, saying: "I wanted to know whether there was anything, any actionable intelligence." When he read the memo of August 6 2001, "I was satisfied that some of the matters were being looked into." He said the document contained "nothing about an attack on America".

The text of the PDB appeared to contradict the

description given by Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, in evidence to the September 11 commission last week. She said it contained only "historical information based on old reporting". Much of the document does refer back to earlier events, including "sensational threat reporting" from an unnamed foreign intelligence service in 1998, suggesting that Osama bin Laden wanted to hijack US aircraft to force the release of an imprisoned radical cleric.

"Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York," the PDB states.

"The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Laden-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our embassy in the *UAE* in May saying that a group of Bin Laden supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives."

The fact sheet picks apart the PDB, pointing out that the surveillance of federal buildings turned out to be "consistent with tourist-related activity" and that: "None of the information relating to the patterns of suspicious activity was later deemed to be related to the 9/11 attacks".

In her testimony last week, Ms Rice argued the FBI and the Federal Aviation Administration were aware of the warnings. However, it has since emerged that the transportation secretary, Norman Mineta, was unaware of the threat.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/12/september11.alqaida [2 February 2015].

judicious: showing intelligence and good judgement
tip-off: warning
to allege: to claim, assert
exhibit A: first piece of evidence in a legal trial
UAE: United Arab Emirates

M 14 In the Ruins of the World Trade Center

Firemen and emergency workers look for survivors on 13 September 2001. At this time several thousand dead are thought to be buried in the ruins, only 160 have been found. Rain falling on the burning ruins has turned to steam and combined with the acrid smoke from the fire. A CNN reporter is reminded of "scenes from Hell". Photograph, 13 September 2001

Tasks

1. Assess the dissolution of the Soviet Union and explain why it changed global politics (text, M1).
2. Compare and contrast the two opinions (M5, M6). Consider which assessment provides the most persuasive analysis, giving reasons for your choice.
3. Analyse Khodorkovsky's speech (M7). Find out why he was arrested and tried (Internet).
4. Research Pussy Riot on the Internet. Determine the group's political goals and assess the popular support given to the band (text, M8, M9).
5. Some have criticized the annexation of Crimea as reminiscent of the Nazi annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938. Look up the Crimean circumstances in 2014 on the Internet. Compare and contrast the historical situations and recommend how the EU should respond today.
6. Analyse the US reaction to the 9/11 attacks (text, M10–M14). Give your personal opinion about the attacks and the response to them.

Domestic Changes in United Germany

Achieving German Unity

After the euphoria of unification passed, Germans confronted the difficult task of merging the two countries together. Although Helmut Kohl had promised future "blooming landscapes" during the election campaign of 1990, it was soon clear that a longer transition would be required to achieve such results.

M 1 **"Helmut, take us by the hand, show us the way to economic wonderland."**
Electoral campaign in Leipzig, March 1990

The loss of eastern markets upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 increased the German difficulties. Transforming the German economy was crucial to maintaining the success of democracy in the country.

Economic Problems

No planned economy had ever been converted to a market economy before. The state of the eastern economy was desperate with run-down factories, outdated production, inadequate infrastructure and shocking environmental pollution. Investment in capital goods had been neglected for well over forty years. Complex solutions had to be found quickly, because many East Germans had begun moving west in 1989. German leaders feared that even more would leave the eastern states if the situation were not stabilized.

The first priorities were currency, business renovation, and property restitution in the eastern states. Despite warnings from economists, the East German currency was exchanged with (West) German marks at a basic rate of 1:1 (with limits depending on the age of the person), further savings were exchanged at the rate of 2:1. Politically, this seemed fair at the time, but the higher wages and pensions coupled with lower productivity *priced* eastern goods *out of their* traditional *market*.

to price out of the market: to charge such high prices that customers don't buy
patrons: customers

The German government transferred huge sums of capital, especially in areas considered vital to improving infrastructure, communication,

and transportation. Naturally, in the short time available, not all of the investments led to financial success when they were completed.
An official Trusteeship Agency ("Treuhandanstalt"), founded in 1990 to renovate and privatize publicly owned eastern businesses and industries, closed many obsolete and unprofitable enterprises, leaving large numbers of people unemployed. In some eastern regions unemployment reached over 30% by the early 1990s.

The treaty on unification intended to restore property which had been expropriated by the East German authorities after 1949. However, legal struggles interfered with claims and investors hesitated to buy affected property. Many invested in new construction projects when the government offered tax rebates on them, but the projects proved disappointing when completed. For example, the eastern states today have attractive shopping malls, luxury bathing facilities, and high-tech office buildings, but not enough *patrons* for them.

Two successive "solidarity pacts" in the west placed a surtax on income to pay for the necessary changes in the eastern states. Taxes, rather than government loans, were the financial motor of the transformation.

M 2 Red-Green Coalition 1998
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (1998–2005) with Vice-chancellor and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer

Demographic Problems

Especially younger, skilled workers continue to leave the eastern states for western jobs. Not only are there more jobs in the west, they pay higher wages than in the east. Many live in the east, travelling to and from their workplaces in the west during the week, while others rent flats in the west and spend weekends at home in the east. An urban-rural gap familiar in the west is also appearing in the east, as many leave rural areas such as Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania for the more promising urban areas of Leipzig, Dresden and Berlin. The rural population in the east is growing older; picturesque market places and historical buildings in the east have been lovingly restored, but often stand empty. As early as the nineteenth century a similar tendency was observed, but the collapse of the large East German collective farms has led to a far greater loss of population.

In general, the revival and renewal of the eastern states continues today. Visually, the progress is impressive, particularly in the restoration of buildings and city centres. Much has been achieved, although the pace of change has been slower than originally planned.

M 3 Grand Coalition 2005
Chancellor Angela Merkel, the first woman to lead the republic, with Vice-chancellor and Labour Minister Franz Muentefering

Three Chancellors

Three Federal Chancellors have influenced the course of the transformation since unification. Helmut Kohl (CDU) led a coalition government together with the FDP until the elections of 1998. Kohl's tenure as chancellor was the longest in the Federal Republic (16 years). His main achievement, German unity, contributed to his lasting electoral success. By 1998, however, the drawing power of unity had faded. Kohl's successor as chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder (SPD), led government coalitions with Bündnis 90/the Green Party from 1998 until 2005. Schroeder's main achievement in domestic politics was the passage of Agenda 2010, which was essential to reducing unemployment and pushing the country out of its long economic stagnation. The programme reformed German welfare, reducing welfare benefits and reformed labour laws, forcing the unemployed to

accept job offers, often at lower pay. German employers could also hire and fire with more flexibility. Agenda 2010 was highly controversial in his own party and among German labour unions. On the other hand, Schroeder's refusal to send German troops to participate in the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 proved much more popular.

In 2005 Schroeder called for early new elections. When his coalition lost its majority, he resigned. His party joined in a Grand Coalition led by Angela Merkel (CDU), the first woman and first East German politician to become chancellor. Merkel, whose staying power was at first underestimated, won re-election for a new coalition with the FDP in 2009 and for a coalition with the SPD in 2013. She has successfully taken up domestic policies originally supported by her political opposition. Laws dealing with kindergartens and family policy (traditional SPD concerns) have been passed by her governments but have increased tension within her own party. Merkel extended the phasing out of nuclear power in Germany to 2030, slowing down Schroeder's faster deadline. However, after the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan, Merkel abruptly changed course and called for swifter elimination of nuclear energy in Germany.

M 4 **"Shut down nuclear power stations at last!"**
Anti-nuclear demonstration in Lubmin (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania), 25 April 2011

Joachim Gauck, the first Federal Commissioner of the Stasi Archives (also known as the "Gauck office"), was elected Federal President in 2012. Thus, within a fairly short period of time following unification, Germany was led both by a chancellor and a president from the former eastern states – a remarkable development.

After 1990 two tendencies in united Germany set off signals of alarm. Xenophobia made a marked appearance, especially in regions showing large numbers of unemployed. In addition, a neo-Nazi *resurgence confounded* police and state authorities at first. More recently, civic and official efforts have been made to combat these tendencies.

resurgence: revival, comeback
to confound: to surprise and confuse

M 5 An Assessment

German economist K-H. Paqué regards German unification as a partial success (2009):

"Mezzogiorno without the mafia". This is how Germany's former federal chancellor Helmut Schmidt called the state of the East German economy in 2005. Uwe Muller, a German journalist, spoke of the "Disaster of German Unity" (Supergau Deutsche Einheit).

These negative judgements about German unification are not justified. There are three main reasons that demand a more optimistic reading of the process and its outcome.

1. The radical economic transformation of East Germany was unavoidable. The new-found freedom of East Germans led to a dramatic surge in the mobility of labour which had to be countered with drastic measures. There were no realistic alternatives to immediate monetary union, rapid privatisation, massive economic subsidies and public investments. The Germans chose the right path. They can be proud of it.

2. The outcome of the economic transformation is better than generally assumed yet worse than the expectations of the early 1990s. Hence German economic unification is a partial success, no less but also no more. That it is no more has nothing to do with political failures of unification. It is rather the consequence of the fundamental and widespread damage done to East Germany's economy by over forty years of socialist rule. In fact, a four decade long isolation from the world market caused severe and lasting *repercussions* for East Germany (and for Central Europe).

3. The continued lack of innovative strength of East Germany's industry is one of the main reasons for the remaining productivity gap between the West and the East. At the same time, however, a large extent of flexibility on the plant level and comparatively low unit labour costs provides competitive advantages. These, however, can only be exploited if economic policy shifts its focus on strengthening the innovative power and capacity of eastern industry.

Karl-Heinz Paqué, The Transformation Policy in East Germany – A Partial Success Story, at www.kas.de/upload/Publikationen/Panorama/2009/1/paque.pdf [15 Oct 2012]. Translated by Susanne Rentzow-Vasu, Singapore.

repercussion: consequence, result

M 6

Unemployment in West and East Germany

	Registered Unemployed, Unemployment Rate Germany as a whole		Territory of the former FRG, not including Berlin		New Länder, including Berlin	
	Number of Unemployed	Unemployment Rate* in %	Number of Unemployed	Unemployment Rate* in %	Number of Unemployed	Unemployment Rate* in %
2005	4 860 234	13.0	3 246 097	11.0	1 614 137	20.6
2004	4 381 042	11.7	2 781 347	9.4	1 599 695	20.1
2003	4 376 028	11.6	2 752 589	9.3	1 623 439	20.1
2002	4 060 317	10.8	2 497 678	8.5	1 562 639	19.2
2001	3 852 564	10.4	2 320 500	8.0	1 532 064	18.8
2000	3 889 695	10.7	2 380 987	8.4	1 508 707	18.6
1999	4 100 499	11.7	2 604 720	9.6	1 495 779	18.7
1998	4 280 630	12.3	2 751 535	10.3	1 529 095	19.2
1997	4 384 456	12.7	2 870 021	10.8	1 514 435	19.1
1996	3 965 064	11.5	2 646 442	9.9	1 318 622	16.6
1995	3 611 921	10.4	2 427 083	9.1	1 184 838	14.8
1994	3 698 057	10.6	2 426 276	9.0	1 271 781	15.7
1993	3 419 141	9.8	2 149 465	8.0	1 269 676	15.4
1991	2 602 203	7.3	1 596 457	6.2	1 005 746	10.2

** Unemployment rate among dependent (i.e., non-self-employed) employable civilians.*
Source: Federal Office of Statistics [Registered Unemployed, Unemployment Rate, 1991–2005] (2007). http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3114 [18 Oct 2012].

Domestic Changes in United Germany

M 7 "Racism and xenophobia still prevalent in Germany"

The journalists Charles Hawley and Daryl Lindsey write in "Spiegel Online" (2012):

Twenty years ago, a neo-Nazi mob attacked a hostel for foreigners in Rostock, one of several similar crimes in the early 1990s. Today, however, Germany is still plagued by a significant level of racism and right-wing extremism in both the east and the west. For far too long, officials seemed content to ignore the problem. [...]

Latent Racism

"Eastern Germany is extremely thinly populated with foreigners. And that vacuum is immediately filled with xenophobic slogans," says Dimitri Avramenko, the politician in charge of immigrant issues for Schwerin, the capital city of the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, where Rostock is located. "There is also a huge amount of latent racism in the population."

It is a statement that is backed by recent election results in the region. The right-wing extremist National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) has managed to clear the 5 percent hurdle for representation in state parliaments in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony during the past two elections there and is also well represented in municipal governments across the region.

Away from the political stage, recent surveys have found a significant level of latent prejudice not just in eastern Germany, but in the country as a whole. In 2011, the latest edition of the longterm study on racism and xenophobia begun by the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence at the University of Bielefeld found that 47.1 percent of Germans agree that "there are too many foreigners in Germany." Just short of 30 percent believe that foreigners should be sent home if jobs become scarce.

Perhaps, then, it should come as no surprise that, in addition to worrying levels of right-wing violence, many victims of extremist crimes complain of official inaction or unwillingness to see a racist crime for what it is.

www.spiegel.de/international/germany/xenophobia-still-prevalent-ingermany-20-years-after-neo-nazi-attacks-a-851972.html [5 October 2012].

M 9 BBC Analysis of Unification Difficulties in Germany

The business reporter Ben Richardson writes in "BBC News Online" (20 September 2004):

The unification of Germany was as bold as it was risky.

After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, political heavyweights including former Chancellor Helmut

M 8 "Unity and Justice and Freedom" (first line of the German national anthem)

Cartoon by Gerhard Mester, 1996



Kohl pushed hard to merge two very different societies.

In the west, a European powerhouse that had led the region's industrial recovery; in the east, a *bloated*, state-planned economy that was as wasteful as it was *forgiving of* inefficiency. The argument that togetherness would ensure prosperity all but drowned out the doubters who questioned whether the task might prove too difficult and too expensive. More than a decade later, the merging of the two Germanys into a single economy has proved anything but *seamless*.

Voting shock

[...] Far-right parties have made gains in once-communist East Germany, underlining the political truth that a grand vision counts for little if the population feel their lives are not getting any better.

"It's a tremendous change and unification hasn't been handled very well in terms of the economy," said Elga Bartsch, an analyst at Morgan Stanley in London.

One key step was the fixing of an exchange rate that swapped one West German Deutsche mark for one East German Ostmark.

Politically it may have been the right thing to do, a noble gesture of partnership, but it created problems that have hampered and hobbled German growth ever since.

Cost base

Almost overnight, workers in east Germany's *wheezing* factories became too expensive to employ. Their productivity lagged western peers, and plants lost contracts and were closed. "It is one of the issues that is at the heart of Germany's economic malaise," said Morgan Stanley's Ms Bartsch. "The problems are still felt to this day." Eastern Germany's unemployment rate has surged and is now at 18.5%, according to the latest official statistics. In the west, it stands at 8.6%. The migration of labour that the exchange rate was supposed to eliminate is taking place with many workers heading west in search of jobs. Others are dependent on state *handouts*, and are becoming increasingly pessimistic about their prospects.

Cash softener

The German state, meanwhile, has done much – some say too much – to help the east and avoid *reneging* on its promise to create a more prosperous, united Germany. [...]

The problem facing Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, analysts say, is how to push through much needed welfare and labour reforms without alienating many people who already feel that their lot is hard enough.

At the same time, he needs to appease those west Germans who want their tax money spent on the regions they live in and see the east as nothing more than an endless drain on limited resources.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3672712.stm [4 October 2012].

M 10 Report on the Status of German Unity

Annual report of the Federal Government on the status of German unity in 2010, Federal Ministry of the Interior (2010):

Today, 20 years later, people in eastern and western Germany can be proud of what they have achieved together since the peaceful revolution and unification. The decay of many city centres has been halted. The devastating pollution has been stopped, many contaminated sites have been cleaned up, and the way has been cleared for environmentally sustainable economic growth. The transport network and the urban building stock have been extensively restored. Access to education is based on qualification, performance and interest. Special mention needs to be made of the public health system, which provides the entire population with much better access to high-quality medical care. After 20 years, people in eastern Germany have almost the same high life expectancy as people in western Germany. Thanks to the renovation of run-down retirement and care homes the elderly may live in comfort and dignity.

However, we are also witnessing increasing political apathy among some citizens, accompanied by declining trust in democratic processes and institutions. This trend gives reason for concern because democracy is driven by the commitment and dedication of people to their public affairs. We should all return to the spirit of the peaceful revolution and the joint restoration since 1990.

bloated: ineffective because too large
forgiving of: tolerant
seamless: without problems
to wheeze: (here: old) to gasp for air
handout: (here) money given to people who need it
to renege: to go back on one's word

Domestic Changes in United Germany

However, during the years following unification public attention increasingly focused on how much eastern Germany had already caught up with the west in economic and social terms. This is largely due to the extremely high expectations amid the unification euphoria in 1990, including the politically promoted image of "blooming landscapes". Despite occasional mistakes, the general course taken since the early 1990s has been right. Twenty years of German unity have brought about a significant improvement in prosperity and quality of life. We owe this to the eastern Germans' adaptability and drive as well as to the solidarity within Germany reflected by the two Solidarity Pacts. [...]

Controversial policy discussions will take place. [...] However, the large majority of Germans do not question German unity. We should not forget about this general consensus when analysing surveys and deploring the lack of "internal unity". In particular young people no longer engage in this kind of debate. Many of them naturally identify themselves as Bavarian or Saxon, German and European. These identities complement rather than contradict one another and thus belong together.

German unity has come of age. It is time to review terms and mentalities created in east and west in the early 1990s. The public sense that the current challenges – coping with the economic and financial crisis, climate change, globalization, European integration – affect east and west alike and can be met only by acting together. Being able to seek guidance from two sources of experience is a genuine gift of unity.

Annual report of the Federal Government on the status of German unity in 2010, Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2010 (pp. 24–25), www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Broschueren/2011/jahresbericht_bodl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile [6 Oct 2012].



M 11 **"Status of German Unity"**
Cartoon by Burkhard Mohr, 2002

Tasks

1. Explain why economic matters were important for the integration of both German states (text, M1, M5, M6, M9).
2. Determine whether racism and xenophobia are serious problems in Germany today (M7, M8). Find examples either of racism or against racism that you have experienced.
3. Evaluate the present status of German unity (M10, M11). What suggestions can you make to improve the present situation?

European Consolidation to 2013

The European Union: A Story of Success

From its beginnings in a Europe devastated by war, the success of the European Union has been phenomenal. Despite many obstacles, the EU has prospered and fostered a more enduring peace than Europe has ever seen before. For this outstanding achievement the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.

Institutions of the European Union Defined

The structure of the EU is unique, because the member states have transferred some of their sovereign rights to independent institutions. These represent the interests of the EU as a whole, the member states, and the citizens of the EU.

There are presently seven EU institutions:

- the European Council
- the European Commission
- the Council of the European Union
- the European Parliament
- the Court of Justice of the European Union
- the European Court of Auditors
- the European Central Bank

The European Council consists of the 27 heads of state from each of the member states. The Council makes landmark decisions in EU policy and affairs. It does not exercise legislative functions. The President of the European Council, who is elected for a term of two and a half years, and the President of the Commission take part in meetings of the European Council. The Council of the European Union (formerly

M 1



called the Council of Ministers) consists of 27 ministers from each member state, depending on what area of political interest is addressed (for example, social matters, health issues, financial problems, etc.).

The European Commission, with 27 commissioners, executes the decisions of the European Council and ensures compliance with treaties. It has the sole right of legislative initiative – only the Commission can propose laws to the Council and the Parliament. The Commission acts on the subsidiarity principle – it is only responsible for European matters which cannot be resolved at the local, regional or national level.

The European Parliament acts on legislative proposals submitted to it by the Commission. Legislative functions are shared by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. Voting procedures in the Council of the EU are complex; depending on what question is being decided, the vote may require a simple majority, a qualified majority or unanimity. The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) established a citizens' initiative which may present petitions for legislative action to the Commission if signed by one million EU citizens.

The Court of Auditors makes sure that funds are spent as intended. The Court of Justice of the EU interprets EU laws and ensures that they are executed uniformly throughout the EU. Both courts are independent of the other EU institutions.

The European Central Bank supervises the stability of prices and the financial system. More recently it is also responsible for monitoring the euro in the countries of the euro zone.

Growth of the European Idea: From Coal and Steel to EU

From its beginnings in 1951 with the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European integration advanced to the European Economic Community (EEC, or "Common Market") in 1957 and then to simply the European Community (EC) in 1973. With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the community officially became the European Union (EU). Participation increased from the original six countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and West Germany) to twenty-eight member states in 2013.

M 2 Building the European House
Cartoon by Frederick Deligne, 2008

European integration was conceived to prevent war by combining the economies of former enemies. Interlocking the economic infrastructure of member states with those of their neighbours made war unreasonable, as a warring country would destroy its own economy. Therefore, European integration began as an economic venture with rules and regulations for all the member states created by a supranational bureaucratic apparatus. It was assumed that political measures would follow.

The further process of integration was interrupted when the European Defence Community was abandoned in 1954. Because defence matters had proved so difficult to deal with, the members returned their focus to economic issues, where a consensus was more easily reached. As the ECSC became the EEC and then the EC, the success of economic integration was indisputable – the growing market increasingly attracted candidates for accession. However, political consolidation, especially when affecting national sovereignty, proved more difficult to achieve.

M 3



Changes in the EU

European integration has developed at a steady pace. The Schengen Agreement (1985) created a single market in which EU citizens may live and work without visas. The "four freedoms" of the EU – free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital – were reformulated in the Single European Act of 1986 and have seen continuous expansion ever since. The Maastricht Treaty laid the foundation for a common currency in the euro zone, created the European Central Bank, and linked foreign policy, defence, justice and home affairs with EU institutions.

bicameral: having two chambers

The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) created the offices of the President of the European Council and the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Council of the EU and the European Parliament form a *bicameral* legislature when enacting ordinary legislative procedures. Qualified majority voting (QMV) replaced unanimity in specific policy areas of the Council of Ministers. The EU became a legal entity, enabling it to be a party to treaties; the Charter of Fundamental Rights from 2000 became legally binding in all member states.

A Critical Problem: Democratic Legitimacy in the EU

Nevertheless, the European Union remains a puzzling apparatus, seemingly far-removed from its citizens. Its legislative procedures are uniquely complex; it is often criticized for its bureaucratic decisions.

Limitation of national sovereignty by the EU has been bitterly debated in Great Britain from the start of the Coal and Steel Community. Although Britain finally joined the EEC in 1972, the conflict of interest has never been fully resolved. British scepticism of the EU remains a major stumbling block in European integration even today.

European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Future of the Euro

to bail out: to help by giving money
to shore up: to support
austerity measures: cutting back government spending (possibly also raising taxes)

The sovereign debt crisis which extended to Europe after the US financial crisis of 2008 is an acute test of financial stability in all the countries connected with the single currency. In Ireland the crisis developed when the government bank *bailed out* private debts resulting from a property bubble. In Greece the debt arose from salaries and pensions paid to government employees. When the government debt was downgraded by rating agencies, interest rose to unsustainable levels. Because the euro zone is merely a monetary union (with one currency), not a fiscal union (with common taxation and public pension rules), it has been difficult for leaders in the zone to respond quickly and adequately to the threats to the euro and the European banks.

In addition to support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB), emergency measures *to shore up* threatened governments and their central banks have been taken; they will be replaced by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) when it has been approved by at least 90% of the member states.

Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Portugal, Spain and France have been most affected in the crisis to date. The *austerity measures* demanded to combat overextended debts are very unpopular with the affected citizens. Germany, with Europe's largest and most prosperous economy, has a prominent role in dealing with the euro crisis. This has led to expressions of resentment toward Germany and unexpected attacks on the EU's goal of supranational cooperation. However, in order to remain a counterweight to the United States and the emerging economies of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) states, the EU must resolve the present crisis in the euro zone.

M 4 European Sovereign Debt Crisis
Greeks protest austerity measures, 2011

M 5 The Schuman Plan

Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, Declaration of 9 May 1950:

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war. Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action which must be taken in the first place must concern these two countries. With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting up of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial production on the same terms, will lay a true foundation for their economic unification .

http://education.ntu.ac.uk/resources/ict_resources/EuroDim/Integration/Appendix1.html [28 October 2012].



M 6 "I hope this works better than the safety pins."

At the sewing maching is French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman; the safety pins refer to the Maginot Line, a system of defence fortifications built between 1929 and 1932 along the French northeastern border to Germany. Cartoon by Klaus Pielert

Tasks

1. Write a brief essay on the role of Robert Schuman in European integration after World War II.
2. Explain briefly how the EU works (text, M1).

Views of the EU

M 7 Britain Is Different from Europe

Two British scholars assess the British resistance to EU integration (2007):

The British, having avoided the experience of defeat and occupation, did not share that fundamental motive for the sharing of sovereignty with other European peoples and felt reliance on the US and NATO to be sufficient. Hence the focus on the economic aspects of integration that has been common among British politicians and has restricted their ability to play an influential and constructive part in some of the most significant developments.

John Pinder and Simon Usherwood, The European Union. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 9.

M 8 A British Satire on the EEC

The fictional diary's narrator is James Hacker, a British Cabinet minister who is trying to jockey himself into the position of Prime Minister by saving the British sausage from EEC standardization guidelines (17 December 1984):

There was one [Christmas] card I particularly resented sending. It was to the EEC Agriculture Commissioner in Brussels. I would rather have sent him a *redundancy notice*. He's even worse than his colleagues, and I can't speak any worse of anybody than that. He's the fool who has forced through the plan to standardise the Eurosausage. By the end of next year we'll be waving goodbye to the good old British sausage, and we'll be forced to accept some foreign *muck* like salami or bratwurst in its place.

Of course, they can't actually stop us eating the British sausage. But they can stop us calling it a sausage. It seems that it's got to be called the *Emulsified* High-Fat *Offal* Tube. And I was forced to swallow it. I mean, it is a perfectly accurate description of the thing, but not awfully appetising. And it doesn't exactly trip lightly off the tongue. It sticks in the throat, as a matter of fact. There's going to be frightful trouble over it. But it's my job to implement EEC regulations. And, in exchange for getting a new deal on farm prices and on Britain's reduced contribution to the community budget, a concession had to be made. The PM [Prime Minister] didn't seem to mind, nor did the FO [Foreign Office], nor did Agriculture – presumably because I'm the one who is to be landed with trying to sell this to the British people. It could ruin my career.

Bernard [Hacker's assistant] asked me what the EEC has against our sausage. Apparently he doesn't read the papers he puts into my red box [briefcase of official government papers].

"Didn't you read this analysis?"

"I glanced at it Minister, but I'm afraid it rather put me off."

I re-read it, there and then.

a lack of healthy nutrition. The average British sausage consists of:
32 % ..... Fat
6 % ..... Rind
20 % ..... Water
5 % ..... Seasoning, preservatives and colouring
26 % ..... Meat
The 26 % meat is mostly *gristle*, head meat, other off cuts, and mechanically recovered meat steamed off the carcass.

I felt slightly sick. I had had one for breakfast. Bernard read the analysis. "Perhaps the EEC Commissioner is right about abolishing it."

Bernard sometimes misses the point completely. "He may be right," I explained wearily, "but it'll be dreadfully unpopular with the voters." Bernard nodded gloomily.

Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay, "Party Games" in Yes, Prime Minister. The Diaries of the Right Hon. James Hacker, Vol. I (London: Guild Publishing, 1986), pp.11–12. The book is an adaptation of the BBC television series "Yes, Prime Minister".

redundancy notice: letter informing that sb. has lost a job
muck: some dirty, unpleasant substance
to emulsify: to mix together
offal: inner organs of an animal, such as liver or kidney
gristle: cartilage; tough, white tissue (in meat)

M 9 "10 things the EU has done for us"

The journalists Kate Connolly and Mark Tran summarize advantages of the EU in "The Guardian" (12 October 2012):

Peace

The origins of peace in Europe lie in the alliance made between France and Germany [sic: which] gave birth to the European Coal and Steel Community, a forerunner of the EU. [...] The continent has indeed enjoyed lasting peace. International security remains one of the EU's top

priorities, not just in Europe but the rest of the world.

Single market

The single market is probably the EU's single biggest achievement after peace, though it's arguably hard to separate the two. It guarantees the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. Apart from the unifying effect of this set-up on European citizens, it has provided the opportunity for them to travel, live, work, study and do business across the union, and to enjoy a wide range of competitively-priced services and goods.

Single currency

The euro zone was established in 1999 and is made up of 17 member states. [...] Most Europeans see the benefits it brings to them as travellers – not having to convert money while away on holiday or business. But its main practical benefit has to do with economic growth. It has helped to strengthen the EU's international standing and improve integration within the union itself.

Easier, passport-free travel

Since the 15 member countries which signed up to the Schengen agreement abandoned their border posts, it is possible to travel freely and easily [...] across huge swaths of the union. Driving licenses are valid across the continent, while the single currency, standardised trains and the fact that holidaymakers are fully covered for emergency hospital treatment in other EU countries have all encouraged freedom of movement.

Foreign aid

The EU accounts for half of all global aid. [...] Aid constitutes about 9% of the EU budget. [...] The European commission is ranked the fifth most transparent donor in the world out of 72, above every EU member state except the UK and the Netherlands.

Cheaper and safer flights

Increased competition between airlines operating within the member states [...] has provided us with cheaper flights to a much wider range of destinations than ever before. Flights are also safer as a result of tightened regulations and improvements in air traffic control.

Democracy and human rights

Brussels sets standards of human rights, democracy and the rule of law to which countries must adhere if they want to be part of the European Union. [...] [T]hese guidelines have had a particular impact on the countries of southern, central and eastern Europe, which joined after they emerged from dictatorships with often underdeveloped civil societies.

Equal opportunities

The EU has tackled discrimination on the basis of gender, race, age and disability with a range of different directives which have had their biggest impact on the labour market.

Cheaper telephone calls

In the 1990s the EU liberalised the telecommunications markets. That together with new technology has led to considerably lower prices. [...]

Improved air and water quality

Member states have demonstrated their own appetite for protecting the environment, but they would arguably not have done so much had pressure not been applied by the EU via legislation to improve the quality of rivers, seas and beaches, and reduce acid rain and sulphur emissions.

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/12/europe-nobel-peace-prize-10-things [14 Oct 2012].

Tasks

1. Assess the main points of criticism expressed about the EU at present (text, M7, M8).
2. Analyse how life in Europe has changed because of the EU (text, M9). Which aspects of life in the EU do you personally find positive and which do you find negative?
3. A hotly debated topic in England today is whether to stay in the EU or not. What arguments are given in this discussion? Use the Internet for your research.

German Involvement in International Affairs

International Uncertainty After 1991

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed an assumed bipolar into a multipolar world, increasing instability. At the same time, a newly unified Germany took on a more prominent role in international affairs. Various conflicts demanded intervention to maintain global peace, but the states participating in such military actions were often reluctant to do so, as the expenses and risks of involvement were high. Following the world wars of the twentieth century, German leaders insisted on pursuing international goals only through peaceful means. Indeed, according to the Basic Law, the sole function of the German military is to defend the country. However, events after 1991 led to an expanded definition of what defending the country meant.

Iraq I, 1990–1991

When the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded and annexed Kuwait on 2 August 1990, his actions were condemned and economic sanctions against Iraq were announced by the UN Security Council. A coalition force from 34 nations led by the USA was authorized to intervene by the UN; in January 1991 aerial bombardment began, followed by a ground assault on 24 February. Iraqi troops were quickly expelled from Kuwait and coalition forces advanced into Iraq. Only 100 hours after the ground assault had begun US President George H.W. Bush called a ceasefire on 28 February in a clear demonstration of the coalition's military superiority. Nevertheless, Iraqi *recklessness* was frightening; targets in Israel were attacked with Scud missiles and oil wells in Kuwait were set afire as Iraqi troops withdrew. Germany supported the coalition with anti-aircraft missiles in eastern Turkey and naval minesweepers in the Persian Gulf.

recklessness: without thinking of possible effects

Wars in Bosnia (1992–1995) and Kosovo (1998–1999)

After the death of the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980, ethnic tension revived in the six Yugoslav republics. When the weakness of the Soviet Union became clear, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. Germany recognized both countries diplomatically in December 1991; the European Union followed in January 1992. However, diplomatic recognition could not prevent military conflict in Yugoslavia.

Croatian and Serbian leaders supported claims to territory in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina before international pressure could intervene. To strengthen ethnic, religious and national claims to the territory, the forces of the Bosnian Serb Army employed the strategy of ethnic cleansing. A pattern of extreme abuse of civilians continued throughout the *contested* regions. Criminal attacks on civilians during the Bosnian War occurred during the Siege of Sarajevo (1992–1996) and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. As early as 1992 UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia and then Bosnia were sent to protect civilians, but the peacekeepers faced increasingly precarious conditions, such as being used as human shields by the Bosnian Serb Army or being forced to stand by as civilians were massacred. NATO intervention in 1995 and the signing of peace accords in Dayton, Ohio, brought an end to the most devastating conflict in Europe since World

M 1 UN Soldier in Chains
A UN soldier is held hostage by the Serb military in the war in Bosnia.

M 2 **The Siege of Sarajevo**
The dead are transported after Serb troops fired on the historic central marketplace in Sarajevo. February 1994

War II. It was also the first war in which NATO troops were engaged without a NATO member state being directly threatened.

In Kosovo the crisis was driven by Serbian and Albanian ethnic rivalries. Albanian separatists, organized in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), provoked military intervention by Yugoslav security forces and Serb militia under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic in 1998. The familiar pattern of ethnic cleansing was repeated by both the Serbian (then called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY) and KLA sides in the conflict. NATO intervened without a UN mandate to do so, bringing the situation under control with largely aerial bombardments. The German air force flew about 500 aerial missions during the Kosovo conflict. In a negotiated agreement, both Kosovo and the FRY accepted UN supervision of administrative and political matters until the future of the region has been determined. The KLA was officially dissolved, but many of its leaders then took up political roles. In June 1999 a UN Security Council resolution authorized a peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) to maintain the fragile peace. Many peacekeeping functions have been turned over to local police and authorities in the meantime. *As of* March 2012 there were 1,230 German soldiers on duty in the KFOR.

M 3 **Kosovo**
German KFOR soldiers in Kosovo, 2004

Afghanistan, 2001–2012

In response to the attacks of 11 September 2001, the US led a coalition of forces from the United Kingdom, France, Australia and the Afghan United Front (Northern Alliance) in Afghanistan in October 2001. The stated goals of the invasion were to eliminate Al-Qaeda, capture its leader, Osama bin Laden, remove the Taliban from power, and create a democratic state in Afghanistan. At first, the Afghan United Front teamed with US and British special forces on the ground and were provided with US aerial support. This effort forced the Taliban regime in Kabul and most of Afghanistan out within a matter of weeks. Most of the Taliban leaders fled to neighbouring Pakistan. A democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was founded, led by Hamid Karzai. An International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created by the UN Security Council in December 2001 for Kabul and its surroundings. In 2003 NATO assumed charge of the ISAF, which includes soldiers from 42 countries. Germany sent a contingent of about 5,000 men (as of March 2011) and aircraft (AWACS) to monitor Afghan airspace, in addition to providing naval supervision of shipping lanes along the

contested region: disputed or unsettled territory
as of: starting on a particular date, beginning with

Horn of Africa and in the Mediterranean. A Taliban insurgency led from inside Pakistan has continued armed opposition to the democratic Afghan republic and to the ISAF. Bin Laden was killed by an American secret operation in Pakistan in 2011. Whether the remaining goals of the invasion will be realized seems doubtful. At present, the military engagement in Afghanistan is the longest in US history. A withdrawal of NATO troops has been set for 2014, but NATO will continue to advise, train, and assist Afghan security forces thereafter. The Bundestag has determined that German participation in the ISAF will end by 2014.

M 4 **US Soldier in Iraq**
A Marine on patrol in Fallujah, October 2004

Iraq II (2003–2011)

By 2002 the USA and the United Kingdom insisted that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Although the UN Security Council resolution demanded Iraqi compliance with UN weapons inspections and Hans Blix, the UN leader of the inspectors, expressed doubts about Iraqi possession of such weapons, an invasion by the US and the UK in a "coalition of the willing" began on 20 March 2003. Chancellor Schroeder and his cabinet refused to participate in the coalition's Iraq actions. The Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, was deposed, and later captured, tried, and executed. What at first appeared to be a quick military victory developed into a long occupation. Iraqi insurgents fought against coalition forces and the new Iraqi government. As public support for the occupation declined and Iraqi authorities assumed more control over security, coalition members like Britain and Italy withdrew their forces. Abuse of prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison added to public criticism. The war was officially ended on 18 December 2011 and US military personnel have been withdrawn. Nevertheless, the situation remains precarious.

Unrest in the Middle East

In 2011 civil unrest – often called the Arab Spring – shook the Arab world. Rulers were removed in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen; further uprisings and protests occurred throughout the entire region. In Iran demonstrations protesting election results were halted in 2009, but unrest revived in February 2011 along with that in the other affected countries. Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons continues to destabilize the region. The transition from authoritarian structures to civil societies presents complex challenges throughout the Middle East. Especially in Egypt, Libya and most recently in Syria the potential for civil war is apparent; as of January 2013 the situation remains unclear.

The German air force evacuated European civilians caught in the civil war in Libya in early 2011. The evacuation was completed so quickly that the Bundestag was not consulted, leading to harsh criticism of the action afterwards. A UN Security Council resolution in mid-March 2011 declared a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized military action to protect civilians. Germany abstained from the vote on the resolution and then refused to participate in enforcing an arms embargo on Libya authorized by the UN. The German refusal to comply with requests from Britain, France, and the US on Libya came as a surprise. However, German crews did *man* AWACS in Afghanistan, enabling other nations' crews to serve in Libya.

to man: to provide a machine with the people needed to operate it

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to accept Palestine as a "non-member state" on

motion: formal suggestion in a meeting

29 November 2012, an implicit recognition of Palestinian sovereignty. Germany abstained on the *motion*, which provoked Israeli criticism.

New German Role in International Affairs

German governments after 1990 struggled with the country's new role on the international stage. Germany was the largest country and the strongest economy in Europe. German leaders were asked to contribute to peacekeeping efforts, financially as well as militarily. However, a more active military role was difficult in both legal terms and with regard to popular opinion. The Basic Law sees only a defensive role for the German military. But ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo forced Germans to intervene in genocidal violence among their European neighbours. When pressured by NATO to participate, Germany, which had profited from nearly fifty years of NATO support, could not refuse. Following the shock of the 11 September attacks, Chancellor Schroeder had reassured his US partners that Germany would stand by them. Thus, German troops were also involved in the invasion of Afghanistan. There they largely took up a role as peacekeepers and military advisors in attempts to improve Afghan police services. Even this less aggressive role has had serious drawbacks, and German troops have been killed in Afghanistan. When US President George W. Bush called for a "coalition of the willing" to participate in the Iraq invasion in 2003, Schroeder refused to send German troops. In 2011 the German abstention from the UN resolution to intervene in Libya and refusal to contribute to a NATO no-fly zone during the Libyan civil war came unexpectedly and were criticized within NATO and Germany.

In 1994 the German constitutional court had delivered a verdict on the growing military involvement. The court declared military engagements legal only if they are approved by the Bundestag within set time limits. The court's decision requires the German public to support (through its parliamentary representatives) any future military intervention. As war is understandably unpopular in Germany, finding enough support for military intervention in the Bundestag can become a difficult task.

M 5 **Joseph ("Joschka") Fischer**
The German Foreign Minister after being hit and injured by a paint bomb at the Green Party convention on 13 May 1999.

M 6 **Honouring the Dead**
The main funeral in Ingolstadt for four German soldiers killed on duty in Afghanistan on 15 April 2010. Photograph, 24 April 2010

Source Material on the Former Yugoslavia

M 7 Crimes of Ethnic Cleansing

From the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) ***indictment*** *of Radovan Karadzic, President of the Republika Srpska, and Ratko Mladic, commander of the army of the Republika Srpska (July 1995):*

Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians were persecuted on national, political and religious grounds throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thousands of them were interned in detention facilities where they were subjected to widespread acts of physical and psychological abuse and to inhumane conditions. Detention facility personnel who ran and operated the [...] detention facilities [...] intended to destroy Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat people as national, ethnic, or religious groups and killed, seriously injured and deliberately inflicted upon them conditions intended to bring about their physical destruction. [...] Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, between April 1992 and July 1995, in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by their acts and omissions, and in concert with others, committed a crime against humanity by persecuting Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians on national, political and religious grounds. As set forth below, they are criminally responsible for the unlawful confinement, murder, rape, sexual assault, torture, beating, robbery and inhumane treatment of civilians; the *targeting* of political leaders, intellectuals and professionals; the unlawful deportation and transfer of civilians; the unlawful *shelling* of civilians; the unlawful appropriation and plunder of real and personal property; the destruction of homes and businesses; and the destruction of places of worship.

www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/ind/en/kar-ii950724e.pdf [24 November 2012].

M 9 Historical Assessment of the Siege of Sarajevo, 2003

From the judgement in the ICTY trial of Stanislav Galic, siege commander of the Republika Srpska forces from 1992–94 (5 December 2003):

The siege of Sarajevo, as it came to be popularly known, was an episode of such *notoriety* in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that one must go back to World War II to find a parallel in European history. Not since then had a professional army conducted a campaign of unrelenting violence against the inhabitants of a European city so as to reduce them to a state of medieval deprivation in which they were in constant fear of death. In the period covered in this *indictment*, there was nowhere safe for a Sarajevan, not at home, at school, in a hospital, from deliberate attack.

http://sim.law.uu.nl/sim/caselaw/tribunalen.nsf/6c3f0d5286f9bf3cc12571b500329d62/31f622000d199e48c12571fe004be26e?OpenDocument [24 November 2012].

indictment: officially accusing sb. of committing serious crimes
to target: to attack
to shell: to attack with explosive weapons
notoriety: being famous for sth. extremely bad

M 8 Srebrenica

Women at the Potocari Memorial Centre in Srebrenica during the burial of 534 Bosnian Muslims on 11 July 2009. The burial was part of a memorial ceremony to mark the 14th anniversary of the worst atrocity of the war in Bosnia. More than 8,000 Muslim men and boys were murdered in the 1995 massacre by Bosnian Serb soldiers who overran the eastern town and the UN peacekeepers stationed there.

M 10 "A war of utter folly"

*Hans Blix (*1928) was the Swedish Foreign Minister in 1978-79 and the General Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency between 1981 and 1997. From 2000 to June 2003 he headed the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in charge of the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2002. No such weapons were found. Blix assessed the invasion of Iraq in "The Guardian", 20 March 2008:*

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a tragedy – for Iraq, for the US, for the UN, for truth and human dignity. I can only see one gain: the end of Saddam Hussein, a murderous tyrant. Had the war not finished him he would, in all likelihood, have become another Gadafy or Castro; an oppressor of his own people but no longer a threat to the world. Iraq was on its knees after a decade of sanctions.

The elimination of weapons of mass destruction was the declared main aim of the war. It is improbable that the governments of the alliance could have sold the war to their parliaments on any other grounds. That they believed in the weapons' existence in the autumn of 2002 is understandable. Why had the Iraqis stopped UN inspectors during the 90s if they had nothing to hide? Responsibility for the war must rest, though, on what those launching it knew by March 2003.

By then, Unmovic [United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission] inspectors had carried out some 700 inspections at 500 sites without finding prohibited weapons. The contract that George Bush held up before Congress to show that Iraq was purchasing uranium oxide was proved to be a *forgery*. The allied powers were on thin ice, but they preferred to replace question marks with exclamation marks.

They could not succeed in eliminating WMDs [Weapons of Mass Destruction] because they did not exist. Nor could they succeed in the declared aim to eliminate al-Qaida operators, because they were not in Iraq. They came later, attracted by the occupants. A third declared aim was to bring democracy to Iraq, hopefully becoming an example for the region. Let us hope for the future; but five years of occupation has clearly brought more anarchy than democracy.

Increased safety for Israel might have been an undeclared US aim. If so, it is hard to see that anything was gained by a war which has strengthened Iran.

There are other troubling *legacies* of the Iraq war. It is a setback in the world's efforts to develop legal restraints on the use of armed force between states. In 1945 the US helped to write into the UN charter a prohibition of the use of armed force against states. Exceptions were made only for self-defence against armed attacks and for armed force authorised by the security council. In 2003, Iraq was not a real or imminent threat to anybody. Instead, the invasion reflects a claim made in the 2002 US national security strategy that the charter was too restrictive, and that the US was ready to use armed force to meet threats that were uncertain as to time and place – a doctrine of preventive war.

In the 2004 presidential election campaign, Bush ridiculed any idea that the US would need to ask for a "permission slip" before taking military action against a "growing threat". True, the 2003 Iraq invasion is not the only case in which armed force has been used in disregard of the charter. However, from the most powerful member of the UN it is a dangerous signal. If preventive war is accepted for one, it is accepted for all.

One fear is that the UN rules ignored in the attack on Iraq will prove similarly insignificant in the case of Iran. But it may be that the spectacular failure of ensuring disarmament by force, and of introducing democracy by occupation, will work in favour of a greater use of diplomacy and "soft power". Justified concerns about North Korea and Iran have led the US, as well as China, Russia and European states, to examine what economic and other non-military *inducements* they may use to ensure that these two states do not *procure* nuclear weapons. Washington and Moscow must begin nuclear disarmament. So long as these nuclear states maintain that these weapons are indispensable to their security, it is not surprising that others may think they are useful. What, really, is the alternative: invasion and occupation, as in Iraq?

www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/mar/20/iraq.usa [24 November 2012].

forgery: sth. not authentic, fake
legacy: sth. left behind
inducement: sth. that persuades sb. to do sth.
to procure: to obtain

Source Material on Growing German Military Involvement

M 11 Resistance to Military Engagement

James D. Bindenagel, a former US career diplomat, assesses the German role in NATO, September 2010:

The German Federal Defense Force (Bundeswehr), the third largest NATO troop contingent in Afghanistan, functions in a peacebuilding, reconstruction, and stabilization role. The German public is deeply averse to the militarization of the Bundeswehr and its engagement in combat roles, except under specific, narrowly defined parameters mandated by parliament. Each Bundeswehr *deployment* depends on a case-by-case parliamentary decision, which is by nature political rather than military in character. In the case of Afghanistan, the mandate explicitly limits the German Bundeswehr to *nonkinetic* peacebuilding operations and force protection. German politicians have been slowly urging the German public to be more involved militarily and to accept a military-combat role in NATO operations. If the United States wants to count on Germany (and NATO) as an effective ally in the next 20 years, we need to empower German politicians to overcome public resistance – and French, British, and Russian resistance as well.

James D. Bindenagel, "Afghanistan The German Factor", Prism 1, Nr. 4, p. 96; also at www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1-4/Prism_95-112_Bindenagel.pdf [26 Nov 2012].

M 12 "The joke of history"

From a report by Deutsche Welle on German Military Engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo (28 December 2010):

The war next door

By the fall of 1994, the war in Yugoslavia had reached a boiling point as Serb forces began targeting NATO aircraft and UN peacekeepers. The NATO allies feared the worst and drew up plans to rescue the lightly armed peacekeepers in the event that the Serbs launched an all-out attack.

As NATO prepared for a showdown, Germany *dragged its feet*. Chancellor Helmut Kohl argued that since the Third Reich had occupied Yugoslavia, it would be historically inappropriate for Germany to intervene in the current conflict. [...]

And as the humanitarian situation worsened, NATO began to lose its patience with Bonn. The allies pressured Germany to send its Tornado warplanes into the Bosnian firestorm. The Tornados had a unique capability to locate and destroy Serb radar installations, which would help cover a possible UN withdrawal. Germany was the only European country that possessed such aircraft.

Ultimately, strategic realities trumped political rhetoric and the Kohl government assented to NATO's request. But Germany's deeply divided parliament still had to approve the decision.

"You can always argue about the sense of using military force, because you never know what the result will be. That's the risk," [Karl] Lamers [the former foreign policy spokesman for the Christian Democrats] said. "But when all the countries in the community that we belong to say it's necessary, we can't just say 'count me out.'"

Winning the home front

For the first time since World War II, a German government had decided to deploy its military to a war zone. Unwilling to shoulder the full political and moral responsibility for its historic decision, the Kohl government reached out to the opposition Social Democrats and Greens.

The Bosnian *quagmire* had thrown the Social Democratic Party into an uproar. The antiwar mainstream feared embarking down a slippery slope that could lead the country away from its peaceful foreign policy. But a more *hawkish* minority supported using force as a last resort to rescue the UN peacekeepers and stop the ethnic cleansing.

"In a 10-to-1 vote, the foreign and security policy experts supported the government's proposal," said Karsten Voigt, former foreign policy spokesman for the Social Democrats. "We knew that the party had a different opinion. There was considerable uproar. In the end, around 50 Social Democrats voted with the government in favor of the Bosnian mission and against their own party."

Green revolution

As Social Democrats inched closer to the Kohl government, the Greens were facing a crisis of conscience that threatened to tear their party in two. Traditionally, the Green Party advocated a pacifist foreign policy rooted in the peaceful resolution of conflicts through international institutions like the UN.

But the UN's failure to stop the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia led to an ideological revolution within certain quarters of the party. After Serb forces massacred thousands of Bosnian Muslims in the

town of Srebrenica, Green Party whip Joschka Fischer declared that force was justified to stop genocide.

"With the Balkan wars we realized for the first time that there are situations in which one has to intervene militarily," said Ludger Volmer, former president of the Green Party who went on to serve as the country's Deputy Foreign Minister. "That was a difficult learning process."

This learning process would end with the Bundestag sending Tornado warplanes as well as peacekeepers to Bosnia. Against the historical and political odds, Germany's divided parties had *forged* a shaky consensus in favor of military intervention.

Peaceniks in power

After serving 16 years in the opposition, the Social Democrats and Greens defeated the Kohl Government in the 1998 elections. No sooner had the left-of-center coalition come to power than renewed ethnic violence erupted in Yugoslavia.

While NATO peacekeepers secured the precarious peace in Bosnia, the breakaway province of Kosovo *careened* toward war as ethnic Albanians demanded independence from Serbia. Germany and its NATO allies pushed for a peaceful settlement. But negotiations collapsed when both sides refused to compromise on Kosovo's political status.

In anticipation of this worst-case scenario, the Kohl government had committed Germany to participate in a NATO air war against Serbia. Now, Social Democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Green Party Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer had to decide whether they would honor their predecessor's commitment. Air strikes hardly *squared* with the coalition's platform of a foreign policy rooted in peaceful conflict resolution.

Bombing Belgrade

When the Security Council *stalled* over Russian and Chinese objections, NATO decided to launch its air war without a UN mandate. The NATO allies accused Serbia of ethnic cleansing and argued that time was of the essence in order to save innocent lives.

Schroeder and Fischer faced a nightmare scenario: an allied military intervention without UN sanction.

"The new Schroeder-Fischer government agreed to participate for purely opportune reasons," said Hans-Ulrich Klose, a leading foreign policy expert and parliamentarian within the Social Democratic Party. "They knew that if they didn't participate, they would face foreign policy isolation from the outset. That's what I call the joke of history. The German position changed irrevocably because the government had no choice but to say yes."

With deep reservations, the former antiwar opposition ordered warplanes to bomb Belgrade in Germany's first overt military strike since World War II. The shaky foreign policy consensus *forged* during the Bosnian crisis had survived its trial-by-fire in Kosovo.

"Germany is not a military power and it doesn't want to become one," Volmer said. "You cannot help but recognize that there are some conflicts for which you have to arm yourself and that there may be situations in which you have to intervene militarily. But at its very core, Germany has a remote relationship to armed force. That's a lesson from the Second World War, from history."

www.dw.de/the-balkan-dilemma-germany-returns-to-military-action/a-6309598 [26 November 2012].

deployment: use (military term)
nonkinetic: not moving
to drag one's feet: to do sth. very slowly, not really wanting to do it
quagmire: a hopeless situation
hawk: hunting bird (here: metaphor for aggressive, warlike behaviour)
forged: (here) gained, reached
to careen: to move from side to side
to square: to agree with, to correspond with sth.
to stall: to delay, to slow down

Tasks

1. Evaluate the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo and their effect on popular opinion in Europe and world (text, M1, M2, M3, M7, M8, M9).
2. Explain the origins of either the war in Afghanistan (2001–2014) or Iraq II (2003–2011) (text, M4, M10). Report on your results to the class.
3. Assess the dilemma of German involvement in foreign affairs after 1990 (text, M5, M6, M11, M12).

Global Challenges

Emerging Economies: The BRICS States

Four emerging markets in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) were grouped together in 2001 for an economic analysis. These countries cover 25 % of the world's land mass, include 40 % of its population, and have the world's largest combined GDP (gross domestic product, "Bruttoinlandsprodukt") today. By 2050 their economies could outpace the world's richest countries. The four states are developing or newly industrialized countries with rapid economic growth; they exert strong influence on their neighbours. In 2009 the BRIC leaders met and have done so annually ever since. Although the goals of their political association are somewhat vague, they appear to be considering how to increase their collective influence on world affairs. In 2012 South Africa joined the group. Despite their similar economic interests, the countries have very different political systems. China retains its authoritarian communist system. Russia appears to be returning to authoritarian structures after a brief attempt to reform its political system. While Brazil, India, and South Africa are all democratic countries, the latter two face serious social and political problems stemming from their histories. A closer examination of India reveals the challenges one of these states must deal with at present.



M 1 Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948)
The leader of Indian independence at a spinning wheel. Photograph, early 20th century

India

The Republic of India was founded in August 1947, following a long struggle for independence led by Mahatma Gandhi, who pursued the strategy of non-violent civil disobedience. Ultimately Gandhi failed to achieve his goal of a united India when the British divided the colonial territory into two countries: largely Muslim Pakistan and largely Hindu India. Partition caused significant *upheaval*, with Hindus leaving their homes in what became Pakistan, while Muslims in India sought shelter in Pakistan. Some regions decided by referendum which country they would join. In 562 "princely states" the leaders made the decision. Thus the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had a 77 % Muslim population but a Hindu prince, joined India. Territorial disputes begun at this time continue to the present day.

Today India is the world's seventh largest country in land mass; with a population of more than 1.2 billion it is the world's most populous democracy and second most populous country. Religious culture in India is extraordinarily diverse – four world religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism) began here, while Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam arrived before the year 1000 A.D.

India's economy is the tenth largest when measured in nominal GDP, third largest in PPP (purchasing power parity, "Kaufkraftparität") and one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Indian experts are renowned leaders in the field of information technology; Indian call centres provide technical assistance to customers world-wide. However, poverty, illiteracy, corruption, malnutrition, child labour, and poor public healthcare are still considerable problems. Women have equality on paper, but are not completely accepted as equal citizens within the society as a whole. Violence against women is a frightening reality for many.

The Indian constitution of 1950 prohibits discrimination based on caste, and caste members can be given special treatment, called

M 2 Auto Industry in India
In 2009 a VW factory with over 2,500 jobs was built in Chakan. Photograph, March 2009

M 3



upheaval: violent change affecting people's lives

reservation in India, to improve their social mobility. The Dalits (once called "untouchables" in the caste system) face serious social barriers to their integration and advancement, so they are given preferential treatment in education and employment.

However, society and politics continue to be influenced by the remains of the caste system. Although India has modernized rapidly, not all sectors of society have kept pace with the changes.

Militarily, the country has the world's third largest standing army and ranks ninth in military spending. India has never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; it tested a nuclear device in 1974. As a result, by 1998 both India and Pakistan had nuclear weapons. India exercises considerable power in the region of South Asia; unresolved conflicts with its neighbours Pakistan and China are potential sources of global instability.

Climate and Environmental Issues

Since the late 19th century, average temperatures on Earth have been rising continuously and will continue to do so in future. The dangers of rising temperatures include the melting of the polar icecaps, the rise of sea levels, and changes in precipitation. Such dramatic climate change also threatens agriculture and food supplies. Scientists attribute global warming to human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation, which increase the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol set binding limits

to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; by 2011 the protocol was signed and ratified by 191 states. Although an original signer, the US has failed to ratify the protocol; Canada withdrew from the agreement in 2011. Because the US is the largest emitter of carbon dioxide, American unwillingness to commit the country to international limits has been widely criticized. As countries such as China continue to grow into industrial powerhouses, the problems of climate change will accelerate as well. An effort to deal with climate change in 2012 at the UN conference in Doha proved disappointing to many observers.

Presently, green energy sources are regarded as hopeful solutions. In Germany, solar and wind energy technologies have been subsidized to make them more accessible and practical than other energy sources. Following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, the German government has also determined that nuclear power will be phased out in future. However, it should be remembered that Fukushima was the result of "only" a natural disaster – a tsunami – which then caused the nuclear reactors to fail. Such natural disasters may be more of a threat to human life on the planet than we now realize.

Global Migration

In a world affected by global migration, changes are experienced by migrants as well as by citizens in the countries they move to.

M 4

Table of Migration Statistics (2010)

category	globally	Europe	the Americas
number of international migrants (est. 2010)	214 million	72.1 million; largest no. in: RUS (12.3 m) GER (10.8 m) UK (6.4 m)	57.5 million; largest no. in: US (42.8 m) CAN (7.2 m) Argentina (1.4 m)
% of population who are international migrants	3.1	8.7	6.1
% of migrants who are women	49	52.4	50.1
number of internally displaced persons (IDPs are people not living in their normal homes, but who have not crossed an internationally recognized border. These people are usually fleeing internal violence or war within their own countries.)	27.5 million	2.5 million; largest no. in: • Turkey (954,000 to 1.2 million) • Azerbaijan (ca. 593,000) • Georgia (ca. 258,000)	5.4 million; largest no. in: • Colombia (3.6 to 5.2 million) • Peru (150,000) • Mexico (120,000)
number of refugees	15.4 million	1.6 million; largest no. in: • GER (594,000) • UK (238,000) • F (201,000)	804,000; largest no. in: • US (265,000) • Venezuela (202,000) • CAN (166,000)
sums transferred by migrants (est. 2010)	325 billion USD*	115 billion USD	58.1 billion USD

** The amount of money sent informally is estimated to be much higher.*
This table has been compiled from statistics listed by the International Organization of Migration at the website http://www.iom.int/cms/home [16 Dec 2012].

Technology Changes the World

Technological innovation advanced exponentially after 1990, especially in communications. The Internet was first introduced for private use in the mid-1990s; today it is present everywhere. As computers have become smaller, shrinking to the pocket size of cell phones, they are now used for things which only science fiction authors imagined in earlier days. Letters have become Email, Email has become texting, and music is downloaded to MP-3 players at the click of a button. Social networks inform "friends" about daily personal decisions as well as earth-shaking events. Automated machines distribute cash,

M 5 "Old-Fashioned Media"
Cartoon by Mike Keefe, 2008

print out bank statements or confirm airline boarding cards. These developments were all unknown in 1990.

Technological changes have wide-ranging effects and transform society rapidly. Whether people are in their private homes, at the workplace, or in public, they are affected and influenced by new innovations. Privacy is threatened when every message and movement can be digitally tracked. In Germany and the EU, legal limits are placed on the information which can be collected and mined. German courts have assured citizens that their "informational freedom" is an essential part of their civil rights.

Innovation in technology can function as a challenge leading to societal progress or as a danger to individual freedom and social structures.

A Look Ahead

At the beginning of 2013 it is clear that change will continue to mark the course of events. Certainly, technological development will continue its rapid pace. The changes in international politics are more difficult to predict. Global terrorism has not been halted, even by extensive military intervention. Its destabilizing effects will continue to be felt for many years.

The leading role of the US in international diplomacy is in transition. If the US dominance in global politics has passed, it remains to be seen how other powers or international organizations will fill the diplomatic gap. Neither China, India, Japan nor Russia can assume global leadership responsibilities at present, nor can the UN or the EU. The world has become less stable since the Cold War ended, which is certainly not what was expected in the euphoria of 1990.

In addition, the financial crisis in the US and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe have led to alarming levels of unemployment, especially among younger workers. At the same time, globalized companies have been able to either lower wages or to out-source work to other countries. The loss of well-paid jobs together with the pension and insurance benefits they provided is disturbing.

European and American leaders are working diligently on solutions to these difficult problems. Their efforts show that international cooperation and mutual respect are more important than ever to ensure global peace.

The BRICS States

M 6 The Problem with BRICS: Merely an *Acronym*?

Harsh V. Pant, a teacher at King's College, London, considers the importance of the BRICS states in Daily News & Analysis India (15 July 2014):

[...] Representing around 40 per cent of the world's population and nearly a quarter of its economic output, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – the so-called BRICS countries – have not been shy about showing off their newfound global *heft*. BRICS does offer promise of *clout*. The economic profile of the BRICS, especially that of China, has continued to grow with suggestions that BRICS collectively could become bigger than the US by 2018 and by 2050 could even surpass the combined economies of G7 States. Yet, a major challenge for ongoing influence from the BRICS is China's dominance over the other four members. For all its promise, it has remained a *talk shop* aspiring for greatness.

The first formal summit meeting of the BRIC grouping was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009 with South Africa joining the group in December 2010, changing the nomenclature from BRIC to BRICS. The Yekaterinburg summit called for "a more democratic and just multipolar world order based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States." Since then the joint statements of the various BRICS summits have been repeatedly underscoring the need for a *realignment* of the post-World War II global order based on the *untrammelled* supremacy of the US. With the US under the Obama administration appearing preoccupied with internal troubles and the Eurozone *mired* in a debilitating economic crisis, a vacuum is increasingly being felt in the international system. This presents an ideal opportunity for the BRICS to finally emerge as major global players. Plans are underway for some joint projects.

The 2012 New Delhi summit resulted in a proposal to create a joint BRICS development bank that would finance investments in developing nations, and last year's summit in Durban led to conclusion of negotiations for setting up this bank. This year's summit will see the formal launch of this bank, which will be the first *bricks-and-mortar institution* to be set up by the BRICS grouping. Though it will initially be too small to rival the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund in terms of size and importance, it is aimed at challenging the extant global institutional fabric. The bank, to be controlled by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, is expected to start with capital of $50bn. This summit is also expected to set up a joint $100bn emergency *swap fund* for financial crises. But tensions continue to simmer beneath the *veneer* of rhetoric usually on display at annual BRICS summits. The structural disparity between China and the rest of the BRICS members remains the core issue. China's rise has been so fast and so spectacular that others are still trying to catch up. The dominance of China makes the very idea of a coordinated BRICS response to the changing global balance of power something of a non-starter. The Chinese economy is now not only the second largest in the world but also larger than the economies of all the BRICS together. The overweening presence of China makes the other members nervous, leading them *to hedge their bets* by investing in alternative alliances and partnerships even as China's rapid accretion of economic and political power adds to its own challenges that has made it difficult for it to make friends. Given the *leverage* that China enjoys in BRICS, it should not come as a surprise that Beijing has suggested that IBSA – the grouping of democracies, comprising India, Brazil and South Africa – be shut down in favour of BRICS.

[...] The growing fascination with BRICS is partly an offshoot of the discussion on the emerging so-called 'post-American' world, where many commentators argue that multipolarity is likely to be the norm. Yet while BRICS may have growing economies, it is not entirely clear if all this will translate into power at the global level. Their contribution to the global order remains tentative at best and problematic at worst. Even if the BRICS get their economic act together, the grouping will find it difficult to be able to turn that strength into a unified political force.

The dominance of China makes most of the goals articulated by the BRICS States wobbly. The point of this coalition was always to show that the balance of power is shifting to emerging countries, away from the West's historical dominance. But a multipolar world isn't the same as China just trying to tilt the balance of power toward itself. New Delhi has done well to resist strongly Chinese

attempts to contribute more than its share to the proposed BRICS bank, leading to greater control and influence of Beijing over its affairs. India insisted that the five nations invest equal capital – $10 billion each – to create a $50 billion corpus. The narrative surrounding the rise of BRICS is as exaggerated as that of the decline of the US. The tectonic plates of global politics are certainly shifting, but their movements are not yet predictable. As a result, BRICS will remain an artificial construct, merely an acronym coined by an investment banking analyst, for quite some time to come.

http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-the-problem-with-brics-2002076 [24 January 2015].

acronym: a pronounceable name made up of initial letters or parts of words, i.e. NATO
heft: weight, importance
clout: influence
a talk shop: a place where only discussion takes place, but no action
realignment: re-organization
untrammelled: unlimited, uncontrolled
mired: caught in an unpleasant situation
bricks-and-mortar institution: an institution operating from a real building, not just online
swap fund: a financial tool that allows stockowners to diversify their holdings without directly selling them
veneer: pretense, facade
to hedge one's bets: to avoid risk
leverage: influence

M 7



Tasks

1. Interpret the statistics and point out aspects you consider remarkable (M4).
2. Assess how you personally are affected by the new electronic media (text, M5).
3. Explain the significance of the BRICS states in global economic affairs (text, M6).
4. Evaluate the author's opinion of the future of the BRICS (M6).

Child Labour in India

M 8 **Child Working in Indian Cotton Field**
Photograph, 2010

M 9 **Child Labour in the Cotton Industry**

Australian Website Guidelines on Cotton Quality Controls (8 June 2012):

Do your favourite jeans tell the world brand is best? Or do they say comfort over couture?!
Whichever you prefer, the cotton used to make your favourite jeans is now under *scrutiny*. Yours may be made using cotton grown right here in Australia. But it's more likely to have been grown in a developing country like India[1].
The story of India's cotton industry is a dark one. It's highly labour intensive and a lot of children, particularly girls, are used to handle its production.
World Vision believes more than 400,000 children under 18 are employed in India's major cotton producing states. More than half these children are reportedly under the age of 14. Children from India's poorest areas, who may be forced to work for low wages to pay off a family debt, are particularly vulnerable. Exploiting children for their labour locks them into a life of poverty and abuse, and drives down adult wages.
Conditions of work
Children employed on Indian cotton seed farms are exposed to dreadful conditions. For example, farmers in the Gujarat region will often make no attempt to protect children from harmful pesticides. Many children work up to 14 hours a day, often in extreme temperatures, for little or no pay. Bound to the fields by debt, they risk threats or physical abuse if they try to leave. Physical intimidation and violence is reportedly common place. [...]
What can you do if you don't know if the product was ethically produced?
1. Ask the sales assistant the following questions:
- Do you know where these products were produced?
- Do you know what your company policy is on the use of child and forced labour?
- Who can I ask for more information about your company's *supply chains*?
2. Research a company's policies
- Go to their website.
- Find the section on supply chains or social responsibility and look for a statement or policy outlining the company's commitment to respecting human rights or for transparent reporting on how they are cleaning up their supply chains.
- If you can't find the information, go to their contact us page and call or email the company and ask them how they ensure forced and child labour is not used in their supply chains. [...]
Remember, when consumers talk, businesses listen!

1 Approximately 70 countries in the world grow cotton. In 2010, developing countries such as China and India accounted for a 51 percent share of end use cotton consumption.

www.worldvision.com.au/news/actionnews/viewArticle_enh.asp?articleID=315 [Jan 2013].

scrutiny: careful examination
supply chains: stages of production from the farm to the store

M 10 The Lima Climate Change Conference: A *Skirmish* Before the Real Battle

From an editorial in The Guardian (14 December 2014):

Another round in the UN climate change negotiations ended in Lima early on Sunday morning. It took a fortnight and two extra days of intense negotiation to achieve one small step towards the outline of an agreement for next year's all-important Paris talks. That is where, if catastrophic global warming is to be averted, a new generation of emissions targets must be agreed.

The Peru gathering was the 20th meeting of the parties to the UN climate change convention, or Cop 20 in the UN's tiresomely *obfuscating* language. Its ambition was deceptively modest: to start to pick a route through the jungle of conflicting interests towards perhaps the most *intractable* problem of global climate equity, a transparent system of measuring emissions. It followed a now familiar *trajectory*: optimism, then stalemate, then overrun and at the end a frantic last-minute scramble before, finally, a deal. The relief on the faces of the delegates indicated how close they had come to complete failure. If they are to succeed in a year's time, there must be a revival of the old sense of urgency that delivered the flawed but ground-breaking Kyoto treaty in 1997. [...]

In the context of the complexity of negotiations involving more than 190 countries, the relatively easy bit was *boosting* the value of the adaptation fund for small island states facing existential threat from rising sea levels and extreme weather events. Less successful was the attempt to prepare the ground for some kind of continuing "climate aid" levy on rich countries. [...] But the biggest, most difficult and ultimately most important challenge is devising an acceptable, transparent route to measuring emissions, in order to facilitate some kind of global monitoring of targets. And that remains a work in progress.

These negotiations will only get more demanding in the coming year. Europe and the US continue to wrestle with troubled economies, reluctant to risk recovery by increasing costs for business and industry, or to burden consumers by demanding more for adaptation. The fall in the price of oil removes one big incentive for the developed world to invest in renewables and greater energy efficiency.

Yet, in its latest synthesis of climate change science, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change found the evidence of human influence on the climate system is clear and that warming is increasingly likely to be irreversible. It is not too late to make a difference, but this is no time to lose heart.

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/14/guardian-view-lima-climate-change-conference-cop-20-skirmish1 [24 January 2015].

skirmish: minor battle
to obfuscate: to confuse, complicate
intractable: very difficult, if not impossible to deal with
trajectory: course, path
to boost: to improve

Tasks

1. Assess the social and economic issues raised by child labour in cotton production in India (M9).
2. Research a brand of clothing you are familiar with regarding the company's policies on child labour. Report on your results in class (M9).
3. Explain why international agreements on climate change are controversial (text, M10, Internet).
4. What environmental problem do you consider the most necessary to solve today? Give reasons for your choice.

Sources on Migration

M 11 Immigration: Threat or Opportunity?

Hasnain Kazim is the son of Indian and Pakistani parents, born and raised in Germany, and an Asian correspondent for SPIEGEL in Pakistan. He writes in "Spiegel Online" (7 July 2011):

Dear Germany,

[...] An Indian software engineer with two job offers recently asked me which one he should choose. One was from an American computer maker and the other was from a German software company.

"I would have to move to the United States for the one job and to Germany for the other. What should I do?"

What Should I Tell the Indian?

I like you, Germany, and I really wish you didn't have these problems. But to be perfectly honest, I'm not sure what advice I would give my Indian acquaintance.

Your language, which I value, is extremely difficult to learn, and most of the world's highly qualified individuals can easily get started with their level of English proficiency in the United States, Canada, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand and Scandinavia – almost anywhere in the world, in fact. But not in Germany. Your food – well, for most people in the world it takes some getting used to. And your climate is a real drawback. Don't get me started on your bureaucracy. And do you really believe that your social system, which you're so proud of, can tempt any highly qualified worker?

So, let me ask you *bluntly*: What exactly do you have to offer the Asian programmer, the African doctor or the engineer from South America? Where is your Little Italy, your Chinatown, your Indian neighborhood? Sure, you have Turkish neighborhoods, like the ones in Berlin, but all you do is complain about them.

Are you actually aware of the fact that as a country, you have to recruit highly qualified immigrants, just as a company recruits good employees? That you have to compete for the best minds in an international competition? That your name and reputation aren't enough, and that you have to put something on the table instead? That you need a truly welcoming culture and should allow diversity in all respects?

Instead, you discuss ways to reduce barriers to immigration, as if you were the center of the universe, to which all people were attracted by virtue of some force of nature. As if it were entirely up to you to open the *sluice* gates just far enough to allow the right amount of talent to flow in. As I mentioned, you're really wonderful, but you're behaving like one of those men who thinks he's the greatest guy in the world, who believes he can have his pick of women. With that self-image I'm afraid you'll wind up alone with your problems, because you don't even notice that no one in the world – except you, of course – thinks you're irresistible.

So you want something from immigrants!

For decades you've treated immigration as a threat. In doing so you paved the way for downright paranoid discussions [...] and for a hostile atmosphere. And now you think you can just stand there, shout "Skilled Workers!" and suddenly they'll come running? Lowering the hurdles for immigration must make you feel incredibly generous and gracious. Your government, after all, is talking to representatives of industry and trade unions. But the minimum salary for highly qualified workers from non-EU countries to achieve, if they want the right of permanent residency, stands at € 66,000 ($ 94,500). Is that supposed to be a joke? What German worker makes that much money at the beginning of his career?

You indicate that you intend to lower this minimum, recognize foreign degrees and make it easier for people with professions you urgently need to come to your shores. For example, the so-called rule of preference for engineers and doctors was recently eliminated, which means that employers are no longer required to search for German job candidates first.

Let me tell you something: It isn't enough. Don't forget that it's people you want to attract, not economic factors. People with their own desires and dreams, cultures and mentalities. They'll certainly work on themselves to please you, but not at any price. They will retain their *idiosyncrasies*, and they'll want to nurture their language and culture. You should see this as an enrichment, not a threat. Make these people a part of you; don't treat them like guests. After all, just as they want

bluntly: speaking very directly
sluice: a passage where water flows along
idiosyncrasy: an unusual attitude or behaviour

something from you, you ultimately want something from them.
Otherwise they'll go to other countries that grant them this freedom, places where they have an easier time and where they are welcomed unconditionally.

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan, www.spiegel.de/international/germany/opinion-dear-germany-what-canyou-offer-your-immigrants-a-772940.html [14 December 2012].

M 12 "Common *Misperceptions* about the Nature of Migration"

From a speech by William Lacy Swing, Director General of the International Organization for Migration, IPS (Inter Press Service) Seminar on Migration and Communication in Helsinki (13 October 2011):

1. Myth: Most migration is across international borders.
Reality: By far the largest numbers of migrants move within the borders of their own countries. According to the most reliable estimates, there are some 214 [million] international migrants around the world today. There are at least three times as many internal migrants; a majority of who have left rural areas for seek a new life in the cities. [...]
2. Myth: Migration is overwhelmingly a flow of people from developing countries and towards developed countries.
Reality: Contemporary migratory movements reflect the complex patterns of social and economic globalization; they flow in all directions and affect all countries in one way or another. [...] [E]xisting figures highlight the importance of intra-regional movement: in 2010, "there were almost as many migrants from developing countries living in other developing countries [73 million] as migrants from developing countries living in developed countries [74 million]" [UNGA, 2010]. [...]
3. Myth: The number of international migrants is spinning out of control.
Reality: The number of international migrants has grown steadily since the end of the Second World War. [...] However this increase must be kept in perspective. In percentage terms, the global international migrant population has stayed consistently at around 3% of the total global population. [...]
4. Myth: Migration places a burden on the economy of countries of destination.
There [...] is an increasingly solid base of evidence supporting the view that migrants make significant and positive contributions to the economies of their countries of destination. [...]
5. Myth: Migration is a *drain on* the resources of countries of origin.
Reality: Migration is the original and oldest poverty reduction strategy known to humankind. It is a time proven strategy for individual – and in many cases community – poverty *alleviation* and development.
Migration and the *remittances* it generates often comprise the determining factor in whether there will be food on the table, medicines for health care, and education for boys and girls.
Officially recorded remittance flows to developing countries in 2010 stood at $325 billion in 2010 and expected to reach $404 billion by 2013 [World Bank 23 May 2011]. That's twice the amount of foreign aid and equal to all foreign direct investment. [...] Money sent home is an important source of poverty alleviation, currency stabilization, and can help unlock human potential.
Likewise, ensuring migrants' rights is essential in the fight against poverty in today's inter-connected and mobile world. Through the trade and investment networks they establish, and the skills and innovative ideas they transfer back to their home countries, migrants provide a critical complement to the human capital already present in the LDCs [less developed countries].

www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/speeches/speech-listing/ips-seminar-on-migration-and-communicati.html [17 Dec 2012].

misperception: misunderstanding
drain on: take away from
alleviation: reduction
remittance: money sent in payment for sth.

Tasks

1. Assess the author's arguments. Write a reply to his letter (M11).
2. Draw a mind-map illustrating the author's "myths" and the facts which disprove them (M12).
3. Evaluate the significance of migration for the future integration of Europe (text, M11, M12).

Conclusion

Germany's role in European and global politics was transformed by national unification in 1990. The changed status of Germany was viewed with euphoria in many countries, but it also renewed old fears of German power in other quarters. How German society and its leaders reacted to the sweeping changes which were necessary to achieve inner unification of the country is a major focus of this book.

However, other entirely unexpected events influenced global and European diplomatic affairs dramatically. German developments were also affected and must be seen against the background provided by these events. First, the Soviet Union rapidly broke apart, then Eastern Europe and what had been the Soviet bloc. Second, the United States was shaken by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001. American efforts to combat terrorism militarily led to lengthy occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. The US financial struggles since 2008 created a global impression of American frailty.

European integration moved quickly in the period under study. The EU moved from twelve member states in 1990 to twenty-eight in 2013. Integrating all the member states requires enormous efforts. Politically, progress has been made; but much more is still necessary. Financially, Franco-German cooperation is essential in the search for solutions to the European sovereign debt crisis. Some countries facing harsh economic restrictions have turned to expressing offensive attitudes to German leaders and policies. These insults dampen efforts for European cooperation.

Germany could not avoid these global difficulties. Geographically, the country is caught between the two poles of Russia and the growing European Union. The expansion of the EU and of NATO to the borders of Russia creates difficulties for German-Russian relations. In addition, NATO responsibilities in global confrontations create difficulties for German civil society and its insistence on avoiding war and military conflict since 1945. Germany's engagement in such conflicts now and in future puts pressure on German society and its leaders.

Further global challenges are seen in the rise of the BRICS states, which may soon outpace the existing economic world order. Problems caused by migration, climate change, and environmental pollution demand immediate attention as well. The ways in which these challenges are met will determine the future of the planet and our lives on it.

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Timeline

2 August 1990	Iraq invades Kuwait
3 October 1990	Declaration of German unity
November 1990	German-Polish Border Treaty is negotiated
January – February 1991	US-led UN coalition drives Iraqi forces out of Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm)
August 1991	Attempted coup d'état in Moscow fails
21 December 1991	Alma-Ata Protocol signed by leaders of Soviet republics, replacing the USSR with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
25 December 1991	Mikhail Gorbachev resigns as president of the USSR, replaced by Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia
7 February 1992	Maastricht Treaty (formally, the Treaty on European Union) begins the process of political integration in the EU
July 1992	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) between NATO and Warsaw Pact goes into effect
1992–1995	War in Bosnia
1 January 1995	Finland, Austria, and Sweden join the EU
July 1995	Srebrenica massacre
1998 – 1999	War in Kosovo
October 1998	Gerhard Schroeder (SPD) becomes German Chancellor, Joschka Fischer (Greens) is Foreign Minister
12 March 1999	Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic join NATO
31 December 1999	Boris Yeltsin resigns as president of Russia, appoints Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as his successor
11 September 2001	Terrorist attacks on New York World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington; US President George W. Bush declares a "war on terror"
October 2001	US, together with coalition partners, invades Afghanistan
20 March 2003	US and Britain, together with a "coalition of the willing", invade Iraq in search for weapons of mass destruction
29 March 2004	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania join NATO
1 May 2004	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Cyprus join the EU
May / June 2005	The EU Constitution is rejected in plebiscites in France and the Netherlands – ratification fails; negotiations with Turkey on EU membership begin
October 2005	negotiations with Croatia on EU membership begin
22 November 2005	Angela Merkel (CDU) is elected German Chancellor, Franz Muentefering (SPD) is Vice-chancellor
1 January 2007	Bulgaria and Romania join the EU
2008 – 2013	US financial crisis sets off a European sovereign debt crisis
20 January 2009	Barack Obama sworn in as US President
1 April 2009	Albania and Croatia join NATO
27 September 2009	Angela Merkel (CDU) is re-elected German Chancellor, Guido Westerwelle (FDP) is Vice-chancellor
1 December 2009	Treaty of Lisbon becomes effective (reforms the EU and amends earlier treaties)
December 2010	Mass protests, revolts, and wars begin the "Arab spring"
15 March 2011	Civilian protests in Syria, followed by civil war
18 December 2011	US withdrawal from Iraq
20 January 2013	US President Obama sworn in for second term of office

A Compendium of Historical Methods

History relies not only on facts, but even more on the analysis of relevant materials. Most important are sources, those remains that inform us about the past. Written documents, pictures, and objects make up different categories of sources. In addition, students of history have to be able to read historical maps and evaluate statistics correctly.

Working with Written Documents

Primary sources are centrally important in historical research. They can be notes, diaries, or memoirs, as well as literary works, speeches, or political programmes and were written when the events under study occurred. Because these documents are so different, historians have to adapt their questions and procedures to the document under study. However, there are some basic rules of analysis which are relevant for all these sources.

Secondary sources, such as historical accounts or textbooks, sum up the results found in the primary sources and present them to the interested public. Older secondary works can become primary sources themselves when, for example, historians want to know how people, events, or developments were interpreted in earlier times.

The scheme offered here can also be used to interpret such secondary sources, as the source type and its intended audience have already been identified.

Procedure and questions for interpreting written documents

1. Read the text and understand its content	- What kind of document is it? - What is the subject? - What do unknown terms mean? - What is the central statement? ...
2. Establish the origins and background of the text	- When was it written? - Who wrote it? - How was it passed on to us? - Was the text shortened or revised? - Are there other comparable sources? ...
3. Explain the context of the text and what it refers to historically	- In what situation did the document play a role? - Whom did the document address? - What effect did it have? - What allusions can be found to the historical situation? ...
4. Interpret the text in summary	- How important was the source in the situation? - How important is the source for our knowledge of the situation? - Is the source supported by other sources? ...

Working with Pictures and Objects

It took a while for pictures to interest historians, but in more recent times they have become increasingly important. In the 20th century photography played an eminent role, but pictorial documents include prehistoric cave paintings as well as 3D simulations, paintings, posters, caricatures and even comics. In film photographs – so-called stills – the transition is relative. The procedure and questions below must be adapted according to the type of picture being analysed.

In principle the same procedure also applies to objects, which come in even more variations than pictures. An object can be a bone found at a site or even a historical monument. In the case of a monument, a written and pictorial source may also be included as part of it. Of course, its location must also be taken into account.

Procedure and questions for interpreting pictures

1. Take in the picture and describe your first impression	- What is the mood of the picture? - What do you notice first? - What attracts your interest? - What confuses you? ...
2. Establish the origins and the background of the picture	- When and how was the picture made? - How large is it? - Are you looking at the original, a copy, or a detail of it? - How was it passed on to us? - Are there comparable pictures? ...
3. Describe the elements of the picture	- What in particular is shown? - How is it portrayed? - What can be seen where in the picture? ...
4. Decode the elements of the picture	- Who are the figures (if present) portrayed? - What do the colours suggest? - What does the structure of the picture suggest? ...
5. Explain the context of the picture and what it refers to historically	- What was the situation in which the picture played a role? - Whom did the picture address? - What effect did it have? - What allusions can be found to the historical situation? ...
6. Interpret the picture in summary	- How important was the picture in the situation? - How important is the picture for our knowledge of the situation? - Is the picture supported by other sources? ...

Working with Maps

Just like other types of sources, maps can be separated into primary and secondary sources. Historic maps, which were made in earlier times, are primary sources and reveal what people at the time knew or thought about their surroundings. Historical maps are secondary sources. They show results that researchers have determined in cartographic form. In addition to providing geographic orientation, historical maps can provide a wealth of information, such as events, territorial changes or trade relations. Interpreted correctly, these maps offer valuable insight on times past. Historical maps can themselves become historic. For example, wall maps made before the unification of Germany reflect the division of the country and the Cold War.

Procedure and questions for interpreting maps

1. Look at the map carefully and get your bearings	- What is the subject of the map? - Which map excerpt has been chosen? - What is the scale of the map? - What is in the legend? ...
2. Establish the origins and the background of the map	- When was the map made? - Who made it? - How was it passed on? - Are there other comparable sources? ...
3. Determine the content of the map	- What sort of map is it (economic, political, etc.)? - What period of time does it refer to? - Is it a static map, showing a state of affairs, or a dynamic map, showing a development? - Which regions are shown? ...
4. Consider the map critically	- Does the use of colour have a specific effect? - If a different excerpt is chosen, does it change the impression created? - How is the title or heading formulated? ...
5. Interpret the map in a summary	- How important was the map in the situation? - How important is the map for our knowledge of the historical situation? ...

Working with Statistics

Columns of figures, bills, and balance sheets have been passed down to posterity for centuries, so they can also be considered written sources. The systematic collection, preparation, and interpretation of data are achievements of the "statistical age" which began in the 19th century. Statistics from earlier times are mostly based on estimates. Older statistics can certainly be seen as sources, while more recent statistics on historical developments have usually been compiled from contemporary data. Various forms of presentation are possible, from tables to graphs and complex diagrams.

The procedure and questions used in interpreting statistics are given below. However, these must be adapted to the specific type of statistics under study.

Procedure and questions for interpreting statistics

1. **Look at the statistics carefully and determine their principles**
   - What is the subject of the statistics?
   - Which form of presentation has been chosen?
   - What data are the statistics based on?
   - What do the terms used in the statistics mean?
   - ...
2. **Establish the origins and background of the statistics**
   - When were the statistics made?
   - Who made them?
   - How were they passed on to us?
   - Are there comparable statistics available?
   - ...
3. **Determine the content of the statistics**
   - What period of time do the statistics refer to?
   - Which data are shown and which are put in relation to each other?
   - Which units of measurement are used?
   - ...
4. **Consider the statistics critically**
   - Is the sample size sufficient?
   - Are the values valid?
   - Are important aspects missing?
   - Is the chosen time period convincing?
   - Is the graphic presentation acceptable?
   - ...
5. **Interpret the statistics in summary**
   - How important were the statistics in the situation?
   - How important are the statistics for our knowledge of the situation?
   - Are the findings of the statistics supported by other sources?
   - ...

War and peace

to be responsible for the outbreak of the war
to set off / trigger a war
to enter / join the war
to declare war
to win / lose a battle / war
to occupy / take control of / invade / annex / conquer a country / territory
to mobilize / demobilize troops / an army
to demand / pay reparations
to establish peace / to stabilize a country
to prevent a military conflict
to conquer territory
to expand a sphere of influence
to invade a country
to support the war effort
to surrender unconditionally / to demand unconditional surrender
on the brink of war
to set up/to station / to install missiles/weapons
to launch a missile/rocket/nuclear strike
to supply sb. with weapons
to withdraw (troops) from
to pay / negotiate / reduce reparations
to make / default on reparations payments
to comply with conditions of a treaty
to fight a proxy war
to use military force / to resort to coercion
to advance / withdraw an army / soldiers
to occupy a zone

Diplomacy

to send / serve as an ambassador / an envoy
to have / break off diplomatic relations with a country
to achieve a diplomatic triumph
to guarantee neutrality
to negotiate / sign an agreement / a pact / a treaty
to stir up /settle a dispute over
to cause / create rising tensions
to issue / deliver an ultimatum
to sign / negotiate an armistice / a peace treaty
to proclaim a republic
to ratify / revise a treaty
to order / announce a plebiscite
to establish an international order
to appease / pacify / stand up to a dictator
to pose a threat to sb.
to confront sb.
sphere of influence
to be dependent on
to be politically linked to
to reassure sb.
to blockade a country
to lift a blockade
to put up an embargo
to pursue a policy of rapprochement / aggression

Economy

to invest money / to go bankrupt
to increase production
to open new markets
to be employed / unemployed / a skilled / unskilled worker
to enjoy economic benefits
to suffer from food shortages
to benefit from measures
to battle / decrease unemployment
to provide work / create jobs
to increase sb.'s living standard
to introduce a new currency / currency reform
to barter / exchange goods
to draw / receive a pension / salary
to institute austerity measures
to raise taxes / to cut benefits / expenses
to restrict trade / the exchange of goods

Human rights and crimes against humanity

to demand / to guarantee civil rights / human rights
to fight for your rights
to ask for / demand the right to work / freedom of speech / of assembly /
of political union / of religion / of the press / of property /
to support / demand / grant universal / women's suffrage
to extend voting rights to ...
to violate civil rights
to restrict / allow political activities
to censor the press
to relax / remove press censorship
to persecute sb. / a minority / to mark social outcasts
to discriminate against sb.
to become a victim of persecution
to exclude sb. from society
to isolate a group in ghettos
to exterminate sb.
to sentence to death
to be sent into exile

to formulate basic rights and obligations
to abuse / mistreat / torture civilians / soldiers / prisoners of war
to resettle displaced persons
to commit genocide

Law and constitution

to pass / enact / initiate / oppose a law
to obey / break / abolish a law / act
to write / ratify a constitution
to open / dissolve a national assembly
to send a deputy / representative to parliament
to have a free / imperative mandate
to approve / reject the budget
to call for (new) elections
to appoint sb. chancellor / to elect sb. to parliament
to gain the right
to entrust an office / an official with powers
to appoint / dismiss a government / judges / officials
to determine the direction of policy
to hold a referendum / plebiscite / initiative
to take / suspend a measure
to rescind an edict
to pass a vote / a constructive vote of no confidence
to rule by decree / by parliamentary majority

Domestic policy

to introduce an act / a law
to eliminate opponents
to ban political parties
to transform democracy into a dictatorship
to execute control over sb.
to indoctrinate sb.
to distribute leaflets
to resist sb.
to overthrow a regime
to participate in a plot
to assassinate a dictator
to encourage plebiscitary participation
to call for / begin a general strike
to enact reforms

Environmental policy

to pollute / to conserve the environment
to exploit natural resources / exploitation
to deal with / improve climate change / global warming
to contend with extreme weather conditions / flooding / drought
to melt the polar ice caps
to curb carbon emissions / greenhouse gas emissions (measured in CO_2-equivalent)
a carbon footprint
to cut emissions / to trade emissions / to start a cap-and-trade policy

abortion: Abtreibung
Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS): fliegendes Radarsystem
airlift: Lüftbrücke
Allied Control Council: Alliierter Kontrollrat
annexation: Annektierung, „Anschluss"
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty): Vertrag zur Begrenzung von Raketenabwehrsystemen
Arab Spring: Arabischer Frühling
armistice: Waffenstillstand

Basic Law: Grundgesetz
Basic Treaty: Grundlagenvertrag, Grundvertrag
Berlin Wall: Berliner Mauer

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Geheimdienst der USA
Christian Democratic Union (CDU): Christlich Demokratische Union
Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU): Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern
Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance): Rat für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (RGW)
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten (GUS)
Communist Party of Germany (KPD): Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands
comprehensive school: Gesamtschule
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE)
constitution: Verfassung
coordination: Gleichschaltung
Council of Foreign Ministers: Rat der Außenminister
Council of People's Deputies: Rat der Volksbeauftragten
Council of the European Union: Rat der Europäischen Union
Court of Justice of the European Union: Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union
"cross front": „Querfront"
currency reform: Währungsreform

"Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State" (Reichstag Fire Decree): „Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat" (Reichstagsbrandverordnung)
"degenerate art": „entartete Kunst"
Department of Homeland Security: Ministerium für Innere Sicherheit der Vereinigten Staaten, auch Heimatschutzministerium
double wage earners: Doppelverdiener

Emergency Act (1968): Notstandsgesetze
emergency decree: Notverordnung
Enabling Act: Ermächtigungsgesetz
"ethnic cleansing": „ethnische Säuberung"
European Advisory Commission (EAC): Europäische Beratende Kommission
European Central Bank (ECB): Europäische Zentralbank (EZB)
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC): Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (EGKS), Montanunion
European Commission: Europäische Kommission, EU-Kommission
European Community (EC): Europäische Gemeinschaft (EG)
European Council: Europäischer Rat
European Defense Community (EDC): Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft (EVG)
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
European Economic Community (EEC), Common Market: Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG)
European Parliament: Europäisches Parlament
European Recovery Program: Europäisches Wiederaufbau-Programm
European Stability Mechanism (ESM): Europäischer Stabilitätsmechanismus
European Union (EU): Europäische Union (EU)
Executive Council: Völkerbundsrat
extra-parliamentary opposition: Außerparlamentarische Opposition (APO)

Federal Attorney General: Generalbundesanwalt
Federal Chancellor: Bundeskanzler
Federal Constitutional Court: Bundesverfassungsgericht
Federal Election Law: Bundeswahlgesetz
Federal President: Bundespräsident
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG): Bundesrepublik Deutschland
federal states: Länder
First General Convention of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils: Erster Allgemeiner Kongress der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte
"First Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law": „Erste Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz"
Four Powers Agreement: Viermächteabkommen
Free Democratic Party (FDP): Freie Demokratische Partei
Free Corps: Freikorps

Gauck office: Gauck-Behörde
Geneva Accords: Genfer Abkommen
German army: Reichswehr, Wehrmacht, Bundeswehr
German Democratic Republic (GDR): Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR)
German Employers' Association: Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA)
"German Labour Front": „Deutsche Arbeitsfront" (DAF)
German parliament: Reichstag, Bundestag
"German Secret State Police": „Geheime Staatspolizei"
German-French Friendship Treaty: Deutsch-französischer Freundschaftsvertrag (Èlysée-Vertrag)
Grand Coalition: Große Koalition
guest worker: Gastarbeiter

Hitler-Stalin Pact (German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact): Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt
Hun Speech: Hunnenrede

Imperial Council: Reichsrat
Imperial court: Reichsgericht
Independent Social Democrats (USPD): Unabhängige Sozialdemokraten (USPD)
initiative: Volksbegehren
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF): nukleare Mittelstreckenraketen

International Military Tribunal: Internationaler Militärgerichtshof
International Monetary Fund (IMF): Internationaler Währungsfonds (IWF)

Kreisau Circle: Kreisauer Kreis

"Law for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased Offspring": „Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses"
"Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour": „Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre"
"Law for the Protection of the Hereditary Health of the German People": „Gesetz zum Schutze der Erbgesundheit des deutschen Volkes"
"Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service": „Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums"
"Law to Remedy the Distress of People and Reich" (Enabling Act): „Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich" (Ermächtigungsgesetz)
"leadership principle": „Führerprinzip"
League of Nations: Völkerbund
Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD): Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands
"living space": „Lebensraum"
London Documents (Frankfurt Documents): Frankfurter Dokumente

Maastricht Treaty, Treaty on the European Union: Vertrag von Maastricht, Vertrag über die Europäische Union
Majority Social Democrats (MSPD): Mehrheitssozialdemokraten (MSPD)
Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MVP)
Ministry for State Security: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS, Stasi)
Munich Agreement: Münchner Abkommen

National Committee for a Free Germany: Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland
National Defense Council: Nationaler Verteidigungsrat
NATO dual-track decision: Nato-Doppelbeschluss
"Night of Broken Glass": „Reichskristallnacht", Novemberpogrom
"Night of the Long Knives": „Röhmputsch"
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Nordatlantik-Pakt (Nato)
nuclear reactor: Atomkraftwerk (AKW)
Nuremberg Laws: Nürnberger Rassengesetze

Operation Valkyrie: Operation Walküre
Palatinate: Pfalz
Parliamentary Council: Parlamentarischer Rat
People's Chamber: Volkskammer
"people's community": „Volksgemeinschaft"
People's Congress: Volkskongress
"People's judges": „Volksrichter"
People's Republic: Volksrepublik
People's teachers: Volkslehrer, Neulehrer
permanent representative: ständiger Vertreter
plebiscite: Volkabstimmung
policy of fulfillment: Erfüllungspolitik
policy of strength: Politik der Stärke
popular sovereignty: Volkssouveränität
presidential governments: Präsidialregierungen, Präsidialkabinette
proportional representation: Verhältniswahl
"Protection Squadron": „Schutzstaffel" (SS)

rapprochement: Annäherung
Red Army Faction: Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF)
Red Orchestra: Rote Kapelle
referendum: Volksentscheid
"Reich Citizenship Law": „Reichsbürgergesetz"
"Reichstag Fire Decree": „Reichstagsbrandverordnung"

Scramble for Africa: Wettlauf um Afrika
"seizure of power": „Machtergreifung"
separation of powers: Gewaltenteilung
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD): Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
Socialist Unity Party (SED): Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
sole representative of all of Germany: Alleinvertretungsanspruch
solidarity pact: Solidaritätspakt
sovereign debt: Staatsverschuldung
Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB): sowjetischer In- und Auslandsgeheimdienst (KGB)
soviet republic: Räterepublik
"stab in the back" myth: „Dolchstoß"-Legende
State Council: Staatsrat
state prosecutor: Staatsanwalt
state-owned business: Volkseigener Betrieb (VEB)
"storm troopers", "brownshirts": „Sturmabteilung" (SA)
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT): Gespräche über die Begrenzung von strategischen Waffen
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI): Strategische Verteidigungsinitiative
Supreme Command: Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL)

trade organisation: Handelsorganisation (HO)
Traffic Treaty: Transitabkommen
Transportation Security Administration: Transportsicherheitsbehörde
Treaty of Lisbon: Vertrag von Lissabon
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa (KSE)
Turnaround: Wende

unconditional surrender: bedingungslose Kapitulation

vote of no confidence: Mißtrauensvotum

war of attrition: Stellungskrieg
war of extermination: Vernichtungskrieg
White Rose: Weiße Rose
Wolf's Lair: Wolfsschanze
workers' and soldiers' councils: Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte
workers' committee: Betriebsrat

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